Unity or Multiplicity, Husserl, para 22, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

by Corry Shores
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Unity or Multiplicity

Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

I "On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between 'Fresh' Memory and 'Full' Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time"

No. 1 "How Does the Unity of a Process of Change that Continues for an Extended Period of Time Come to Be Represented?

Intuition and Re-presentation"

Paragraph 22

We have been discussing the flow of intuition that we undergo when intuiting an object. For example, our gaze wonders around an inkwell. At first we have just partial intuitions of the inkwell’s parts. After we see enough of it, we recognize the inkwell and then our stream of intuition intuits it as a whole. Despite that, whenever we intuit the inkwell, we always do so with some particular part being more in focus than the others.

Husserl writes that no matter what perspective we take, we still recognize the same object. Our roving focus only modifies the intuition we have of it, but does not change it to an intuition of a different unity.

Whatever subjective “standpoint” we may assume, recognizing always occurs; and no matter how we vary the standpoint, we find nothing absolute new but only something made distinct – specifically, something made distinct within fixed boundaries. With the exception of the making-distinct of the relevant part, the total impression certainly undergoes no fundamental change of the kind that would lead to something new. (152-153)

So when we are looking at just one object, each of its parts hints at the other ones that make up total unity. We are always then “able to analyze truth from the total impression the various parts that point ahead to and intend the corresponding distinct parts.” Each partial intuition of the object’s parts represents the whole in this way. But the other parts are not evident during that partial intuition. So the partial intuition represents the whole object but not in its full presence. Hence Husserl calls them nonpresentative representations. They give us an intuition of the whole, but in a deficient way, which causes us to satisfy it by seeking-out more partial intuitions and unifying them all into one whole flowing intuition of the entire object. When the partial intuitions flow into the intention of the whole object, then we recognize it. By this means, we identify the object.

Whatever standpoint we assume, by maintaining the same external circumstances of seeing we are able to analyze out from the total impression the various parts that point ahead to and intend the corresponding distinct parts. Thus fulfillment of the intention takes place step by step – and with it identification – only so far as the intending representation flows into union with the intended intuition. Identification therefore takes place step by step, for identification indeed signifies nothing other than the experience of recognition when an intending representation flows over into its intended intuition. (153b)

[Say we ride a train into a tunnel. There is graffiti stretching down the whole wall. We have never been in this tunnel before. Each new part of the graffiti appears to us as the train rolls on. But each part is new. On this account, we do not identify any of the images. However, the next day we ride again through the tunnel. Now we have intuitions of images that are the same as the day before. By this means we recognize the identity of each image. As well, the whole sequence of impressions is the same. So we recognize the whole graffiti mural itself.]

Only where a flow of intuition again and again offers something new does unity give way to a plurality made up of as many different elements as there are new things separately apprehended. But when we always find “the same” again, we have objectively just one thing. It is always the same since we always move within the same intimately related group of intuitions, within which a quite familiar transition leads from member to member, from what is known to what is known, and does so in such a way that the total content that we have in each moment already contains in itself the intention aimed at all the content of the further moments. Consequently, the transition to any member of the group whatever offers a fulfillment of a part of the intention directed towards it. (153c)

[Directory of other entries in this series.]

Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

The Flow of Intuitional Identity, Husserl, para 21, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

by Corry Shores
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The Flow of Intuitional Identity

Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

I "On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between 'Fresh' Memory and 'Full' Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time"

No. 1 "How Does the Unity of a Process of Change that Continues for an Extended Period of Time Come to Be Represented?

Intuition and Re-presentation"

Paragraph 21

Husserl has been discussing the flow of intuitions we have when being aware of an object. Previously he discussed two components that contribute both to this flow and the changes it undergoes [our summaries skipped some of this analysis.]

Now Husserl will emphasize some additional matters.

We have intuitions during a flowing course of time. As well, we experience time by flowingly blending our sequence of intuitions into one unbroken continuum. Hence Husserl states: “The flow of intuition is a temporal flow.” It both happens in time, and it serves to establish our experience of time.

So, our intuitions occur through a temporal flow. However, when analyzing intuitions, we are not concerned with any one particular temporal instant during that flow. [Consider this. We are looking at the ink-well. Our eyes run over its different parts. To each part we see, we have an intuition of that part. After seeing enough parts, we intuit the whole ink-well. As we continue to view the ink-well, one part or another will “shine forth with distinctness.” The whole intuition of the ink-well will modify according to which part we notice at that moment. Imagine we see a friend. But then we notice his hand is bleeding. We still have the total intuition of our friend. But how we intuit our friend is modified at that moment, because we notice that one of his parts indicates something unusual about the whole: that the whole of his health has changed. Returning to the ink-well example, we might at one time intuit the ink-well with one corner being prominent and distinct to the intuition. And at another time another corner might be notably distinct.] Husserl explains that we return to certain distinctions in a cyclical fashion without any temporal regularities.

