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by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos and other distracting mistakes. Somers-Hall is abbreviated SH and Difference and Repetition as DR.]
Summary of
Henry Somers-Hall
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition:
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide
Part 1
A Guide to the Text
Chapter 4. Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference
4.8 Essence, Possibility and Virtuality (186–8/235–7, 208–14/260–6)
Brief summary:
For Deleuze, Ideas are actualized, but they are not essences in the conventional sense of the term. Deleuze, following Bergson, notes two ways we may understand essences. The first is the Aristotelian way of removing everything non-essential. So if we wanted to know the essence of color, we would remove each of their accidental traits. But this gives us only an abstract and empty notion of color. The other way to understand the Idea as an essence is to consider how it implicates complicatedly (that is, how it ‘perplicates’) all actualizations it can take. To make an analogy, the essence of color under this view would be like white light, since we can break white light down into every actualizable color of the spectrum and also recompose that white light by recombining all actual light colors. This notion of the Idea is tied to the distinction between the virtual, actual, and the possible. The Idea is virtual, and the instantiations in spatio-temporal reality that the Idea somehow generates are actual. The virtual is not the possible, since the possible is a deprivation of the existant and also since the possible is not “real,” while instead the virtual is real and is also not deprived. The virtual, then, has three important features. 1) The virtual is real without being actual, since “it provides the structure responsible for the genesis of the qualities we find in actual entities”. 2) The virtual is complete without being entire, because it implies all actualizable determinations and thus is lacking nothing (it is complete), but at the same time, it is infinitely rich in such implications, and thus it can never be exhausted by its actualizations (it is not entire). 3) The Idea is differentiated without being differenciated, since it is composed of differential relations (it is differentiated) whose related parts are by themselves undetermined, meaning they lack an identity to which predicates may be ascribed (it is not, then, differenciated).
Summary
We have been looking at how for Deleuze, Ideas find many actual instantiations. But this does not mean for him that Ideas are essences. We could only call an Idea an essence if we mean it in a different way than we normally do, namely as instead “the accident, the event, the sense” (SH 250 qtg. DR 191/241) [But I am not sure what that means yet]. SH says that this claim [that Ideas are not essences at least in the conventional sense] “is inseparable from his claim that Ideas ‘perplicate’ or interpenetrate one another (DR | 187/236)” (SH 150-151). To explain more what he means by Ideas, Deleuze makes reference to examples in Bergson’s “The Life and Work of Ravaisson,” namely that the Idea of color is like white light and the Idea of sound is like white noise. Bergson is concerned with the question of what different colors have in common. [Since what they would all have in common is something very general about color] this inquiry is about the question of “how we are to think, philosophically, the notion of colour. In effect, we are therefore asking the question ‘what is X?’ for colour, the question Deleuze takes to be ‘the question of essences’ (DR 188/236)” (SH 151). Bergson says there are primarily two ways to answer such a question as this. 1) With an Aristotelian manner of determining essences by removing from each instance whatever is non-essential to it:
The first is the traditional answer to the question of essences provided by Aristotle. In order to determine the essence of something, we abstract from it those properties that are inessential (or accidental), to arrive at purely those properties that every individual in the class has. Thus, ‘we obtain this general idea of colour only by removing from the red that which makes it red, from the blue what makes it blue, from the green what makes it green’ (Bergson 1992: 225). If we try to answer the question ‘what is colour?’ by this means, we end up with a concept that is abstract and empty, as we have proceeded ‘by gradual extinction of the light which brought out the differences between the colours’ (Bergson 1992: 225).
(SH 151)
2) By means of “perplication” [This one is harder to grasp, so let me quote it first.]
