Goldschmidt (2.1.4.1.39) Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps, “Providentialisme et causalité”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Victor Goldschmidt

 

Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps

 

Deuxième partie:

Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne

 

A

La Connaissance

 

Chapitre IV

L’interprétation des événements

 

1

L’interprétation a l’échelle cosmique

 

2.1.4.1.39

Providentialisme et causalité

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(2.1.4.1.39.1) Since we cannot know how events and our actions are leading finally to the greater good of the whole, we are left to wonder, what then is the good of consulting diviners to tell us about the future and about how we should behave now with respect to that foreseeable future? For, whatever it is that they tell us to do, it will still only result in the foreseen event. But that is precisely what their value is. They can guide us to do our part in bringing about that future. But why would we help a bad outcome for us to transpire? That is because there really are no bad outcomes from the perspective of divine providence. For, anything that seems bad for us is really good for the whole in the end, even though we cannot understand how or why. Thus diviners are agents of Destiny, and they help us become agents of Destiny too.

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.1.4.1.39.1

[Diviners and Divinees as Agents of Destiny]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

 

2.1.4.1.39

Providentialisme et causalité

 

 

2.1.4.1.39.1

[Diviners and Divinees as Agents of Destiny]

 

(p.89-91: “ C’est la divination, précisément, qui « confirme tout …”)

 

[In sum: Since we cannot know how events and our actions are leading finally to the greater good of the whole, we are left to wonder, what then is the good of consulting diviners to tell us about the future and about how we should behave now with respect to that foreseeable future? For, whatever it is that they tell us to do, it will still only result in the foreseen event. But that is precisely what their value is. They can guide us to do our part in bringing about that future. But why would we help a bad outcome for us to transpire? That is because there really are no bad outcomes from the perspective of divine providence. For, anything that seems bad for us is really good for the whole in the end, even though we cannot understand how or why. Thus diviners are agents of Destiny, and they help us become agents of Destiny too.]

 

Divination is what confirms the idea of the providence of the gods who are watching over human affairs. But how in fact does divination reveal this divine benevolence? The problem here is [that it turns us away from anthropomorphic finalism (which we said in section 2.1.4.1.37.3 and section 2.1.4.1.37.5 was that all things in the world are designed for the gods and men and generally speaking for the good of all), for, if we have a prevision of what will happen to us (and how we will react, then if we act differently, we have contradicted the very assumptions underlying how the prevision was possible in the first place.) We might for example try to ward off bad futures using prayers or similar spiritualistic means. But were we to do so, it would be a matter of confatality, which means that we would have done them anyway by necessity. But if in fact any action we take to ward off a bad future is already presumed by the prophesy to take place as part of how events lead up to that bad future, then what service does a diviner render to us? For, our actions that we do out of concern about that future will still only lead to that same future. The answer here is that the diviner is an agent of destiny, [broadly speaking, and he helps us become agents of our particular destiny too, to make us aware that we must participate actively in how our divined future comes about, even if it is a bad future. (For, remember from section 2.1.4.1.37.5, there is no “bad” event that can happen from the perspective of the whole.)] Here Goldschmidt cites Cicero’s Natural Questions, Chapter 2, section 38, lines 3-4, but let us read some context too:

(3) “Either it’s going to happen or it’s not,” someone says. “If it’s going to happen, it will happen, even if you do not undertake vows. If it’s not going to happen, even if you do undertake vows, it will not happen.” Your dilemma is invalid, because you are ignoring the proviso that falls between those alternatives: this will happen, but only if vows are undertaken. (38.1) “But,” someone says, “fate must also cover this very point, that you either undertake vows or you do not.” Regard me as surrendering to you and conceding that the fact that vows will occur is also covered by fate: therefore they will occur. (2) It is fated that one man should be eloquent, but only if he learns to read; the same fate includes the point that he should learn to read: therefore he must be taught. This man will be wealthy, but only if he goes to sea; but in the sequence of fated events that promises him a large fortune, this too is necessarily included, that he should also go to sea: therefore he will go to sea. It is the same with expiations, I tell you: someone will escape the dangers if he expiates the divinely predicted threats; but it is also fated that he should expiate them; therefore he does expiate them. (3) Such arguments are commonly used against us to prove that nothing is left to our will, and that full rights over our actions are handed over <to fate>. When I am dealing with that topic, I shall explain how something is left to the individual’s decision, though fate remains intact. But for the present I have explained what is under discussion, how, if the course of fate is fixed, expiations and | placatory sacrifices can avert the dangers of prodigies: the reason being that they do not compete with fate, but they themselves are subject to fate’s law. (4) “So what use is a diviner to me?” you ask. “For it is necessary for me to perform the expiation in any case, even if he does not advise it.” He is of use because he is a servant of fate; in the same way, although we are indebted to fate for good health, we are also indebted to the doctor, because fate’s kindness reaches us through his hands.

