Uexküll (3.3) Theoretical Biology, “The Principle of Comparison”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary is my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos. Page citations refer to the 1928 German edition first and to the 1926 English edition second.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Jakob von Uexküll

 

Theoretical Biology

[Theoretische Biologie]

 

Ch.3 The Content-Qualities

[Die Inhaltsqualitäten]

 

3.3 The Principle of Comparison

[Das Prinzip der Vergleichung]

 

 

 

Brief summary:

We have been using geometrical shape-diagrams to represent the experience of non-spatial sorts of continuous variations, like experiences of color. The “common denominator” between these experiences and the diagram shapes are marked changes, which in experience are changes in attention, and in the shapes, are changes in the direction of the lines.

 

 

 

Summary

 

§376

[We want to know more about how to spatially represent certain qualitative variations that are not experienced spatially or quantitatively, like the changes between qualitatively distinct colors along a continuous spectrum of color variation.]

 

[In the prior section we examined intensive quality circles, particularly the color circle. Here we drew a square, which showed relations between four colors that stood out in the spectrum, namely, red, yellow, blue and green.

What we take special note of here is the fact that the colors are not spatially arranged in this way in experience. The right angles that turn from one color to another represent more how we experience the colors as veering qualitatively from continua of variation.] Uexküll now asks how we transfer relationships like that between colors in our experience to the spatial realm of our diagrammatic representations. We are especially concerned with how “while our eye ran along the band of the spectrum, we noticed at certain points that a new colour-mixture appeared. This turning-point in the color sequence we transformed into the turning-point in a line in space” (64-65 / 75). [In other words, we want to understand better how it is that we determine points where in our minds a qualitative variation reaches a “turn” when objectively speaking it would still be seen as undergoing a linear variation, like the light waves increasing or decreasing quantitatively while we perceive qualitatively distinct colors that do not seem to be more and less of something. Blue does not seem more or less of a common variable found in red.]

 

 

§377

[Along the continua of variation we experience turning points, like the different distinct and “pure” colors along the color spectrum.]

 

[In this prior section, one of the first things we noted was that the four colors (red, yellow, green, blue) stood out as distinct and pure colors.

So objectively speaking there is a continuum of variation that privileges no point along the change. But in our experiences, as our eyes move down the line, it is as if we cross through privileged points. So there is another layer of the motion, which is not linear and continuous. It is as if these privileged points were like pivot points swinging us toward another privileged point. We represented that in our diagram by having the lines turn at an angle.

]

Our attention, at first focussed on the red-yellow colour- mixture, was suddenly compelled to turn to the mixture of yellow with green. Even in ordinary speech we speak of our attention, “taking a new direction.” By drawing a line which suddenly takes a new direction, we give a concrete form to the expression.

(65 / 75)

 

 

§378

[As our eyes move between the pure colors, we experience a change in our attention that we can represent spatially by means of angles that turn the continuum of variation. These attention changes are the “common denominator” between a non-spatial color experience a spatial representation of it.]

 

[The next idea references some ideas from prior sections. See chapter 2 on moment-signs. Time is not space, but we can measure its flow by finding a pulse (46 / 54). And we can then represent that pulse by placing line markings in a row (47 / 55). This means that we have sound recurring at intervals (represented perhaps by muscle movements like taps) and a visual phenomenon recurring at intervals, like the lines or tick-marks written out in a row to represent the temporal repetition. Uexküll then asks what is the common basis between these two different dimensions of representation or experience that allows the two sorts of representation to be interchangeable? What is common, he says, is that both sorts of markings designate changes that appear to our apperception (47-48 / 56-57). We can also think of them as each marking a “change in the attention” (48 / 57). Since they are transposable in both temporal and spatial experience and representation, we can think of such attention changes as a common denominator. Now, there are certain quantitative variations that objectively are continuous but whose continuity of variation we cannot measure well by means of our own senses alone. Consider for example if we hold a bucket into which a slow and steady flow of water fills it gradually. We feel that the weight is increasing over time, but we have difficulty measuring that increase, because it is not like we have in our minds a dial with numerical markings telling us each time we go up an objective standard unit of weight. Uexküll refers us to Weber’s solution (see this entry and its initial links for more). Weber introduces the notion of a threshold of our perception. (Uexküll defines threshold in the following way: “Threshold means the just perceptible difference between two intensities of a quality.” (52 / 63).) The objective increase in weight will vary continuously, and if it is slow enough, it will go unnoticed, until we cross a threshold when we notice the difference. At lower weights, we are more sensitive to changes, and thus the thresholds correspond to smaller increases in the objective weight of the bucket. But as it fills heavier, we become less sensitive, as the thresholds correspond to greater intervals of weight-change (49 / 58-59). (This bracketed summarization of ideas found in prior sections holds for this and the following paragraphs, which will be quoted).]

