Peirce (CP1.303) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol1/Bk3/Ch2/A/§3, “The Monad"

by Corry Shores
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Summary of

 

Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy

 

Book 3: Phenomenology

 

Chapter 2: The Categories in Detail

 

A: Firstness

 

§3: The Monad [1.303]

Brief summary:

Peirce will try to characterize the idea of the monad. Since monads have Firstness, they cannot be constituted or conceived complexly. So they cannot be understood as an object, because the concept or status of object requires an exteriority to another object or subject, namely, we ourselves as that over against which the object stands. But we also cannot use the concept of self for the monad. A monad as something experienced would be like a vague pure sensation or feeling that we might have while in a semi-conscious state. Metaphysically speaking, a monad would be similar to a secondary quality.

Summary

 

1.303

[The concept of the monad cannot involve any additional conceptual material. A monad in experience would be like a simple and pure feeling or sensation that is had in a semi-conscious state. Metaphysically, a monad would be like a secondary quality.]

[Peirce is describing his basic categories of thought. The most basic is Firstness. In this section the issue becomes the monad, so it may be a slightly disorienting to suddenly shift back to this discussion of the monad, although on the other hand monad and First are nearly the same concept. The editorial note for this section says: ‘From “The List of Categories: A Second Essay,” c.1894. 303 follows 293 and is followed by 326 in the ms.’ I do not know how the Collected Papers were constructed and why this order is chosen. But if we look back at 1.293, we see that this paragraph is continuous with that discussion of monads, dyads, and triads. He says there that “the first step in the present inquiry is to ascertain what are the conceptions of the pure monad, free from all dyadic and triadic admixtures” (146). Perhaps the idea here is that to conceive the monad is to conceive of Firstness.] An object is something that stands over against us. That means that in order to conceive an object, we would need to conceive of a dyad, because we would need to think of the object in relation to us. Thus, to understand what a monad is, we should not think of it as an object. Then what about as a self? Peirce says that the notion of self is too complex for the concept of monad [but I do not know why it would be more complex]. He says in fact that the notion of monad is actually closer to that of object than to self. If our concept of monad is not specific enough, then we are thinking nothing at all. [Peirce then says that if our conception is too abstract that it will refer to a special suchness. But I do not understand how something that is made more abstract would have a more specified suchness.] Our conception of the monad has to have a suchness that is in a category all its own, because it needs to bear no conceptual relation to any other suchness. Peirce then tries to characterize what it would be like for us to have a monadic state of feeling. We would need to be in a semiconscious state, so that the feeling is vague enough and also not objectified or subjectified, and it could be a simple feeling of redness, a salt taste, an ache, grief, joy, or even a prolonged musical note. This so far is a psychological or a logical conception of the monad. But what about a metaphysical monad? It would have to have a pure nature and composition [so as to not be constituted by more than one element]. For this metaphysical concept, what are often called the “secondary” qualities are a close approximation to monads.

The pure idea of a monad is not that of an object. For an object is over against me. But it is much nearer an object than it is to a conception of self, which is still more complex. There must be some determination, or suchness, otherwise we shall think nothing at all. But it must not be an abstract suchness, for that has reference to a special suchness. It must be a special suchness with some degree of determination, not, however, thought as more or less. There is to be no comparison. So that it is a suchness sui generis. Imagine me to make and in a slumberous condition to have a vague, unobjectified, still less unsubjectified, sense of redness, or of salt taste, or of an ache, or of grief or joy, or of a prolonged musical note. That would be, as nearly as possible, a purely monadic state of feeling. Now in order to convert that psychological or logical conception into a metaphysical one, we must think of a metaphysical monad as a pure nature, or quality, in itself without parts or features, and without embodiment. Such is a pure monad. The meanings of names of "secondary" qualities are as good approximations to examples of monads as can be given.

(149)

 

 

 

Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 1: Principles of Philosophy.  In Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [Two Volumes in One], Vols. 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 [1931].

 

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Peirce (CP1.294–1.299) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, §4, “Indecomposable Elements"

 

by Corry Shores

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[The following is summary. Boldface and bracketed commentary are mine. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos.]

