Showing posts with label art. Show all posts
Showing posts with label art. Show all posts

28 Jul 2020

Breeur (Apx) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Appendix: “The Last Thought”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Roland Breeur, entry directory]

[Breeur, Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, entry directory]

 

[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased here.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Roland Breeur

[Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page]

 

Lies – Imposture – Stupidity

 

Appendix

“The Last Thought: An Essay on Edgar Hilsenrath’s  Novel The Story of the Last Thought

 

 

 

 

 

Very brief summary:

Bare factual reporting does not suffice as the truth. For, it completely lacks the power of the truth, and in fact, by itself only makes truth vulnerable to violation and erasure. Facts can be falsified, deemphasized, ignored, and scrubbed from the records. They have no power of self-insistence in that sense. Historically speaking, the truths of great atrocities committed by groups in power over minorities are often hidden from public view. But what can be hidden is limited to truths of a factual formulation. There is also the truth of the anguish and injustice of the victims. Their voices are often muted and their stories are excluded from the story of history’s sequence of events. But that does not mean their cries and raw affects of pain and indignation have no bearing upon history and its unjust aggressors. These affects can be given articulation by literature and art, which are not constrained by the requirements of factual reporting. Rather, story and artistically fashioned imagery can speak this anguish in a way that imposes those affects upon us, haunting the unjust and alerting and reminding all of us that this pain was, is, and will always be more real and concrete than any historical record. In a sense, then, such works of art take that cry out of its singular moment when it happened and after which it was erased, and place that cry beyond the meddling reach of unjust actors inside the flow of history. These cries lie outside the limits of historical time. Yet, each moment of history becomes infused by them. The cries haunt and linger always. It is in this way that truth has power: the power to defy history, to escape time, to give voice the those unjustly victimized  and silenced, and to create an affective recording and replaying with a power of self-insistence completely lacking in factual articulations of truth. One exemplary instance of such a work of literature is Edgar Hilsenrath’s Das Märchen vom letzten Gedanken. It’s imagery of torture of Armenian peoples, for instance of stopping up their bodily holes to metaphorically force them to keep inside their expressions of pain and injustice, and of violating their bodies in other ways too, may not always be factually accurate (although also not too far from actual events) and may in fact by fantastical and lie outside the logic and truth of our so-called “real world;” nonetheless, the affective reality they articulate is more real than even the most factual, objective retelling, which is fundamentally incapable of expressing and responding to grave injustice.

 

 

Brief summary (collecting those below):

(Apx.1) Edgar Hilsenrath’s Das Märchen vom letzten Gedanken (The Story of the Last Thought) (1988) tells a story of the suffering of the Armenian people during the 1915 genocide but under a quasi-mythological mode of narrative. This does not make it untrue; rather, it tells a certain kind of truth that would escape a more factual sort of retelling, because that truth carries a pain that no such objective report could capture: “Edgar Hilsenrath seems to offer a quasi-mythological account of the Great Massacres. Not in the sense that what he says isn’t true, but in the sense that his account is of a truth for which history lacks words. In that sense, it is not about ‘facts’ but about events of woe and suffering that make holes in the body of history. What happened in 1895 and 1915 transcends the reality of historical facts and acquires something sadly universal, it resonates forever outside time and reality, and for that reason it haunts the thoughts of those who survived, | generation after generation, in the form of dreams, nightmares, or last thoughts” (90-91). (Apx.2) In the story, the character Meddah recounts the events to Thovma, the son of Vartan, who is traditionally a Christian Armenian hero. (Recall that the title of the novel translates as The Story of the Last Thought.) “Thovma’s ‘last thought’ will be of the suffering of those who lived, and died, before him” (91). (Apx.3) Thovma’s mother is Anahit. She dreamt that she heard a voice saying she should have named Thovma as Hayk instead. Thovma’s last thought (which is “of the suffering of those who lived, and died, before him”) will similarly take the form of a whisper that will join all the other last thoughts of the murdered Armenians, haunting the souls of those who killed them. For, it is believed that these whispers cause them nightmares. Hilsenrath speaks from his experience of persecution as a Jew. The novel’s fairy-tale format itself haunts the reader, thereby transcending historical documentation (91). “In this sense, the storyteller is not simply on the page, he is in our head – indeed, he is telling his story to us so that it will be our last thought, hidden in our last cry” (91). (Apx.4) The novel’s story is about the life of Vartan (Thovma’s father). Turkish authorities wanted to scapegoat him and his people for starting the first World War, so they try to force him to confess to the patently absurd accusation that he assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The charges were dropped; he survived the genocide, went to Switzerland and then Poland. He lost his papers, was mistaken for a Jew, and was sent to a camp where he died. (Apx.5) Vartan (Thovma’s father) at one point was hanged upside down and tortured by Turks. They want to interrogate him the next day, so they need him alive. But they fear he may have eaten poisoned food. Yet, to make him vomit, the policeman rapes him orally. In the room is a torch that casts shadows of the scene on the wall, like Turkish shadow puppets. The provincial governor notes to the chief constable how the incredible imagery on the wall is “Real art. There’s no people in the world that can surpass us in the shadow play” (92). (Apx.6) Later, after Vartan refuses to sign a confession, they punish him by filling his bodily orifices with mortar, causing him to be unable to excrete urine or feces. This serves two purposes in the novel. It prepares us for other descriptions of human depraved behavior, and it establishes an image for how human nature shapes human history. Our bodies are understood as being permeable by harmful, protrusive objects, and they possess such weapon-like appendages that are used to violate other bodies. Even the first appearance of a tooth is on the one hand an internal penetration of the tooth through the gum, but then can be a weapon to permeate other bodies through biting. (Apx.7) In the novel’s anatomical imagery, the processes of life are also bound up with those of death. The penis, for instance, is an organ of procreation but is symbolically one of death, because it is associated with violent threats of harmful physical violation of women. (Apx.8) Hilsenrath thematizes the limits between inside and outside, both on the bodily and cultural levels. It is inhuman when intruders violate a social body or when outsiders are denied safety within. But the provincial governor is irritated by the fact that the Armenians are not in a position to strictly adhere to these boundaries, as they are geographically distributed on both sides of the frontier with Russia. The Turks even take up false beliefs to blame the Armenians for why they cannot tolerate them, for instance, that they bake needles into their baklava: this is a metaphor for why they cannot “stomach” the Armenian people. (Apx.9) According to Hilsenrath, human dignity is attacked when the vital processes of procreation are confused or conflated with those of digestion and defecation. Thovma, born during the deportation, was said to have been shitted out. (Apx.10) Human history is portrayed as the production of defecated (shitted-out) peoples who are dealt with cruelly, both with violence but also with intentional forgetting in the records. Historians will not be able to capture the truth of this mistreatment and erasure, because they deal too generally and abstractly with events when in fact each individual endured their own unique suffering that defies objective description. (Apx.11) History is impotent at preventing travesties such as genocide. The Armenians had to bear witness to their destruction silently and helplessly. This is portrayed as the eye of an Armenian being nailed to a cross in the place of Jesus. (Apx.12) Before thinking his last thought, Thovma had a strange dream where the prime minister of Turkey was troubled by the (intentionally made) gaps in history which can be filled by the haunting whispers of victims. The minister considers the possibility that everyone who has ever been persecuted all whisper at once. It would create terrible nightmares, the minister notes and then wonders, “what’s the sense of it?” Thovma replies by asking, “Who says everything has to make sense?” after which he “breathed out his soul.” (Apx.13) History moves forward in a “blind, deaf, and dumb evolution.” While the whispers of its victims may not “make sense” or stimulate historical progress, its blind evolution can still be resisted by them: it can be “an intense scream, one which remains outside history, which resists being digested and crushed by it.” The “last thought” of Thovma, the cry of history’s victims, is not assimilated into history; rather,  it stands at its limit, haunting the durationless gap that comes after it. (In a sense, it affirms a superior temporality to that of History): “The Story of the Last Thought is in this sense like an intense scream, one which remains outside history, which resists being digested and crushed by it. [...] The story contains the thought of a body that has been tortured and pierced. That thought remains in history and time, it can be heard, but only as the last thought, heard at the limit and at the instant of its disappearance.” The book itself expresses or articulates such a cry, which, while happening within the course of history and perhaps lasting no more than an instant in that flow, exists in an eternity that is greater than all of Mistory: “Maybe this last thought, fragile yet insistent, is also a good image in order to describe the position of the writer. The cry it hides is a last cry that lasts forever, even if within history and measured in historical scales it lasts only for one second. It is not long, but it is possible that ‘eternity is shorter than a fraction of a second. It’s measured in a different way’.” (Apx.14) The last scream and thoughts of History’s victims may come at History’s limit, but they “fly back home, they will become whispers that haunt the guilty parties who seek to erase the names and traces of their victims.” Fashioning such whispers is the task of literature and art. We might otherwise think that all that is needed for justice would be a historical, factual recounting of atrocities. The problem with this is that it is impotent and lacks the haunting power that can only come when voice is given to the silent, unarticulated “voices” that History (and its cruel drivers) tries to mute and erase from its course. The fact that The Story of the Last Thought is not factually true does not at all subtract from its importance in setting the historical record straight. Although its fantastical imagery creates a new reality, it is one whose affective powers haunt us as readers and speak truth to injustice in a way that cannot be denied, ignored, or erased from the record. Thus it is not telling untruths; rather, it is telling the truth differently. (Truth is something that obtains its real, undeniable power over the course of events and also its full veridicality only by being twisted artistically into alternate forms that capture the raw, affective intensity of History’s muted victims.) “The truth that everyone knows but tries to ignore, to repress, or to forget – that is the truth that art must tell. Hilsenrath’s novel tells the truth in a manner that is more intense than ‘mere’ History, in a manner that is not compromised by the exigencies proper to other discourses. Its constraints are those related to what makes a novel into something real, a reality of its own, a real work of art. And the quality of this work – the intensity of its emotions, the tragedy of its characters, the absurdity of its follies – makes it the most powerful and faithful reflection, representation, and evocation of the reality to which it refers” (98).

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

Apx.1

[Hilsenrath’s Das Märchen vom letzten Gedanken as Fiction Telling Deeper Truth]

 

Apx.2

[The Novel’s Narrator Character as Meddah Narrating to Thovma]

 

Apx.3

[The Haunting of the Last Thoughts]

 

Apx.4

[Vartan’s Plight]

 

Apx.5

[Vartan’s Hanging Rape and Shadow Play]

 

Apx.6

[Vartan’s Torture: Orifices Stopped Up]

 

Apx.7

[Death and Reproductive Organs]

 

Apx.8

[Social Body Boundaries and Their Violations]

 

Apx.9

[Loss of Human Dignity from the Confusion of Procreation and Digestion/Defecation]

 

Apx.10

[History’s Memory Failure]

 

Apx.12

[The Haunting of All Victims’ Collective Whispers]

 

Apx.13

[The Temporal Superiority over History of the Last Thought and Scream]

 

Apx.14

[The Full Truth: Modulating the Truth with the Affectivity of History’s Victims]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

Apx.1

[Hilsenrath’s Das Märchen vom letzten Gedanken as Fiction Telling Deeper Truth]

 

[Edgar Hilsenrath’s Das Märchen vom letzten Gedanken (The Story of the Last Thought) (1988) tells a story of the suffering of the Armenian people during the 1915 genocide but under a quasi-mythological mode of narrative. This does not make it untrue; rather, it tells a certain kind of truth that would escape a more factual sort of retelling, because that truth carries a pain that no such objective report could capture: “Edgar Hilsenrath seems to offer a quasi-mythological account of the Great Massacres. Not in the sense that what he says isn’t true, but in the sense that his account is of a truth for which history lacks words. In that sense, it is not about ‘facts’ but about events of woe and suffering that make holes in the body of history. What happened in 1895 and 1915 transcends the reality of historical facts and acquires something sadly universal, it resonates forever outside time and reality, and for that reason it haunts the thoughts of those who survived, | generation after generation, in the form of dreams, nightmares, or last thoughts” (90-91).]

