Pt3.Ch8.Sb8 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Contingency in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature’. summary

by Corry Shores
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[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 8: Contingency in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature

Brief Summary:

To explain evolution, we need an account of accidental, contingent variations. These can be seen either positively or negatively. A theory of anatomy like Cuvier’s or Hegel’s is teleological, meaning that it identifies anatomical parts in terms of their functionality, their purpose in the function of the organism. This means that if there were to be a deviation, a slight mutation, then this changes the structure of the organism’s functioning and thus degrades its functioning. Geoffrey’s homological theory of anatomy does not regard anatomical parts in terms of their purposes but rather in terms of how their interrelations correspond isomorphically to an abstract or transcendental model. This means that parts can change both form and function so long as their structural relations match the mold. A deformity then is the model expressing itself in another way, so this would be a positive account of variation rather than a negative one. This notion of homologous variation is central to evolution which is a process of the natural selection from a pool of variations.

Summary

Previously we saw how Geoffroy’s homology theory of anatomy, or unity of composition, is central to the development of evolution theory, and it is also like Deleuze’s Idea. Cuvier’s teleological theory of anatomy however, is antithetical to evolutionary theory.

 

This is partly because Cuvier’s theory does not allow for contingent, accidental traits to appear. A slight change in one anatomical part changes the structure of functional relations of all parts, which would too radically change the organism’s overall functioning. Hegel’ position is not as extreme.

Hegel writes that "nature everywhere blurs the essential limits of species and genera by intermediate and defective forms, which continually furnish counter examples to every fixed distinction" (PN, § 250, Rem.) [233]

Also, humans have organs that are remnants of earlier forms, and Hegel thought “less differentiated forms can contain organs belonging to higher species, as for instance snakes are characterized by Hegel as possessing vestigial legs.” (233) But Hegel understands these variations in negative terms.

"In order to be able to consider such forms [of monstrous birth] as defective, imperfect, and deformed, one must presuppose a fixed, invariable type" (PN, § 250, Rem.) [233]

But, Hegel notes, these deviations could be positively a difference in organization rather than an impotence of nature. But if we are using a teleological theory, this means that if structure changes, then functionality reduces.

As Darwin notes, such a view is not possible on a teleological account, as the correlation of structure to purpose means that a reduction in the purposive role is correlated to a degradation in structure. (233)

And, if an organic structure is dialectically intelligible, it is understood teleologically. But as we saw, teleology cannot explain homology, thus Hegel’s notion of the contingency of deformation does not make his theory compatible with homology and thus also with evolution.

Further, while Hegel may give greater latitude than Cuvier to contingency, it is still the case that insofar as an organic structure is dialectically intelligible, it is understood in terms of the teleological account. Thus, while it may be possible to explain deformations on Hegel's account, the homology, a correspondence vital to the evolutionary account, cannot be explained dialectically. (233)

Thus we cannot have a positive study of deviations and aberrations in Hegel, a science of teratology; and yet, teratology is a necessary precondition for evolutionary theory. (233-234) Thus Somers-Hall concludes:

Ultimately, I believe, the idea of a compatibilism between evolutionary theory and Hegelian dialectic therefore fails. (234a)

 

Note also the relation of part whole in terms of individual and species. In order for the Notion to become present for itself, the animal's singular finite existence must be connected with its species, the universal. This involves the finite passing into the infinite, and the relation can be seen as between bad and true infinite. First consider the spurious infinite in the relation between species and individual: the genus maintains itself because individuals continually reproduce and repeat the form. Species is here understood as the repetition of the individual (234-235) But, as we examine increasingly differentiated species, we get the sense that the species is the animal’s essential determination. More differentiated species [more advanced/complex species] have the feeling of unity with the genus/species. Thus mammals have breasts [to link up and sustain other members of the species] and they look after their young. This feeling of unity increases with differentiation.  Then in human beings, the feeling of unity is replaces with the universality of thought itself. (234) “It is thus in man that the Notion truly becomes aware of itself as the unity of finite subject and infinite, universal, species.” (234) [The individual has a finite life span the but the species itself continues with reproduction.]