(Seneca 2010: 181-182)

And next from Epictetus, Discourses, Book 2, ch.10, part:

CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, you are a man and this is one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated from domestic animals (προβάτων). Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient (serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connexion of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise (profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this.

(Epictetus 1890, copied from Perseus)

Thus, we should consult diviners, but not with our desires in mind but only to aid in the unfolding of destiny. For as we see in Epictetus, Discourses, Book 2, Chapter 7, “How We Ought to Use Divination” (part):

What then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see: let us sacrifice on the occasion.—Yes, master, as fortune chooses. —When he has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play upon us.

What then should we do? We ought to come (to divination) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the man whom he meets which of two roads leads (to his journey's end), without any desire for that which leads to the right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any road except the road which leads (to his end).

(Epictetus 1890, copied from Perseus)

So there is a danger in interpreting the finalism of providence in terms of our personal preferences, (namely I think, the danger of going against G0d’s wisdom for the greater good of the whole.) This again refers us back to bare causality (but I am not sure what is meant by that. It perhaps means that we cannot know the finalities of things, but we can work with the causes, as for example the ways our behaviors serve as causes of events leading to those finalities.)]

39. C’est la divination, précisément, qui « confirme tout [89|90] à fait l’idée que la providence des dieux veille sur les affaires humaines »¹. Mais en quoi, exactement, ce don de prévision manifeste-t-il la bienveillance divine ? – Sans doute peut-on répondre : « Il est faux que la connaissance des événements futurs ne nous importe en rien, car nous serons davantage sur nos gardes, si nous l’avons »². Mais de cette réponse, il convient d’écarter toute idée de finalisme anthropocentrique. Ce serait contredire la prévision aussi bien que la providence, que de croire que, connaissant l’avenir, on pourrait le changer. Si la prédiction annonce simplement « des dangers qui nous menacent » alors, sans doute, prières, vœux, sacrifices pourront « détourner » ces dangers. Mais de telles « mesures de précautions »³ rentrent elles-mêmes dans le destin et « sont comprises sous sa loi » à titre de confatalia. Nécessairement donc, nous les eussions prises. « En ce cas, quel service un haruspice me rend-il ? Je suis de toute façon obligé de faire ces expiations, même s’il ne me les conseille pas. – Le service qu’il te rend, c’est d’être l’agent du destin⁴. » Donc, même dans le cas d’un danger conjuré, le finalisme de la prédiction est résorbé dans la causalité du destin. Il en est ainsi, à plus forte raison, quand l’avenir annoncé dépasse la probabilité d’un danger. Il semble même que l’utilité véritable de la divination consiste à nous faire connaître ce qui sera, sans plus ; que le bon usage de la divination se borne à nous rendre nous-mêmes « agents du destin » ; que les « mesures de précaution » tendent précisément à nous faire coopérer à ce quiarrivera⁵. Aussi faut-il « aller vers les devins sans désir et sans répugnance, comme le voyageur demande au passant qu’il rencontre laquelle des deux routes conduit au but, ne désirant pas davantage que ce soit celle de droite plutôt que celle de gauche. Il ne veut pas, en effet, passer par telle de ces routes, mais par celle qui [90|91] conduit »¹. – Devant le danger d’interpréter le finalisme de la providence selon nos préférences passionnelles, nous sommes renvoyés, ici encore, à la causalité nue.