 

[ditto]

- ‘‘And so,” said Bülbül to little Vartan, “that is how I was pierced and knew that man is only flesh and blood and so can be pierced.”

These are the words the midwife Bülbül says to the small Vartan, the main character in Hilsenrath’s famous novel Das Märchen vom letzten Gedanken (The Story of the Last Thought), published in 1988, in which the German writer tells the story of the sufferings of the Armenians and the genocide of 1915 as reflected in the history of the Khatisian family. Using the form of an Oriental fairy tale with references to the Armenian sagas and legends (to the stories of Hayk, to the King Agbar, to the pre-Christian myth of the fertility goddess Anahit, and to the Christian Armenian hero Vartan and Saint Gregor, etc.), Edgar Hilsenrath seems to offer a quasi-mythological account of the Great Massacres. Not in the sense that what he says isn’t true, but in the sense that his account is of a truth for which history lacks words. In that sense, it is not about “facts” but about events of woe and suffering that make holes in the body of history. What happened in 1895 and 1915 transcends the reality of historical facts and acquires something sadly universal, it resonates forever outside time and reality, and for that reason it haunts the thoughts of those who survived, | generation after generation, in the form of dreams, nightmares, or last thoughts.

(90-91)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.2

[The Novel’s Narrator Character as Meddah Narrating to Thovma]

 

[In the story, the character Meddah recounts the events to Thovma, the son of Vartan, who is traditionally a Christian Armenian hero. (Recall that the title of the novel translates as The Story of the Last Thought.) “Thovma’s ‘last thought’ will be of the suffering of those who lived, and died, before him” (91).]

 

[ditto]

The events in the novel are recounted by the character Meddah (whose name is derived from the name given to traditional Turkish storytellers) to Vartan’s son, Thovma, who is dying. Hence, upon hearing the events recounted to him by Meddah, Thovma’s “last thought” will be of the suffering of those who lived, and died, before him.

(91)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.3

[The Haunting of the Last Thoughts]

 

[Thovma’s mother is Anahit. She dreamt that she heard a voice saying she should have named Thovma as Hayk instead. Thovma’s last thought (which is “of the suffering of those who lived, and died, before him”) will similarly take the form of a whisper that will join all the other last thoughts of the murdered Armenians, haunting the souls of those who killed them. For, it is believed that these whispers cause them nightmares. Hilsenrath speaks from his experience of persecution as a Jew. The novel’s fairy-tale format itself haunts the reader, thereby transcending historical documentation (91). “In this sense, the storyteller is not simply on the page, he is in our head – indeed, he is telling his story to us so that it will be our last thought, hidden in our last cry” (91).]

 

[ditto]

Thovma’s last thought, it is said, is beyond time; it has hidden itself in the last “cry of fear” and waits there to “sail out into the air” through one’s “gaping mouth.” Where? Back to Hayastan. Indeed, at the end of the book, his last thought joins the last thoughts of his parents, Vartan and Anahit. Anahit had a dream: When her son left her body, she heard a voice saying that, rather than Thovma, he should be named Hayk. Therefore, after having died, Thovma’s last thought will whisper along with all the last thoughts of all the murdered Armenians and will forever haunt the souls of their persecutors. For, it is said, when these whispers travel through the night, the Turks have nightmares. Discernible in Hilsenrath’s writing is a sensitivity and knowledge possessed by someone who was himself, a Jew born in 1926, persecuted and who survived the most harrowing circumstances.103 And, as only a great writer can, he transcends historical documentation. Though his novel is historical, there is more involved than mere facts of history. On the strength of its fairy tale style, its complex structure and symbolism, the voice of its narrator, etc., Hilsenrath’s novel haunts the reader. In this sense, the storyteller is not simply on the page, he is in our head – indeed, he is telling his story to us so that it will be our last thought, hidden in our last cry.

(91)

103. See his earlier novel Night (New York: Doubleday, [1964] 1966).

(92)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.4

[Vartan’s Plight]

 

[The novel’s story is about the life of Vartan (Thovma’s father). Turkish authorities wanted to scapegoat him and his people for starting the first World War, so they try to force him to confess to the patently absurd accusation that he assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The charges were dropped; he survived the genocide, went to Switzerland and then Poland. He lost his papers, was mistaken for a Jew, and was sent to a camp where he died.]

 

[ditto]

The novel charts the vicissitudes of Vartan’s life from the first arrests and crimes against the Armenians until his death during World War II. Vartan was imprisoned and tortured by the Turkish authorities. They wanted him to incriminate himself and indict his people for being behind a great world | conspiracy against the Turkish culture and nation. However, his alleged crime – of assassinating the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and initiating World War I – seemed so ludicrous even to Turkey’s allies (i.e. German officers) that, in order to avoid international embarrassment, the matter was dropped. Vartan went on to survive the Genocide, then he made his way to Switzerland during World War II, and then he finally ended up in Poland. There, after losing his papers, he was arrested during a raid, mistaken for a Jew, and taken to a concentration camp, which is where he died.

(91-92)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.5

[Vartan’s Hanging Rape and Shadow Play]

 

[Vartan (Thovma’s father) at one point was hanged upside down and tortured by Turks. They want to interrogate him the next day, so they need him alive. But they fear he may have eaten poisoned food. Yet, to make him vomit, the policeman rapes him orally. In the room is a torch that casts shadows of the scene on the wall, like Turkish shadow puppets. The provincial governor notes to the chief constable how the incredible imagery on the wall is “Real art. There’s no people in the world that can surpass us in the shadow play” (92).]

 

[ditto]

For all intents and purposes, the story begins with the image of three Armenians having been hanged at the gate Babi-Sé adet, the gate of blessedness. That’s where Thovma’s last thought sits and listens to Meddah, who tells of Thovma’s imprisoned father. After a while, they go to Vartan’s cell, and they see that he is also hanging, but, rather than hang him by the neck (“only by the legs...and legs have no necks”), they hanged him upside down. His fate will be decided soon enough. Since they plan to interrogate him the following morning, and since they fear that he has been poisoned by the bulgur he could have eaten, they want to make him vomit. That’s where one of the Saptieh (policemen) rapes him orally. The whole scene is described as a Karagös, “the classic Turkish shadow play that Europeans have always admired,” due to the way one of the Saptiehs’ torch projects the imagery onto the opposite wall. On the other side of the cell:

– “Look, Vali Bey,” said the Mudir (chief constable). “It’s most incredible, what’s being played on the wall. And yet it’s only a wall.”

– “That is art,” said the Vali (provincial governor). “Real art. There’s no people in the world that can surpass us in the shadow play.”

(92)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.6

[Vartan’s Torture: Orifices Stopped Up]

 

[Later, after Vartan refuses to sign a confession, they punish him by filling his bodily orifices with mortar, causing him to be unable to excrete urine or feces. This serves two purposes in the novel. It prepares us for other descriptions of human depraved behavior, and it establishes an image for how human nature shapes human history. Our bodies are understood as being permeable by harmful, protrusive objects, and they possess such weapon-like appendages that are used to violate other bodies. Even the first appearance of a tooth is on the one hand an internal penetration of the tooth through the gum, but then can be a weapon to permeate other bodies through biting.]

 

[ditto]

However, somewhat later, since he does not want to sign his confession of being one of the organizers of the so-called ‘‘Armenian conspiracy,” they literally stop or seal up his holes, i.e. his bodily orifices, with mortar, forcing his body to retain its excrement and urine, i.e. to keep what it has digested or was forced to swallow. With the cruelty that it evokes, this is a central passage in the whole book. First, it sets the stage for the descriptions of the depraved behaviour human beings are capable of, and second, it serves as an image or a metaphor for what the author suggests is constitutive of human history. In this novel, Hilsenrath suggests that a considerable amount of human behaviour is determined by physical/sexual lust, sadism, and violence. The body is defined as that which can be drilled into, or perforated, or, as the midwife Bübül declares to Vartan after having been raped by a Prince, pierced; it can be pierced by “a Kurd’s knife, for example,” or “a Turk’s knife,” or “a rifle bullet,” or even “the living death’’ that men have between their legs. Bübül tells this sad story the very day that Vartan is about to get his first tooth. The implication is that one can indeed be pierced from without, but also from within. Why is that? Because, explains Bübül, ‘‘Allah’’ wants to show that all which is made of flesh and blood can be pierced, and, as soon as a person grows teeth, he inherits the ability to bite, to crush, to pierce, even to kill.

(93)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.7

[Death and Reproductive Organs]

 

[In the novel’s anatomical imagery, the processes of life are also bound up with those of death. The penis, for instance, is an organ of procreation but is symbolically one of death, because it is associated with violent threats of harmful physical violation of women.]

 

[ditto]

Hilsenrath plays with the idea that the processes of life are inextricably bound up with the processes of death and decay. The male organ of procreation is compared to a weapon, it is described as an organ of death and putrefaction. The penis of the Kaiser is compared to the canons he supplies to the Turkish army, those of Russian soldiers are compared to disgusting worms, etc. And it is said precisely that a male’s dignity depends on what dangles between his legs. It sometimes even seems as if some males are metonymically indicated through their penises. For example, Hilsenrath tells us of how the Armenian wives of the village panicked every time they saw Kurds coming down the mountains to their village. For | them, the Kurd “is every inch of him the symbol of a thrusting, fleshy, irresistible penis,” and, since Armenians were prohibited from carrying weapons, they were defenceless against the Kurds’ libidinal aggressions. Hence the importance of virginity, as well: The small fragile membrane that protects young girls against the aggression from without is also used as an image or a metaphor for what protects humans against the inhuman. Death, rape, and violence are linked to aggressive intrusions (into the body, into the town, into a culture), and the first thing that the enemy does to punish Armenian males is to emasculate or castrate them.

(93-94)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.8

[Social Body Boundaries and Their Violations]

 

[Hilsenrath thematizes the limits between inside and outside, both on the bodily and cultural levels. It is inhuman when intruders violate a social body or when outsiders are denied safety within. But the provincial governor is irritated by the fact that the Armenians are not in a position to strictly adhere to these boundaries, as they are geographically distributed on both sides of the frontier with Russia. The Turks even take up false beliefs to blame the Armenians for why they cannot tolerate them, for instance, that they bake needles into their baklava: this is a metaphor for why they cannot “stomach” the Armenian people.]

 

[ditto]

Throughout the story, Hilsenrath continuously stresses the vital importance of limits between the inside and the outside, on biological and cultural levels. Inhuman situations occur as a result of aggressive intrusions from without and/or from “outsiders” being denied any space/place within. What irritates the “Vali” about the Armenians is the fact that they live on both sides of the frontier (“Four Million at our side, one Million at the side of the Russians”). That’s dangerous. Limited by no one and by nothing, they proliferate like vermin and rats. Even worse, they want to make believe that the Turks themselves are responsible for the fact that they cannot stand them. The Armenian bakers are said to put needles in their baklava – this is part of the world conspiracy – to make them, the Turks, believe it’s the fault of their own stomachs if they cannot digest that which is unusual or strange. Fortunately for him, at least according to the Meddah, the screams of Armenian prisoners (“those infidels”) being tortured acted on the Mudir as an effective digestive aid. Stimulating his digestion, he no longer needed any more castor oil.

(94)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.9

[Loss of Human Dignity from the Confusion of Procreation and Digestion/Defecation]

 

[According to Hilsenrath, human dignity is attacked when the vital processes of procreation are confused or conflated with those of digestion and defecation. Thovma, born during the deportation, was said to have been shitted out.]