Deleuze’s problem with Hegel’s notion of the individual species relation, according to Somers-Hall, is that it sees organism as a closed unity. For Deleuze, the species is a transcendental illusion, and we should focus instead on the genesis of the individual. The organism is open. [Perhaps this is saying that the individual does not repeat a form; it is free to be whatever it evolves into, and a ‘species’ is merely a categorizing designation given after the genesis of the individual. Or the organism is not a self-contained system. I’m missing the point here, so I will just quote it.]

While Hegel ultimately sees in the structure of the species the structure of the infinite, Deleuze once again introduces the concept of a transcendental illusion: "It is not the individual which is an illusion in relation to the species, but the species which is an illusion--inevitable and well founded, it is true--in relation to the play of the individual and individuation" (DR, 250). Deleuze's point here, I take it, is that just as the homology requires reference to a moment of virtuality, a focus on the actual species ignores the importance of the dynamic generation of the organism. As Ansell Pearson notes, if we take as central the organization of the organism, we tend to be led to a conception of the organism as a closed unity. In contrast to this approach, Deleuze brings in the possibility of seeing the organism as essentially open when he argues that the species is ultimately a transcendental illusion and focusing on the conditions of genesis of the individual itself. Ansell Pearson addresses these points in relation to the theory of autopoiesis, which attempts to reintroduce a notion of teleological unity into modern conceptions of the organism as a counterweight to mechanistic conceptions of Darwinism:

Although autopoiesis grants a high degree of autonomy to a living system it ultimately posits systems that are entropically and informationally closed. In defining what constitutes the system as 'open' by placing the stress on operational closure, which can only conserve the boundaries of the organism, it blocks off access to an appreciation of the dynamical and processual character of machinic evolution and is led to present a stark choice between either entropy | or maximum performance. In placing the emphasis on living systems as guided solely by concerns with survival and self-maintenance, even though these are to be understood as endogenously driven and monitored, the theory of autopoiesis too much resembles the theory it seeks to supersede, namely orthodox Darwinism with its focus on discrete units of selection. (235-236)

We now turn to Deleuze and Guattari and transversal moments in the genesis of the organism. [Autopoiesis is the theory that organisms are systems that produce the materials and structures that support themselves, like how cells work. but] Autopoiesis  does not explain how different types of systems serve each other, their symbiosis. So for example, although the mitochondria are organelles that produces materials for the cell, they were originally separates cells that later came to be incorporated into a larger cell structure. Also [we cannot say that organisms are self-contained and not transversally related to other organisms because] bacteria often exchange genetic material and “bacterial DNA forms a substantial part of the genetic code of higher organisms.” (236) [Organisms affect and alter one another, and coevolve symbiotically. We need this concepts for explaining the generation of variety that can be selected from in evolutionary development.]

Through these transversal connections, an element of variability is introduced into the organism. This element of variability is essential to an evolutionary account, since we need to be able to explain not only selection from a variety of organisms, but also the generation of this variety in the first instance. (236)

So we also need an account of how organism's boundaries become disintegrated in order to explain evolution. We need both virtual and actual [because actualization only explains how structures are as they are, but virtuality explains how they can become other than they are. I’m not sure if this is right, because this is all Somers-Hall says.]

These examples point to the need not only to recognize the relative integrity of the organism but also that the disintegration of the boundaries of the organism is an essential moment in the formation of organisms and species. Deleuze argues that it is only with an account that incorporates both virtual and actual moments that we are able to achieve this. (236)

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb3 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Hegel and Evolution.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

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[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 3: Hegel and Evolution

Brief Summary:

Hegel’s ideas on the dialectical movement in nature might suggest a compatibility with evolutionary theory, even though Hegel’s thinking precedes Darwin. However, evolution as a theory precedes Hegel. For Hegel, the dialectical movement in nature is not to be seen as something unfolding in time. So Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not easily seen as compatible with evolutionary theory.