(89-91)

1, Cic., de nat. deor., II, LXV, 162.

2. Cic., de diu., I, XXXVIII, 83: « Neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae euentura sunt ; erinius enim cautiores, si sciemus ».

3 Cf. note précèd.

4. Sénèque, Quest. Nat., II, XXXVIII, 3-4.

5. P. ex. Epictète, .Diss., II, X, 5 : « Si l’homme de bien pouvait prévoir l’avenir, il coopérerait lui-même à la maladie, à la mort; à la mutilation, parce qu’il aurait conscience qu’en vertu de l’ordre universel, cette tâche lui est assignée. »

(90)

1. Epict., Diss., II, VII, 10.

(91)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

              

Bibliography

 

From:

 

Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.

 

 

 

Otherwise:

 

 

Epictetus. 1890. The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments. English translation by George Long. London: George Bell and Sons.

Copied from Perseus:

http://data.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng1

 

 

Seneca. 2010. Natural Questions. English translation by Harry M. Hine. Chicago: University of Chicago.

 

 

[contents]

 

 

 

 

.

Goldschmidt (2.1.4.1.34) Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps, “Divination et connaissance dans le présent, 1”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Stoicism, entry directory]

[Victor Goldschmidt, entry directory]

[Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Victor Goldschmidt

 

Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps

 

Deuxième partie:

Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne

 

A

La Connaissance

 

Chapitre IV

L’interprétation des événements

 

I

L’interprétation a l’échelle cosmique

 

2.1.4.1.34

Divination et connaissance dans le présent, 1

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(2.1.4.1.34.1) The events of the world happen by causal necessity and are guided by God’s wisdom. This means that to interpret an event is to understand its place in a series of rationally ordered events that unravel in this ordered way. The practice of divination may not involve actually knowing the causes, but it can still operate by recognizing the signs of causes. (2.1.4.1.34.2) The image of the uncoiling of a rope that Cicero gives when describing an ordered time that can be divined is not about the (metrical or qualitative) homogeneity of time (like the geometrical “time-line”) but is rather about the idea that all events are from the beginning found together and that the temporal succession only deploys an initially given set.

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.1.4.1.34.1

[The Unraveling of Providential Destiny’s Coil and the Interpretation of Its Events through Divination]

 

2.1.4.1.34.2

[The Togetherness of Moments in the Coil of Time]

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

 

2.1.4.1.34.1

[The Unraveling of Providential Destiny’s Coil and the Interpretation of Its Events through Divination]

 

(p.79-80, “On sait que le stoïcisme identifie Destin et Providence...”)

 

[In sum: The events of the world happen by causal necessity and are guided by God’s wisdom. To interpret an event means to understand its place in a series of rationally ordered events that unravel in this ordered way. The practice of divination may not involve actually knowing the causes, but it can still operate by recognizing the signs of causes.]

 

The Stoics identified Destiny with Providence. This means that when we interpret an event, we are both assessing a causal explanation and finding a justification for it in terms of ends. This involves understanding its connectedness within the series of events that unfold as providential Destiny. Goldschmidt quotes Cicero’s On Divination Book 1, LVI, 127:

he who knows the causes of future events necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledge is possible only to a god, it is left to man to presage the future by means of certain [p. 363] signs which indicate what will follow them. Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order. This connexion between cause and effect is obvious to two classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs. They may not discern the causes themselves, yet they do discern the signs and tokens of those causes.