 

[ditto]

During their so-called “deportation,” or during instances of sexual and/or violent assault, Armenians were deprived of their human dignity. There was not only a despoiling of the limit between the human and the animal (they were seen as rats), there was also the destruction of the limit between purely biological processes of digestion and defecation on the one | hand and sexual processes of procreation and birth on the other. Hilsenrath suggests that assaults on human dignity occur when these vital processes are confused/conflated. Born in an inhuman situation during the deportation, Thovma is said to have been defecated. “He was a crying piece of shit.”

– “Your father’s childhood ... the village of Yedisu ... the furtive eyes of the Kurds up in the mountains ... the death in the files of the Turkish authorities that sooner or later emerges from the files to clean up forgotten provinces ... the Sultan in Constantinople who doesn’t like Christians, especially Armenians... rumors ..? somewhere at the ass of the World.”

(94-95)

 

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.10

[History’s Memory Failure]

 

[Human history is portrayed as the production of defecated (shitted-out) peoples who are dealt with cruelly, both with violence but also with intentional forgetting in the records. Historians will not be able to capture the truth of this mistreatment and erasure, because they deal too generally and abstractly with events when in fact each individual endured their own unique suffering that defies objective description.]

 

[ditto]

In point of fact, history itself is presented as a process of digestion and defecation. In the name of some great historical unity and progress, more than one million people were treated as “crying pieces of shit” and as if they were defecated out of history. In order to unify that History, however, or to “restore its order,” many lies and fictions have to be told (the “world conspiracy”) and “shadow plays” have to be performed. Either that or what had been excluded must be forgotten and all traces erased. There is certainly a lot of dust on “Forgotten History” files. Of course, there are archives, filing cabinets with open shelves, etc., but a file that is as old as the Armenian Genocide will have been “covered in dust for ages”; dusting it off would undoubtedly raise “clouds of dust,” and, since the cleaning ladies of the “United Nations have asthma,” this would surely cause more than a few coughing fits. “What’s forgotten mustn’t be dusted. It’s too dangerous.” History is thus (not surprisingly) riddled with holes. Hilsenrath is in this sense quite cynical about the role historians play in the acts of filling in the holes of history with the “mortar” of their discourses.

– “Given their lack of imagination,” says Meddah, “they’ll just look for figures to delimit the masses of the dead – as they | will say, to record them – and then they’ll look for words to describe the great massacre and classify it pedantically. They don’t know that every human being is unique, that even the village idiot in your father’s village has the right to a name. They will call the great massacre ‘mass-murder,’ and the scholars among them will say it’s called ‘genocide.’ Not one smart aleck among them will say it’s called ‘armenocide,’ and in the end some crank will look up his dictionary and finally announce that it is called ‘holocaust!”’

(95-96)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.11

[Helpless Witnesses to Destruction]

 

[History is impotent at preventing travesties such as genocide. The Armenians had to bear witness to their destruction silently and helplessly. This is portrayed as the eye of an Armenian being nailed to a cross in the place of Jesus.]

 

[ditto]

The witness testimonies published after the massacres of Sassoun in 1894 didn’t prevent the massacre of Erzurum of the 30th of October 1895, to say nothing of what took place in the Armenian Genocide during World War 1 and in the Holocaust during World War II. Nevertheless, politicians like to appeal to the historians for serious research about the “facts” for which their own governments should have taken responsibility. At a certain moment in the novel, Meddah says that he sees a cross. ‘‘And hanging on the cross is, not Jesus Christ, but the eye of an Armenian. A Turk nails it up.” It is as if the Armenians were reduced to being the silent and crucified witnesses of their own destruction. “If you want to know if someone is Armenian, look into his eyes.”

(96)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.12

[The Haunting of All Victims’ Collective Whispers]

 

[Before thinking his last thought, Thovma had a strange dream where the prime minister of Turkey was troubled by the (intentionally made) gaps in history which can be filled by the haunting whispers of victims. The minister considers the possibility that everyone who has ever been persecuted all whisper at once. It would create terrible nightmares, the minister notes and then wonders, “what’s the sense of it?” Thovma replies by asking, “Who says everything has to make sense?” after which he “breathed out his soul.”]

 

[ditto]

Before thinking his last thought, right at the beginning of the novel, Thovma tells Meddah about his strange dream. He dreamt that he had been talking to the Turkish prime minister. “Who are you?” he asked. “I’m your Armenian psychiatrist” was the reply. The next morning, the minister came to his consulting room and admitted that he had been having nightmares. Why? Because of the Armenians, answered Thovma. “They were wiped out by the Turks.” And there’s “nothing about it in our history books,” said the minister, “on account of the gap in history,” added Thovma. That is why the minister was so frightened. He dreamt about nothing but gaps and holes, all to be filled with the whispers of the last thoughts of those who left the world in torment. “Whispering | is infectious.” Other victims could begin to whisper. Imagine what a whispering there would be “if everybody in the world who’s been persecuted suddenly began to whisper their complaint[s]!” Think of all the nightmares that could keep us awake. “Who wants that? And what’s the sense of it?” Thovma answered the minister’s question with a question of his own: “Who says everything has to make sense?” And then “he breathed out his soul.”

(96-97)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.13

[The Temporal Superiority over History of the Last Thought and Scream]

 

[History moves forward in a “blind, deaf, and dumb evolution.” While the whispers of its victims may not “make sense” or stimulate historical progress, its blind evolution can still be resisted by them: it can be “an intense scream, one which remains outside history, which resists being digested and crushed by it.” The “last thought” of Thovma, the cry of history’s victims, is not assimilated into history; rather,  it stands at its limit, haunting the durationless gap that comes after it. (In a sense, it affirms a superior temporality to that of History): “The Story of the Last Thought is in this sense like an intense scream, one which remains outside history, which resists being digested and crushed by it. [...] The story contains the thought of a body that has been tortured and pierced. That thought remains in history and time, it can be heard, but only as the last thought, heard at the limit and at the instant of its disappearance.” The book itself expresses or articulates such a cry, which, while happening within the course of history and perhaps lasting no more than an instant in that flow, exists in an eternity that is greater than all of Mistory: “Maybe this last thought, fragile yet insistent, is also a good image in order to describe the position of the writer. The cry it hides is a last cry that lasts forever, even if within history and measured in historical scales it lasts only for one second. It is not long, but it is possible that ‘eternity is shorter than a fraction of a second. It’s measured in a different way’.”]

 

[ditto]

To be sure, from the point of view of History, none of these whispers make sense. All the trouble and digestive disturbances they would create wouldn’t stimulate historical progress. But if History and all the things that have been perpetrated in its name and authority incarnate what is called “being human,” then all whispering disturbances, the whispering of all those who have been crushed under History’s feet or who have been expelled/excluded from it, must be encouraged in order to resist its blind, deaf, and dumb evolution. The Story of the Last Thought is in this sense like an intense scream, one which remains outside history, which resists being digested and crushed by it. It insists and persists through the kind of time that History imposes on the world, but, for all that, it is not a real eternity. The story contains the thought of a body that has been tortured and pierced. That thought remains in history and time, it can be heard, but only as the last thought, heard at the limit and at the instant of its disappearance. Maybe this last thought, fragile yet insistent, is also a good image in order to describe the position of the writer. The cry it hides is a last cry that lasts forever, even if within history and measured in historical scales it lasts only for one second. It is not long, but it is possible that “eternity is shorter than a fraction of a second. It’s measured in a different way.”

(97)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

Apx.14

[The Full Truth: Modulating the Truth with the Affectivity of History’s Victims]

 

[The last scream and thoughts of History’s victims may come at History’s limit, but they “fly back home, they will become whispers that haunt the guilty parties who seek to erase the names and traces of their victims.” Fashioning such whispers is the task of literature and art. We might otherwise think that all that is needed for justice would be a historical, factual recounting of atrocities. The problem with this is that it is impotent and lacks the haunting power that can only come when voice is given to the silent, unarticulated “voices” that History (and its cruel drivers) tries to mute and erase from its course. The fact that The Story of the Last Thought is not factually true does not at all subtract from its importance in setting the historical record straight. Although its fantastical imagery creates a new reality, it is one whose affective powers haunt us as readers and speak truth to injustice in a way that cannot be denied, ignored, or erased from the record. Thus it is not telling untruths; rather, it is telling the truth differently. (Truth is something that obtains its real, undeniable power over the course of events and also its full veridicality only by being twisted artistically into alternate forms that capture the raw, affective intensity of History’s muted victims.) “The truth that everyone knows but tries to ignore, to repress, or to forget – that is the truth that art must tell. Hilsenrath’s novel tells the truth in a manner that is more intense than ‘mere’ History, in a manner that is not compromised by the exigencies proper to other discourses. Its constraints are those related to what makes a novel into something real, a reality of its own, a real work of art. And the quality of this work – the intensity of its emotions, the tragedy of its characters, the absurdity of its follies – makes it the most powerful and faithful reflection, representation, and evocation of the reality to which it refers” (98).]

[ditto]

In this last scream, the last thoughts of those who suffered from History will be drowned out. So these thoughts will fly back home, they will become whispers that haunt the guilty parties who seek to erase the names and traces of their victims. From this perspective, the task of literature, of art, is a | serious one. Its task is not to create shadow plays that facilitate “escape,” nor to tell entertaining stories that are “unreal,” nor even to tell “other truths”; its task is to tell the truth differently. The truth that everyone knows but tries to ignore, to repress, or to forget – that is the truth that art must tell. Hilsenrath’s novel tells the truth in a manner that is more intense than “mere” History, in a manner that is not compromised by the exigencies proper to other discourses. Its constraints are those related to what makes a novel into something real, a reality of its own, a real work of art. And the quality of this work – the intensity of its emotions, the tragedy of its characters, the absurdity of its follies – makes it the most powerful and faithful reflection, representation, and evocation of the reality to which it refers. Not many books or novels which refer to or represent the Armenian genocide have been able to reach this level of intensity and quality. Hilsenrath’s novel does.

(97-98)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

Breeur, Roland. Lies – Imposture – Stupidity. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.

The book can be purchased here.

 

Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page.

.

 

 

.

31 Aug 2017

Nietzsche (1) The Birth of Tragedy, section 1 [On the Apolline/Dionysiac distinction and on the primordial unity between humans and between them and nature], with Deleuze’s commentary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

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[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary and boldface in quotations are my own additions. Paragraph enumerations are my own, but they follow the paragraph divisions of the German text. Proofreading is incomplete, so you will encounter typos and other distracting and problematic errors, including such things as inaccurate page citations for example. So please trust the original sources over my summarization and citation. Notes on Deleuze’s commentary is given in this shade of red.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Friedrich Nietzsche

 

Die Geburt der Tragödie

The Birth of Tragedy

L’origine de la tragédie

 

Section

1

[On the Apolline/Dionysiac distinction and on the primordial unity between humans and between them and nature.]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

There is a primordial unity where all things and people are joined together without sharp distinctions separating them. And there are two main tendencies in Ancient Greek art:

{1} The Apolline. It is associated with image- or sculpture-based art and with poetry. To Apollo belongs the world of dream and semblance. It is a source of intelligibility and pleasure, even when the images are dark and gloomy. In this realm of semblance, things are intelligible and have forms that on the one hand allow for different things to be distinguished from one another and that on the other hand allow human individuals to distinguish themselves from both other human individuals and from the world as a whole. Thus even though the Apolline involves a realm of semblance, appearance, and illusion, one never enters into a pathological [delirious] state where one confuses dream and reality and blur together the things in the world, including oneself and others. One thus checks one’s “wilder impulses” and instead has the “wise calm” of Apollo, while holding on to the principle of individuation (principium individuationis) that allows intelligible distinctions to hold. [Thus the Apolline tendency in artistic practice breaks one from the primordial unity.]

