Uexküll (3.7) Theoretical Biology, “The Observer and the Animal”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary is my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos. Page citations refer to the 1928 German edition first and to the 1926 English edition second. Note: German terms are repeatedly inserted to facilitate comparison with translations of other Uexküll texts.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Jakob von Uexküll

 

Theoretical Biology

[Theoretische Biologie]

 

Ch.3 The Content-Qualities

[Die Inhaltsqualitäten]

 

3.7 The Observer and the Animal

[Die Beobachter und das Tier]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

An animal subject’s body can be divided into two main parts: {1} the receptor half, which is involved with the properties of the animal’s world that affect it and potentially trigger it to act, also called the world-as-sensed [Merkwelt], and {2} the effector half, which is involved with the properties of the animal’s world that facilitate its effective action and which can be altered by means of those actions. This half is involved with the world of action [Wirkwelt]. But because each half is so intimately bound up with its respective world, such that even physical resemblance can be detected, we might think that the animal is simply the imprint of its environment. But this is a faulty conclusion. Our sensory organs are spatially distinct but they tell us about objects whose properties are unified. The animal carves up the world of indications in its own way and by means of its own anatomical structures. But when we consider nature more broadly, we see that there is a larger plan at work governing how each species experiences the world. Also, although we cannot know another animal’s sensations, we can, by means of experimentation with their response behaviors and with a study of their anatomies, discern which environmental indications it is sensitive to and also the form of the relations holding between these indications.

 

 

 

Summary

 

§395

[There are two functional halves to an animal subject: {1} the receptor half that is sensitive to affecting influences, and {2} the effector half that reacts and makes changes in the world.]

 

[We are continuing our study of the animal on the part of an observer. It seems we will consider the parts of the animal itself. Uexküll, instead of simply making that analysis, is fitting this description in with the prior discussion. So we think of the observer looking at the animal. The animal in a sense then has properties that the observer can detect, and thus those properties serve as indications for the observer (see section 3.5 on indications). On the basis of these discerned indications telling the observer about the animal’s body, she would distinguish two halves of the animal: {1} the receptor half, which is involved with the properties of the animal’s world that affect it and potentially trigger it to act, also called the world-as-sensed, and {2} the effector half, which is involved with the properties of the animal’s world that facilitate its effective action and which can be altered by means of those actions.]

The properties of which the animal is composed are likewise indications for the observer. These, after careful study, he will divide into two halves — a receptor half, corresponding to the world-as-sensed [Merkwelt], and an effector half, corresponding to the world of action [Wirkwelt]. The receptor half receives the actions of the surrounding-world [Umwelt], and the effector half reacts thereto.

(68 / 81, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

§396

[Because the animal’s receptor half is so intimately bound up with its world-as-sensed (Merkwelt) and because its effector half is so intimately bound up with its world of action (Wirkungswelt), it would seem that the animal is an imprint of its surrounding world (Umwelt) and is thus moulded from it.]

 

The animal has both receptor organs and effector organs. [See §§26, 32, 34-43 of Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men.] The receptor organs correspond very closely with the animal’s world-as-sensed, and the effector organs correspond very closely with the animal’s world of action. We thus are led to view the animal as being something like an “imprint of its surrounding world”. [In other words, half of the organism is ‘designed’ to sense the important features of its surrounding world, and the other half is ‘designed’ to effectively operate with and in that world. As such, the features of the surrounding world are directly and obviously implied in the receptive and effective features of the animal’s anatomy and behavior. We can look at the animal’s body and actions, and we can infer what sort of environment it thrives in. The resemblance might even be visually and obviously apparent, like the white fur of an animal that lives in a snow-covered region.] This idea forms the basis for theories that regard the animal as like a material moulded in conformity with its environment.

There is an astonishingly close correspondence, on the one hand, between the animal's receptor organs and the world-as-sensed [Merkwelt] and, on the other, between its effector organs and the world of action [Wirkungswelt]. This must strike every observer, and it gives the impression that the animal is merely an imprint of its surrounding-world [Umwelt]. On this impression are based all the theories that see in the living substance of which all animal bodies are made, merely a plastic element, passively moulded, which adjusts itself more or less exactly to external influences.

(68 / 81, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

§397

[Theories saying that the animal’s anatomy and behavior are moulded by the environment are wrong. For, the coherence of the animal’s limited set of features implies a coherence and unity in the environment’s features, when in fact the environment’s features are countless and variable.]

 

These theories saying that the animal is moulded from its surrounding world forget something. [The idea seems to be the following. The coherence of the features in an animal seem to imply a coherence of the features in the environment. For example, the whiteness and warmth-providing features of the animal fur are coherently given in one part of the animal’s body (the hair), and it makes us think that the snowy environment has a coherence to it, for example, that it has a material, namely snow, which is cold and white. Uexküll claims that the features of the surrounding world are not inherently and coherently unified, and they only are so when they enter into agreement with the animal. Without that bond with the animal’s features, the properties of the world remain disconnected. I am not sure exactly why that is so. I could see the features of the world having a certain coherence based on natural laws, like snow is always cold and white on account of its physical constitution. Perhaps the idea is that the animal’s anatomy and behavior are sensitive to and interact with only a small selection of the environment’s features, and that limited representation makes us think that the environment has a simple composition. However, the environment will have countless variable features. Let me quote, because I am guessing:]

These theories overlook one essential circumstance, namely, that the surrounding-world [Umwelt] of an animal, if considered by itself, is not a unity. On the contrary, the properties of the surrounding-world [Umwelt] become linked up into a unity only when they are in agreement with the properties of the animal; without this bond, they merely flutter about disconnectedly.

(68 / 81, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

§398

[But animals are not moulded by their environments, because their receptive organs are not distributed on the body like they are in the environment; and also, the animal is receptive only to a limited selection of environmental indications, and this varies highly between animals in the same environment. Furthermore, the features of objects responsible for their many sensible properties are unified in the objects, but they are sensed disunifiedly by distinct sensory organs in the animal’s body.]