 

 

Summary of

 

Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy

 

Book 3: Phenomenology

 

Chapter 1: Introduction

 

§4: Indecomposable Elements [1.294–1.299]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

A phenomenon [or “phaneron” in Peirce’s terminology] can be classified on the basis of the way its indecomposable parts relate to one another. What makes the parts indecomposable is the fact that they are the most elementary possible constituting relations on the basis of which more complex arrangements can be composed. For example, were we to analyze something into simpler and simpler parts, we would need to arrive upon parts that stand unto themselves [atoms of a sort]. But what constitutes an elementary part as being something standing unto itself? That would be its self-affirmative self-relation that needs no further external relations to be what it is. Thus a decompositional analysis will take us down to parts that are constituted by a self-relation which cannot be made any simpler and thus this monadic self-relation is itself an indecomposable element. But if we have many monadic elementary self-relations, we are missing how they are parts. For, as such they are merely wholes and not parts. To be a part means to be in a relation to some other part. Thus there is another indecomposable relation, the dyadic relation of part to part. It is not decomposable into monadic relations, because those are self-reflexive but dyadic ones are external. Yet still, we have not done our analysis properly if we only have parts related to other parts. For, supposedly they are parts of something greater that we have analyzed. Hence we need a third kind of relation, that between parts taken together as having a combined relation to a third thing, the whole they compose. So such a triadic relation as this is another indecomposable element. We cannot decompose it into monadic and dyadic relations, because neither of those involve externally related things being taken together in relation to yet another entity. But, any larger relation, like a tetradic one for example, is decomposable. This is because, having established the first three kinds of relations, any further one would need to repeat those. We cannot say for example that in the tetradic relation, the four parts are taken together to relate to the still larger whole, thereby creating a new sort of relation. For, this is no different than the triadic one just mentioned, which takes parts together and relates them to another thing. And if we say that in the tetradic relation part 1 is related to part 2 which is related to part 3 which is related to part 4, we just have three dyadic relations and no new relational structure. Any further complicated sorts of relational structures within a tetradic formation would still be nothing other than dyadic ones. Suppose for example part 1 is related to parts 2, 3, and 4, and each one of these in turn is related to each of the others. Still, these are no more than sets of dyadic relations. Thus the triadic is the most complex of the indecomposable relational structures, and Peirce considers this to be the most important philosophical concept.

 

 

Summary

 

1.295

[A element is something that is taken as a unitary simply thing, even though it could be further decomposed. Were we to decompose anything, we would find that the smallest parts would have to be self-related, and thus be constituted by a monadic relation. Other decomposable elements would furthermore be other sorts of relations that cannot be conceived as the bare sum of lesser relations]

 

Peirce now explains why he is using the term “indecomposable element” [since it might seem like a redundancy in terms. Would not an element be indecomposable by definition?] [I do not follow what Peirce says next, so you can skip to the quotation below. Specifically, I do not understand how what he says explains why “indecomposable element” means something different from simply “element”. Let me still pass through the points he makes. The first point is that to perform a logical analysis does not mean decomposing something complex into its existing elements. (But what it is instead I am not sure. From his description, it would seem still to be a sort of decomposition into existing elements.) Instead, doing logical analysis means taking a concept, and then taking with it its negation, and furthermore, taking with it all other things with which it may relate (with those other things being its “correlates”). With how he exemplifies correlates, it seems to be like the “places” of n-place predicates. One example he gives is ‘to love’ and ‘to be loved’. In these cases, there would be two correlates, the person loving and the person loved. He makes the further point that the different arrangements of this relation are not to be considered as having any order of priority. So to love, to not love, to be loved, and to not be loved are instances of the same concept. The next example will explain how concepts can be built up with other concepts. So consider the concept ‘A is parent of B’. What happens when we combine two of these relations to get ‘A is parent of B who is parent of C’? This now gives us the concept of ‘grandparent’: ‘A is grandparent of C’. Or what if along with ‘A is parent of B’ we also have ‘X is spouse of Y’? So now let us make this combination: ‘A is spouse of B who is parent of C’. We now have the concept ‘A is stepparent of C’. But suppose instead we begin with the concept of ‘A grandparent of C’. Following Peirce’s first mode of analysis, we would take with this ‘A is not grandparent of C’, ‘C is grandchild of A’, and ‘C is not grandchild of A’. But this concept can also be analyzed through decomposition. We could decompose ‘A is grandparent of C’ into two concepts, namely, ‘A is parent of B’ and ‘ B is parent of C’. So that is the analysis. But I am not sure what to say about indecomposable elements. They might be such relations as ‘A is parent of B’, which are analyzable into no other simpler relations. In that case, perhaps Peirce uses the term “indecomposable element” because were he to simply use “element,” he might also be referring to persons A, B, and C in our examples. And maybe the problem with this is that A herself can be analyzed as being made of body parts or other definable characteristics, and in that sense is not indecomposable. However, were we even to decompose person A, we would eventually have to arrive upon indecomposable elements that constitute the person on the most fundamental level. (In light of what Peirce says below, possibly these most basic sorts of relations are the monadic type.) So I am just guessing, but perhaps Peirce’s idea here is that we need to say “indecomposable elements” to distinguish the indecomposable relations between elementary parts from those elementary parts themselves, which are potentially subject to their own further decomposition. And were we to decompose any such decomposable part, we would eventually arrive upon things constituted by indecomposable simple relations like bare self-relation. Let me quote:]