In both instances, a change occurs in the process of attention. This yields us the common denominator that permits us to reproduce in the form of an event familiar to the eye one that is of quite another kind.

(65 / 75)

 

§379

[We made a similar spatial transposition when marking time-beats with strokes drawn side-by-side.]

 

[See the summary in the above section.]

 

We were employing the same method when we converted time-beats into a series of strokes set side by side, and thereby transformed time into space. Our attention was able to keep the change of content quite separate from the nature of the content, and to give this change a concrete expression by transference into spatial relations.

(65 / 75)

 

 

§380

[With this in mind, we could represent musical tones with a seven-sided pillar where the angles mark notes (with the variations between them on the intervening lines), but they are arranged so that each octave takes another horizontal layer of the pillar, placing all of the equivalent notes in vertical alignment.]

 

We can also spatially represent other sorts of non-spatial qualitative experiences. For example, “In order to reproduce in concrete form the relationship-form of musical sounds, we shall employ a seven-sided pillar, and on its edges we shall arrange all the sounds in a spiral, so that those that differ by an octave lie below one another. On the faces we shall place the transitional half-tones and quarter-tones” (65 / 75).

 

§381

[Other shapes can be used for other sorts of content-qualities.]

 

Henning suggests a prism to represent the “relationship-form” of olfactory qualities, but the other content-qualities could be represented using a two-dimensional plane shape (65 /75).

 

 

§382

[In all our diagrams, the turning-points in our attention correspond with angles in the shape.]

 

But even though we use different shapes, we maintain the same organizing principle, namely, that we demarcate the turning-points in our attention with changes of angles in the diagram shape (65 / 75-76).

The particular procedure in every case depends on the same principle: the turning-points at which our attention acquires a new direction are fixed concretely by the angles or edges of a spatial figure.

(65 / 75-76)

 

 

 

 

 

Works cited (in this order):

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1928. Theoretische Biologie, 2. gänzlich neu bearbeitete Auflage. Berlin: Springer.

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1926. Theoretical Biology. Translated by Doris Livingston MacKinnon. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. / New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. PDF available at:

http://www.archive.org/details/theoreticalbiolo00uexk

 

 

.

Playing with Difference. Rasmus Leth Jørnø. The Reality of Games

presentation of Jørnø's work, by by Corry Shores
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Playing with Difference

Rasmus Leth Jørnø

The Reality of Games

The Philosophy of Computer Games Conference, Oslo 2009

The follow cites short passages from Rasmus Leth Jørnø's conference paper. It is a very interesting discussion on difference. To get a preview of the mind-openningness of this presentation, consider reading this joke he tells.

An engineer, a physicist and a mathematician are challenged to calculate the shortest stretch of fence capable of containing a herd of sheep.

The engineer jumps at the challenge and makes a square fence, which narrowly contain the sheep, since a square has a smaller circumference in relation to total area, than a rectangle.

The physicist scoffs and makes a circle shaped fence, which narrowly contains the sheep, since a circle has the smallest circumference in relation to total area.

The mathematician smirks and makes a circle shaped fence, which narrowly contains himself and then he defines himself as being outside.

The rest as well is quotation.