 

So Uexküll does not think that the animal is moulded by its environment. To prove this, we need to show that animals have features that could not have been imprinted upon it by the features of the environment. He acknowledges that such a proof cannot be given definitively. [I am not sure why. Perhaps any cited evidence could still be interpreted somehow as being an imprint. But the reason for this I do not know.] [Uexküll then goes on to cite examples anyway. I unfortunately do not understand his point here, so you should skip to the quotation to follow. I will at least guess the idea is the following. Animals have receptive organs responsible for different sense modalities. Were the receptive organs an imprint of the surrounding environment, then the organs would be distributed on the body in the way the environment affects the body. And since the environment affects the body from all directions, we would expect the receptive organs, as imprints, to be distributed all over the body. In fact they are not. They are concentrated in certain specific places. But that interpretation cannot be right, because it does not seem like he has in mind the idea that an animal would have eyes, ears, etc. all over its body. Perhaps instead Uexküll is not referring to the spatial distribution of the organs on the body, but rather to the select range of indications it is sensitive to. So along this line of thinking, we would note that the environment has many different features. Were the animal an imprint of the environment, it would be sensitive to all of those features. However, animals are sensitive only to a very limited number of them, that is, to just the indication-circles that interest it. Also consider the vast diversity of animal types living in the same environment. They can even have very different sensory systems (consider bats, for example, like Nagel does). If animals are imprints of their environments, then how could there be such diversity of anatomies and behaviors in one same environment? I am not sure that this is the correct interpretation, because we might say that the animal is still imprinted by the environment, even though only by a portion of it. Given what he writes later, there is a third interpretation I would offer. Many of the features of one object are given together by means of the same physical properties of that object. For example, the physical motion of a vibrating instrument string gives both its visual appearance and its sonic appearance. But we do not have one organ that detects both of these features. We have eyes and separately we have ears. So the unity of the object’s properties is not reflected in the animal’s body, which separates those features anatomically. Thus it is not an imprint of the environment. I realize that I have probably not conveyed Uexküll’s own reasoning, so please read the quotation to discern it for yourself.]

The convincing proof that the animal body does not owe its form to external influences can only be given by our showing that it displays properties that could not have been imprinted on it from without. And this proof can never be brought quite definitely. In the arrangement of their receptive or sensory organs, all the higher animals show a distribution which has nothing to do with the arrangement | of the surrounding-world [Umwelt], but which, on the other hand, reproduces spatially the distribution of the circles of their indications [Merkmalskreise]. In the eye are assembled all the nervous elements that are directed on the colour-indications of the surrounding-world [die farbigen Merkmale der Umwelt]. The same holds good for the ear, as regards the indications [Merkmale] of sound. In the mouth lie the receptors for taste, and in the nose those for smell.

(69 / 81-82, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

§399

[Those still defending the idea that bodies are imprints of environments despite the fact that unified phenomena are perceived disunifiedly through various sense organs can make the following reply: the properties of the unified phenomena are conveyed disunifiedly through various distinct physical media, thus various distinct receptive organs are needed to perceive those sensible features.]

 

Uexküll then considers a counterargument that defends the notion that animals are imprints, despite the separation of sense organs. [Again, you will have to discern the reasoning for yourself. I can only guess what the idea is. It might be that the physics of the sensible phenomena involve a separation into physical media, and thus it is fitting that the anatomy, as an imprint, has a separation of the receptive organs. I do not understand what Uexküll means by etheric vibrations, so let us consider our own example of the vibrating string. Yes, it is one same unified phenomenon responsible for its features, namely the string’s structural properties in relation to its particular physical motion. But this movement affects both the motion of the surrounding air and it also affects the patterns of light waves bouncing off of it. So the sensible properties of this motion is conveyed on the one hand through air vibrations and on the other through light wave patterns. Thus our anatomies, as imprints of the environment, should rightly have separate eyes and ears, according to this reply.]

As a rule people try to explain this remarkable anatomical separation of the quality-circles [Qualitätenkreise] within the body by pointing to the uniformity of the method [gemeinsame Wirkungsart] in which the related properties act in the surrounding-world [Umwelt]. The etheric vibrations require specific transformers if they are to be converted into nervous excitation; so do the air-waves. The same may be said of the substances soluble in water that yield the taste stimuli; and the stimuli of the sense of smell are conveyed by air- currents.

(69 / 82, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

§400

[But in the case of fish, the same medium conveys both olfactory and gustatory information, yet the receptive organs are distinct. So the above defense of the imprint theory does not hold in all cases.]

 

Uexküll rejects this defense [namely, that the distinct physical media conveying the sensible features of unified physical phenomena call for distinct sensory organs.] He notes that for aquatic animals, there is one medium conveying both smell and taste, as they are both “delivered by substances dissolved in water”. However, “fishes, like other vertebrates, have their olfactory and gustatory organs quite distinct from one another” (69 / 82). [So in other words, a shared medium for two sorts of sensible features of things in the world should correspond with one sensory organ sensing them both, according the imprint theory. But in fish, this is not so.]

 

 

§401

[What determines the distribution of sense functions in sense organs on an animal’s body is the result of how their quality-circles are arranged, such that when certain types of qualities lie in different circles, they could be received by distinct sensory organs that are found on different spatial locations of the body.]