Summary

Previously we saw how for Hegel, the organism expresses the identity of difference and identity in the movements of nature, because it is a multiplicity of organs that make a unified organism.

Now we turn to Hegel on the topic of evolution. The idea of the transformation of species goes back to Lamarck especially, whose work predates Hegel and Darwin. We will now examine the relation between evolution and Hegel’s thinking. (214)

We saw that Hegel’s genetic account of the categories solves problems in Kant’s and Aristotle’s systems. Each category emerges from prior ones, and some commentators have described this as an evolutionary motion. Harris thinks Hegel’s dialectic is preeminently evolutionary, because it exhibits two essential features of evolution: “process, in the form of the movement between finite forms, and direction, in the form of necessary dialectical transformations.” (215) Evolution is thus a progression that is is both immanent and purposive. So Spencer merely gives an evolutionary taxonomy of creatures, but he does not give an account of the evolutionary movement itself, “it cannot explain why the taxonomical structures take the forms that they do.” (215)

We saw how Kant derives his categories by tracing their relationships to empirical logic. Hegel found this to be an arbitrary way to determine the categories. Hegel proposes instead his his genetic account which shows “how the categories could be seen as developing immanently from one another.” (215) But this is merely a logical understanding of development. Philosophy of Nature in a similar way tries to “derive categories that govern the fundamental structure of nature.” (215) But the development of the stages is not temporal, it happens just in the “ ‘inner Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature’. (PN, § 249).” (215) So whatever development we find in nature will “necessarily fall outside of tl1e Notion.” (215)

That is, Hegel's developmental account cannot be taken to he an evolutionary account as precisely those parts of the account that carry explanatory weight in Hegel's system, the development of the Notion, form the structure of nature itself and are not developed temporally within nature. (215)

 

So Hegel does not discuss a Darwinian sort of evolution. However, he does discuss two other explanations for how species are generated: emanation and evolution, which are both serial progressions. (216a)

[1] Evolution:

Evolution starts from ‘the imperfect and formless.’ First there was just water and aquatic life forms. There then evolves plants, polyps, mulluscs, then fishes. The fishes then evolve into land animals, and out of the land animals humans evolve.

[2] Emanation:

Here instead of less perfect beings giving rise to more advanced ones, we begin with the most perfect being who creates a lesser one, who creates a lesser in turn, all the way down to negative being, or matter, and the extreme of evil.
Note how both these explanations describe a quantitative variation between species, being either increasing or decreasing perfection. [But this means there is one type of thing, perfect being, under quantitative and not qualitative variation.]

Such accounts, according to Hegel, favor identity over difference, as they operate according to only one principle or type. The idea of qualitative divisions in the natural world is therefore key to Hegel's account, and he argues that we should "reject such nebulous, at bottom, sensuous ideas, as in particular the so called origination . . . of the more highly developed animal organisms from the lower" (PN, § 249 Rem.). (216)

 

So Hegel does not see there being a dialectical understanding of evolution. However, we might still wonder if Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is compatible with evolutionary theory.

Hegel writes that "it is a completely empty thought to represent species as developing successively, one after the other, in time. Chronological difference has no interest for thought" (PN, § 249, Add.). (216)

So if we are looking for compatibility between Hegel and evolution, we need to think that ‘no interest for thought’ here refers to dialectical thought and not thought in general. Somers-Hall in fact thinks that “Hegel's account of the structure of the organism entails an antievolutionary account of species”. (217) He explains:

This approach has three advantages. First, it takes us away from Hegel's somewhat cursory remarks on evolutionary theory to some of his more substantive discussions. Second, it allows us to look in more detail at Hegel's relationship to contemporaries on this issue. And third, it allows us to relate Hegel's account to Deleuze's, through an analysis of the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate of the 1820s and 30s in French anatomy. (217)