I doubt not that readers have been fretting over the ridiculous-seeming phrase “indecomposable element,” which is as Hibernian as “necessary and sufficient condition” (as if “condition” meant no more than concomitant and as [if] needful were not the proper accompaniment of “sufficient”). But I have used it because I do not mean simply element. Logical analysis is not an analysis into existing elements. It is the tracing out of relations between concepts on the assumption that along with each given or found concept is given its negative, and every other relation resulting from a transposition of its correlates. The latter postulate amounts to merely identifying each correlate and distinguishing it from the others without recognizing any serial order among them. Thus to love and to be loved are regarded as the same concept, and not to love is also to be considered as the same concept. The combination of concepts is always by two at a time and consists in indefinitely identifying a subject of the one with a subject of the other, every correlate being regarded as a subject. Then if one concept can be accurately defined as a combination of others, and if these others are not of more complicated structure than the defined concept, then the defined concept is regarded as ana- | lyzed into these others. Thus A is grandparent of B, if and only if A is a parent of somebody who is a parent of B, therefore grandparent is analyzed into parent and parent. So stepparent, if taken as not excluding parentage, is analyzed into spouse and parent; and parent-in-law into parent and spouse.

(pp.146-147)

 

 

1.295

[We use the term ‘Priman” in reference to the indecomposable logical relations in which the part is what it is regardless of reference to other things.]

 

Peirce then says that there is no a priori reason preventing us from saying that there are indecomposable elements in the phaneron that are what they are regardless of any relations to other things. Peirce uses the term Priman to refer to these things and to things of their sort. [This seems roughly equivalent to firstness with regard to logical relations.]

These things being premised we may say in primo, there is no a priori reason why there should not be indecomposable elements of the phaneron which are what they are regardless of anything else, each complete in itself; provided, of course, that they be capable of composition. We will call these and all that particularly relates to them Priman. Indeed, it is almost inevitable that there should be such, since there will be compound concepts which do not refer to anything, and it will generally be possible to abstract from the internal construction that makes them compound, whereupon they become indecomposable elements.

(147)

 

 

1.296

[“Secundan” designates phenomenal parts that are constituted just by relations to only one other thing, for example, the idea of ‘otherness’. ]

 

Indecomposable elements of a phaneron can also be said to be what they are on account of their relation to just one other thing, regardless of some possible relation to a third thing. We would use the term Secundan for these cases. An example is the idea of ‘otherness’.

In secundo, there is no a priori reason why there should not be indecomposable elements which are what they are relatively to a second but independently of any third. Such, for example, is the idea of otherness. We will call such ideas and all that is marked by them Secundan (i.e., dependent on a second).

(p.147)

 

 

1.297

[“Tertian” is the term for the relational structure involving a relation not just of one thing to another but as well of both together to a third thing, as for example the idea of composition (which has a part-part Secundan relation as well as a parts-whole tertian relation).]

 

And finally, there are indecomposable elements of phanerons that are what they are on account of both a relation to a second thing in addition to a relation to a third, and for this situation we use the term tertian [I do not know why it is uncapitalized.] One example is the idea of ‘composition’. [For something to be composed, it needs at least two parts. So there is the relation of the one part to the other, and that is the Secundan component. But there is also the relation of each part to the whole, which is a third thing that is part of this concept. That would be the tertian component.]

In tertio there is no a priori reason why there should not be indecomposable elements which are what they are relatively to a second and a third, regardless of any fourth. Such, for example, is the idea of composition. We will call everything marked by being a third or medium of connection, between a first and second anything, tertian.

(p.147)

 

 

1.298

[There are no indecomposable relations beyond the triadic, because anything further is decomposable into other simpler relations.]