 

Thus “the anatomical separation of the receptive organs into quite distinct unities” cannot be explained on the basis of “the chemical or physical connection with the surround world [Umwelt]” (69 / 82, bracketed insertion mine). [I will have to guess again at the next idea, so please consult the quotation. Uexküll might be saying the following. We have mark-signs (Merkzeichen), which are the qualitative differences we perceive (see section 3.4). The next sentence I am not sure how to interpret: “What are responsible are the attention-forms [Aufmerksamkeitsformen] of the mark-signs [Merkzeichen], of which they are the spatial images”. The attention-forms might be the relations between attention thresholds. Perhaps the mark-signs are spatial images of these relations. But I do not think the mark-signs are spatialized. So perhaps somehow the receptive organs are spatial images of these relations, although it is not entirely clear to me how that is so. At any rate, it seems the attention-forms (whatever they are) of the mark-signs are responsible for the anatomical distribution of the receptive organs, with one component being a spatial images of another. Let us consider some possible interpretations. Does he simply mean that because visual mark-signs are not found in the same quality-circles as sonic mark-signs (for some species), that these quality circles can be considered spatially distinct somehow, and thus on the body the eyes and ears are spatially separated? In this case, the “spatial image” would seem to be the spatial distance between the receptive organs which corresponds to the non-overlap of the different quality-circles. Or does he mean that within one sensory organ there is a spatial distribution that reflects the distribution of mark-signs? For example, in the part of the ear where there are hairs that vibrate, perhaps the hairs are arranged in an ascending order that reflects the ascending order of frequencies we are sensitive too. But this does not explain the spatial distinctness of different sensory organs. Please read the following paragraph, and I would be interested in what you think. The interpretation I will go with for now is that because for example sight and sound data are in different qualitative circles, they are received by different organs. Were they somehow in the same circle, they would be received by the same organ. We might consider bats for example. For them, spatial properties and sonic properties might very well fall into the same quality-circle. In other words, it both hears and “sees”  in the same receptive act, using the same receptive organ, because the form of its attention places spatial qualities and sonic qualities in the same circle of quality variation.]

For the anatomical separation of the receptive organs into quite distinct unities, the chemical or physical connection with the surrounding-world [Umwelt] cannot be held responsible. What are responsible are the attention-forms [Aufmerksamkeitsformen] of the mark-signs [Merkzeichen], of which they are the spatial images. And thus the representations we draw in space of the quality-circles [Qualitätskreise] acquire increased significance [Bedeutung]. When we study the sense-organs of animals, we see Nature herself at work, and in the very act of reproducing in extensive forms the laws of intensive magnitudes.

(69 / 82, bracketed insertions mine).

 

 

§402

[Indicators are common among all animals, because we live in the same physical world, although each animal groups them differently and is sensitive to a limited range of them. We do not have access to another animal’s sensations, but by conducting experiments, we can determine the indicators they are sensitive to and the ways those indicators are related. This indirectly gives us a picture of the animal’s Umwelt and of its general manner of experiencing that world.]

 

[Again please consult the quotation, but I will guess at an interpretation of this next paragraph. We cannot know the animal’s sensations, but we still want to know what its inner world is like or at least what its life is like in its own particular Umwelt. To arrive upon this knowledge, w can perhaps conduct experiments to see how animals respond to variations in the indications of their environment, and in addition we can study how their nervous systems work while perceiving these variations. This can tell us what their indications are and thus what their mark-signs might be, even though we do not have access to their own experience of sensations. His next point seems to build from this idea that the way our indications are grouped in our experience is the same as for other animals. This was a point I had trouble with, but as far as I could tell, he is not saying that our indication groupings are identical but rather that the general laws ours follow will also be followed by the animals. For example, he says, an indicator of spatial relations between objects for us would not be able to indicate a different spatial relation between the objects for another animal. The indications, he explained, are thought to be parts of the world rather than parts of inner experience (the mark-signs are more on the side outer of inner experience). He seems to be working with the idea then that while our mark-signs might differ between creatures in how we experience them, the indications that one animal finds in the world are potentially discoverable by other animals, because, it seems he assumes, we share the same physical world, even though we all constitute it differently and subjectively. So perhaps we might say that we each live in our own appearance-world with its own mark-signs, but we also live in a shared world with common indications. Uexküll’s next point seems to be that on the basis of how we determine the indication groupings of higher animals, we then do so for lower animals. They might have sense organs very different from our own, but so long as we can group their indicators, we can better study their Umwelts and manners of experiencing the world. But please consult the quotation to see its meaning:]

This makes our research very much easier, for, in investigating animals, we can never hope to attain to a knowledge of their sensations. All we can determine by experiment | is the number and the nature of the indications [Merkmale] in the sensed world [Merkwelt] to which the animal reacts. Thus far, we have been able to group indications [Merkmale] only according to the forms of our own attention [Formen unserer eigenen Aufmerksamkeit]. But by realising that the sense-organs of the higher animals correspond to this grouping, we are put in a position to go further; by anatomical study of the lower animals, we can now undertake to group their indications [Merkmale] also, and this even when we come across sense-organs that are quite unfamiliar to us.

(69 / 62-83, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

§403

[We can infer that there is a higher order of unified nature on account of the super-subjective cause of how we fashion our appearance-worlds.]

 

 

[I again am uncertain what is meant in this next paragraph. Let me quote it first.]

The most important advance, however, lies in the following conclusion. If the laws manifested in the forms of our attention [Formen unserer eigenen Aufmerksamkeit] (which is the deciding factor for the appearance-world [Erscheinungswelt] of our own subject) can be recognised not only in the shape of our own body, but also in the shape of the bodies of other subjects of whose attention-forms [Aufmerksamkeitsformen] we know nothing, then this indicates that the work of fashioning by the mark-signs [Merkzeichen] is not determined purely by our own subject, but is super-subjective. This means that we are on the track of a control by Nature [Naturwalten] pointing to a unity even higher than our own apperception, in which otherwise we must see the final unity.