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Charles Darwin, Entry Directory

by Corry Shores
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Charles Darwin


[Thanks newsdesk.org]

In relation to Bergson's Time and Free Will

The Bodily Rage of Darwin and James

Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 1, §20 "The Intensity of Violent Emotions"

Herbert Spencer's Trembling Terror and Darwin's Flush-Faced Love

Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 1, §21 "Intensity and Reflex Movements"

Darwin's Teeth Gnashed Infernal: Inescapable Agony Expressed by Every Part of the Body

In relation to Bergson's Creative Evolution

Non-Resembling Reproduction. Creative Evolution. Bergson. Ch.1 Part 8. The Quest of a Criterion

Evolutionary Nonsense. Creative Evolution. Bergson. Ch.1 Part 10. Darwin and Insensible Variation



Image Credits:
http://newsdesk.org/2010/03/darwin-saw-chiles-earthquake-coming/

Evolutionary Nonsense. Creative Evolution. Bergson. Ch.1 Part 10. Darwin and Insensible Variation

by Corry Shores
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[Paragraph headings are my own.]

[May I sincerely thank the image sources. I placed credits both at the end and near the images.]

Evolutionary Nonsense

Henri Bergson

Creative Evolution

Évolution Créatrice

Chapter 1

The Evolution of Life – Mechanism and Teleology

Chapitre Premier

De l’évolution de la vie. – Mécanisme et finalité.

10. Darwin and Insensible Variation

10. Darwin et la variation insensible

Many different species share similar features. For example, animals of all sorts have very similar organs. But the species' lines of evolution diverged before they developed these organs. Somehow the species evolved them independently. And yet they are strikingly similar. So it is probably not a coincidence. Bergson used this as grounds for his own creative theory of evolution. It says that there is a universal impetus that is responsible for these similarities between divergently-evolved species. He previously gave 2 examples: both plants and animals reproduce sexually, and many species have similarly structured eyeballs, even though they developed them independently. A mechanistic theory of evolution would say that evolutionary changes are random, and those most adapted to the species’ circumstances will be passed-on. There are two varieties of this theory. Darwin is responsible for the first one. He says that variations are very small and gradual. They are ‘insensible variations.’ The other kind are sudden. Hugo de Vries gave this account.

§67 Evolutionary Teething

Bergson now looks specifically at the theory that evolution happens gradually by means of insensible variations. It assumes that chance causes variations in the species traits, and they accumulate gradually.

Now, let’s note that something like an eyeball functions only on account of its many coordinated mechanisms. And also consider this: if a species evolves an organ that does not function, it probably will not be passed-on. Yet, for something like an eyeball to function, very many parts would have to all appear concurrently: “the minute structure of the retina may develop, and however complicated it may become, such progress, instead of favouring vision, will probably hinder it if the visual centres do not develop at the same time, as well as several parts of the visual organ itself” (67d). But how could all the many delicate and finely-coordinated parts of an eye all by coincidence appear at the same time? Darwin saw that this was unlikely, and so he proposed his theory of insensible variations; for, “a difference which arises accidentally at one point of the visual apparatus, if it be very slight, will not hinder the functioning of the organ; and hence this first accidental variation can, in a sense, wait for complementary variations to accumulate and raise vision to a higher degree of perfection” (68b). Nonetheless, Bergson objects. Sure, one tiny variation in the eye could form without that hindering the other parts. However, it would also not help them either. So if it does not contribute to the organism's function, why then would that organisms be favored in natural selection? One possible answer is that evolution adds little parts that will later be added-upon. [Bergson likens such a variation to a pierre d'attente, which is translated as a “toothing stone.” It seems that pierres d'attente are stones that jut-out of the edge of a wall, so that the wall might be continued at a later time. See the images below.]