The alternative is what Deleuze takes up with his concept of perplication. Bergson suggests that rather than proceeding by abstraction, we proceed by [the following up to citation is Bergson quotation]
taking the thousand and one different shades of blue, violet, green, yellow and red, and passing them through a converging lens, bringing them to a single point. Then appears in all its radiance the pure white light which, perceived here below in the shades which disperse it, enclosed above, in its undivided unity, the indefinite variety of multicoloured rays. (Bergson 1992: 225)
Such an account can only be an analogy, as light is still seen in this case too much along the lines of actual phenomena, but it clarifies the interpenetrative notion of the Idea. Just as the conjunction of the two terms of the differential relation allow us to specify all of the points on a curve, the differentials of the Idea together specify all of the possible states of affairs that a given system can exhibit. Rather than achieving this by excluding what is non-essential, it does so by positively specifying the genetic conditions for each of these states. In this sense, for Deleuze, the Idea does not so much contain the essence of a state of affairs, as the grounds for the totality of possible accidents a system can | exhibit. Depending on how the elements are related to one another, different states of affairs will be generated.
(SH 151-152)
[What we need to take from the example perhaps is that if we start with white light, we see that it implies the full range of color possibilities, since it can be broken down into them, and also the white light can be recomposed were all those colors of light combined. So white is the “essence” of color, in Deleuze’s sense of the Idea, since it contains ‘perplicated’ (perhaps meaning something like ‘implicated complicatedly’) within it implicitly “the totality of possible accidents” the system of color can exhibit. I wonder then if this is like what SH says about state diagrams in his Hegel-Deleuze book. This is another of the great sections in this other book.]
[The next point seems to be that Ideas as these totalities of possible accidents are not of the same nature as the accidents themselves and thus are not of the same nature as the states of affairs, which are actualizations of the accidents. Yet, recall in the example of light that the colors together imply white light and vice versa, even though they are qualitatively different sorts of things, since one has color and the other has none. Thus the genetic conditions for states of affairs, that is, the Ideas, are immanent to the states of affairs while being different in kind. I quote to be sure:]
Clearly, if an Idea is to be understood as forming a multiplicity of interpenetrating elements, then it cannot have the same nature as states of affairs. Elements in states of affairs are determined in an opposite manner to the interpenetrative structure of perplication, namely by determining their limits (what they are not). Furthermore, we can see that just as problems were immanent to their solutions, the genetic conditions for states of affairs (Ideas) are simultaneous with states of affairs themselves. Thus, for Epicurus, atoms co-existed with the sensible objects that they constituted, and for Althusser, the mode of production co-existed with the actual relations that it determined. We thus have two series that differ in kind: actual events that occur within the world, and the ideal events of ‘sections, ablations, adjunctions’ that engender them (DR 188/237).
(SH 152)
SH will now jump [it seems by about 20-30 pages in DR] to the related topic of the Idea and possibility. For Deleuze, the Idea is virtual, and he makes three claims regarding the virtual: 1) it is real without being actual, 2) it is complete without being entire, and 3) it is differentiated without being differenciated. SH will go through these claims, all the while being sure to contrast them with the structure of possibility, since for Deleuze the virtual should never be confused with the possible (152).
1) The virtual is real without being actual. We first consider Kant’s point that there is not difference between a possible and a real object. A hundred real silver coins has the exact same value as a hundred possible ones. The only difference between them is their existential status, since the one actually exists physically and the other does not. “Now, the virtual is instead ‘Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’ (DR 208/260)” (153). [SH then gives two reasons why this is so. The second one I grasp much better. It is that since the Idea provides the structure responsible for the genesis of actual entities’ qualities, it therefore must be real, even if it is not actual. The first idea I am not sure about. Let me just quote it since it seems to be presented as the less important idea and since I will not interpret it properly myself. Perhaps the thinking here is that actuality and possibility are different in kind, and that is already a strong enough distinction that we do not need to bring into the matter their difference in terms of reality, and then this has something to do with the issue of the virtual being real without being actual. I will quote since as you can see I got it wrong:]
Now, the virtual is instead ‘Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’ (DR 208/260). Throughout this chapter, we have seen that Ideas are different in kind from actual states of affairs, just as differentials differ from actual numbers. In this sense, we do not need to distinguish possibility from actuality in terms of reality, as they can be distinguished by this difference in kind itself. More than this, however, the virtual is real to the extent that it provides the structure responsible for the genesis of the qualities we find in actual entities. ‘The reality of the virtual is structure’ (DR 209/260). It provides a complete account of the structure of the actual state of affairs that results from it, and is no less a real part of the object than the actual object itself.