(70 / 83, bracketed insertions mine)

[So somehow the shape of our bodies expresses the forms of our attention. But we also know that the shapes of the bodies of other animals also expresses the forms of their attention, even though we do not have any knowledge of those forms (except what we learn through objective experimentation on the animals). The part that confuses me is: “the work of fashioning by the mark-signs [Merkzeichen] is not determined purely by our own subject, but is super-subjective”. I do not know what ‘the work of fashioning by the mark-signs’ [die Formgebung der Merkzeichen] is. Let me make a wild guess. The world objectively speaking is full of indications of its very many different properties. Each animal is sensitive only to a limited set of them. So for example, dogs might see fewer colors than we do, but mantis shrimp see more. Our appearance-worlds are made of the mark-signs corresponding to the indications we are receptive to. So perhaps ‘the work of fashioning by the mark-signs’ is the way that our limited range of mark-signs fashions our own unique appearance-world, which varies from creature to creature. They are sort of like the palate we use to paint our world, and each creature paints their world with a different palate. And so he says that because we can see this through the anatomies of other animals, we can say that this fashioning of the phenomenal world is super-subjective and involves the higher unity of Nature. But I do not understand that statement or the reasoning involved in it. I wonder if the idea is the following, but this is an unreliable guess. Each animal’s body carves out its own appearance-world, giving it its own place in relation to the other creatures. But somehow all these different Umwelten interlock and function together coherently. So perhaps the particulars of our own species’ attention-forms is governed by a higher organization of all species in nature. I doubt that is the meaning, but I am not sure what else to propose. See the quotation above.]

 

 

§404

[Our inner mental life, which experiences intensive variations, corresponds to the extensive differences of our receptive organs and of the physical stimuli. But there is not a paralelism; rather, there is a factor or law that determines their mutual conformation.]

 

[The final paragraph also confuses me, so as always, please consult it for yourself. It might be making the following points. The forms of our attention conform to the forms of our anatomy. I am not exactly sure how, but perhaps it is again the idea that certain qualities are grouped in their own circles, and the separation between these circles corresponds with the separation of their respective receptive organs. From this Uexküll says we can infer that there is some factor that determines both our physical and mental activities. I am not sure what that factor is. Perhaps it is his idea of a “plan” that we will return to later. (Now, some might object that there is no factor governing the mind’s and the body’s correlation, but rather that they are simply parallel.) He does not think that we can explain this correlation with a notion of parallelism, because the intensive and the extensive are never parallel. However, there are certain laws that can express themselves both intensively and extensively. (I am not certain exactly how Uexküll makes the intensive/extensive distinction. From before it seemed like a difference between a spatialized sort of variation with a variation by degrees. Here maybe I wonder if there is the element of the extensive being external and a part of the objective world while intensive is a part of the inner world of mental experience. I do not know the laws that express themselves in both. Perhaps we might think of there being an extensive difference between sound waves of different frequencies and an intensive difference between how we experience them as different pitches.]

The fact that the forms of our attention [Formen unserer Aufmerksamkeit] find expression in the conformation of our own frame is sufficient to suggest that there is a factor which uniformly determines the activity both of our consciousness and of our body. It is not enough to speak of a parallelism between mental and bodily processes; an expression like this loses its sense when we are dealing with a comparison between intensive and extensive forms, for such forms are never parallel to one another. On the other hand, we may speak of identical laws, which express themselves both in intensive and extensive forms.

(70 / 83, bracketed insertions mine)

 

 

 

Works cited (in this order):

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1928. Theoretische Biologie, 2. gänzlich neu bearbeitete Auflage. Berlin: Springer.

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1926. Theoretical Biology. Translated by Doris Livingston MacKinnon. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. / New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. PDF available at:

http://www.archive.org/details/theoreticalbiolo00uexk

 

 

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Pt3 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Beyond Representation.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Very, Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s and Hegel’s interpretations of differential calculus tell us that for Deleuze the given world is made of indefinite yet reciprocally determinable parts and also that there is another transcendental plane, and for Hegel it is a matter of determinate parts and a single plane.  Hegel goes beyond representational systems with his dialectic, but it is reducible within Deleuze’s philosophy and it is inadequate in application to evolution. Deleuze’s approach can subsume dialectic and also it better explains the genesis of variation in evolution.


Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s and Hegel’s alternative solutions to problems in classical representationalist systems can be compared first by seeing their interpretations of the calculus, next by seeing how successfully one theory can subsume the other, and finally by applying theories to anatomy’s role in evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible with it. We find that Deleuze’s calculus differential reveals that for Deleuze there are two onological planes, virtual and actual, but for Hegel infinite thought keeps the dialectical process and its products on the same level. We also see that basic things in the given world for Deleuze are determinable in differential relations but indeterminate on their own, where for Hegel they are determinate on their own. Because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are not opposites, they cannot be subsumed into Hegel’s system through sublation; however Hegel’s dialectical movement can be seen as a false secondary movement to Deleuze’s genesis of difference. We also find that Deleuze’s theory of anatomy better explains variations that evolution requires, but Hegel’s teleological account does not.

Brief Summary:

Deleuze and Hegel offer theories that respond to the problems of representation. We can better make a comparison by first seeing their different interpretations of differential calculus. Hegel regards the differentials as vanishing values which are determinate values that combine finite and infinite, and being and nothingness. This contradiction is only thinkable with infinite thought. For Deleuze the terms of the differential relation are undetermined and subrepresentational, but they are determinable in relation to one another and are the unconditioned condition of all (conditioned) actual determinations. Kant has an antimony about whether or not the world has a finite beginning. For him, the unconditioned cannot be in the series of moments of the world; it is rather outside it as the thing-in-itself. For Hegel, the antinomy shows the sublation of finite and infinite, because one side argues that there must be a limit and the other side argues every limit is surpassed. For Hegel, the unconditioned, the dialectic, is in fact on the same ontological plane as the conditioned. For Deleuze, the unconditioned is on a different plane, the transcendental, but unlike for Kant, Deleuze thinks it is not indeterminable, because it is determinable as differential relations. If Hegel were to critique Deleuze, he would try to collapse Deleuze’s virtual/actual distinction on which Deleuze’s anti-Hegelian ontology is built. But since virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not opposites, such a critique would not hold. However, Deleuze could include Hegel’s dialectic into his own philosophy by seeing it as a false movement that is secondary to the real movement, the genesis of difference. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist. So we find a common application, the structure of the organism and its role in evolution, to compare them. Deleuze’s response to representational philosophy, and not Hegel’s, is compatible with evolutionary theory. For, Deleuze’s virtual explains novel variation in the organism’s structure, but Hegel’s dialectic does not. Also, Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel exhibit themselves when we relate Hegel’s ideas to evolution: [1] dialectical movement would halt evolutionary movement, [2] Hegel’s logic circles around a center, the sublation of organ and organism, which blocks evolutionary progress, and [3] Hegel’s account misses the ambiguities and variations that are vital to evolution.