[www.larousse.fr]

[leblogdeclaudelothier.blogspot.comThank you Claude Lothier]

But such a theory would suggest that the coming developments are presupposed in the prior ones. This is not compatible with the Darwinian thesis that the variations are random. Yet, in order to understand how both the mollusk and vertebrate eyes are so similar [see §64], we would need to suppose that the evolutionary development already had tendencies like these masonry protrusions, as though the variations expected that they would later be built-upon.

From the English translation:

From the original French:

Bergson, Henri. L'Évolution Créatrice. Ed. Felix Alcan. Paris: Librairies Félix Alcan et Guillaumin Réunies, 1908. Available online athttp://www.archive.org/details/levolutioncreatr00berguoft

Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Transl. Arthur Mitchell. London: MacMillan and Co., 1922. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/creativeevolutio00berguoft

Picture from:

http://leblogdeclaudelothier.blogspot.com/2006/12/les-pierres-dattente-du-boulevard.html

Thank you Claude Lothier.

Diagram from:

http://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/nom-commun-nom/attente/23866

Non-Resembling Reproduction. Creative Evolution. Bergson. Ch.1 Part 8. The Quest of a Criterion

by Corry Shores
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[Other entries in the Bergson Creative Evolution series]

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Non-Resembling Reproduction

Henri Bergson

Creative Evolution

Évolution Créatrice

Chapter 1

The Evolution of Life – Mechanism and Teleology

Chapitre Premier

De l’évolution de la vie. – Mécanisme et finalité.

8. The Quest of a Criterion

8. Recherche d'un critérium.

Bergson rejects mechanism. He follows finalism only so far. Then he breaks from it. He explained previously: we are not evolving toward any destination. But, we are moving forward. For, evolution is creative.

§55 Evolving Differences

Live evolved. At its origin was an impetus. It has continued since.

There are many evolving species. The one creative evolutionary impetus diverged into a multiplicity of concurrent developmental tendencies. Some species became extinct. They were incompatible with the others at that time.

We said of life that, from its origin, it is the continuation of one and the same impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution. Something has grown, something has developed by a series of additions which have been so many creations. This very development has brought about a dissociation of tendencies which were unable to grow beyond a certain point without becoming mutually incompatible. [56c emphasis mine]

Nous disions que la vie, depuis ses origines, est la continuation d'un seul et même élan qui s'est partagé entra des lignes d'évolution divergentes. Quelque chose a grandi, quelque chose s'est développé par une série d'additions qui ont été autant de créations. C'est ce développement même qui a amené à se dissocier des tendances qui ne pouvaient croître au delà d'un certain point sans devenir incompatibles entre elles. [57-58]

There are other ways to conceive evolution. We might think of just one thing that evolved without any companions. This process would have only one dimension: a single line of development. Or, perhaps we conceive of evolution this way: there are many species evolving at the same time, but none along a linear continuum. This would also be one dimensional. At every moment there is an extension of different species. But they would not extend through a temporal development. For, there would in this second case just be continuous lines of evolution.

Evolution, however, is not one-dimensional. It has “actually taken place through millions of individuals, on divergent lines, each ending at a crossing from which new paths radiate, and so on indefinitely” (56-57 emphasis mine).

Bergson’s thesis is that there is one driving impetus for all the many lines of development. [As a driving force, it is something of a psychological nature]. Hence “they must keep something in common in spite of the divergence of their effects, as school-fellows long separated keep the same memories of boyhood. Roads may fork or by-ways be opened along which dissociated elements may evolve in an independent manner, but nevertheless it is in virtue of the primitive impetus of the whole that the movement of the parts continues” (57a.b).

So all the divergent paths share a common driving force. We will see evidence of it in each particular species. For example, the internal organs of different species will bear similarities: “Something of the whole, therefore, must abide in the parts; and this common element will be evident to us in some way, perhaps by the presence of identical organs in very different organisms” (57b).