 

Peirce says that there can be no indecomposable element that involves relations to more than three correlates. This is because were there to be one, it would be decomposable by means of the dyadic relation. [I suppose the idea is the following. A monadic relation is not decomposable, because there is only one relation. We cannot have half a relation, for example. A dyadic relation is not decomposable either. Suppose we decompose it into two monadic relations. Putting them together does not give us a dyadic relation. We just have two monads. In order to have the dyadic, we need an additional structure, namely, an exterior relation of one thing to another. Now it gets tricky. Why is the triadic relation indecomposable? Consider this. For one thing, it is not decomposable into dyad and monad, since by combining those we do not get a triad. Why? If we work just with the notion of composition, suppose we decompose it into the dyadic relation of two internal parts and the monadic relation of the whole unto itself. When we put them together, we just have a dyad and monad, but not the relation between them of parts-to-whole. It is also not made of two dyadic relations, namely, that between a part and a part and that between a part and a whole. Why? Because then we do not have the notion of composition. We have the relation of part 1 to part 2, the relation of part 1 to the whole, and the relation of part 2 to the whole. But that does not render us the notion of composition, which requires that the relation of parts to whole be a relation involving the togetherness of the parts in their combined relation to the whole. For, otherwise we do not have a whole but rather just a part of a whole. The only way parts can compose a whole is in their combining relations with one another. Thus the triadic relation in this example is indecomposable. To recap, we need three relational structures for the idea of ‘composition’: {1} the monadic self-relational structure of part 1 to itself and part 2 to itself, (which makes them components that can be relatable), {2} the dyadic relation of part 1 to part 2, and {3} the triadic relation of both parts taken together and then related to the whole. So the triadic, at least in this example, is indecomposable, because there is a third sort of relation that is not simply a dyadic one between part and whole but rather requires the additional operation of taking the parts together to relate them, as a grouping, with a third entity, the whole they compose. Now we need to understand why a tetradic relation is in fact decomposable into two dyadic relations. Without any examples, I am not sure how. Let me venture a wild guess. When studying emergentism and brain states, I recall the following idea. Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon that arises from the dynamics of particular brain states. However, that emergent phenomenon of consciousness can then have some influence on how the parts are operating (something like conscious volition with regard to what one is choosing to think or how one is doing one’s thinking). This idea I think is called “downward causation”. So here we have {1} the monadic self-relation of the biological parts (or operations) of our cognition; {2} the dyadic relation of these parts or operations interacting with one another; {3} together their operations generate a third term to which they are compositionally related, namely, the emergent phenomenon of consciousness; and{4} that emergent consciousness then can act again back upon its own constituent parts and operations, affecting their structures or behaviors. But what kind of relation is 4? Is it a new kind? Perhaps it is reducible to a dyadic, in that it is one thing related to the parts as another thing. Or perhaps it is a triadic, because it is one thing relating to constituent parts. Another way to think about it is the following. We needed to add an operation to get the triadic relation of conscious parts to relate to the emergent conscious whole. But to go back from whole to parts, we need no additional relational operation. We already have the parts taken together, as a left-over from the triadic relation. And we also have the parts taken by themselves, from the monadic relation. So there is no need for an additional relational “invention” to conceive the idea of downward causation. I am not sure. A less interesting example would be “A loves B who loves C who loved D”. Maybe this is tetradic, and it is clearly decomposable into three dyadic relations. Any more complicated such relations between parts, like A, B, C, and D each loves each of the others, still involves dyadic relations. At any rate, Peirce places a very high philosophical importance to the impossibility of tetradic and higher –adic forms being indecomposable. Let me quote.]

 

It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable element which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine any number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.

(147)

 

 

1.299

[There are three types of indecomposable parts of phanerons: 1) those that are what they are just by themselves, 2) those that are what they are in relation to something else, and 3) those that involve a combination that is then taken to be further related to something else.]

 

Peirce then summarizes his findings in this section. The phaneron’s indecomposable parts come in one of three varieties: {1} those that are simply positive totals [they are wholly what they are on their very own], {2} those that involve a dependence of one on another without them being regarded as together forming something that may take further relations, and {3} those that involve the combinations of parts taken together as a further relatable entity.

We find then a priori that there are three categories of undecomposable elements to be expected in the phaneron: those which are simply positive totals, those which involve dependence but not combination, those which involve combination.

(p.147)

 

Peirce then announces that he will examine the phaneron [in a more phenomenological way]: “Now let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in fact” (p.147).

 

 

 

Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 1: Principles of Philosophy.  In Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [Two Volumes in One], Vols. 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 [1931].

 

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Peirce (CP1.293) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, §3, “Monads, Dyads, and Triads"

 

by Corry Shores

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[The following is summary. Boldface and bracketed commentary are mine. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos.]

 

 

Summary of

 

Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy

 

Book 3: Phenomenology

 

Chapter 1: Introduction

 

§3: Monads, Dyads, and Triads [1.293]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

Structures of relational bonding between indecomposable parts (“logical relatives”) can only take one of three forms: monadic, dyadic, and triadic. Peirce will now analyze each type as independently as possible from the other forms.