{2} The Dionysiac. It is associated with the imageless art of music. To Dionysus belongs the realm Bacchic intoxication and revelry, where the principle of individuation does not hold. Here one loses one’s sense of distinction between the things in the world, including between oneself and the world and between oneself and other people. Yet, unlike the danger of delirium under the Apolline mode, this state of intoxication is healthy and not at all pathological. Thus the Dionysiac tendency in artistic practice renews the primordial unity.

These two Ancient Greek artistic modes are oppositional, and through their intense competition they eventually gave rise to Attic tragedy, which involves an equal measure of both factors

 

 

 

Brief summary of Deleuze’s commentary:

{1} Deleuze notes the opposition that Nietzsche sets up “between primitive unity and individuation” / “de l’unité primitive et de l’individuation” (Deleuze NP, 1962: 11 / 2006: 13).

{2} Dionysiac intoxication (l’ivresse bachique) [which renews the primitive unity] is an affect that increases the power to exist, and it can be understood as the will to power. (Deleuze Cours 1983–12–13. Session 49.2 of “Cinéma / Vérité et temps – La puissance du faux”; Cours 1984–11–20. Session 70.2 of “Cinéma / Pensée”)

 

 

 

Summary

 

1.1

[There are two main tendencies in Ancient Greek art: The Apolline, which is associated with image or sculpture based art, and the Dionysiac, which is associated with the imageless art of music. The two factors are oppositional, and through their competition they eventually gave rise to Attic tragedy, which involves an equal measure of both factors.]

 

 

The “continuous evolution of art is bound up with the duality of the Apolline and the Dionysiac” (14). For the Ancient Greeks, Apollo and Dionysus were “[t]heir two dieties of art” (14). There is an “an enormous opposition, both in origin and goals” between the two art Gods. To Apollo we associate the “art of the image-maker or sculptor (Bildner)” and to Dionysus “the imageless art of music” (14). Nietzsche characterizes these two artistic tendencies as drives (Tribe) that are oppositional and competing in a fruitful way, and through the Hellenic “Will” their competition produces Attic tragedy, which has equal measures of both factors: “These two very different drives (Triebe) exist side by side, mostly in open conflict, stimulating and provoking (reizen) one another to give birth to ever-new, more vigorous offspring in whom they perpetuate the conflict inherent in the opposition between them, an opposition only apparently bridged by the common term ‘art’ – until eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic ‘Will’, they appear paired and, in this pairing, finally engender a work of art which is Dionysiac and Apolline in equal measure: Attic tragedy” (Speirs 14).

 

Wir werden viel für die aesthetische Wissenschaft gewonnen haben, wenn wir nicht nur zur logischen Einsicht, sondern zur unmittelbaren Sicherheit der Anschauung gekommen sind, dass die Fortentwickelung der Kunst an die Duplicität des Apollinischen und des Dionysischen gebunden ist: in ähnlicher Weise, wie die Generation von der Zweiheit der Geschlechter, bei fortwährendem Kampfe und nur periodisch eintretender Versöhnung, abhängt. Diese Namen entlehnen wir von den Griechen, welche die tiefsinnigen Geheimlehren ihrer Kunstanschauung zwar nicht in Begriffen, aber in den eindringlich deutlichen Gestalten ihrer Götterwelt dem Einsichtigen vernehmbar machen. An ihre beiden Kunstgottheiten, Apollo und Dionysus, knüpft sich unsere Erkenntniss, dass in der griechischen Welt ein ungeheurer Gegensatz, nach Ursprung und Zielen, zwischen der Kunst des Bildners, der apollinischen, und der unbildlichen Kunst der Musik, als der des Dionysus, besteht: beide so verschiedne Triebe gehen neben einander her, zumeist im offnen Zwiespalt mit einander und sich gegenseitig zu immer neuen kräftigeren Geburten reizend, um in ihnen den Kampf jenes Gegensatzes zu perpetuiren, den das gemeinsame Wort “Kunst” nur scheinbar überbrückt; bis sie endlich, durch einen metaphysischen Wunderakt des | hellenischen “Willens”, mit einander gepaart erscheinen und in dieser Paarung zuletzt das ebenso dionysische als apollinische Kunstwerk der attischen Tragödie erzeugen.

(Werke 19-20. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics when we have come to realize, not just through logical insight but also with the certainty of something directly apprehended (Anschauung), that the continuous evolution of art is bound up with the duality of the Apolline and the Dionysiac in much the same way as reproduction depends on there being two sexes which co-exist in a state of perpetual conflict interrupted only occasionally by periods of reconciliation. We have borrowed these names from the Greeks who reveal the profound mysteries of their view of art to those with insight, not in concepts, admittedly, but through the penetratingly vivid figures of their gods. Their two deities of art, Apollo and Dionysos, provide the starting-point for our recognition that there exists in the world of the Greeks an enormous opposition, both in origin and goals, between the Apolline art of the image-maker or sculptor (Bildner) and the imageless art of music, which is that of Dionysos. These two very different drives (Triebe) exist side by side, mostly in open conflict, stimulating and provoking (reizen) one another to give birth to ever-new, more vigorous offspring in whom they perpetuate the conflict inherent in the opposition between them, an opposition only apparently bridged by the common term ‘art’ – until eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic ‘Will’, they appear paired and, in this pairing, finally engender a work of art which is Dionysiac and Apolline in equal measure: Attic tragedy.

(Speirs 14)

 

 

We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by logical inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality—just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations. The terms Dionysian and Apollinian we borrow from the Greeks, who disclose to the discerning mind the profound mysteries of their view of art, not, to be sure, in concepts, but in the intensely clear figures of their gods. Through Apollo and Dionysus, the two art deities of the Greeks, we come to recognize that in the Greek world there existed a tremendous opposition, in origin and aims, between the Apollinian art of sculpture, and the nonimagistic, Dionysian art of music. These two different tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly at variance; and they continually incite each other to new and more powerful births, which perpetuate an antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the common term “art”; till eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic “will,” they appear coupled with each other, and through this coupling ultimately generate an equally Dionysian and Apollinian form of art—Attic tragedy.

(Kaufmann, Basic Writings 33. Text copied from Readsbird)

 

 

We shall have gained much for the science of æsthetics, when once we have perceived not only by logical inference, but by the immediate certainty of intuition, that the continuous development of art is bound up with the duplexity of the Apollonian and the Dionysian: in like manner as procreation is dependent on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual conflicts with only periodically intervening reconciliations. These names we borrow from the Greeks, who disclose to the intelligent observer the profound mysteries of their view of art, not indeed in concepts, but in the impressively clear figures of their world of deities. It is in connection with Apollo and Dionysus, the two art-deities of the Greeks, that we learn that there existed in the Grecian world a wide antithesis, in origin and aims, between the art of the shaper, the Apollonian, and the non-plastic art of music, that of Dionysus: both these so heterogeneous tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly at variance, and continually inciting each other to new and more powerful births, to perpetuate in | them the strife of this antithesis, which is but seemingly bridged over by their mutual term “Art”; till at last, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will, they appear paired with each other, and through this pairing eventually generate the equally Dionysian and Apollonian art-work of Attic tragedy.

(Haussmann, Complete Works 21-22.  Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

Nous aurons fait un grand pas en ce qui concerne la science esthétique, quand nous en serons arrivés non seulement à l’induction logique, mais encore à la certitude immédiate de cette pensée : que l’évolution progressive de l’art est le résultat du double caractère de l’esprit apollinien et de l’esprit dionysien, de la même manière que la dualité des sexes engendre la vie au milieu de luttes perpétuelles et par des rapprochements seulement périodiques. Ces noms, nous les empruntons aux Grecs qui ont rendu intelligible au penseur le sens occulte et profond de leur conception de l’art, non pas au moyen de notions, mais à l’aide des figures nettement significatives du monde de leurs dieux. C’est à leurs deux divinités des arts, Apollon et Dionysos, que se rattache notre conscience de l’extraordinaire antagonisme, tant d’origine que de fins, qui exista dans le monde grec entre l’art plastique apollinien et l’art dénué de formes, la musique, l’art de Dionysos. Ces deux instincts impulsifs s’en vont côte à côte, en guerre ouverte le plus souvent, et s’excitant mutuellement à des créations nouvelles, toujours plus robustes, pour perpétuer | par elles le conflit de cet antagonisme que l’appellation « art », qui leur est commune, ne fait que masquer, jusqu’à ce qu’enfin, par un miracle métaphysique de la « Volonté » hellénique, ils apparaissent accouplés, et que, dans cet accouplement, ils engendrent alors l’œuvre à la fois dionysienne et apollinienne de la tragédie attique.

(Marnold and Morland 25-26. Text copied from Wikisource. PDF at Gallica.)

 

 

 

 

1.2

[To Apollo belongs the world of dream, and to Dionysus, intoxication. In dream the artist and poet view the form of the divine.]

 

Nietzsche analyzes these two tendencies in Greek art by considering them in terms of their respective worlds, which are characterized by physiological states: to Apollo belongs the world of dream, and to Dionysus, intoxication. [“the separate art-worlds of dream and intoxication | (Rausch)”; “les mondes esthétiques différents du rêve et de l’ivresse”. Deleuze’s commentary. Deleuze speaks of Nietzsche’s notion of Bacchic intoxication as affect that increases the power to exist, and it can be understood as the will to power:

L’affect qui augmente une force de vie, Nietzsche en parle très souvent et lui donne un nom particulier. Il l’appelle ivresse. L’ivresse, c’est donc pas boire, c’est pas la drogue, bien que boire et la drogue puissent...on sait pas, Nietzsche y fait allusion parfois. Est-ce que ça produit de telles augmentations ou pas ? Est ce que l’on paie ces augmentations d’une diminution aussi considérable, etc.... Et tous ces problèmes ? Faudrait les voir dans chaque cas. - Mais, il l’appellera ivresse, toute intensification, tout processus d’intensification qui augmente la puissance de vie. [...] Voyez bien que tous ce qu’il appelle volonté de puissance, Nietzsche, on commence à le comprendre. C’est bien la même chose que l’ivresse, c’est-à-dire l’augmentation de la puissance d’exister.

(Deleuze Cours 1983–12–13. Session 49.2 of “Cinéma / Vérité et temps – La puissance du faux”)

C’est aussi l’ivresse bachique qui pénètre toutes les parties. C’est le délire, c’est l’ivresse bachique, le double, la double figure, le repos translucide et simple et l’ivresse bachique.

(Deleuze Cours 1984–11–20. Session 70.2 of “Cinéma / Pensée”)

] [The next point I do not firmly grasp, so please consult the texts below. It seems the idea is that in dreams, artists and poets gain certain kinds of inspiration, including a view of the forms of the gods, with their well-proportioned bodies.]

 

Um uns jene beiden Triebe näher zu bringen, denken wir sie uns zunächst als die getrennten Kunstwelten des Traumes und des Rausches; zwischen welchen physiologischen Erscheinungen ein entsprechender Gegensatz, wie zwischen dem Apollinischen und dem Dionysischen zu bemerken ist. Im Traume traten zuerst, nach der Vorstellung des Lucretius, die herrlichen Göttergestalten vor die Seelen der Menschen, im Traume sah der grosse Bildner den entzückenden Gliederbau übermenschlicher Wesen, und der hellenische Dichter, um die Geheimnisse der poetischen Zeugung befragt, würde ebenfalls an den Traum erinnert und eine ähnliche Belehrung gegeben haben, wie sie Hans Sachs in den Meistersingern giebt:

Mein Freund, das grad' ist Dichters Werk,

dass er sein Träumen deut' und merk'.

Glaubt mir, des Menschen wahrster Wahn

wird ihm im Traume aufgethan:

all' Dichtkunst und Poëterei

ist nichts als Wahrtraum-Deuterei.