We will now draw a sharp contrast between classical mechanism and creative evolution. The distinction regards different ways to produce likenesses.

[Consider first that bread is made round the world. The same laws of chemistry are used each time. The result is that bread is roughly similar no matter where you go (or else we would not call it bread). So here a similar thing (bread) is produced by a similar means (baking dough).

Now let’s think about evolution. Organisms were very similar and simple in the beginning. Gradually they diverged, developed, and diversified into the variegated plurality of species we know today. Note how many plants and animals reproduce by some sort of fertilization process. Let’s consider the simpler life forms preceding plants and animals. Probably there were ancient organisms lacking plant and animal traits. But evolving from this pool of simple life forms were two diverging lines of development: one tending toward being more plantlike and the other toward being more animal-like. Now try to imagine organisms that have not yet evolved enough to be classified as either plants or animals. Can we even conceive of how so simple an organism would reproduce using fertilization? It’s difficult. So Bergson assumes that both plants and animals developed their own form of fertilization independently from each other, after they went down their divergent lines of evolution. And hence] Bergson’s theory is that there is a common evolutionary impulse shared by drastically diverging lines of development.

A mechanist would explain these similarities a different way. They would not result from a common evolutionary impulse. Mechanists only consider mechanical processes. For them, the cause lies behind the effect. So things are not all unified by a common driving force, whether towards a final end or not. Under this mechanist view, it would only be by accident if different lines of evolution independently develop similarities: “evolution must then have occurred through a series of accidents added to one another, each new accident being preserved by selection if it is advantageous to that sum of former advantageous accidents which the present form of the living being represents” (57c). So it is highly unlikely that a similarity between species [such as plant and animal fertility] results from mechanistic causes. He writes: “The more two lines of evolution diverge, the less probability is there that accidental outer influences or accidental inner variations bring about the construction of the same apparatus upon them, especially if there was no trace of this apparatus at the moment of divergence” (57c?).

Bergson’s theory of the universal evolutionary impulse however does explain such phenomena. [Now consider again plant and animal fertilization. Each one is a very different sort of fertilization. They came about in very different ways. We cannot use a common mechanistic principle to explain the very different ways they originated. So,] creative evolutionary theory regards the independently-evolved similarities as being apparatuses that are alike but that were produced by very different means. However, mechanistic theories would say that there is probably a common cause for a feature shared by different species. Hence in mechanism, these similarities are likenesses produced by like means. Thus, Bergson could disprove mechanism if he shows that likeness can be produced by unlike means on account of a common impetus.

Pure mechanism, then, would be refutable, and finality, in the special sense in which we understand it, would be demonstrable in a certain aspect if it could be proved that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution; and the strength of the proof would be proportional both to the divergency between the lines of evolution thus chosen and to the complexity of the similar structures found in them. [57-58, emphasis mine]

Le pur mécanisme serait donc réfutable, et la finalité, au sens spécial où nous l'entendons, démontrable par un certain côté, si l’on pouvait établir que la vie fabrique certains appareils identiques, par des moyens dissemblables, sur des lignes d'évolution divergentes. La force de la preuve serait d'ailleurs proportionnelle au degré d'écartement des lignes d'évolution choisies, et au degré de complexité des structures similaires qu'on trouverait sur elles. [59bc]

§56 Adapting Machines

Mechanists might say that it was not purely coincidence that there is so much similarity between the diverse species. Rather, each creature is part of a line of development. But, they might add, throughout their generational alterations, each different species faces very similar conditions. [For example, the sun shines on the surface of the earth, so many surface-dwelling animals have eyes.] Each species adapts to the similar conditions. Hence mechanists might argue that we should not be surprised when evolutionary adaptations would be similar.