 

Summary

In the previous part we saw how Deleuze and Hegel propose alternative theories to overcome problems in the representational systems of Aristotle, Kant, and Russell. Both proposals revolve around a concept of unifying difference. Deleuze takes up Bergson’s continuously-integrated heterogeneous multiplicity, which considers terms as intrinsically and inseparably related. Hegel’s dialectic also conceives of terms being both different yet intrinsically and inseparably related, but in his case because of a process of productive negation that unites the terms in their genetic sequence.

Now in this final part, we examine how Deleuze and Hegel propose theories that try to overcome the problems of representational theories like the ones we saw in the first part, and we pit the theories against one another and apply them to evolution so to better evaluation them. First we examined how Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to classical representationalist philosophical can be compared on the basis of their different interpretations of differential calculus and Kant’s antinomies. We found that for Deleuze we have an unconditioned ground of sensible and intelligible things that is subrepresentational, and for Hegel it is representable, using infinite thought. The calculus differential determines the varying relation between variables that vary with respect to one another. Leibniz saw it as the relation between infinitesimal magnitudes but there are formal problems with this. Newton saw it in terms of vanishing values. Hegel regards the vanishing values as being determinate values that combine finite and infinite, and being and nothingness. This contradiction is only thinkable with infinite thought. For Deleuze the terms of the differential relation are undetermined and subrepresentational, but they are determinable in relation to one another and are the unconditioned condition of conditioned actual determinations. Kant thinks we arrive at antinomous theories regarding whether there is a temporal beginning to the world because our understanding is unable to grasp the unconditioned, the thing in itself, with its categories. Hegel thinks the antinomies go together. Together they express the genuine infinite, because they affirm both that there is a limit and also that it is surpassed. For Hegel the unconditioned, the dialectical contradiction, is representable with infinite thought. Deleuze thinks that the unconditioned is thinkable but not using representational thought but rather using the logic of incompossibility.

We then saw how Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack than Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another. If Hegel wanted to critique Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, he would show how Deleuze’s virtual and actual as contraries dialectically sublate, which collapses the basic distinction of Deleuze’s ontology. However, because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not contraries, such a Hegelian critique would not hold. From a Deleuzean perspective, Hegel’s dialectic could be viewed as a false movement, with Deleuze’s genesis of difference being the real movement. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist.

So we then applied Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to representation to evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible and also to see if Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel still hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic does not provide enough precision for characterizing the world. For Hegel, nature is the one totality and it externalizes into multiplicity, but these form unified systems where parts and their whole are reciprocally determining. Hegel’s dialectic is  not temporal, so it does not describe an evolutionary progress through time. The structure of the organism is the reciprocally determining relation between organism and organs, which are opposing dialectical pairs like the one and the many. Individuals and species bear this organ/organism relation too for Hegel. Hegel’s structure of the organism is more closely tied to Cuvier’s anatomy, which is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes. Geoffroy’s homological theory of the unity of composition does not identify anatomical parts on the basis of their functions. Rather, he looks to see if the relations between the parts are isomorphic to a transcendental model which is so abstract that it can actualize in a wide variety of forms, such that a fin can be identified with an arm. This is compatible with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and theory of the virtual, which sees there being a transcendental level that is actualized in various ways. Cuvier’s and Hegel’s theories, as teleological, regard deformations or mutations in negative terms, as degradations of the organism’s structure and thus functioning as well. But evolutionary theory needs a positive view of aberrations. Geoffrey’s and Deleuze’s theories see variation positively, because variations are considered novel actualizations of the virtual model. Thus Deleuze’s response to the problems of representational theories is better than Hegel’s at least with regard to its application in evolutionary theory. We also see that Deleuze’s three criticism’s hold, because [1] Hegel’s movement is a matter of (infinite) representation, but because it cannot explain novel evolutionary variations, there is no real evolutionary movement involved. [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb7 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Teratology and Teleology’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 7: Teratology and Teleology

Brief Summary:

Geoffroy’s homological theory provides an account of the variations in anatomy, which becomes central to the theory of evolution. For Darwin different species have homologous forms on account of common ancestors. And anatomical parts can evolve according to how their functions alter. Cuvier's teleological theory of anatomy is not compatible with evolution, [because were a part’s function to change, it is no longer the same part, and thus such an evolutionary connection cannot be observed using this approach.] Also, Geoffrey’s homology or unity of composition is like Deleuze’s Idea.

Summary

Previously we examined Geoffroy’s homology theory of anatomy. Structures in different species can be identified on the basis of sharing one-to-one correspondences with an abstract, transcendental model which may be expressed in numerous species. Unlike Cuvier’s anatomy, Geoffrey’s is not based on teleological function; so for Cuvier a fin and an arm would not be the same anatomical part, because they have different purposes, however they would be the same for Cuvier, because its relation to the other parts correspond isomorphically with the transcendental model.

Deleuze characterizes Geoffroy as ‘calling forth monsters’ and Cuvier laying ‘out all fossils in order.’ (229) We saw two sections back that “Cuvier claimed to be able to show the structure of the entire animal from a small set of bones and used this technique successfully to prove the prior existence of now extinct species.” (229d) However, this approach led to there being gaps between species “where the combinations of different parts were not able to form a harmonious, purposive organism.” (230a) In Cuvier’s teleological approach major organs [compared between species] show less differentiation, but “Deviations in minor organs were less likely to affect the optimal functioning of the organism as a whole and could therefore be sustained.” (230) So there is more differentiation found in the lesser important organs. For Aristotle’s teleological account, if there are differences [in terms of deformations], they are deviations from the essence of the species, and were therefore understood as a lack. They were monsters by excess or defect. But Geoffroy provides a positive account of deformity. A deformity is an arrest in a part of the organism that leads to the unity of composition [the isomorphism to the transcendental model] in a different form [so the homology remains but in another expression/actualization]. 