(Cicero 1923, copied from Perseus, boldface mine)

Here is the Goldschmidt text:

34. On sait que le stoïcisme identifie Destin et Providence⁵. En ce sens, interpréter un événement signifie indiffé- | remment l’expliquer (cause) ou le justifier (fin), en le rattachant ou, plutôt, en comprenant son rattachement à la série des événements que déroule le Destin providentiel « Qui tiendrait, en effet, les causes des événements futurs saur a nécessairement tout l’avenir. Cela, nul n’en est capable, excepté Dieu ; mais il reste à l’homme, d’après certains signes qui impliquent des conséquences, à prévoir l’avenir. L’événement futur, en effet, ne surgit pas brusquement, l’écoulement du temps d’un moment à l’autre ressemble au déroulement d’un câble qui ne produit rien de nouveau, mais qui déploie, à chaque fois, ce qui était auparavant. C’est là ce que voient aussi bien ceux qui ont reçu le don de la divination naturelle que ceux qui connaissent le cours des choses par l’observation ; s’ils n’aperçoivent pas les causes elles-mêmes, ils en aperçoivent au moins les signes et les indices »¹.

5. Chalcidius, in Plat. Tim., 142 (Chrysippe). S.V.F., II, 933.

(79-80)

1. Cic., de diu, LVI, 127.

(80)

 

 

 

2.1.4.1.34.2

[The Togetherness of Moments in the Coil of Time]

 

(p.80, “La pleine connaissance des événements...”)

 

[In sum: The uncoiling of the rope is an image that is not about the (metrical or qualitative) homogeneity of time (like the geometrical “time-line”) but is rather about the idea that all events are from the beginning found together and that the temporal succession only deploys an initially given set.]

 

Only God has full knowledge of all events and their causes. We have already seen that God sees all things in the cosmic period in the mode of the present. The image of the uncoiling of a rope does not necessarily signify that all things are “perfectly uniform”; rather, it simply conveys the idea that all things are present together: the temporal succession only deploys an initially given set. [I am not entirely sure I understand the implications of that claim. Is the emphasis on ‘initially’ there to suggest that the series can change?] Bergson uses a similar image of an unfolding fan to portray the atemporalism that he was arguing very firmly against. It is primarily in divination that humans imitate, to the extent that they are able, this vision of the whole of time, by beginning with a singular event.

La pleine connaissance des événements et de leurs causes n’appartient qu’à Dieu. Nous avons déjà vu qu’elle saisit toutes choses dans le mode du présent, l’ensemble d’une période cosmique étant présent au regard de Dieu². L’image du déroulement d’un câble ne signifie pas nécessairement que le cours des choses soit « parfaitement uniforme »³ ; elle exprime simplement l’idée que les choses sont présentes ensemble : la succession temporelle ne fait que déployer un ensemble initialement donné (« traductio temporis... primum quidque replicantis ») ; c’est par une image tout à fait comparable, que Bergson figurera l’intemporalisme qu’il combat⁴. – C’est principalement dans la divination, que l’homme, autant qu’il en est capable, imite cette vision d’ensemble, à partir d’un événement singulier.

(80)

2. Cf. §§ 17-18.

3. Ch. Appuhn, éd. Garnier, n. 178. – Il est vrai que, en dernier ressort, il y a équivalence entre l’homogénéité de la substance, le présent cosmique des périodes et l’identité des événements à travers les périodes (§§ 25, 2; 101; cf. p. 39, n. 6).

4. « L’éventail qu’on déploie pourrait s’ouvrir de plus en plus vite, et même instantanément ; il étalerait toujours la même broderie, préfigurée sur la soie » (La Pensée et le Mouvant, p. 11).

(80)

 

 

 

From:

 

Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.

 

 

Otherwise:

Cicero. 1923. De Senectute De Amicitia De Divinatione. With An English Translation. William Armistead Falconer. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi053.perseus-eng1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.

Goldschmidt (2.1.4.0.32) Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps, “Connaissance et action”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Stoicism, entry directory]

[Victor Goldschmidt, entry directory]

[Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Victor Goldschmidt

 

Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps

 

Deuxième partie:

Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne

 

A

La Connaissance

 

Chapitre IV

L’interprétation des événements

 

0

[Introductory Material to Ch.4]

 

2.1.4.0.32

Connaissance et action

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(2.1.4.0.32.1) For the Stoics, we should live our lives according to nature. But this does not mean in a Platonic sense to see nature as providing a model for particular actions that our will can either copy or not copy. Rather, for the Stoics, the distance between model and copy must be eliminated as much as possible, such that what we will is not something that may or may not accord with nature, rather, what we will should be no different than what Destiny’s laws have mandated and thus what Nature is doing.