(153)
2) It is complete without being entire. [I do not follow this one very well either. Let me quote it first.]
‘The reality of the virtual is structure’ (DR 209/260). It provides a complete account of the structure of the actual state of affairs that results from it, and is no less a real part of the object than the actual object itself. In this regard, Deleuze notes that it is ‘complete without being entire’ (DR 214/266). Deleuze’s point is that the virtual does not rely on any reference to the actual, although in fact it is always found to be associated with the object which it engenders. In this sense, it escapes from the limitation of possibility we discussed in the previous chapter. There, we saw that the concept of possibility could not give us the sense of an object, because it merely reduplicated it at a higher transcendental level of analysis. As such, a possible object is not complete, since it is dependent on the notion of a real object to which we add the concept of non-being. The completeness of the virtual is thus what allows us to understand it as giving the sense of a proposition, even though it is not whole, since ‘every object is double’ (DR 209/261).
(SH 153)
[I do not recall off the top of my head this point about possibility from chapter 3. Perhaps it is in reference to possible states of affairs suggested by the sense of a statement, from section 3.8. There was also discussion of a problem understood in terms of the possibility of its solution in section 3.9, but that does not seem related enough as far as I can tell. I am sorry that I cannot pin this one down. At any rate, we might still be able to extract the important idea here. Perhaps the notion is the following. A possible object is not complete, since we obtain it first by taking the notion of a real object and then subtracting the notion of its actual existence. But that is not how we obtain the notion of the virtual. Rather, it is perhaps like a map of all the differential relations which can find various instantiations in actuality. So it is complete in that no differential relation that could be actualized is left out, just as every variety of color is implicated in the white light. However, perhaps also it can never be exhausted by any actualizations or by any series of them, as perhaps it is infinitely rich, and for that reason it perhaps is complete without being entire, since it can never be fully exhausted. I am guessing.]
3) The Idea is differentiated without being differenciated. SH says this means, “That is, it operates according to an entirely different procedure of determination to that of the possible” (153). [The following is very complicated, and so I am afraid my summary will lack overall coherence. I will just follow the ideas as they are presented, and I will quote it all in the end so it can be understood better.] We first need to recall from chapter 1 how we differentiated things on the basis of ascribing to it its own properties, and thus we needed a concept of identity [in order to make predications to it]. So when “we describe an object by ascribing predicates to a subject,” “we differenciate it” (153). “The other procedure of determination generates structural properties by bringing into relation with each other elements which are in themselves undetermined (they are differentiated, in the sense of the differentials we looked at in 4.2)” (153) [I am not sure what might be an example of this, but perhaps the light example somehow works here]. SH explains that Deleuze uses Leibniz’ distinctions between clear and confused, and distinct and obscure in order to characterize these two sorts of organization. Recall how Leibniz traces the world back to possibility, that is, to possible worlds that God chooses from. So at first it seems that Leibniz will not provide for us a good philosophy for the notion of the virtual. However, his ideas regarding perception will give us “an important insight into the relationship between virtuality and actuality” (154). [The next idea is very complicated. We begin first with an example Leibniz gives of microperceptions, which are the small perceptions of, for example, all the tiny sounds each little wave makes, which together give us the composite total perception of the roar of the sea. What makes this seem complicated at least at first is we have these two levels of micro and macro perceptions, but we also note two languages, which each having two counterpart concepts. So we have the language of the roaring noise of the sea. It is a language of the clear-confused. The clarity comes from the roar being one unified thing that we might distinguish from other things. The confusion comes from the fact that we mix up all the constituent parts in order to make one coherent whole. Then we have the language of the individual waves themselves. This is the language of the distinct-obscure and also of the virtual (but I am not sure if the language of the whole roar is of the actual). It would be distinct if we hear each differential relation, that is, each wave by itself, but that would make the whole obscure, since we then would not be able to take in the roar as a whole mixture of them all. So the basic idea seems to be that there is always a tradeoff. Either we hear it coherently and clearly as a whole, in which case we lose the distinctness of the parts, or we hear the parts distinctly, and thereby lose the sense of the whole that the parts together are making up. Now we need to relate this to the notion that Idea is differentiated without being differenciated. The way this is so is not directly stated, so let us work with the definitions given above. SH explained that we differenciate when “we describe an object by ascribing predicates to a subject”. And something is differentiated when “determination generates structural properties by bringing into relation with each other elements which are in themselves undetermined,” and this is differentiation like in the calculus. In that case, it seems the Idea is differentiated in the sense of it being made of differential relations, but it is not differenciated, since each differentially related undetermined part is not perceived or conceived distinctly from one another, as none have an identity to which predicates can be ascribed.]