Thus, he attempted to show that aberrations still followed the principle of the unity of composition: "Monstrosity exists, but not, however, exceptions to the ordinary laws [of nature]." (230)

Also Geoffrey could explain organs changing to new or null functions.

Furthermore, as the form of the organism was not understood in purposive terms, Geoffroy was able to give a positive description of these changes that allowed the organ either to no longer function in the new organism or to change its function. Thus, while we might argue teleologically that the bones in the human skull are separate in infants and later fuse together by claiming that this aids parturition, a teleological account seems implausible of the separation of the same bones in birds, which peck their way out of a shell. (230)

 

Theory of evolution would benefit from a positive account of the structure of variation, thus both the notions of positive contingency and identity irrespective of function [because they explain variations] would serve a theory of evolution. “This variation will eventually lead to speciation.” (230) Cuvier rejects an evolutionary theory that would say there is a transformism of species, because this would contradict the teleological account [because it would mean that parts change their function, but that means they are not the same parts any more so they cannot be thought of as linked developmentally?] Geoffroy however on the basis of his homological account produces a theory of evolution. Yet “While Geoffroy's account of evolution was incorrect, as it was based on purely environmental factors affecting the developing embryo, what is important is that in moving to a nonteleological account of the organism, an evolutionary account of the organism became possible.” (230) But Darwinian theory is based on the idea of two species with similar structures being homogeneous on account of a common ancestor.

Turning to Darwinian evolution, we can see that the main modification is the replacement, or perhaps grounding, of the unity of composition in an evolutionary account of the organism. For Darwin, therefore, homologies exist because organisms from different species share an ancestor. The theory of homologies thus plays a central role in the formulation of his own account of the organism:

Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire has strongly insisted on the high importance of relative position or connexion in homologous parts; they may differ to almost any extent in form and size, yet remain connected together in the same invariable order . . . what can be more different than the immensely long spiral proboscis of a sphinx-moth, the curious folded one of a bee or bug, and the great jaws of a beetle?--yet all these organs, serving for such widely different purposes, are formed by infinitely many modifications of an upper lip, mandibles, and two pairs of maxillae . . . Nothing can be more hopeless than to attempt to explain this similarity of pattern in members of the same class, by utility or by the doctrine of final causes. (231)

 

Deleuze thinks Geoffroy is seeking differential relations, and they would fulfill Deleuze’s criteria for the Idea.

He argues that what Geoffroy is aiming at with his emphasis on connections is a field of differential elements (the ideal correlates of the bones) forming specific types of relations (the connections which are central to Geoffroy's account). On this basis, Deleuze claims that the unity of composition functions like a Deleuzian Idea, attempting to fulfill his three criteria, which we discussed in chapter 4 (DR, 184). The elements of the Idea "must have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification," and the unity of composition seems to fulfill this requirement due to the fact that it is essentially nonmetric and topological, therefore differing from the actual structures that express it. Second, "these elements must be determined reciprocally," which in the case of the unity of composition, Deleuze takes to mean that what is central is not the bones themselves, but the connections they hold with other bones. Third, "a multiple ideal connection, a differential relation, must be actualized in diverse spatiotemporal relationships, at the same time as its elements are actually incarnated in a variety of terms and forms." In both Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze emphasizes that the unity of composition implies that homologies do not exist directly between actual terms "but are understood as the actualisation of an essence, in accordance with reasons and at speeds determined by the environment, with accelerations and interruptions" (DR, 184). That is, we note a homology by recognizing that the actual parts of both organisms are actualizations of the same transcendental essence, the unity of composition, rather than | by a direct correlation of actual terms, as in Cuvier's comparative anatomy. The unity of composition therefore functions, according to Deleuze, much like the virtual, as that which is actualized, while differing in kind from its actualization. (231-232)

Also, for Deleuze, the concept of essence in Geoffroy’s approach is not like the classical understanding of essence but is instead “functions more like a field of accidents, with no privileged form or level of organization.” (232)

 

However, Deleuze in Difference and Repetition thinks that “Geoffroy's anatomical elements may not be able to support the difference between virtuality and actuality required by the Idea”. (232) Yet in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze thinks that Geoffroy’s anatomical elements are like molecular relations that a single abstract animal or machine presents everywhere. But “Geoffroy's anatomical elements may not be able to support the difference between virtuality and actuality required by the Idea”. (232)

 

So we cannot formulate a theory of evolution on the basis of Cuvier’s teleological approach to anatomy. For, evolution [1] requires the existence of suboptimal organisms and [2] accepts that “structure cannot be determined simply by function, as homologies can be found regardless of the function of the parts in question.” (232) Change of function, which Geoffrey’s approach can describe, is central to the theory of evolution.  We turn now to Hegel to see if his philosophy is compatible with evolution. (233)

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb6 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Deleuze, Geoffroy, and Transcendental Anatomy’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 6: Deleuze, Geoffroy, and Transcendental Anatomy

Brief Summary:

Geoffroy offers a theory of anatomy based on homology. There is a transcendental unity of parts to which actual empirical cases correspond isomorphically. The theory was most demonstrable in application to embryonic forms. Thus both fish and human embryonic skeleton’s share a one-to-one correspondence to a transcendental arrangement of parts. This goes against Cuvier’s anatomy, and Hegel’s as well, because for them, anatomical parts are understood teleologically, in terms of their purposes or functions for the organism. So a fin and arm in Cuvier’s and Hegel’s approaches would not share the same designation, because their functions are different, however in Geoffrey’s they will. The relation between transcendental and empirical resonates with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism.