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.1.4.0.32.1

[Living According to Nature by Willing According to Nature]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.1.4.o.32

 

2.1.4.0.32.1

[Living According to Nature by Willing According to Nature]

 

(p. 77-79, “L’enveloppement de la morale par la physique s’exprime...”)

 

[In sum: For the Stoics, we should live our lives according to nature. But this does not mean in a Platonic sense to see nature as providing a model for particular actions that our will can either copy or not copy. Rather, for the Stoics, the distance between model and copy must be eliminated as much as possible, such that what we will is not something that may or may not accord with nature, rather, what we will should be no different than what Destiny’s laws have mandated and thus what Nature is doing.]

 

 

The idea of developing morality in accord with physics is captured in Zeno’s saying, “live according to nature.” This saying may have undergone slight variation as it was written from scholar to scholar. Yet, it seems to imply two different attitudes regarding moral life that nonetheless must be made to overlap. Living is an activity, but it must conform to nature, which as well acts, and moreover is the sole, true agent of activity. (I am not certain, but maybe here an idea could be that any of our own actions are actions of nature too, as we are a part of nature. And also, nature is fundamentally the unique agent of activity.) So in order for human action to conform to nature’s activity, we first need to know what nature’s activity is. In the history of philosophy, there is nothing radically new in this idea of giving priority to knowledge or contemplation over action. Consider for example how all of Platonism subordinates such activities to a prerequisite knowledge of Models/Forms. The novelty of this Stoic doctrine is that here, on the one hand, knowledge is no longer conceived as a purely theoretical attitude, while on the other hand, knowledge completely changes its object. [I probably have this next point wrong, but I am guessing: This knowledge is no longer about realities in the basis of which we derive precepts, and then secondarily our action would be free to conform or to not conform to those precepts. Rather,nature’s activity must conform to Destiny’s laws, and it does so whether or not we act with good will. (I am guessing that the idea here is the following. Nature will act the way it does in its conformity to Destiny, and we, as part of nature and Destiny, likewise act in such a way. In other words, it is not about us seeing that in nature there are certain ideals of goodness etc. that we should strive to make our actions conform to, rather, there are certain laws of nature, dictated by Destiny, and we should make our ethical life conform to these laws, which have nothing to do with good will. They rather have more to do with causality and fatality.) Knowing nature is less a matter of knowing what must be done as much as it is a matter of understanding that what nature does is what is done (maybe: to know nature (for the sake of knowing how to act) does not mean understanding what sorts of actions we need to be taking, it rather involves understanding that whatever happens (in nature) was such by Destiny (and thus we are not to develop a sense that we must try to do better to make our free will conform to certain precepts but rather that we must submit our will to that of destiny. So it is not about having a moral sort of free will. It is about willing what destiny wills.)) Thus, as Diogenes Laertius says regarding this, “living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature” (Hicks trans. at Perseus.) The experience of the ways things happen naturally is not a theorization that precedes action; between theory and action, there is no longer the same distance that we see between model and copy and between the norm that is known and the norm that is obeyed. (In other words, we do not model our behavior after nature; we simply make our behavior be natural or at least move with the flow of nature’s way and activity.) Just as nature does not wait for our free initiative in order to reduce this distance (between the way that things happen and the way we choose for things to happen), the only difference is then between nature’s will which is being achieved and our will which, having understood nature’s will, consents to it. It is the difference between “being driven” (or “being dragged along”) and “following willingly”. In the footnote here, Goldschmidt cites Seneca, and I will take more of the quotation to give context and elaboration:

I have just been following Cicero’s example:

11 Guide me, o father, lord of the lofty firmament,

wherever you decide; I hasten to obey;

I am here and ready. But if I be reluctant,

groaning, I still must go; in wretchedness must suffer,

what might have been my own act, were I virtuous.

Fate guides the man who’s willing, drags the unwilling.