Since now this part, now that part of the momentarily given total intuition shines forth with distinctness, resulting in an appropriate change in the whole intuition, it happens time and again that the old intuition with the part distinguished in it returns. The stages of the flow of intuition therefore flow over into one another cyclically but without any firm cycle, without any definite order. Depending on the random stimuli of the content and the random direction of interest, the flow time and again assumes different sequences. Choice can also be a determining factor by singling out at will this or that moment from the moments that are indirectly seen and noticed for themselves and that stand in competition. (152b.c, emphasis mine)

[So suppose we walk into the office. From the doorway we see the inkwell from a particular angle. From that vantage we experience a particular version of our inkwell intuition in which the foremost corner is especially distinct.] So Husserl writes:

With every return of equivalent circumstances, the equivalent intuition appears and is recognized as such and as a reproduction. (152c)

[No imagine that we continue walking into the office, walking around the desk, and taking our seat on its other side, all while looking at the inkwell as we get closer to it. We perform this ritual many times. So not only does each moment of our seeing the well give us a different modification of the one intuition of the inkwell, we also experience the same sequence of partial intuitions – along with its internal transitions – as we do every other day.] These repetitions of intuitions are the grounds for us recognizing particular objects, [and not say any inkwell in general.] By this means we may judge that an object intuited at one time is identical with that same object when we intuit it another time.

With every return of equivalent circumstances, the equivalent intuition appears and is recognized as such and as a reproduction; and every return of equivalent paths of change (or sequences of change in circumstances) also gives rise to equivalent and recognized flows of intuition along with the recognized distinctions. A linguistic mediation is not required for these acts of recognizing; such recognizing, however, does supply the presupposition for our judgment that what is given in the flow of intuition is an object identical with itself. (152d)

[Directory of other entries in this series.]

Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

Even While Men’s Minds are Wild?; Bostrom and Sandberg's Brain Emulation, Examined and Critiqued. Section 5

by Corry Shores
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[The following is tentative material for my presentation at the Society for Philosophy & Technology Conference this summer.]

Corry Shores

Do Posthumanists Dream of Pixilated Sheep?

Bostrom and Sandberg's Brain Emulation,

Examined and Critiqued

Section 5:

Even While Men’s Minds are Wild?

Neural noise can result from external interferences like magnetic fields. Or internal random fluctuations might make the signals unpredictable. (Ward 116-117) In both cases, chance & chaos reign our brains. According to Steven Rose, our brain is an “uncertain” system on account of “random, indeterminate, and probabilistic” events that are essential to its functioning (Rose 93). Alex Pouget and his research team recently found that the mind's ability to compute complex calculations has much to do with its noise. The word noise is misleading, he says, because it implies something goes wrong. But these unpredictable irregularities are the mind’s way of running at optimum performance. Our mind produces noisy signals to represent the uncertainty of the world around us. Pouget explains,

if we want to do something, such as jump over a stream, we need to extract data that is not inherently part of that information. We need to process all the variables we see, including how wide the stream appears, what the consequences of falling in might be, and how far we know we can jump.

In this way, the brain is flooded with countless variables. And the neurons transmit various signal patterns for the same stimulus. This allows us to estimate margins of error. We then use a probabilistic inference to make what is most likely to be the best decision. (Pouget, interview with Science Daily) So we might jump the stream, if probably we can cross it, even though we can never be certain about such matters.

Some also theorize that noise is essential to the human brain’s creativity. Johnson-Laird claims that creative mental processes are never predictable. (Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind 256) He hypothesizes that we could make a machine creative by programming it to alter its own functioning according to generated random variations. (Human and Machine Thinking, 119-120) This would produce what Ben Goertzel refers to as “a complex combination of random chance with strict, deterministic rules.” (Goertzel 119) And according to Daniel Dennett, this indeterminism is precisely what endows us with what we call free will. (Dennett 295, cited in Dartnall 37) Likewise, Bostrom & Sandberg suggest we introduce random noise into our simulation by using pseudo-random number generators. They are not truly random, because eventually the pattern will repeat. But if it takes a very long time before the repetitions appear, then probably it would be sufficiently close to real randomness (Bostrom & Sandberg 38-39). Also, there might be random variations that are hidden to our observations, and thus would not be properly represented in the simulation. They recognize the profound difficulty in incorporating true randomness or hidden variables into the simulation. Yet they believe these sorts of randoms most likely will be unnecessary for whole brain emulation.