(Werke 19-20. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

In order to gain a closer understanding of these two drives, let us think of them in the first place as the separate art-worlds of dream and intoxication | (Rausch). Between these two physiological phenomena an opposition can be observed which corresponds to that between the Apolline and the Dionysiac. As Lucretius envisages it, it was in dream that the magnificent figures of the gods first appeared before the souls of men; in dream the great image-maker saw the delightfully proportioned bodies of superhuman beings; and the Hellenic poet, if asked about the secrets of poetic procreation, would likewise have reminded us of dream and would have given an account much like that given by Hans Sachs in the Meistersinger:

My friend, it is the poet's task

To mark his dreams, their meaning ask.

Trust me, the truest phantom man doth know

Hath meaning only dreams may show:

The arts of verse and poetry

Tell nought but dreaming's prophecy.

(Speirs 14-15)

 

 

In order to grasp these two tendencies, let us first conceive of them as the separate art worlds of dreams and intoxication. These physiological phenomena present a contrast analogous to that existing between the Apollinian and the Dionysian. It was in dreams, says Lucretius, that the glorious divine figures first appeared to the souls of men; in dreams the great shaper beheld the splendid bodies of superhuman beings; and the Hellenic poet, if questioned about the mysteries of poetic inspiration, would likewise have suggested | dreams and he might have given an explanation like that of Hans Sachs in the Meistersinger:

The poet’s task is this, my friend,

to read his dreams and comprehend.

The truest human fancy seems

to be revealed to us in dreams:

all poems and versification

are but true dreams’ interpretation.

(Kaufmann, Basic Writings 33-34. Text copied from Readsbird)

 

 

In order to bring these two tendencies within closer range, let us conceive them first of all as the separate art-worlds of dreamland and drunkenness; between which physiological phenomena a contrast may be observed analogous to that existing between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In dreams, according to the conception of Lucretius, the glorious divine figures first appeared to the souls of men, in dreams the great shaper beheld the charming corporeal structure of superhuman beings, and the Hellenic poet, if consulted on the mysteries of poetic inspiration, would likewise have suggested dreams and would have offered an explanation resembling that of Hans Sachs in the Meistersingers:—

Mein Freund, das grad' ist Dichters Werk,

dass er sein Träumen deut' und merk'.

Glaubt mir, des Menschen wahrster Wahn

wird ihm im Traume aufgethan:

all' Dichtkunst und Poeterei

ist nichts als Wahrtraum-Deuterei.

(Haussmann, Complete Works 22.  Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

Figurons-nous tout d’abord, pour les mieux comprendre, ces deux instincts comme les mondes esthétiques différents du rêve et de l’ivresse, phénomènes physiologiques entre lesquels on remarque un contraste analogue à celui qui distingue l’un de l’autre l’esprit apollinien et l’esprit dionysien. C’est dans le rêve que, suivant l’expression de Lucrèce, les splendides images des dieux se manifestèrent pour la première fois à l’âme des hommes, c’est dans le rêve que le grand sculpteur perçut les pro­portions divines de créatures surhumaines, et le poète hellène, interrogé sur les secrets créateurs de son art, eût évoqué lui aussi le souvenir du rêve et répondu comme Hans Sachs dans les Maîtres Chanteurs :

Ami, l’ouvrage véritable du poète

Est de noter et de traduire ses rêves.

Croyez-moi, l’illusion la plus sûre de l’homme,

S’épanouit pour lui dans le rêve :

Tout l’art des vers et du poète

N’est que l’expression de la vérité du rêve.

(Marnold and Morland 26. Text copied from Wikisource. PDF at Gallica.)

 

 

 

 

 

1.3

[The world of dream is a world of semblance. It is a source of intelligibility and pleasure, even though the images may even be dark and gloomy.]

 

When in our state of dream we are creating our dream world, we are fully being an artist. And the semblance of dream is “the precondition of all the arts of image-making, including, as we shall see, an important half of poetry”. Yet even when “this dream-reality is most alive, we nevertheless retain a pervasive sense that it is semblance”. Some philosophers have even come to regard our own world as a semblance of some deeper reality: “Philosophical natures even have a presentiment that hidden beneath the reality in which we live and have our being there also lies a second, quite different reality; in other words, this reality too is a semblance”. Schopenhauer had a similar sort of idea. Artists use the reality of dream as a source of pleasure and they use dream images “to interpret life”. But along with pleasant images that give the artist “this feeling of complete intelligibility”, they also see “passing before him things which are grave, gloomy, sad, dark, sudden blocks, teasings of chance, anxious expectations”. But even these darker images are understood to be semblances.

 

Der schöne Schein der Traumwelten, in deren Erzeugung jeder Mensch voller Künstler ist, ist die Voraussetzung aller bildenden Kunst, ja auch, wie wir sehen werden, einer wichtigen Hälfte der Poesie. Wir geniessen im unmittelbaren Verständnisse der Gestalt, alle Formen sprechen zu uns, es giebt nichts Gleichgültiges und Unnöthiges. Bei dem höchsten Leben dieser Traumwirklichkeit haben wir doch noch die durchschimmernde Empfindung ihres Scheins: wenigstens ist dies meine Erfahrung, für deren Häufigkeit, ja Normalität, ich manches Zeugniss und die Aussprüche der Dichter beizubringen hätte. Der philosophische Mensch hat sogar das Vorgefühl, dass auch unter dieser Wirklichkeit, in der wir leben und sind, eine zweite ganz andre verborgen liege, dass also auch sie ein Schein sei; und Schopenhauer bezeichnet geradezu die Gabe, dass Einem zu Zeiten die Menschen und alle Dinge als blosse Phantome oder Traumbilder vorkommen, als das Kennzeichen philosophischer Befähigung. Wie nun der Philosoph zur Wirklichkeit des Daseins, so verhält sich der künstlerisch erregbare Mensch zur Wirklichkeit des Traumes; er sieht genau und gern zu: denn aus diesen Bildern deutet er sich das Leben, an diesen Vorgängen übt er sich für das Leben. Nicht etwa nur die angenehmen und freundlichen Bilder sind es, die er mit jener Allverständigkeit an sich erfährt: auch das Ernste, Trübe, Traurige, Finstere, die plötzlichen Hemmungen, die Neckereien des Zufalls, die bänglichen Erwartungen, kurz die ganze "göttliche Komödie" des Lebens, mit dem Inferno, zieht an ihm vorbei, nicht nur wie ein Schattenspiel - denn er lebt und leidet mit in diesen Scenen - und doch auch nicht ohne jene flüchtige Empfindung des Scheins; und vielleicht erinnert sich Mancher, gleich mir, in den Gefährlichkeiten und Schrecken des Traumes sich mitunter ermuthigend und mit Erfolg zugerufen zu haben: "Es ist ein Traum! Ich will ihn weiter träumen!" Wie man mir auch von Personen erzählt hat, die die Causalität eines und desselben Traumes über drei und mehr aufeinanderfolgende Nächte hin fortzusetzen im Stande waren: Thatsachen, welche deutlich Zeugniss dafür abgeben, dass unser innerstes Wesen, der gemeinsame Untergrund von uns allen, mit tiefer Lust und freudiger Nothwendigkeit den Traum an sich erfährt.

(Werke 20-21. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

Every human being is fully an artist when creating the worlds of dream, and the lovely semblance of dream is the precondition of all the arts of image-making, including, as we shall see, an important half of poetry. We take pleasure in dreaming, understanding its figures without mediation; all forms speak to us; nothing is indifferent or unnecessary. Yet even while this dream-reality is most alive, we nevertheless retain a pervasive sense that it is semblance; at least this is my experience, and I could adduce a good deal of evidence and the statements of poets to attest to the frequency, indeed normality, of my experience. Philosophical natures even have a presentiment that hidden beneath the reality in which we live and have our being there also lies a second, quite different reality; in other words, this reality too is a semblance. Indeed Schopenhauer actually states that the mark of a person's capacity for philosophy is the gift for feeling occasionally as if people and all things were mere phantoms or dream-images. A person with artistic sensibility relates to the reality of dream in the same way as a philosopher relates to the reality of existence: he attends to it closely and with pleasure, using these images to interpret life, and practising for life with the help of these events. Not that it is only the pleasant and friendly images which give him this feeling of complete intelligibility; he also sees passing before him things which are grave, gloomy, sad, dark, sudden blocks, teasings of chance, anxious | expectations, in short the entire ‘Divine Comedy’ of life, including the Inferno, but not like some mere shadow-play - for he, too, lives in these scenes and shares in the suffering - and yet never without that fleeting sense of its character as semblance. Perhaps others will recall, as I do, shouting out, sometimes successfully, words of encouragement in the midst of the perils and terrors of a dream: ‘It is a dream! I will dream on!’ I have even heard of people who were capable of continuing the causality of one and the same dream through three and more successive nights. All of these facts are clear evidence that our innermost being, the deep ground (Untergrund) common to all our lives, experiences the state of dreaming with profound pleasure (Lust) and joyous necessity.

(Speirs 15-16)

 

 

The beautiful illusion of the dream worlds, in the creation of which every man is truly an artist, is the prerequisite of all plastic art, and, as we shall see, of an important part of poetry also. In our dreams we delight in the immediate understanding of figures; all forms speak to us; there is nothing unimportant or superfluous. But even when this dream reality is most intense, we still have, glimmering through it, the sensation that it is mere appearance: at least this is my experience, and for its frequency—indeed, normality—I could adduce many proofs, including the sayings of the poets.

Philosophical men even have a presentiment that the reality in which we live and have our being is also mere appearance, and that another, quite different reality lies beneath it. Schopenhauer actually indicates as the criterion of philosophical ability the occasional ability to view men and things as mere phantoms or dream images. Thus the aesthetically sensitive man stands in the same relation to the reality of dreams as the philosopher does to the reality of existence; he is a close and willing observer, for these images afford him an interpretation of life, and by reflecting on these processes he trains himself for life.

It is not only the agreeable and friendly images that he experiences as something universally intelligible: the serious, the trou-| bled, the sad, the gloomy, the sudden restraints, the tricks of accident, anxious expectations, in short, the whole divine comedy of life, including the inferno, also pass before him, not like mere shadows on a wall—for he lives and suffers with | these scenes—and yet not without that fleeting sensation of illusion. And perhaps many will, like myself, recall how amid the dangers and terrors of dreams they have occasionally said to themselves in self-encouragement, and not without success: “It is a dream! I will dream on!” I have likewise heard of people who were able to continue one and the same dream for three and even more successive nights—facts which indicate clearly how our innermost being, our common ground, experiences dreams with profound delight and a joyous necessity.

(Kaufmann, Basic Writings 34-35. Text copied from Readsbird)

 

 

The beauteous appearance of the dream-worlds, in the production of which every man is a perfect artist, is the presupposition of all plastic art, and in fact, as we shall see, of an important half of poetry also. We take delight in the immediate apprehension of form; all forms speak to us; there is nothing indifferent, nothing superfluous. But, together with the highest life of this dream-reality we also have, glimmering through it, the sensation of its appearance: such at least is my experience, as to the frequency, ay, normality of which I could adduce many proofs, as also the sayings of the poets. Indeed, the man of philosophic turn has a foreboding that underneath this reality in which we live and have our being, another and altogether different reality lies concealed, and that therefore it is also an appearance; and Schopenhauer actually designates the gift of occasionally regarding men and things as mere phantoms and dream-pictures as the criterion of philosophical ability. Accordingly, the man susceptible to art stands in the same relation to the reality of dreams as the philosopher to the reality of existence; he is a close and willing observer, for from these pictures he reads the meaning of life, and by these processes he trains himself for life. And it is perhaps not only the agreeable and friendly pictures that he realises in himself with such perfect understanding: the earnest, the troubled, the dreary, the gloomy, the sudden checks, the tricks of fortune, the uneasy presentiments, in short, the whole "Divine Comedy" of life, and the Inferno, also pass before him, not merely like | pictures on the wall—for he too lives and suffers in these scenes,—and yet not without that fleeting sensation of appearance. And perhaps many a one will, like myself, recollect having sometimes called out cheeringly and not without success amid the dangers and terrors of dream-life: "It is a dream! I will dream on!" I have likewise been told of persons capable of continuing the causality of one and the same dream for three and even more successive nights: all of which facts clearly testify that our innermost being, the common substratum of all of us, experiences our dreams with deep joy and cheerful acquiescence.