12 That’s how we should live and speak, with fate finding us ready and prepared. This is the strong character that has surrendered himself to fate. In contrast we have the puny degenerate, struggling, thinking ill of the world order, and preferring to correct the gods rather than himself.

(Seneca 2015: 425, boldface mine)

Also cited are these lines from Seneca’s The Happy Life [with some context]:

Follow god. (6) On the other hand, whoever complains and laments and groans is compelled by force to follow orders, and though he is unwilling, he is nonetheless seized away to do what has been commanded. Yet what insanity it is to be dragged rather than to follow!

(Seneca 2014: 253, boldface mine)

We say that our will has as its object what should be done. But under this Stoic view, this is because our knowledge has indicated to our will that regardless, what should be done has been done (or maybe, what we should will do be done is that which has already been done or that which is already now being done): “wish the things which happen to be as they are” (Epictetus Enchiridion 8, Long trans., Perseus.)]

L’enveloppement de la morale par la physique s’exprime dans le célèbre adage de Zénon : « Vivre conformément à la nature »¹. Cette formule, malgré les légères variations qu’elle a pu subir d’un scolarque à l’autre², implique, semble-t-il, deux attitudes dans la vie morale, encore qu’elle exige de les amener à se recouvrir. Vivre, c’est bien une activité, mais qui doit se conformer à la nature, laquelle, elle aussi, agit et même, est l’unique agent véritable³. C’est [77 | 78] donc l’action de la nature qu’il faut connaître, avant de pouvoir y conformer l’action humaine. Cette priorité donnée à la connaissance ou, si l’on préfère, à la contemplation sur l’action, n’aurait, en soi, rien d’original ; tout le platonisme, par exemple, subordonne les conduites d’action ou de création à la connaissance préalable des Formes-Modèles. La nouveauté de cette doctrine stoïcienne¹ vient de ce que la connaissance n’est plus conçue comme une attitude purement théorique et que, d’autre part, elle change complètement d’objet. Elle ne porte plus sur des réalités dont il s’agirait de faire dériver des préceptes², auxquelles, ensuite, l’action serait libre de se conformer ou non. Elle porte sur la nature qui, dans le Destin, conforme elle-même son action à ses lois³, sans rien demander à notre bonne volonté. Connaître la nature, c’est bien moins comprendre ce qu’il faut faire, que comprendre ce qu’elle fait, ce qui se fait : « Vivre selon la vertu équivaut à vivre conformément à l’expérience des choses qui arrivent naturellement⁴. » Cette expérience n’est pas une theoria précédant l’action ; il n’y a plus, entre l’une et l’autre, la distance du modèle à la copie, de la norme connue à la norme obéie. Comme la nature n’attend pas notre libre initiative, pour réduire elle-même cette distance, le seul écart est entre sa volonté qui s’accomplit et la nôtre qui, ayant compris cette volonté, y consent. C’est la distance, indiscernable en apparence, entre « être entraîné » et « suivre de bon gré »⁵. Si l’on peut dire que la volonté prend pour objet ce qu’il faut faire, c’est parce que la connais- [78 | 79] sance lui indique que, de toutes manières, cela se fait : « Vouloir les événements comme ils se produisent »¹.

(77-79)

1. Selon Pohlenz (Stoa, II, 67) après M. Schafer (cf. note suiv.), il conviendrait d’accepter le témoignage de Stobée (II, 75, II = S.V.F., I, 179), selon lequel la formule de Zénon était seulement : ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν. Nous préférons, avec E. Bréhier (Chrysippe, p. 220, n. 2), attribuer déjà à Zénon l’adjonction : τῇ φύσει. 1) Il ne suffit pas, pour invalider la témoignage de Diogène Laërce (VII, 87), de le déclarer « faux », avec Pohlenz, qui, d’autre part, ne commente ni ne réfute le texte concordant de Cicéron (de fin., IV, VI, 14) ; 2) nous ne tenons pas pour résolu le problème des antécédents académiciens (Polémon) et péripatéticiens (Théophraste) de la morale stoïcienne, eu général, et de la formule en question, en particulier (cf. p. 56, n. 2et l’article de von Arnim, cité à la p. 56, n. 3). Pohlenz lui-même doit concéder que « Zénon a dû sans doute en avoir reçu plusieurs suggestions » (Stoa, I, 118.) Le problème (comme, d’ailleurs celui des antécédents pythagoriciens du platonisme) est parfois obscurci par l’ardeur des auteurs à sauvegarder la pleine originalité des Stoïciens (ou de Platon). Mais cette originalité subsiste dans tous les cas (parce qu’un système n’est pas une mosaïque de doctrines ; cf. p. 202, n. 2), et sans qu’il soit besoin, pour la soutenir, de nier de parti pris les emprunts de certaines formules. On risque, autrement, d’imiter, en sens inverse, l’attitude de Cicéron (de fin., IV) qui ressortit à la polémique plutôt qu’à la science historique.