 

 

Summary

 

1.294

[Logical relatives can only take on of three forms: monad, dyad, and triad. Peirce will now analyze each one.]

 

Peirce has conducted a thorough study of the logic of relations, and he concludes the following. Logical terms are one of three sorts: monads, dyads, or polyads. But [for some reason] there is no radical difference between triads and other higher valence ‘-ads’ . So there are really just three: monads, dyads, and triads. Peirce will now investigate the monad without reference to dyads and triads. He then will examine dyads, which involve monads, but without reference to triads. And finally he will examine the triad, which involves monads and dyads.

A thorough study of the logic of relatives confirms the conclusions which I had reached before going far in that study. It shows that logical terms are either monads, dyads, or polyads, and that these last do not introduce any radically different elements from those that are found in triads. I therefore divide all objects into monads, dyads, and triads; and the first step in the present inquiry is to ascertain what are the conceptions of the pure monad, free from all dyadic and triadic admixtures; of the dyad (which involves that of the monad) free from all triadic contamination, and what it is that is peculiar which the dyad adds to the monad; and of the triad (which involves those of the monad and dyad) and what it is that is characteristic of the triad.

(146)

 

 

 

 

Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 1: Principles of Philosophy.  In Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [Two Volumes in One], Vols. 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 [1931].

 

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Peirce (CP1.288–1.292) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, §2, “Valencies"

 

by Corry Shores

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[The following is summary. Boldface and bracketed commentary are mine. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos.]

 

 

Summary of

 

Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy

 

Book 3: Phenomenology

 

Chapter 1: Introduction

 

§2: Valencies [1.288–1.292]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

Peirce’s phenomenology is a phaneroscopy; it will give a taxonomy of types of phanerons (phenomena). It will do so by distinguishing the phanerons on the basis of the types of their indecomposable parts’ structures. We cannot distinguish one indecomposable part from another by means of their internal structures, as they have none. Instead, we must distinguish them on the basis of an external structure. The only viable candidate for such an external structure is valency, which is the number of relational bonds one part may make with other parts. The indecomposable parts of phanerons can only take one of three possible valency structures: monadic [valency of 1, only self-relatable, to make a singular structure], dyadic [valency of 2, forming only one bond with another, to make a paired structure], and triadic [valency of 3, forming two bonds to make a tripled structure]. It is not really possible for a phaneron’s indecomposable part to have no valency, that is, to be medadic [and as such it would be unable to form even a stable self-relation]. However, were it to be so, it would come into and pass out of our awareness instantaneously, without registering in our memory. 

 

 

 

Summary

 

1.288

[Peirce’s taxonomy of types of phanerons will distinguish them on the basis of the differences in their indecomposable parts’ structures.]

 

[Recall from sections 1.284–1.287 that the phaneron is the sum of all phanerons, which are anything that can come before the mind’s awareness (in other words, they are phenomena in the phenomenological sense). This means that] we should always be able to determine that something is a phaneron so long as it is something that has come to our phenomenal awareness.  We next consider the elements of the phaneron that are logically indecomposable or at least that under our direct inspection we cannot decompose into smaller parts. Peirce will now attempt to produce a taxonomy of types of these indecomposable phenomenal components. There may be many ways to do this, of which Peirce is aware of two: one of them divides the types according the form of the indecomposable parts’ structures and the other divides the types according to the indecomposable parts’ matters. After much work on the second type, Peirce abandoned it, and now favors the method based on structure.

There can be no psychological difficulty in determining whether anything belongs to the phaneron or not; for what- | ever seems to be before the mind ipso facto is so, in my sense of the phrase. I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and there may be others. Of these two I know of, one is a division according to the form or structure of the elements, the other according to their matter. The two most passionately laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying to ascertain something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the attempt as beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself that they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all taxonomists of every department have found classifications according to structure to be the most important.

(p142-143)

 

 

1.289

[Since the indecomposable parts cannot be said to have an internal composition on the basis of which we might distinguish one type from another, we instead will use the external trait of valency, which, like in chemistry, means the number of connecting bonds one type can make with other types.]

 

[Peirce seems to first make the following point. If we decompose something into its indecomposable parts, that means we cannot distinguish one such part from another on the basis of their internal features. For, to do so would mean that one has a different internal composition than the others. But since they are indecomposable, that means they do not have any internal parts on the basis of which we might distinguish one from the other by means of their internal features. However, we could distinguish them on the basis of how one sort can interact with others, perhaps something like how we note as among the properties of a chemical substance its manners of interaction (or its non-interactability) with other materials. I regret that I do not know anything about chemistry. It seems that the divisions of chemical elements that Peirce gives corresponds roughly with the vertical groupings of elements in the periodic table. So the noble gasses, which tend not to form compounds with other elements, are roughly the elements that Peirce  calls medads, because they have a valency of 0. I suspect then that the next group of elements are those that tend to form a singular bond with other elements, and they are called monads. And so on through the rest of the groupings. Maybe the reason that these groupings do not correspond exactly to the periodic table groups is because the science of chemistry has since learned new things that contradict what was known at Peirce’s time. Let me quote.]