Summary

Previously we saw how Cuvier, like Hegel, thinks that animals should not be classified in terms of differences of degree. Unlike Hegel, he uses a non-unified system, one with four branches. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Cuvier’s system is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes.

Now we turn to Deleuze’s connection with Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire to better see Deleuze’s account of the organism. Geoffroy proposes a transcendental anatomy.

Geoffroy was a contemporary of Cuvier. They first worked together but later sharply disagreed. Geoffroy rejects two important tenets in Cuvier’s anatomy. (224) [1] Geoffroy favors the principle of morphology over teleological function. He was concerned more with the connections between parts and with the parts’ genesis.

First, Geoffroy rejected Cuvier's principle of the correlation of parts in favor of his own "principle of connections." Rather than arguing that comparisons between organisms should be grounded in an analysis of the form or function of their parts, Geoffroy instead proposed that anatomical classification should proceed along morphological lines. In rejecting form and function, Geoffroy argued that what was key was the relations between parts themselves. Parts were therefore understood in terms of their connections with other parts and their genesis, according to an abstract schema. Such an account presented a radical break with teleology. (224)

We will contrast Geoffroy’s approach with that of comparative anatomists. For comparative anatomists, if parts between species share the same form and function, they may be given the same name.

For the comparative anatomist, the names of the parts of animals are, to a certain extent, derived analogically with those of other animals, archetypally with man. Thus, for instance, we can apply the term legs to other animals as they share certain characteristics of form and function with human legs. When the function or form of parts differs from those of man, however, a different term must be assigned to the part in question. Thus, although there is a similarity between the fins of a fish and the arm of a man, on a teleological account, the functional and structural differences mean that different terms must be applied to each. (225)

For Geoffroy, however, “parts in different animals may play different functional roles but may nevertheless be classified as essentially the same.” (225) This means that fins and arms could be classified together, even though they have different functions. A homology is a similarity across different organisms. But we are here rejecting the teleological account of anatomical function as the basis for classification. The teleology, purpose, would explain similar features in different species (like leg in men and dogs). But now we need some other rational ground to explain such similarities for parts whose functions might differ. Geoffroy proposes the ‘principle of the unity of composition.’ (225) [It is not specified yet, but parts are similar according to similarities to an abstract model for the part.]

The principle that Geoffroy employs for this role is the principle of the unity of composition. In order to posit similarities, Geoffroy posited an underlying abstract structure for particular animal forms. This structure was not to be understood in teleological terms, the function of the structure emerging depending on the particular form this structure took in the animal in question. The underlying plan allows the homology to be defined without reference to teleology. The British comparative anatomist Richard Owen was later to define it as "the same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function," whereas Cuvier's analogies were defined as "a part or organ in one animal which has the same function as another part or organ in another animal." Thus, to use Appel's example, the legs of a crab are analogous to those of a quadruped, as they share the same function, but they are not homologous to them. Fins and arms, on the contrary, would be homologous without being analogous. (225)

A classical example of Geoffroy’s method is fish skeletons. We are concerned with similar connections of parts in different creatures.  There needs to be a one-to-one correlation. Geoffroy shows such a correlation between fish and human skeletons, although because there are more bones in the fish, he examined the creatures in their embryonic state. “Despite the differences in the final number of bones, the same number of centers of ossification were found in both types of embryos, although these fused together as mammalian embryos developed.” (226) One difference is the bone structure of the gill cover in fish, not apparently found in humans, but Geoffroy thinks it is homologous with the human hearing bones in the ear. “That is, the bones that provided the function of hearing within mammals were part of the respiratory system of fishes. Thus, the field of homologies extended beyond those that could be discovered by teleological means.” (226)

Deleuze takes interest in Geoffroy and in his difference with Cuvier. Their 1830 public debate was about how Geoffroy was supporting a paper that demonstrated a homology across two of Cuvier’s embranchments, which in Cuvier’s system, were incomparable (specifically between vertebrates and mollusks.) Cuvier showed the flaws in the paper’s argument. The argument was over three points, “the distinctness of species, the question of method, and the question of political control of the academy,” but we are here concerned with the first two. Cuvier won the first argument over the distinctness of species, by showing that the homologies cannot be found between mollusks and vertebrates in the way they are in the paper. (226-227) Also, under Cuvier’s teleological system, minor changes in the structure of one organ “would necessarily lead to reciprocal changes in the remainder of the organism,” meaning that there are not intermediaries between species.

Thus there is not a continuity of species for Cuvier and hence also not a transformation of species “as changes would have to cut across the dead zone of teleological imperfection surrounding a given species.” (227) However, “On Geoffroy's account, however, it was possible to see species as forming a continuity, since unity was defined by the connection of parts, rather than their particular instantiation in a teleological nexus.” [Thus a small variation in a part would not mean a drastic anatomical change, because functioning is not the basis for determining the anatomy.] The second part of the debate was about method, and it has two parts. Cuvier thought anatomy is a science that can only focus on the facts and their categorization. Geoffroy thought that after determining the facts, their scientific consequences must be assessed. Cuvier thought that there is a difficulty in formulating Geoffroy’s unity of composition. Cuvier thinks that homologies lead to absurdities, but teleology is consistent, also, some of Geoffrey's examples were mechanically impossible.

Cuvier argued that if homologies were to be understood as the identity of an organ across different species, we were led to absurdities, but if we rejected the idea that homologies were strict identities, then instead, we simply had a concept of analogy, such as that formulated by Aristotle, between different species. Following on from this criticism, Cuvier argued that many of the homologies proposed by Geoffroy were in fact mechanically impossible to perform on a given organism, such as the reversal of position of several key organs in fish compared to mammalian vertebrates. (227)

 

There is a transcendental at work in Geoffroy’s theory. There is a transcendental unity of organization expressed in different species.