(Haussmann, Complete Works 23-24. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

L’apparence pleine de beauté des mondes du | rêve, dans la production desquels tout homme est un artiste complet, est la condition préalable de tout art plastique, et certainement aussi, comme nous le verrons, d’une partie essentielle de la poésie. Nous éprouvons de la jouissance à la compréhen­sion immédiate de la forme, toutes les formes nous parlent, nulle n’est indifférente, aucune n’est inutile. Et pourtant la vie la plus intense de cette réalité de rêve nous laisse encore le sentiment confus qu’elle n’est qu’une apparence. C’est du moins le résultat de ma propre expérience et je pourrais citer maints témoignages et aussi les déclarations des poètes pour montrer combien cette impression est nor­male et répandue. L’homme doué d’un esprit phi­losophique a même le pressentiment que, derrière la réalité dans laquelle nous existons et vivons, il s’en cache une autre toute différente, et que, par conséquent, la première n’est, elle aussi, qu’une apparence ; et Schopenhauer définit formellement, comme étant le signe distinctif de l’aptitude phi­losophique, la faculté pour certains de se repré­senter parfois les hommes et toutes les choses comme de purs fantômes, des images de rêve. Eh bien, l’homme doué d’une sensibilité artistique se comporte à l’égard de la réalité du rêve de la même manière que le philosophe en face de la réa­lité de l’existence ; il l’examine minutieusement et volontiers ; car, dans ces tableaux, il découvre une interprétation de la vie ; à l’aide de ces exemples, | il s’exerce pour la vie. Ce ne sont pas seulement, comme on pourrait croire, les images agréables et plaisantes qu’il retrouve en soi-même avec cette absolue lucidité : le sévère, le sombre, le triste, le sinistre, les obstacles soudains, les railleries du ha­sard, les attentes angoissées, en un mot toute la Divine Comédie de la vie, avec son Inferno, se déroule aussi devant lui, non pas seulement comme un spectacle de fantômes, d’ombres, — car, ces scènes, il les vit et les souffre, — et cependant sans qu’il puisse écarter tout à fait cette impression fu­gitive qu’elles ne sont qu’une apparence. Et peut-être quelques-uns se souviendront comme moi de s’être écrié, en se rassurant au milieu des périls et des terreurs d’un rêve : « C’est un rêve ! Je ne veux pas qu’il cesse ! Je veux le rêver encore ! » J’ai en­tendu dire aussi que certaines personnes possé­daient la faculté de prolonger la causalité d’un seul et même rêve pendant trois nuits successives et plus. Ces faits attestent avec évidence que notre nature la plus intime, l’arrière-fond commun de nous tous, trouve dans le rêve un plaisir profond et une joie nécessaire.

(Marnold and Morland 26-28. Text copied from Wikisource. PDF at Gallica.)

 

 

 

1.4

[The Apolline is a matter of dream, illusion, and appearance. This opens the possibility that one under its influence descends into a state of madness or delirium where one gives into wilder impulses and is unable to discern dream from reality or even things from each other. Yet, as part of the Apolline artistic influence, one retains a wise calm that prevents this pathology.]

 

Apollo, “the god of all image-making energies,” is “also the god of prophecy”. And, Apollo is the god of light and thus of semblance and fantasy. [I do not know German, unfortunately, but we might note a terminological overlap between illumination and semblance. Apollo is “the luminous one” (der Scheinende), and he is associated with the realm of semblance (Schein). Schein is “semblance” in Speirs, “illusion” in Kaufmann, “appearance” in Haussmann, and “l’apparence” in Marnold and Morland.] [I may not follow the next point, so please consult the quotations below. The idea might be the following. So far we have associated Apollo with dream. But we can mistake dreams for reality, especially in states of delirium. Nietzsche now says that the Apolline contains a certain limiting structure that prevents the artist from confusing dream and reality, and to also check “wilder impulses” and to instead have the “wise calm” of Apollo. This calm is somehow related to “the consecrated quality of lovely semblance” and to what Schopenhauer says about humans who are trapped in the veil of maya. Here in a stormy sea, the boatman sits calmly. He is supported by and trusts the principium individuationis. I am not sure what the idea is there, but I will guess it is the following. The realm of dream can become confused with reality, and it opens the possibility that one loses control over one’s mind, as it descends into a delirium or madness. In that state, perhaps, one’s own self or the things around oneself can lose their stable identities. But those under the Apolline artistic influence trust in the principle that distinguishes things formally from one another. But I get the sense that the principium individuationis here is also the factor that allows one to distinguish oneself from the surrounding world, as the next section will suggest. Let me quote for you now.]

 

 

Diese freudige Nothwendigkeit der Traumerfahrung ist gleichfalls von den Griechen in ihrem Apollo ausgedrückt worden: Apollo, als der Gott aller bildnerischen Kräfte, ist zugleich der wahrsagende Gott. Er, der seiner Wurzel nach der "Scheinende", die Lichtgottheit ist, beherrscht auch den schönen Schein der inneren Phantasie-Welt. Die höhere Wahrheit, die Vollkommenheit dieser Zustände im Gegensatz zu der lückenhaft verständlichen Tageswirklichkeit, sodann das tiefe Bewusstsein von der in Schlaf und Traum heilenden und helfenden Natur ist zugleich das symbolische Analogon der wahrsagenden Fähigkeit und überhaupt der Künste, durch die das Leben möglich und lebenswerth gemacht wird. Aber auch jene zarte Linie, die das Traumbild nicht überschreiten darf, um nicht pathologisch zu wirken, widrigenfalls der Schein als plumpe Wirklichkeit uns betrügen würde - darf nicht im Bilde des Apollo fehlen: jene maassvolle Begrenzung, jene Freiheit von den wilderen Regungen, jene weisheitsvolle Ruhe des Bildnergottes. Sein Auge muss "sonnenhaft", gemäss seinem Ursprunge, sein; auch wenn es zürnt und unmuthig blickt, liegt die Weihe des schönen Scheines auf ihm. Und so möchte von Apollo in einem excentrischen Sinne das gelten, was Schopenhauer von dem im Schleier der Maja befangenen Menschen sagt. Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, S. 416 "Wie auf dem tobenden Meere, das, nach allen Seiten unbegränzt, heulend Wellenberge erhebt und senkt, auf einem Kahn ein Schiffer sitzt, dem schwachen Fahrzeug vertrauend; so sitzt, mitten in einer Welt von Qualen, ruhig der einzelne Mensch, gestützt und vertrauend auf das principium individuationis". Ja es wäre von Apollo zu sagen, dass in ihm das unerschütterte Vertrauen auf jenes principium und das ruhige Dasitzen des in ihm | Befangenen seinen erhabensten Ausdruck bekommen habe, und man möchte selbst Apollo als das herrliche Götterbild des principii individuationis bezeichnen, aus dessen Gebärden und Blicken die ganze Lust und Weisheit des "Scheines", sammt seiner Schönheit, zu uns spräche.

(Werke 22-23. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

The Greeks also expressed the joyous necessity of dream-experience in their Apollo: as the god of all image-making energies, Apollo is also the god of prophecy. According to the etymological root of his name, he is 'the luminous one' (der Scheinende), the god of light; as such, he also governs the lovely semblance produced by the inner world of fantasy. The higher truth, the perfection of these dream-states in contrast to the only partially intelligible reality of the daylight world, together with the profound consciousness of the helping and healing powers of nature in sleep and dream, is simultaneously the symbolic analogue of the ability to prophesy and indeed of all the arts through which life is made possible and worth living. But the image of Apollo must also contain that delicate line which the dream-image may not overstep if its effect is not to become pathological, so that, in the worst case, the semblance would deceive us as if it were crude reality; his image (Bild) must include that measured limitation (maßvolle Begrenzung), that freedom from wilder impulses, that wise calm of the image-making god. In accordance with his origin, his eye must be 'sunlike'; even when its gaze is angry and shows displeasure, it exhibits the consecrated quality of lovely semblance. Thus, in an eccentric sense, one could apply to Apollo what Schopenhauer says about human beings trapped in the veil of maya:

Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, trusting his frail craft in a stormy sea that is boundless in every direction, rising and falling with the howling, mountainous waves, so in the midst of a world full of suffering and misery the individual man | calmly sits, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis [ . . . ]

(World as Will and Representation, I, p. 416)

Indeed one could say that Apollo is the most sublime expression of imperturbable trust in this principle and of the calm sitting-there of the person trapped within it; one might even describe Apollo as the magnificent divine image (Götterbild) of the principium individuationis, whose gestures and gaze speak to us of all the intense pleasure, wisdom and beauty of 'semblance'

(Speirs 16-17)

 

 

This joyous necessity of the dream experience has been embodied by the Greeks in their Apollo: Apollo, the god of all plastic energies, is at the same time the soothsaying god. He, who (as the etymology of the name indicates) is the “shining one,” the deity of light, is also ruler over the beautiful illusion of the inner world of fantasy. The higher truth, the perfection of these states in contrast to the incompletely intelligible everyday world, this deep consciousness of nature, healing and helping in sleep and dreams, is at the same time the symbolical analogue of the soothsaying faculty and of the arts generally, which make life possible and worth living. But we must also include in our image of Apollo that delicate boundary which the dream image must not overstep lest it have a pathological effect (in which case mere appearance would deceive us as if it were crude reality). We must keep in mind that measured restraint, that freedom from the wilder emotions, that calm of the sculptor god. His eye must be “sunlike,” as befits his origin; even when it is angry and distempered it is still hallowed by beautiful illusion. And so, in one sense, we might apply to Apollo the words of Schopenhauer when he speaks of the man wrapped in the veil of māyā (Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, p. 416): “Just as in a | stormy sea that, unbounded in all directions, raises and drops mountainous waves, howling, a sailor sits in a boat and trusts in his frail bark: so in the midst of a world of torments the individual human being sits quietly, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis.” In fact, we might say of Apollo that in him the unshaken faith in this principium and the calm repose of the man wrapped up in it receive their most sublime expression; and we might call Apollo himself the glorious divine image of the principium individuationis, through whose gestures and eyes all the joy and wisdom of “illusion,” together with its beauty, speak to us.

(Kaufmann, Basic Writings 35-36. Text copied from Readsbird)

 

 

This cheerful acquiescence in the dream-experience has likewise been embodied by the Greeks in their Apollo: for Apollo, as the god of all shaping energies, is also the soothsaying god. He, who (as the etymology of the name indicates) is the "shining one," the deity of light, also rules over the fair appearance of the inner world of fantasies. The higher truth, the perfection of these states in contrast to the only partially intelligible everyday world, ay, the deep consciousness of nature, healing and helping in sleep and dream, is at the same time the symbolical analogue of the faculty of soothsaying and, in general, of the arts, through which life is made possible and worth living. But also that delicate line, which the dream-picture must not overstep—lest it act pathologically (in which case appearance, being reality pure and simple, would impose upon us)—must not be wanting in the picture of Apollo: that measured limitation, that freedom | from the wilder emotions, that philosophical calmness of the sculptor-god. His eye must be "sunlike," according to his origin; even when it is angry and looks displeased, the sacredness of his beauteous appearance is still there. And so we might apply to Apollo, in an eccentric sense, what Schopenhauer says of the man wrapt in the veil of Mâyâ: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I. p. 416: "Just as in a stormy sea, unbounded in every direction, rising and falling with howling mountainous waves, a sailor sits in a boat and trusts in his frail barque: so in the midst of a world of sorrows the individual sits quietly supported by and trusting in his principium individuationis." Indeed, we might say of Apollo, that in him the unshaken faith in this principium and the quiet sitting of the man wrapt therein have received their sublimest expression; and we might even designate Apollo as the glorious divine image of the principium individuationis, from out of the gestures and looks of which all the joy and wisdom of "appearance," together with its beauty, speak to us.