But perhaps there is more to consider. Lawrence Ward reviews findings that demonstrate neural noise is pink noise, or what is called 1/f noise. (Ward 145-153, citing research by Lundström and McQueen, and Novikov, Shannonhoff-Khalsa, Schwartz, and Wright) On account of its fractal nature, 1/f noises are always parts of similar larger-orders of variation happening on much longer time-scales. We might have to wait weeks or months to see larger-scale variations that were varying the randomness of the more local noisy events. (Anderson & Mandell 78-79) These are what Gregory Bateson calls metarandom variables. They are hidden to us, because we never see the whole picture (Bateson Steps to an Ecology 418). It’s why live lobsters never notice their cooking water gradually increase to boil (Mind and Nature 109). They only notices alterations on a local level, so nothing really seems to be changing. In a similar way, if all we are observing is randomness on a smaller scale, we might be missing the larger scale variations. It would be like randomly adjusting a radio to pick up different bands of radio static. If all we knew was the randomness of radio static at each moment, we might not also notice the higher order randomness that varies the lower one that we are listening-to. Because these uncontrollable unpredictabilities are essential to all the random changes happening around us, Bateson calls them wild variables. (Mind and Nature 49-50)

Perhaps it is for similar reasons that Benoit Mandelbrot classifies 1/f noise under what he terms “wild randomness” and “wild variation.” (Mandelbrot The (mis)Behavior of Markets 39-41) This sort of random might not be so easily simulated. Mandelbrot gives two reasons for this.

1) In wild randomness, there are events that defy the normal random distribution of the bell curve. He cites a number of stock market events that are astronomically improbable. But such events in fact happen quite frequently in natural systems despite their seeming impossibility. There is no way to predict when they will happen or how drastic they will be. (The (mis)Behavior of Markets 4)

2) Each event is random and yet it is not independent from the rest, like each toss of a coin is. One seemingly small anomalous event will echo like reverberations at unpredictable intervals into the future. (The (mis)Behavior of Markets 181-185)

For these reasons, he considers wild variation to be a qualitatively different state of indeterminism than the usual mild variations we encounter at the casino. For, there is infinite variance in the distributions of wild randomness. Anything can happen at any time (Mandelbrot, Fractals and Scaling 128). He says, “the fluctuation from one value to the next is limitless and frightening.” (Mandelbrot (mis)Behavior of Markets 39-41) This is the wildness of our brains.

Paul Shepard considers our minds to be wild in an even more literal sense: we are wild animals. He distinguishes tameness from domestication. Cows are domesticated. They have been bred to suit our needs. And now their genes would probably not prepare them to live in the wild without human protections. But the human species has merely been tamed by culture and not domesticated like cows. Genetically, we are still the same wild creatures who hunted the Pleistocene savannas. So to emulate the human brain is to simulate the workings not of a rational machine, but of a wild animal. (Shepard 132-133) He writes, “The savage mind is ours! ... as a species we have in us the call of the wild.” (143)

Shepard’s characterizes the wild, like Bateson and Mandelbrot do, as being too complex for any simulation. But he offers his own theory to explain why. He notes the fractal nature of reality. Within every scale is another smaller scale, and so on to infinity. He says that every layer of complexity operates according to deterministic principles. But, there is no lowest level of complexity. Hence there is no way to get to the bottom of what is happening now. It’s turtles all the way down. Thus there is no way to fully understand why things are the way they are now. And thus we can never know how things will be in the future. (146-147)

But let’s suppose that the brain’s wild randomness can be adequately simulated. Will brain emulation still attain its fullest success of perfectly replicating a specific person’s own identity? Bostrom & Sandberg recognize that neural noise will prevent precise one-to-one emulation. However, they think that the noise will not prevent the simulation from producing meaningful brain states (Bostrom & Sandberg 7). But to pursue further the personal identity question, let’s imagine that we want to emulate a certain slot machine. A relevant property is its unpredictability. Consider these two possibilities. 1) We set the original and the simulation to the same starting position. We give both handles a number of pulls. Each time, they both show the same outcomes, because we replicated the mechanics perfectly. But then, we cannot say that we have preserved its relevant essential property of being unpredictable. For, we can just run the simulator by itself and that will predict the original’s future outcomes. Or, 2) instead the emulation produced its own different random series of outcomes. Then in fact we would be replicating the original’s property of unpredictability.