But not all biologists see adaptation the same way. [Consider the example of vision. Some might say that the sun’s light directly causes the organism to evolve eyes, as though the light impresses upon the skin, which responds by creating light-sensing organs. Others might say that there are various mutations, and those with sensitivity to light out-competed those species which could not see. And gradually vision developed.] So there are some biologists who think adaptation comes about from a stimulus’ direct influence on the organism, while others (of a more Darwinist persuasion) say that adaptation results indirectly: natural selection favors those mutations that are more fit to the given conditions.

[Consider that in the first case, the sunlight added vision to the creature, while in the second case, the sunlight subtracted those beings which could not see. Hence,] some biologists think thatpositive influences cause adaptation by producing variations, while other think that it results from negative influences that eliminate variations.

Nonetheless, both cases share something in common: outer conditions cause the adaptation. It is like a cause-effect mechanism. Hence biologists on both sides are mechanists in this way.

Bergson will now give a general presentation of his arguments against mechanistic adaptation.

§57 Darwin’s Accident

Consider first the positive direct thesis of adaptation. Conditions directly cause changes in the species, [like light stimulating animals to grow eyes]. In this case, we can explain the similarities on the grounds that there is a common source for all the similar variations across the wide range of species. But now instead consider the Darwinist thesis: there are random mutations, and those that are sufficiently adapted to circumstances survive the others. [So recall the example of light under this Darwinian theory. Let’s imagine all the different lines of evolution before they obtained vision. Somehow each one had the same random mutation that caused each to have symmetrical eye-pairs. As well, they share many other internal organs. Are there not infinitely many other ways that an organism can take-in nutrition and eliminate waste? Why do all have very similar digestive tracks? Are conditions really so similar that every animal would evolve nearly identical digestive organs? Given all the other possibilities, it seems far too unlikely. So] this Darwinist thesis seems untenable when we consider that such profound similarities between species all came-about independently.

An accumulation of accidental variations, such as would be necessary to produce a complex structure, requires therefore the concurrence of an almost infinite number of infinitesimal causes. Why should these causes, entirely accidental, recur the same, and in the same order, at different points of space and time? [59c]

Une accumulation de variations accidentelles, comme il en faut pour produire une structure compliquée, exige le concours d'un nombre pour ainsi dire infini de causes infinitésimales. Comment ces causes, toutes accidentelles, réapparaîtraient-elles les mêmes, et dans le même ordre, sur des points différents de l'espace et du temps? [61a]

Hence, “The struggle for life and natural selection can be of no use to us in solving this part of the problem, for we are not concerned here with what has perished, we have to do only with what has survived” (60-61).

§58 Can a Machine Wander?

Recall the principle of mechanism: “the same causes produce the same effects” (60b). Mechanists do not work backward, saying that the same effects must have the same causes, [as Bergson would like to do with similarities between divergent evolutionary lines]. But Bergson argues that we may assume that in evolution, similar outcomes result from similar causes. [For Bergson, this is the common evolutionary impetus]. He will show that the fact that two species have the same organs is not a matter of random chance. The mechanist would say it is random. Bergson analogizes the random path of development with the example of two people wandering aimlessly. Eventually they meet. This is no surprise; we expect them to at some point. Let’s suppose we draw a line that follows each walker’s wanderings. How likely is it that both random walks are so similar that we may superpose them and match them identically? Now, their paths could be very complex. But consider how unfathomably complex one internal organ is. And it will be similar with another species’ same organ. The development of each evolutionary line will be different and it will create something profoundly complex. But it is as though both were being guided by a common impetus. It cannot just be coincidence that all animals have such similar internal organs. (60c)

§59 The Positive Thesis is Missing Something

We just examined the Darwinian thesis that there are random accidental evolutionary changes. And we found that such an accidental basis cannot explain all the evolutionary similarities, because there would be far too many unlikely coincidences. Now Bergson will examine the other thesis, the positive one. According to this view, species adapt because external conditions directly force the species to comply with its environment. “Adaptation [...] is not merely elimination of the unadapted; it is due to the positive influence of outer conditions that have moulded the organism on their own form” (60d). In the first theory, similar causes produce similar effects. In this other hypothesis, the similarities between the effects are produced by similarities in the causes (60d). However, Bergson claims that this hypothesis is based on a semantical confusion regarding the term “adaptation” (61).