2. Cf., p. ex. Cic., de fin., IV, VI, 14-15; citons l’historique donné par Pohlenz, Stoa, 116-118, et par Max. Schäfer, Ein frühstoisches System d. Ethik bei Cicero, Munich, 1934 (qui propose, aux pp. 10-11 et 127, n. 2, une interprétation, reprise par Pohlenz, de la formule zénorienne : ζῆν ὁμολογουμένως, sans datif complémentaire). – Notons enfin qu’un des derniers commentateurs de Zénon rétablit, dans cette formule, l’adjonction : τῇ φύσει (A. Jagu, Zénon de Cittium, Paris, 1946, p. 18).

3. Sénèque, Ep., 65, 12 (cf. p. 35) ; de benef., IV, VII, I : « quid... aliud est natura quam deus et diuina ratio toti mundo et partibus eius inserta ? » ; le Destin conçu comme αἰτία unique (S.V.F., II, 934- 938).

(77)

1 Cela sans préjudice des « deux idées neuves » qu’y signale, à un autre point de vue, E. Bréhier, Crysippe, p. 221.

2. Que ces réalités soient transcendantes (Formes platoniciennes) ou à la portée de tous (« nature », au sens que ce terme pouvait avoir chez Théophraste ou Polémon) ; les impératifs auxquels elles donnent lieu étant toujours, dans une certaine mesure, dépendants de l’initiative humaine, pour être obéis.

3. Sén., de prou,. V, 8: « Irreuocabilis humana pariter ac diuina cursus uehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper parit, semel iussit. »

4. Diog. Laërt., VII, 87: Ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ᾽ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος. Cf. Cie., de fin.., IV, VI, 14: (secuudum naturam uiuere summum esse bonum) « His uerbis tria significari Stoici dicunt, unum eius modi, uiuere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum quae natura euenirent ; hune Zenonis aiunt esse finem. »

5. Voir entre autres, Sén., Ep., 107, II: « Ducunt uolentem fata, nolentem trahunt » (citation de Cléanthe, cf. Epict., Man., 53) ; de uita beata, XV, 5 : « a Deum sequere ! … quae autem dementia est potius trahi quam sequi. »

(78)

1. Epict., Man., 8: θέλε τὰ γινόμενα ὡς γίνεται καὶ εὐροήσεις.

(79)

 

 

 

 

 

From:

 

Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.

 

 

 

Also cited:

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

[1-160]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

[179-202]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=D.+L.+7.7&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

[1-160]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

[179-202]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=D.+L.+7.7&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258

 

Seneca. Epistulae morales ad Lucilium.

Available at:

https://la.wikisource.org/wiki/Epistulae_morales_ad_Lucilium

 

Seneca. 2014. On the Happy Life. In Hardship and Happiness, pp. 235-273. Translated by James Ker [other texts in this edition are translated by others]. Chicago: University of Chicago.

 

Seneca. 2015. Letters on Ethics. To Lucilius. Translated by Margaret Graver and A.A. Long. Chicago and London: University of Chicago.

 

 

 

.

Fate of the Wild [77] Francis Bacon: Seated Figure, 1974.Deleuze on Bacon, Painting Series

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]

[Entry collecting the Images of the Paintings]

[Index of Painting Entries in the Deleuze on Bacon, Painting Series]

[May I deeply thank the sources of these images:

eaobjets.wordpress.com

Palazzo Reale

Credits found at the end.]