Finally, the virtual is differentiated without being differenciated. That is, it operates according to an entirely different procedure of determination to that of the possible. As Deleuze puts it, ‘one [the possible] refers to the form of identity in the concept, whereas the other designates a pure multiplicity in the Idea which radically excludes the identical as a prior condition’ (DR 211–12/263). We saw that Chapter 1 of Difference and Repetition deals at length with the claim that in order to determine something through the properties it possesses, we need some kind of concept of identity. This is because we describe an object by ascribing predicates to a subject (we differenciate it). The other procedure of determination generates structural properties by bringing into relation with each other elements which are in themselves undetermined (they are differentiated, in the sense of the differentials we looked at in 4.2). Deleuze characterises these two modes of organisation in terms of Leibniz’s distinctions between the clear and confused, and the distinct and obscure. We saw in Chapter 1 that Leibniz’s understanding of the world ultimately traces | it back to the notion of possibility, as God chooses the best of all possible worlds. Nevertheless, in his claim that perception of spatio-temporal objects is a confused perception of conceptual relations, we have an important insight into the relationship between virtuality and actuality. In the New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz puts forward the claim that perception of objects is based upon microperceptions below the threshold of the senses. In support of this theory, he gives the following analogy [the following up to citation is Leibniz quotation]:
To give a clearer example of these minute perceptions which we are unable to pick out from the crowd, I like to use the example of the roaring noise of the sea which impresses itself on us when we are standing on the shore. To hear this noise as we do, we must hear the parts which make up this whole, that is the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all the others, and would not be noticed if the wave which made it were by itself. (Leibniz 1997: 54)
Deleuze interprets this passage as presenting ‘two languages which are encoded in the language of philosophy and directed at the divergent exercise of the faculties’ (DR 214/266). On the one hand, we have the language of the roaring noise of the sea. This is the language of the clearconfused. It is clear, in so far as I am able recognise the roar of the sea as a whole and take it up as an object, but it is confused as I only do so in so far as I do not take account of the elements (the waves) which together determine it as an object. On the other hand, we have the language of the waves themselves, which is the language of the virtual, and of the distinct-obscure. If, on the contrary, we focus on the noise of the waves themselves, the waves are perceived distinctly, as we grasp the differential relations that make up the noise as a whole, but also obscurely, since our focus on these particular relations precludes our comprehension of the ‘white noise’ of the sea as a whole. In contrast to Descartes’ notion of clear and distinct ideas, Deleuze’s claim is that ‘the clear is confused by itself, in so far as it is clear’ (DR 254/316). It is this radical divergence between the two languages of philosophy that allows us to give the sense of a proposition, or the conditions of experience, without simply falling into a banal reiteration of the structure of actuality.
(153-154)
Citations from:
Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.
Or if otherwise noted:
DR:
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994/London: Continuum, 2004.
Bergson, Henri (1992), The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison, New York: Carol Publishing.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1997), New Essays on Understanding, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