§60 Evolution is Neither Wine nor Line

We confuse two meanings for ‘adaptation’ when we follow the positive theory. Consider the first meaning with an example. We pour water and wine into a glass. The fluids mix and take the form of the glass itself. We might say that the liquid is ‘adapting’ to the structural conditions of the glass. But this sort of adaptation is really just a mechanical way that fluids adjust to their containers. In this case, the shape of the glass already exists, and it forces its contours upon the water/wine mixture.

But consider instead the adaptation of an organism. [Image creatures that have been forced into a colder region. Some change the way they build their shelters to better protect them from the cold. Others hibernate. Some develop migration patterns. Others change their diet, or the way they raise their young. None of these adaptations are like the imprint of coldness, like how the watered wine takes-on the imprint of the glass containing it.] When organisms adapt, there is no concrete ‘form’ to their environment. There are conditions. And the creature must form itself in its own way in order to adapt to those conditions. Their new changes will not resemble the conditions like how the watered wine resembles the glass. [Migration does not resemble coldness]. Rather, the conditions are a ‘call,’ and each species independent adaptation is the ‘response’.

The circumstances are not a mould into which life is inserted and whose form life adopts: this is indeed to be fooled by a metaphor. There is no form yet, and life must create a form for itself, suited to the circumstances which are made for it. It will have to make the best of these circumstances, neutralize their inconveniences and utilize their advantages, in short, respond to outer actions by building up a machine which has no resemblance to them. Such adapting is not repeating, but replying, an entirely different thing. (61c, underline and boldface mine)

Les conditions ne sont pas un moule où la vie s'insérera et dont elle recevra sa forme : quand on raisonne ainsi, on est dupe d'une métaphore. Il n'y a pas encore de forme, et c'est à la vie qu'il appartiendra de se créer à elle-même une forme appropriée aux conditions qui lui sont faites. Il va falloir qu'elle tire parti de ces conditions, qu'elle en neutralise les inconvénients et qu'elle en utilise les avantages, enfin qu'elle réponde aux actions extérieures par la construction d'une machine qui n'a aucune ressemblance avec elles. S'adapter ne consistera plus ici à répéter, mais à répliquer, ce qui est tout différent. (63a)

Now consider a geometry problem. [For example, we know two angles of a triangle, 30 and 60 degrees. On that basis we want to find the third.] We are given certain conditions. And our answer ‘adapts’ to them. [The third is 90 degrees, because that is all the angular ‘room’ left that the other angles leave us.] But this is different than the mechanical adaptation of fluids in a glass. When we solve a geometry problem, we had to engage with the conditions using our minds, and find a solution by working with our mental tools. But still this is unlike natural evolution, because it presupposes that there is some final answer and an intelligible logic in the mathematics of geometry. We only need to find that pre-existing (a priori) solution using logical analysis. So Bergson’s evolution is neither like filling a glass nor solving a geometry problem. If evolution were just a passive molding, then all the possible forms are already given in the conditions, waiting for creatures to mold to them. This cannot explain then how new forms are created. But if evolution were like actively solving a geometry problem using logic, then we are ascribing too much of a human-like intelligence to the world [see §53 for Bergson's critique of this sort of finalism]. But often times people slip from one such meaning of adaptation to the other, switching as soon as the one ceases to be effective.

Images from the English translation [click to enlarge]:

Images from the original French [click to enlarge]:

Bergson, Henri. L'Évolution Créatrice. Ed. Felix Alcan. Paris: Librairies Félix Alcan et Guillaumin Réunies, 1908. Available online athttp://www.archive.org/details/levolutioncreatr00berguoft

Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Transl. Arthur Mitchell. London: MacMillan and Co., 1922. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/creativeevolutio00berguoft