[The following is quotation. My commentary is bracketed in red.]

Fate of the Wild

Francis Bacon: Seated Figure, 1974

Gilbert de Botton Collection

(Thank you so very much Stampfli & Turci of eaobjets.wordpress.com and Palazzo Reale)

Painting 39 of Deleuze's Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. Tome II - Peintures

Painting [77] of the English translation, and

Painting [39] of the Seuil 2002 French

Man becomes animal, but not without the animal becoming spirit at the same time, the spirit of man, the physical spirit of man presented in the mirror as Eumenides or Fate [77]. (Deleuze 2003: 16ab)

L'homme devient animal, mais il ne le devient pas sans que l'animal en même temps ne devienne esprit, esprit de l'homme, esprit physique de l'homme présenté dans le miroir comme Euménide ou Destin. [39] (Deleuze 2002: 28bc)

[The faces of Bacon's figures are often deformed as though pushed-and-pulled in many divergent directions at once. These deformations result from one of Bacon's techniques. He randomly messes-up the figure in unintentional ways, like spattering or smearing the paint. This creates new opportunities to unfold the figure's rendition. But because Bacon develops the work in more than one direction at once, the face is warped, stretched, and mutilated. There are many forces chaotically intertwined in the figure's body. We might say that there is a zone of wilderness, like a jungle of forces, inhabiting the wildly twisted body. The forces are not explicit, yet they are fully there, fully expressed in the body's contortions. They are implicit involved intensities rather than explicit evolved extensities. They flare-up-and-about like the tongues of a wild fire. This is the wild spirit inhabiting intensified bodies, making them more like animal meat than human flesh.

When we view Bacon's paintings, we are affected in such a way that our bodies feel the same affect. Our bodies become disorganized. Its many organs which want to function harmoniously and organically now operate divergently, able only to communicate to each other the differences they are feeling. In a sense, we became animal, because we embody a wilderness. Hence when our bodies and faces become animal, it is not that they take-on specific animal shapes. As Deleuze writes, "the marks or traits of animality are not animal forms, but rather the spirits that haunt the wiped off parts, that pull at the head, individualizing and qualifying the head without a face" (Deleuze 2003: 15-16). So, we embody the spirit of the wild, of the animal.

(Again, thanks Stampfli & Turci of eaobjets.wordpress.com and Palazzo Reale)

That man becomes animal in this way is a fact. But likewise in the same process, animal becomes man. Their inter-becoming, then, is a 'common-fact'. Perhaps as our bodies express their inner wilderness, we give a human embodiment to the animal spirits. When the figure here looks in the mirror, he does not see the image of his body. Rather, he sees its physical spirit. What we observe in the painting is an animal-like creature that is taking-on the form of a Fury or of Fate.

(And once more, I would like to thank Stampfli & Turci of eaobjets.wordpress.com and Palazzo Reale)

The animal spirits, in this way, cross-into a human domain where they come to express a human rendition of destiny. So consider when we are torn-about by wild animal forces. Our bodies then embody the animal spirits of wildness just as much as these spirits take-on human form and express the human in its rawest state or 'fact'. The common fact then is the dual state-of-affairs arising when the human expresses the animal all while the animal thereby expresses the human.]

Deleuze, Gilles. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Transl. Daniel W. Smith. London/New York: Continuum, 2003.

Deleuze, Gilles. Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. Paris: Seuil, 2002.

Deleuze, Gilles. Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. Tome II - Peintures. Paris: Editions de la différence [Littératures], 1981.


Images obtained quite gratefully from:

http://eaobjets.wordpress.com/2008/05/16/francis-bacon-at-the-palazzo-reale-milano/

Stampfli & Turci of espaces arts & objets.

Authors here say the image was provided courtesy of Palazzo Reale:

http://www.comune.milano.it/dseserver/webcity/portale/palreale.nsf/index.htm?readForm&settore=MCOI-66DHPH_HP