A reader may very intelligently ask, How is it possible for an indecomposable element to have any differences of structure? Of internal logical structure it would be clearly impossible. But of external structure, that is to say, structure of its possible compounds, limited differences of structure are possible; witness the chemical elements, of which the "groups," or vertical columns of Mendeléeff's table, are universally and justly recognized as ever so much more important than the "series," or horizontal ranks in the same table. Those columns are characterized by their several valencies, thus:

He, Ne, A, Kr, X are medads (μηδέν [méden] none + the patronymic = ιδης [idés]).

H, L [Li], Na, K, Cu, Rb, Ag, Cs,-,-, Au, are monads;

G [Gl], Mg, Ca, Zn, Sr, Cd, Ba, -,-, Hg, Rd [Ra], are dyads;

B, Al, Sc, Ga, Y, In, La, -, Yb, Tc [Tl], Ac are triads;

C, Si, Ti, Ge, Zr, Sn, Co [Ce], -, -, Pc [Pb], Th, are tetrads;

N, P, V, As, Cb, Sb, Pr [Nd], -, Ta, Bi, Po [Pa], are properly pentads (as PCL[5], though owing to the junction of two pegs they often appear as triads. Their pentad character is particularly required to explain certain phenomena of albumins);

O, S, Cr, Se, Mo, Te, Nd [Sm], -, W, -, U, are properly | hexads (though by junction of bonds they usually appear as dyads);

F, Cl, Mn, Br, -, I, are properly heptads (usually appearing as monads);

Fe, Co, Ni, Ru, Rh, Pd, -, -, -, Os, Tr [Ir], Pt, are octads; (Sm, Eu, Gd, Er, Tb, Bz [?], Cl [Ct], are not yet placed in the table.)

(pp.143-144)

 

 

1.290

[First Peirce will need to deal with the problem of him importing other notions into his phaneroscopy.]

 

In a similar manner to how chemical substances are grouped by valency, Peirce will distinguish types of phanerons on the basis of the valencies of their indecomposable parts. [But recall from section 1.287 that Peirce said his methodology will only involve an examination of the phenomenal givens and that it will not import other theories into the study of phanerons. Yet, here he seems to be doing just that with this notion of valency that we find in chemistry.] But this means that before moving on to the actual analysis of phanerons, Peirce will first need to deal with the problem of him importing preconceived notions into his phenomenological study.

So, then, since elements may have structure through valency, I invite the reader to join me in a direct inspection of the valency of elements of the phaneron. Why do I seem to see my reader draw back? Does he fear to be compromised by my bias, due to preconceived views? Oh, very well; yes, I do bring some convictions to the inquiry. But let us begin by subjecting these to criticism, postponing actual observation until all preconceptions are disposed of, one way or the other.

(p.144)

 

 

1.291

[Given the unviability of the one other possible method, it is necessary that we use valency to differentiate types of indecomposable phaneron parts.]

 

[(I do not follow this section, so you can skip to the quotation below.) For one reason or another, Peirce will now ask whether or not valency is the sole formal way that phanerons can possibly differ from one another. I am not sure what this has to do with preconceptions, as mentioned in the prior section. Perhaps the idea is that if he can show that it is necessary for us to use valency, then it does not matter if it is preconceived, because it is the only means and so it is necessary and thus furthermore we might have arrived upon it naturally anyway. (For, we would not have arrived upon any other means.) Putting aside the motivations for the question, the answer Peirce gives, and he admits this, is very puzzling, and I will not be able to give a good interpretation. To understand it, we need to know what he means by “relations between bonds”. Relations between parts I would think are bonds. But what are relations between bonds? Is it a numerical relation, as in one bond has for example two more valency values than another one? Or can one bond (holding between parts) create a relation of some sort with the others, like a bond between bonds themselves? The only sense I can give “relations between bonds” are the numerical valency relations. But then it gets even more confusing. We need next to distinguish (a) divisions by variations of such relations between bonds from (b) divisions according to valency. But according to the only sense I can give to (a), I am unable to distinguish it from (b). So without understanding the meanings here, I cannot give any interpretation for the first part of 1.291. I quote it below for your own interpretation. The next part I also cannot interpret. It seems we need to know about his notion of the ten trichotomies of signs. He shows then that the total number of classes for them is 59049. I am not sure what this has to do with phanerons. My best guess regarding the overall points is the following, but I caution that it is almost certainly wrong. The main idea seems to me to be that there is a pragmatic reason why we need to use valency as the determining trait. For, it will keep the number of classes down to a very small number. Were the number too large, it would no longer serve a taxonomic purpose, because we want to make the types comprehensible rather than incomprehensible. And they would become incomprehensible if there too many of them. Now, were we not to use valency, we would be using another means (I do not know what) which happens to make way to many classes. (That other means might for example be to classify the types on the basis of every possible combination of parts rather than on the number of other things each one sort tends to combine with. But I just guess.) So since this other way does not suit the purpose of the examination, we have just valency as the only viable means.]