The problem is that the brain’s 1/f noise is wildly random. So suppose we emulate some person’s brain perfectly. And suppose further that the original person and her emulation have an identity merger where each one thinks they are talking to their very own selves when really they are talking to the other. They confuse themselves with one another. They are completely aware of what is in the other’s mind at that first moment, because they can tell it is the same as what is in their own mind. And suppose further that the original person loses her fear of death, knowing that something she cannot distinguish from himself will carry on after her body dies. But if both minds are subject to wild variations, then their consciousness and identity might come to differ more than just slightly. They could veer-off wildly. The original person and her emulation might become so mistrustful of each other, that they want to end the other’s existence.

So we might need to emulate this wild neural randomness. But that seems to remove the possibility that the emulation will continue on as the original person. Perhaps our very effort to emulate a specific human brain results in our producing an entirely different brain altogether.

[Next entry in this series.]

Anderson, Carl M. & Arnold J. Mandell. Fractal Time and the Foundations of Consciousness: Vertical Convergence of 1/fPhenomena from Ion Channels to Behavior States. in Fractals of Brain, Fractals of Mind. Ed. Earl Mac Cormac & Maxim I. Stamenov. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1996. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=WdERazd7Ik4C&hl=en

Bateson, Gregory. "Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation." in Steps to an Ecology of Mind. London: Granada Publishing, 1972. . More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=FQvfqk31zFQC&hl=en

Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. London: Fontana, 1979. More information available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=aQtHAAAAMAAJ&hl=en&pgis=1

Sandberg, A. & Bostrom, N. (2008): Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap, Technical Report #2008‐3, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University. Available online at:http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Reports/2008-3.pdf

Dartnall, Terry. "Introduction: On Having a Mind of Your Own." in Artificial Intelligence and Creativity: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Ed. Terry Dartnall. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=4phC9RwvC8YC&hl=en

Dennett, Daniel. Brainstorms. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978. More information available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=s3V-AAAAMAAJ&hl=en&pgis=1

Goertzel, Ben. Chaotic Logic: Language, Thought, and Reality from the Perspective of Complex Systems Science. London: Plenum Press, 1994. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=zVOWoXDunp8C&hl=en

Johnson-Laird, R. N. The Computer and the Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=Tf5gRFgVuegC&hl=en

Johnson-Laird, Philip. Human and Machine Thinking. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1993. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=sPbdQjtkIhkC&hl=en

Mandelbrot, Benoit B., & Richard L. Hudson. The (mis)Behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Risk, Ruin, and Reward. New York: Basic Books, 2004. More information available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=DPwBTj99a7UC&hl=en

Science Daily. "Mysterious 'Neural Noise' Actually Primes Brain For Peak Performance." Nov. 13, 2006. Available online at: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/11/061112094812.htm

Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=5b18NqLB8LMC&hl=en

Ward, Lawrence M. Dynamical Cognitive Science. London: MIT Press, 2002. More information and limited preview available at: http://books.google.be/books?id=g1ZMAoWGYesC&hl=en

Also mentioned:

(Lundström and McQueen, 1974, "A proposed 1/f noise mechanism in nerve cell membranes," Journal of Theoretical Biology, 45, 405-409).

(Novikov E., A. Novikov, Shannonhoff-Khalsa, Schwartz, and Wright, 1997, "Scale-similar activity in the brain," Physical Review E, 56, R2387-R2389,)

Bateson, We become Irreversibly Randomized when We Die, in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity

by Corry Shores
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[The following is citation.]

We become Irreversibly Randomized when We Die

Gregory Bateson

Mind and Nature:

A Necessary Unity

Ch. IV

Criteria of Mental Process

Criterion 2. The Interaction between Parts of Mind is Triggered by Difference

When I wipe the blackboard, where does the difference go? In one sense, the difference is randomized and irreversibly gone, as ‘I’ shall be gone when I die. (109d)

Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. London: Wildwood House, 1979.