Contrary to Cuvier's characterization of homologies as involving direct relations between actual creatures, homologies instead refer to the transcendental unity of composition. It is because particular structures in different organisms are an expression of this same transcendental unity of organization that the homology exists between them. (227)

Geoffroy does not think we can characterize the unity of composition on the basis of some particular structures of actual organisms, because it is a matter of a transcendental unity. So Geoffroy is concerned more with how the transcendental unity relates to empirical unity, and not how the parts of some actual creature’s body part relates to another one. This is why Deleuze finds resonances of Geoffroy’s ideas in his own work. “Thus, Cuvier's criticism fails to hit its mark, as Geoffroy's account does not deal with relations between actual terms but between the transcendental and the empirical. The identities directly between actual organs that Cuvier attributes to Geoffroy simply do not occur, and hence neither do Cuvier's supposed absurdities.” (228) Now we may distinguish Hegel’s from Cuvier's approaches. Both Hegel and Geoffroy have something like an archetypal animal [for Hegel, man, for Geoffroy, the transcendental unity of anatomical parts.] But unlike Hegel, Geoffroy does not propose that the archetype is an actual species. “Geoffroy's abstract animal instead could not be actualized without a radical alteration in kind.” (228) Also, Hegel’s approach has a hierarchy going from least to most differentiated. Yet, “Geoffroy's account does not prioritize any actual form of life; instead, all vertebrates relate to a transcendental unity of composition.” (228) Hegel’s approach is teleological, but Geoffroy’s is not, because the same anatomical part can have a different function in other animals. Thus Hegel’s approach is closer to Cuvier’s, with the exception of the four embranchments. (228)

Cuvier notes that certain homologies involved mechanically impossible transformations. Geoffroy’s solution was turning toward embryonic structures. “Certain structures that would later appear very dissimilar could be | discerned to develop from the same embryonic structures.” (228-229)

Because Geoffroy gives an embryogenetic account, he could trace the development of structures, which was not possible for prior anatomies. Also, in Cuvier’s approach, an aberration is considered a deviation from the plan of a species. Geoffroy’s approach could give a more positive description.

Geoffroy therefore took up Serres' theory of arrests of development, which held that deformity was caused when the development of a particular organism was arrested at a lower form of organization, forcing this form of organization to perpetuate within the organism. This can be combined with the fact that the unity of composition, as it was not understood teleologically, was able to give a positive account even of deformations that reduced the effectiveness of the organ in question. The science of aberrations, known as "teratology," in fact plays an important role in the formulation of the theory of evolution and will be central to the evaluation of the limitations of Hegel's account. (229)

 

 

 

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb5 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Hegel, Cuvier, and Comparative Anatomy’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 5: Hegel, Cuvier, and Comparative Anatomy

Brief Summary:

Cuvier, like Hegel, thinks that animals should not be classified in terms of differences of degree. Unlike Hegel, he uses a non-unified system, one with four branches. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Cuvier’s system is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes.

Summary

Previously we saw for Hegel, the organism is made up of the organic relation between the organism and its organs, and it is best exhibited in humans, which have the greatest differentiation that is still unified.

 

Now we turn to Hegel’s treatment of Cuvier to see how types of organisms’ structures are determined in different ways according to the organism’s needs. Cuvier was a highly influential 19th century French anatomist. He worked toward the “formation of the orthodox view of anatomy”.  (221) He helped turn anatomy into its own natural science.

At the root of this transformation was the intuition that by comparing the anatomy of animals from different species, it would be possible to build up a taxonomical system that classified animals according to rational determinations, rather than simply placed them in groups arbitrarily. (221)

His system of classification has two central principles: [1] the four embranchements and [2] the functional account of the organism’s structure.

The four embranchements:

For Cuvier, Hegel’s systems of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction as features of the organism were inadequate for a system of classification. Instead, Cuvier proposes four embranchements of animals, which are are four fundamentally distinct provinces. They are “defined according to fundamental differences in the structure of the nervous system.” (222) [1] vertebrates [2] articulates, [3] the mollusks, and [4] the radial embranchements. Because the differences across these branches is so extreme, we cannot compare them. Unlike Hegel, Cuvier does not think we can find a central plan, like humans, to characterize all organisms’ structures. But Hegel and Cuvier share the view that species should not be defined in terms of difference in degree.

According to Cuvier, “there are certain general laws that are logically prior to the actual existence of the organism that govern its structure.” (222) These laws are derived from the purposive nature of organisms.

The conditions of existence define a harmony in the functioning of the organism as a whole, which leads to the hypothesis that the nature and distribution of the parts of the organism can be discovered simply by reasoning from their place in the functional unity of the organism. (222)

Hegel also expressed this view in the Philosophy of Nature.

This is a teleological account similar to Hegel’s. Cuvier’s method was highly effective, “particularly in the field of paleontology, where Cuvier was able to prove the possibility of extinction by reconstructing now extinct species from fossilized remains.” (222) He could also conclude anatomical features on the basis of animals’ level of activity. “Thus birds, which are very active, of necessity had to be completely surrounded by air, as well as have air inside them, in the form of hollow bones.” (222) For Cuvier, like Hegel, there is a purposive nature of organs and nature herself.

As Cuvier goes on to write, "it is in this dependence of the functions and the aid which they reciprocally lend one another that are founded the laws which determine the relations of their organs and which possess a necessity equal to that of metaphysical or mathematical laws." We can see from this that Cuvier was further in agreement with Hegel that the kind of purposive account proposed by Kant need not be understood as a purely regulative form of understanding, but in fact told us something fundamental about the nature of the world as such. (223)

 

But there are important differences between Hegel’s and Cuvier’s accounts. For Cuvier, we can understand the organism’s structure on the basis of its functional needs, but only for more developed animal life forms. Also, there can be structural features that have no function [as circumstances have changed and the creature no longer needed that organ.] Also there are purely accidental mutations in nature that have no function. Yet

In spite of these differences, it is still the case that Hegel's account is teleological and | functionalist and that where he departs from Curvier, it is in order to claim either that a given feature is contingent and therefore inexplicable or else is governed by teleology operating at a different level. (223-224)

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.