First, then, let us ask whether or not valency is the sole formal respect in which elements of the phaneron can possibly vary. But seeing that the possibility of such a ground of division is dependent upon the possibility of multivalence, while the possibility of a division according to valency can in nowise be regarded as a result of relations between bonds, it follows that any division by variations of such relations must be taken as secondary to the division according to valency, if such division there be. Now (my logic here may be puzzling, but it is correct), since my ten trichotomies of signs, should they prove to be independent of one another (which is to be sure, highly improbable), would suffice to furnish us classes of signs to the number of

3¹⁰ = (3²)⁵ = (10-1)⁵ = 10⁵ - 5.10⁴
+ 10.10³ - 10.10²
+ 5.10 - 1
= 50000
+ 9000
+ 49
= 59049

(Voilà a lesson in vulgar arithmetic thrown in to boot!), which | calculation threatens a multitude of classes too great to be conveniently carried in one’s head, rather than a group inconveniently small, we shall, I think, do well to postpone preparations for further divisions until there be prospect of such a thing being wanted.

(pp.144-145)

 

 

1.292

[Phaneron elements can only be monads, dyads, and tetrads.]

 

So since we are using valency to divide phaneron elements, we will be finding them to be medads, monads, dyads, and the like. [We will for some reason think of the different ‘-ads’ as being ideas. Medads are indecomposable ideas that are logically severed from all other indecomposable ideas. Monads are indecomposable elements that are completely characterizable without reference to other elements. Dyads’ traits are ones that are based on relations to another thing, but without referring to some third thing. A triad’s traits involve two different relations with two other things. A medadic indecomposable phaneron part is impossible for some reason, perhaps because it would have no conceptual content whatsoever, even though it could in some sense come before our minds in an absolutely fleeting way. From Peirce description of the possible phenomenal medadic part, I wonder if it would be anything like a hyletic datum in Husserl’s phenomenology or a Deleuzian phenomenal pure differential relation. Peirce then claims that signs require triads. I am not sure why, but perhaps we learn later. He then says that it is evident that a triad cannot be reduced to monads or dyads. However, I did not follow his reasoning for this. Furthermore he says it can be proven that there is no higher valency than three, but I cannot begin to guess how this could be proven.]

If, then, there be any formal division of elements of the phaneron, there must be a division according to valency; and we may expect medads, monads, dyads, triads, tetrads, etc. Some of these, however, can be antecedently excluded, as impossible; although it is important to remember that these divisions are not exactly like the corresponding divisions of Existential Graphs, which have relation only to explicit indefinites. In the present application, a medad must mean an indecomposable idea altogether severed logically from every other; a monad will mean an element which, except that it is thought as applying to some subject, has no other characters than those which are complete in it without any reference to anything else; a dyad will be an elementary idea of something that would possess such characters as it does possess relatively to something else but regardless of any third object of any category; a triad would be an elementary idea of something which should be such as it were relatively to two others in different ways, but regardless of any fourth; and so on. Some of these, I repeat, are plainly impossible. A medad would be a flash of mental “heat-lightning” absolutely instantaneous, thunderless, unremembered, and altogether without effect. It can further be said in advance, not, indeed, purely a priori but with the degree of apriority that is proper to logic, namely, as a necessary deduction from the fact that there are signs, that there must be an elementary triad. For were every element of the phaneron a monad or a dyad, without the relative of teridentity (which is, of course, a triad), it is evident that no triad could ever be built up. Now the relation of every sign to its object and interpretant is plainly a triad. A triad might be built up of pentads or of any higher perissad elements in many ways. But it can be proved – and really with extreme simplicity, though the statement of the general proof is confusing – that no element can have a higher valency than three.