More information at:

http://books.google.be/books?id=aQtHAAAAMAAJ&q=Mind+and+Nature:+A+Necessary+Unity&dq=Mind+and+Nature:+A+Necessary+Unity&ei=CWcpSpDIF5TyzQSqiZj7Cg&hl=en&pgis=1

Carroll's Games of Chance, Bacon's Controlled Chance, Pollock's "F__ing" Chance Operations, Cage's "Hazard of the Dice" & Brakhage's Colored Chaos

by Corry Shores
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[The following is taken from my master's thesis, The Rhythm of Sensation on the Surface of Sense: Communication in Deleuze as NonSensed and Intense, pages 102, 112-113. Completed, defended, and archived June 2008]

Games of Skill, Carroll's Games of Chance,

Bacon's Controlled Chance,

Pollock's "F__ing" Chance Operations,

Cage's "Hazard of the Dice," and

Brakhage's Controled Color Chaos

The introduction of chance through diagramming endows the painting with rhythm;[1] for, it throws the formal regularities into disarrays which no mental calculation could have formulated, and thus the viewer’s faculties will never be able to synchronize and harmonize in agreement over a common recognition. For Deleuze, real artistic creation and thinking come about only when they affirm chance, but they do not do this by completely submitting to the random.

Deleuze distinguishes two sorts of games that make use of chance. In games of skill, the rules are fixed in advance; and, the element of randomness, the dice, is introduced in a controlled way that has no influence on those rules; it merely helps to determine a winner and loser. Games of chance, however, have changing rules, “each move invents its own rules;” that is to say, random events in this game change the very way the game is played. Deleuze illustrates by referencing the chaotic games Carroll portrays in Alice in Wonderland, yet he claims that a game of chance may “only exist in thought” and have “no other result than the work of art;” for, each dice-throw produces the aleatory point, which forces together incompatible series.[2] This is precisely Bacon’s diagramming technique: before making his involuntary marks, there is a different probability for what images can be placed into which zones of the canvass; for example, the more important figurations would more likely be placed in the center. Action painting equalizes those probabilities by painting past the canvass’ edges and letting the splatters land by pure chance. Abstract painting, accomplishes the opposite by predetermining with mathematical precision how the images are to be distributed, which almost entirely eliminates the element of chance. However, when Bacon diagrams with his involuntary marks, he creates new probabilities for the distribution of images, and he opens new possible dimensions and directions to take the painting. He neither obeys the rigid pre-formed unequal probabilities, nor does he reduce the painting to a single zone of equal probability; rather, he creates entirely new sets of possibilities and limitations.[3] Yet, Bacon’s chance is not totally blind; he explains that although his cleaning woman could take a handful of paint and throw it upon the canvass to produce a viable diagram, she most likely would not produce a fruitful outcome, because accident for him is a controlled chance: he has practiced throwing paint long enough to be able to aim its trajectory somewhat.[4]

Director Stan Brakhage narrates a story illustrating that Pollock’s aimed throws are also a sort of controlled chance.[5]

This misnomered painting was essentially finished and hung stuck on the walls of Pollock’s barn, and Pollock was dead drunk with a quart of whisky beside him, two-thirds down. And these New York painters . . . used the word ‘chance operations,’ which . . . really angered very deeply Pollock, and he said, ‘don’t give me any of your fucking “chance operations,”’ he said, ‘you see that doorknob?’ And there was a doorknob about [15 meters] from where he was sitting, that was in fact the door that everyone was going to have to exit-by. And drunk as he was, he just with one swirl of his brush, picked up a glob of paint, hurled it, and hit that doorknob smack-on with very little paint over the edges, and then he said, ‘And that’s the way out.’

Brakhage likewise does not see chance operations in John Cage’s works, which he created using the “hazard of the dice;” for, Cage rejected almost all the outcomes, until arriving upon one that seemed to express his “soul.” It needed to be a work that, although created by chance, was still something he could authenticate with his signature and take responsibility-for. Brakhage explains that his own chaotic color images come about much this way.[6]

It is for this reason that Bacon may enhance the force of communication; he both blends order & chaos while also maximizing the tension between them. Thus, our faculties remain farthest apart from each other, all while being under a profound pressure to try to synchronize; for, there is an element of order for them to recognize, but the diagrammed chaos keeps such a representation always at bay.

---

[1] “The painting thus becomes a catastrophe-painting and a diagram-painting at one and the same time. This time, it is at the point closest to catastrophe, in absolute proximity, that modern man discovers rhythm,” Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation, Transl. Daniel W. Smith, (London: Continuum Books, 2003), p.74. Francis Bacon : Logique du la sensation (Paris : Les Éditions du Seuil, 2002), p.98-99.

[2] Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, Transl. Mark Lester (London: Columbia University Press, 1990, reprinted by Continuum, 2001), p.69-71. Logique de sens, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969), p.74-75.

[3] Logic of Sensation, p.65-66. Logique de la Sensation, p.88-89.

[4] Francis Bacon & David Sylvester, The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon 1962-1979, (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1975), p.92.

[5] Stan Brakhage, Encounters 1.

[6] Brakhage, Encounters.