(Haussmann, Complete Works 24-25. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

De même les Grecs ont représenté sous la figure de leur Apollon ce désir joyeux du rêve : Apollon, en tant que dieu de toutes les facultés créatrices de formes, est en même temps le dieu divinateur. Lui qui, d’après son origine, est « l’apparence » rayon­nante, la divinité de la lumière, il règne aussi sur | l’apparence pleine de beauté du monde intérieur de l’imagination. La vérité plus haute, la perfection de ce monde, opposées à la réalité imparfaitement intelligible de tous les jours, enfin la conscience profonde de la réparatrice et salutaire nature du sommeil et du rêve, sont symboliquement l'analogue, à la fois, de l’aptitude à la divination, et des arts en général, par lesquels la vie est rendue possible et digne d’être vécue. Mais elle ne doit pas manquer à l’image d’Apollon, cette ligne délicate que la vision perçue dans le rêve ne saurait franchir sans que son effet ne devienne pathologique, et qu’alors l’apparence ne nous donne l’illusion d’une grossière réalité ; je veux dire cette pondération, cette libre aisance dans les émotions les plus violentes, cette sereine sagesse du dieu de la forme. Conformément à son origine, son regard doit être « rayonnant comme le soleil » ; même alors qu’il exprime le souci ou la colère, le reflet sacré de la vision de beauté n’en doit pas disparaître. Et l’on pourrait ainsi appliquer à Apollon, dans un sens excentrique, les paroles de Schopenhauer sur l’homme enveloppé du voile de Maïa (Monde comme Volonté et comme Représentation, I, 416) : « Comme un pêcheur dans un esquif, tranquille et plein de confiance en sa frêle embarcation, au milieu d’une mer démontée qui, sans bornes et sans obstacles, soulève et abat en mugissant des montagnes de flots écumants, | l’homme individuel, au milieu d’un monde de dou­leurs, demeure impassible et serein, appuyé avec confiance sur le principium individuationis ». Oui, on pourrait dire que l’inébranlable confiance en ce principe et la calme sécurité de celui qui en est pénétré ont trouvé dans Apollon leur expression la plus sublime, et on pourrait même reconnaître en Apollon l’image divine et splendide du principe d’individuation, par les gestes et les regards de laquelle nous parlent toute la joie et la sagesse de « l’apparence », en même temps que sa beauté.

(Marnold and Morland 28-30. Text copied from Wikisource. PDF at Gallica.)

 

 

 

 

1.5

[But the Dionysiac, under the Bacchic state of intoxication, in fact does involve this breakdown in one’s sense of distinction between the things of the world and between oneself and the world. This state of intoxication is healthy and not pathological.]

 

Nietzsche then says that in the above quoted part of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer also describes a profound state of horror that overcomes people “when they suddenly become confused and lose faith in the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world because the principle of sufficient reason, in one or other of its modes, appears to sustain an exception”. [I am not familiar with Schopenhauer’s text, so I do not know how the principle of sufficient reason is involved in the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world. I also do not know what it means for the principle of sufficient reason to sustain an exception. The idea here seems to be that on account of some cause, one loses the ability to draw distinctions between the things that appear in their world and between themselves and that world.] Along with this horror, one may also [on account of similar causes or reasons] experience “the blissful ecstasy which arises from the innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself, whenever this breakdown of the principium individuationis occurs, we catch a glimpse of the essence of the Dionysiac, which is best conveyed by the analogy of intoxication”. [We saw that with the Apolline, one does not enter this state of loss of distinctions between things and between oneself and the world. But such a state in inherent to the Dionysiac influence.] “These Dionysiac stirrings, which, as they grow in intensity, cause subjectivity to vanish to the point of complete self-forgetting, awaken either under the influence of narcotic drink, of which all human beings and peoples who are close to the origin of things speak in their hymns, or at the approach of spring when the whole of nature is pervaded by lust for life”. This sort of Bacchic state was also seen later in the German Middle Ages. The Bacchic state is a vital and healthy one and not necessarily a matter of pathology.

 

An derselben Stelle hat uns Schopenhauer das ungeheure Grausen geschildert, welches den Menschen ergreift, wenn er plötzlich an den Erkenntnissformen der Erscheinung irre wird, indem der Satz vom Grunde, in irgend einer seiner Gestaltungen, eine Ausnahme zu erleiden scheint. Wenn wir zu diesem Grausen die wonnevolle Verzückung hinzunehmen, die bei demselben Zerbrechen des principii individuationis aus dem innersten Grunde des Menschen, ja der Natur emporsteigt, so thun wir einen Blick in das Wesen des Dionysischen, das uns am nächsten noch durch die Analogie des Rausches gebracht wird. Entweder durch den Einfluss des narkotischen Getränkes, von dem alle ursprünglichen Menschen und Völker in Hymnen sprechen, oder bei dem gewaltigen, die ganze Natur lustvoll durchdringenden Nahen des Frühlings erwachen jene dionysischen Regungen, in deren Steigerung das Subjective zu völliger Selbstvergessenheit hinschwindet. Auch im deutschen Mittelalter wälzten sich unter der gleichen dionysischen Gewalt immer wachsende Schaaren, singend und tanzend, von Ort zu Ort: in diesen Sanct-Johann- und Sanct-Veittänzern erkennen wir die bacchischen Chöre der Griechen wieder, mit ihrer Vorgeschichte in Kleinasien, bis hin zu Babylon und den orgiastischen Sakäen. Es giebt Menschen, die, aus Mangel an Erfahrung oder aus Stumpfsinn, sich von solchen Erscheinungen wie von "Volkskrankheiten", spöttisch oder bedauernd im Gefühl der eigenen Gesundheit abwenden: die Armen ahnen freilich nicht, wie leichenfarbig | und gespenstisch eben diese ihre "Gesundheit" sich ausnimmt, wenn an ihnen das glühende Leben dionysischer Schwärmer vorüberbraust.

(Werke 23-24. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

In the same passage Schopenhauer has described for us the enormous horror which seizes people when they suddenly become confused and lose faith in the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world because the principle of sufficient reason, in one or other of its modes, appears to sustain an exception. If we add to this horror the blissful ecstasy which arises from the innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself, whenever this breakdown of the principium individuationis occurs, we catch a glimpse of the essence of the Dionysiac, which is best conveyed by the analogy of intoxication. These Dionysiac stirrings, which, as they grow in intensity, cause subjectivity to vanish to the point of complete self-forgetting, awaken either under the influence of narcotic drink, of which all human beings and peoples who are close to the origin of things speak in their hymns, or at the approach of spring when the whole of nature is pervaded by lust for life. In the German Middle Ages, too, ever-growing throngs roamed from place to place, impelled by the same Dionysiac power, singing and dancing as they went; in these St John's and St Vitus' dancers we recognize the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks, with their pre-history in Asia Minor, extending to Babylon and the orgiastic Sacaea. There are those who, | whether from lack of experience or from dullness of spirit, turn away in scorn or pity from such phenomena, regarding them as 'popular diseases' while believing in their own good health; of course, these poor creatures have not the slightest inkling of how spectral and deathly pale their 'health' seems when the glowing life of Dionysiac enthusiasts storms past them.

(Speirs 17-18)

 

 

In the same work Schopenhauer has depicted for us the tremendous terror which seizes man when he is suddenly dumfounded by the cognitive form of phenomena because the principle of sufficient reason, in some one of its manifestations, seems to suffer an exception. If we add to this terror the blissful ecstasy that wells from the innermost depths of man, indeed of nature, at this collapse of the principium individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian, which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy of intoxication.

Either under the influence of the narcotic draught, of which the songs of all primitive men and peoples speak, or with the potent coming of spring that penetrates all nature with joy, these Dionysian emotions awake, and as they grow in intensity everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness. In the German Middle Ages, too, singing and dancing crowds, ever increasing in number, whirled themselves from place to place under this same Dionysian impulse. In these dancers of St. John and St. Vitus, we rediscover the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks, with their prehistory in Asia Minor, as far back as Babylon and the orgiastic Sacaea. There are some who, from obtuseness or lack of experience, | turn away from such phenomena as from “folk-diseases,” with contempt or pity born of the consciousness of their own “healthy-mindedness.” But of course such poor wretches have no idea how corpselike and ghostly their so-called “healthy-mindedness” looks when the glowing life of the Dionysian revelers roars past them.

(Kaufmann, Basic Writings 36-37. Text copied from Readsbird)

 

In the same work Schopenhauer has described to us the stupendous awe which seizes upon man, when of a sudden he is at a loss to account for the cognitive forms of a phenomenon, in that the principle of reason, in some one of its manifestations, seems to admit of an exception. Add to this awe the blissful ecstasy which rises from the | innermost depths of man, ay, of nature, at this same collapse of the principium individuationis, and we shall gain an insight into the being of the Dionysian, which is brought within closest ken perhaps by the analogy of drunkenness. It is either under the influence of the narcotic draught, of which the hymns of all primitive men and peoples tell us, or by the powerful approach of spring penetrating all nature with joy, that those Dionysian emotions awake, in the augmentation of which the subjective vanishes to complete self-forgetfulness. So also in the German Middle Ages singing and dancing crowds, ever increasing in number, were borne from place to place under this same Dionysian power. In these St. John's and St. Vitus's dancers we again perceive the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks, with their previous history in Asia Minor, as far back as Babylon and the orgiastic Sacæa. There are some, who, from lack of experience or obtuseness, will turn away from such phenomena as "folk-diseases" with a smile of contempt or pity prompted by the consciousness of their own health: of course, the poor wretches do not divine what a cadaverous-looking and ghastly aspect this very "health" of theirs presents when the glowing life of the Dionysian revellers rushes past them.

(Haussmann, Complete Works 25-26. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

À la même page, Schopenhauer nous a dépeint l’épouvantable horreur qui saisit l’homme, dérouté soudain par les formes apparentes des phénomènes, alors que le principe de causalité, dans une de ses manifestations quelconques, semble souffrir une exception. Si, outre cette horreur, nous considé­rons l’extase transportée qui, devant cet effondre­ment du principe d’individuation, s’élève du plus profond de l’homme, du plus profond de la nature elle-même, alors nous commençons à entrevoir en quoi consiste l’état dionysiaque, que nous compren­drons mieux encore par l’analogie de l’ivresse. C’est par la puissance du breuvage narcotique que tous les hommes et tous les peuples primitifs ont chanté dans leurs hymnes, ou bien par la force despotique du renouveau printanier pénétrant joyeu­sement la nature entière, que s’éveille cette exal­tation dionysienne qui entraîne dans son essor | l’individu subjectif jusqu’à l’anéantir en un complet oubli de soi-même. Encore pendant le moyen âge allemand, des multitudes toujours plus nom­breuses tournoyèrent sous le souffle de cette même puissance dionysiaque, chantant et dansant, de place en place : dans ces danseurs de la Saint-Jean et de la Saint-Guy nous reconnaissons les chœurs bachiques des Grecs, dont l’origine se perd, à tra­vers l’Asie Mineure, jusqu’à Babylone et jusqu’aux orgies sacéennes. Il est des gens qui, par igno­rance ou étroitesse d’esprit, se détournent de sem­blables phénomènes, comme ils s’écarteraient de « maladies contagieuses », et, dans la sûre con­science de leur propre santé, les raillent ou les pren­nent en pitié. Les malheureux ne se doutent pas de la pâleur cadavérique et de l’air de spectre de leur « santé », lorsque passe devant eux l’ouragan de vie ardente des rêveurs dionysiens.

(Marnold and Morland 30-31. Text copied from Wikisource. PDF at Gallica.)