(p.145)

 

 

 

 

Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 1: Principles of Philosophy.  In Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [Two Volumes in One], Vols. 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 [1931].

 

.

Peirce (CP1.284–1.287) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, §1, “The Phaneron”

 

by Corry Shores

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Summary of

 

Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

 

Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy

 

Book 3: Phenomenology

 

Chapter 1: Introduction

 

§1: The Phaneron [1.284–1.287]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

Peirce develops his own sort of phenomenology. It is concerned with phanerons, which are basically phenomena, that is, they are anything that can be given to one’s mind, regardless of a correspondence to some objective reality in the physical world or to some physiological state – like brain states – of the person experiencing them. Peirce’s study of the phaneron (the sum total of all phanerons) is called phaneroscopy. Its primary task is determining a taxonomy of phaneron types, and methodologically it examines just phanerons and does not bring into that study any other theoretical notions.

 

 

Summary

 

1.284

[The phaneron is the sum total of all phenomena, which are anything capable of coming before one’s mind, regardless of whether they are real or not. Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron.]

 

[Previously, in section 1.186, Peirce divides philosophy into three branches, Phenomenology, Normative Science, and Metaphysics. He then defines phenomenology in this way.

Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way.

(1.186, p.78)

] Peirce will begin an account of his phenomenology; it studies phenomena, which are anything present to the mind in any way [see 1.86, p.78]. But he will introduce unique terminology. The first term to note is the phaneron. This is the sum total of all phenomena, that is, of all things which can come before the mind, whether really existing or not [hallucinated for example, or imagined]. Phaneroscopy, then, is the description of the phaneron.

Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron. I know that there is another series of elements imperfectly represented by Hegel's Categories. But I have been unable to give any satisfactory account of them.

(p.141)

 

 

1.285

[The phaneron is a little like the notion of idea in British philosophy of that time, but it is different, because the phaneron includes phenomena that do not correspond to really existing things.]

 

We find an unsatisfactory approximation of Peirce’ s notion of phaneron in some English philosophers’ notion of the idea. [But their notion of the idea does not extend to cases of phenomena that do not exist, so this concept is not the same.]

English philosophers have quite commonly used the word idea in a sense approaching to that which I give to phaneron. But in various ways they have restricted the meaning of it too much to cover my conception (if conception it can be called), besides giving a psychological connotation to their word which I am careful to exclude. The fact that they have the habit of saying that "there is no such idea" as this or that, in the very same breath in which they definitely describe the phaneron | in question, renders their term fatally inapt for my purpose.

(pp.141-142)

 

 

1.286

[Peirce’s phaneroscopy will classify the different types of phanerons.]

 

Phanerons more than anything else are apparent directly to our observations. Peirce will deal only with commonly experienced ones. This means we can better evaluate his claims. In fact, what he will say requires that we repeat his experience-descriptions for ourselves. Peirce’s phaneroscopy will do the following things: {1} distinguish types of phanerons, {2} describe each’s features, {3} show that although we can describe each type’s characteristic traits, at the same time, phanerons are so mixed up and bound together with one another that none can be isolated, {4} prove that there is only a short list of general phaneron types, and {5} carefully detail subdivisions within each general type.

There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories.

(142)

 

 

1.287

[Methodologically speaking, Peirce’s phaneroscopy works only with phenomenal givens and makes its claims just on their basis; it does not presuppose other theoretical notions.]

 

Peirce’s phaneroscopy is concerned merely with phenomena in their phenomenal givenness. He will not deal with questions regarding their correspondence to reality, neither to a real physical world outside us nor to our own physiology, as with brain states. Rather, it will carefully analyze small details in phenomenal givenness and at the same time try to make on their basis very broad generalizations. We also take as a methodological principle a rejection of any pregiven knowledge on the matter. Rather, we only work with what is phenomenally given and with what can be said about it on its basis.

It will be plain from what has been said that phaneroscopy has nothing at all to do with the question of how far the phanerons it studies correspond to any realities. It religiously abstains from all speculation as to any relations between its categories and physiological facts, cerebral or other. It does not undertake, but sedulously avoids, hypothetical explanations of any sort. It simply scrutinizes the direct appearances, and endeavors to combine minute accuracy with the broadest possible generalization. The student's great effort is not to be influenced by any tradition, any authority, any reasons for supposing that such and such ought to be the facts, or any fancies of any kind, and to confine himself to honest, single-minded observation of the appearances. The reader, upon his side, must repeat the author's observations for himself, and decide from his own observations whether the author's account of the appearances is correct or not.

(p.142)

 

 

 

Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 1: Principles of Philosophy.  In Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [Two Volumes in One], Vols. 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 [1931].