 

 

 

 

1.6

[The primordial unity between humans and between humans and nature is disrupted in Dionysiac celebration.]

 

[There apparently was a primordial bond between humans that is disrupted by the principle of individuation, because the Dionysiac renews that bond. And as well, there was apparently a primordial bond between humans and nature, because the Dionysiac renews that as well. Many subjugating bonds between humans are broken, as are any other bounds of distinction between people, by means of the Bacchic revelry.] [Deleuze commentary. Deleuze notes the opposition that Nietzsche sets up “between primitive unity and individuation” / “de l’unité primitive et de l’individuation” (1962: 11 / 2006: 13).]

 

Unter dem Zauber des Dionysischen schliesst sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdete, feindliche oder unterjochte Natur feiert wieder ihr Versöhnungsfest mit ihrem verlorenen Sohne, dem Menschen. Freiwillig beut die Erde ihre Gaben, und friedfertig nahen die Raubthiere der Felsen und der Wüste. Mit Blumen und Kränzen ist der Wagen des Dionysus überschüttet: unter seinem Joche schreiten Panther und Tiger. Man verwandele das Beethoven'sche Jubellied der "Freude" in ein Gemälde und bleibe mit seiner Einbildungskraft nicht zurück, wenn die Millionen schauervoll in den Staub sinken: so kann man sich dem Dionysischen nähern. Jetzt ist der Sclave freier Mann, jetzt zerbrechen alle die starren, feindseligen Abgrenzungen, die Noth, Willkür oder "freche Mode" zwischen den Menschen festgesetzt haben. Jetzt, bei dem Evangelium der Weltenharmonie, fühlt sich Jeder mit seinem Nächsten nicht nur vereinigt, versöhnt, verschmolzen, sondern eins, als ob der Schleier der Maja zerrissen wäre und nur noch in Fetzen vor dem geheimnissvollen Ur-Einen herumflattere. Singend und tanzend äussert sich der Mensch als Mitglied einer höheren Gemeinsamkeit: er hat das Gehen und das Sprechen verlernt und ist auf dem Wege, tanzend in die Lüfte emporzufliegen. Aus seinen Gebärden spricht die Verzauberung. Wie jetzt die Thiere reden, und die Erde Milch und Honig giebt, so tönt auch aus ihm etwas Uebernatürliches: als Gott fühlt er sich, er selbst wandelt jetzt so verzückt und erhoben, wie er die Götter im Traume wandeln sah. Der Mensch ist nicht mehr Künstler, er ist Kunstwerk geworden: die Kunstgewalt der ganzen Natur, zur höchsten Wonnebefriedigung des Ur-Einen, offenbart sich hier unter den Schauern des Rausches. Der edelste Thon, der kostbarste Marmor wird hier geknetet und behauen, der Mensch, und zu den Meisselschlägen des dionysischen Weltenkünstlers tönt der eleusinische Mysterienruf: "Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen? Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?" -

(Werke 23-24. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

Not only is the bond between human beings renewed by the magic of the Dionysiac, but nature, alienated, inimical, or subjugated, celebrates once more her festival of reconciliation with her lost son, humankind. Freely the earth offers up her gifts, and the beasts of prey from mountain and desert approach in peace. The chariot of Dionysos is laden with flowers and wreaths; beneath its yoke stride panther and tiger. If one were to transform Beethoven's jubilant 'Hymn to Joy' into a painting and place no constraints on one's imagination as the millions sink into the dust, shivering in awe, then one could begin to approach the Dionysiac. Now the slave is a freeman, now all the rigid, hostile barriers, which necessity, caprice, or 'impudent fashion' have established between human beings, break asunder. Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be not simply united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but quite literally one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious primordial unity (das Ur-Eine). Singing and dancing, man expresses his sense of belonging to a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk and talk and is on the brink of flying and dancing, up and away into the air above. His gestures speak of his enchantment. Just as the animals now talk and the earth gives milk and honey, there now sounds out from within man something supernatural: he feels himself to be a god, he himself now moves in such ecstasy and sublimity as once he saw the gods move in his dreams. Man is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: all nature's artistic power reveals itself here, amidst shivers of intoxication, to the highest, most blissful satisfaction of the primordial unity. Here man, the noblest clay, the most precious marble, is kneaded and carved and, to the accompaniment of the chisel-blows of the Dionysiac world-artist, the call of the Eleusinian | Mysteries rings out: 'Fall ye to the ground, ye millions? Feelst thou thy Creator, world? '

(Speirs 18-19)

 

 

Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son,25 man. Freely, earth proffers her gifts, and peacefully the beasts of prey of the rocks and desert approach. The chariot of Dionysus is covered with flowers and garlands; panthers and tigers walk under its yoke. Transform Beethoven’s “Hymn to Joy” into a painting; let your imagination conceive the multitudes bowing to the dust, awestruck—then you will approach the Dionysian. Now the slave is a free man; now all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or “impudent convention”26 have fixed between man and man are broken. Now, with the gospel of universal harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the veil of māyā had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity.

In song and in dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing. His very gestures express enchantment. Just as the animals now talk, and the earth yields milk and honey, supernatural sounds emanate from him, too: he feels himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking in his dreams. He is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: in these paroxysms of intoxication the artistic power of all nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the primordial unity. The noblest clay, the most costly marble, man, is here kneaded and cut, and to the sound of the chisel strokes of the Dionysian world-artist rings out the cry | of the Eleusinian mysteries: “Do you prostrate yourselves, millions? Do you sense your Maker, world?”

(Kaufmann, Basic Writings 37-38. Text copied from Readsbird)

 

 

Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the covenant between man and man again established, but also estranged, hostile or subjugated nature again celebrates her reconciliation with her lost son, man. Of her own accord earth proffers her gifts, and peacefully the beasts of| prey approach from the desert and the rocks. The chariot of Dionysus is bedecked with flowers and garlands: panthers and tigers pass beneath his yoke. Change Beethoven's "jubilee-song" into a painting, and, if your imagination be equal to the occasion when the awestruck millions sink into the dust, you will then be able to approach the Dionysian. Now is the slave a free man, now all the stubborn, hostile barriers, which necessity, caprice, or "shameless fashion" has set up between man and man, are broken down. Now, at the evangel of cosmic harmony, each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, blended with his neighbour, but as one with him, as if the veil of Mâyâ has been torn and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious Primordial Unity. In song and in dance man exhibits himself as a member of a higher community, he has forgotten how to walk and speak, and is on the point of taking a dancing flight into the air. His gestures bespeak enchantment. Even as the animals now talk, and as the earth yields milk and honey, so also something super-natural sounds forth from him: he feels himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted and elated even as the gods whom he saw walking about in his dreams. Man is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: the artistic power of all nature here reveals itself in the tremors of drunkenness to the highest gratification of the Primordial Unity. The noblest clay, the costliest marble, namely man, is here kneaded and cut, and the chisel strokes of | the Dionysian world-artist are accompanied with the cry of the Eleusinian mysteries: "Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen? Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?"

Te bow in the dust, oh millions?
Thy maker, mortal, dost divine?
Cf. Schiller's "Hymn to Joy"; and Beethoven, Ninth Symphony.—TR.

(Haussmann, Complete Works 26-28. Text copied from Project Gutenberg. PDF at Internet Archive)

 

 

Ce n’est pas seulement l’alliance de l’homme avec l’homme qui est scellée de nouveau sous le charme de l’enchantement dionysien : la nature aliénée, ennemie ou asservie, célèbre elle aussi sa réconci­liation avec son enfant prodigue, l’homme. Spon­tanément, la terre offre ses dons, et les fauves des rochers et du désert s’approchent pacifiques. Le char de Dionysos disparaît sous les fleurs et les couronnes : des panthères et des tigres s’avancent sous son joug. Que l’on métamorphose en tableau l’hymne à la « joie » de Beethoven, et, donnant carrière à son imagination, que l’on contemple les millions d’êtres prosternés frémissants dans la poussière : à ce moment l’ivresse dionysienne sera proche. Alors l’esclave est libre, alors se brisent toutes les barrières rigides et hostiles que la misère, l’arbitraire ou la « mode insolente » ont établies entre les hommes. Maintenant, par l’évangile de l’harmonie universelle, chacun se sent, avec son prochain, non seulement réuni, réconcilié, fondu, mais encore identique en soi, comme si s’était dé­chiré le voile de Maïa, et comme s’il n’en flottait plus que des lambeaux devant le mystérieux Un-primordial. Chantant et dansant, l’homme se ma­nifeste comme membre d’une communauté supé­rieure : il a désappris de marcher et de parler, et est sur le point de s’envoler à travers les airs, en dansant. Ses gestes décèlent une enchanteresse béatitude. De même que maintenant les animaux parlent, et que la terre produit du lait et du miel, la voix de l’homme, elle aussi, résonne comme quelque chose de surnaturel : il se sent Dieu ; main­tenant son allure est aussi noble et pleine d’extase que celle des dieux qu’il a vus dans ses rêves. L’homme n’est plus artiste, il est devenu œuvre d’art : la puissance esthétique de la nature entière, pour la plus haute béatitude et la plus noble satis­faction de l’Un-primordial, se révèle ici sous le frémissement de l’ivresse. La plus noble argile, le marbre le plus précieux, l’homme, est ici pétri et façonné ; et, aux coups du ciseau de l’artiste des mondes dionysiens, répond le cri des Mystères d’Éleusis : « Vous tombez prosternés à genoux, mil­lions d’êtres ? Monde, pressens-tu le Créateur ?»

(Marnold and Morland 30-31. Text copied from Wikisource. PDF at Gallica.)

 

 

 

 

 

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1899.  Die Geburt der Tragödie. In Nietzsche’s Werke, Erste Abtheilung, Band 1. Leibzig: Naumann.

PDF available at:

https://archive.org/details/werke01niet

Online text of Die Geburt der Tragödie available at:

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7206

 

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1999. The Birth of Tragedy. In The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, English translation by Ronald Speirs,  pp.1-116. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

 

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1968. The Birth of Tragedy. In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, edited by Walter Kaufmann, English translation by Walter Kaufmann, pp.3-178. New York: Modern Library.

Text available online at:

http://www.readsbird.com/basic-writings-nietzsche-friedrich-wilhelm-nietzsche-walter-arnold-kaufmann

 

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1923. The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, vol.1: The Birth of Tragedy, edited by Oscar Levy, English translation by WM. A. Haussmann. New York: George Allen & Unwin.

PDF available at:

https://archive.org/details/thebirthoftraged00nietuoft

Online text available at:

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51356

 

Another English translation online text at:

http://nietzsche.holtof.com/select.htm

http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_the_birth_of_tragedy/index.htm

http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_the_birth_of_tragedy/the_birth_of_tragedy.htm

 

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1901. L’origine de la tragédie, ou Hellénisme et pessimisme. French translation by Jean Marnold et Jacques Morland. Paris: Mercure de France.

PDF available at:

http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb310183772

http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k97691395/f19.image

Online text available at:

https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/%C5%92uvres_compl%C3%A8tes_de_Fr%C3%A9d%C3%A9ric_Nietzsche

https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/L%E2%80%99Origine_de_la_Trag%C3%A9die

 

 

Also cited:

 

Deleuze, Gilles. 1983. Cours 1983–12–13. Session 49.2 of “Cinéma / Vérité et temps – La puissance du faux”.

http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=272

 

Deleuze, Gilles. 1984. Cours 1984–11–20. Session 70.2 of “Cinéma / Pensée”.

http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=368

 

Deleuze, Gilles. 1962 [6th edn, 1983]. Nietzsche et la philosophie. Paris: PUF.

 

Deleuze, Gilles. 2006 [Text 1983 Athlone; foreward and index 2006 Colombia University]. Nietzsche and Philosophy. New York: Colombia University / Athlone.

 

 

 

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