“...In that Empire, the craft of Cartography attained such Perfection that the Map of a Single province covered the space of an entire City, and the Map of the Empire itself an entire Province. In the course of Time, these Extensive maps were found somehow wanting, and so the College of Cartographers evolved a Map of the Empire that was of the same Scale as the Empire and that coincided with it point for point. Less attentive to the Study of Cartography, succeeding Generations came to judge a map of such Magnitude cumbersome, and, not without Irreverence, they abandoned it to the Rigours of sun and Rain. In the western Deserts, tattered Fragments of the Map are still to be found, Sheltering an occasional Beast or beggar; in the whole Nation, no other relic is left of the Discipline of Geography.” (Borges, A Universal History of Infamy, 1975) [from Jørnø, p.2-3]

“Interesting phenomena occur when two or more rhythmic patterns are combined…In the case of rhythmic patterns, the combination of two such patterns will generate a third. Therefore, it becomes possible to investigate an unfamiliar pattern by combining it with a known second patterns and inspecting the third pattern which they together generate.” (Bateson, Mind and Nature, 1979, s. 91) [from Jørnø p.6]

changing state does not require observing a difference, but it does require crossing a difference. Consider a turtle which travels on a plane with marks on it. The turtle scans the color of the plane underneath it. Once it detects a change, it changes state, travelling from an unmarked state to a marked state or vice versa, i.e. by crossing a line, it changes state. This illustrates what Bateson calls 'news of a difference' (Bateson, Steps to an ecology of Mind, 1972, s. 458). Such a turtle would have no idea of whether or not being in a marked or unmarked state (or rather wouldn't have an idea which state was the marked one), it is simply interested in the news that there is a difference, which we can equate with a change of state. In other words as actors we are simply biased when acting, i.e. we are in one state or another. A given state has no borders or horizon. It is simply the world as it is. When we observe we differentiate, we do not 'see' the other side of the difference‟ – there is no figure, because there is no ground. [from Jørnø p.10]

“If we speculate about the evolution of communication, it is evident that a very important stage in this evolution occurs when the organism gradually ceases to respond quite „automatically‟ to the mood signs of another and becomes able to recognize that the other individual‟s and its own signals are only signals, which can be trusted, distrusted, falsified, denied, amplified, corrected, and so forth.” (Bateson, Steps to an ecology of Mind, 1972, s. 178) [from Jørnø p.11]

any difference will do as a starting point of a world. It is 'in' the world, because it cannot be anywhere else. The hard part is not to come up with differences. The world is teeming with them. The hard part is to account for how some differences become more important than others, i.e. they become differences that make a difference. [from Jørnø p.14]

“1. The parts of any member of Creatura are to be compared with other parts of the same individual to give first-order connections.

2. Crabs are to be compared with lobsters or men with horses to find similar relations between parts (i.e., to give second-order connections).

3. The comparison between crabs and lobsters is to be compared with the comparison between man and horse to provide third-order connections.” (Bateson, Mind and Nature, 1979, s. 20)

1.order marks allows us to talk about the world. 2.order marks allows us to talk about the things we say about the world and 3.order marks allows us to talk about talking. [from Jørnø p.21]

“...this phenomenon, play, could only occur if the participant organisms were capable of some degree of metacommunication, i.e., of exchanging signals which would carry the message 'this is play.'” (Bateson, Steps to an ecology of Mind, 1972, s. 179)

I would rather suggest that games and play phenomena are called games and play, because they are not able to carry the metacommunicative message 'this is real.' [from Jørnø p.24]

Bo Kampman Walther (Kampmann Walther, 2003) has shown how a significant part of play is concerned with the play with reality. A child gleefully running from a parent desparately trying to make the child go to sleep, is playing with the the parent‟s breakdown of 'playtime' from a frame of 'sleep time.' In the famous cartoon „Calvin and Hobbes‟ when Calvins teacher appears in one of Calvins Sci-fi fantasies, he (spaceman Spiff) negotiates her as an alien. Most classroom teachers would manage to re-instate 'real' life by their simple presence. [from Jørnø p.25]

Any frame which isn‟t taken serious looses its appeal. It ceases to be able to differentiate and is by default broken down. It is no longer engaging. On the playing ground these negotiations take place every day. Who wants to play alone? Empires have fallen because priest haven‟t been able to procure rain, the people defecting no longer believers (they are no longer serious or rather something much more serious is taking place).

Games and play are real and they are being taken seriously as such as long as they are played, but they are no match for other more established frames. They are readily broken, giving way to something which is taken more serious and therefore considered more real, the 'realest' of which is IRL or 'life' as we know it. [from Jørnø p.26]

Jørnø, Rasmus Leth. "The Reality of Games." The Philosophy of Computer Games Conference, Oslo, 2009. PDF available at: http://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/forskning/forskningsprosjekter/3.place/Jorno.pdf

Texts cited in the above passages:

Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and Nature. Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co.

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of Mind. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Borges, J. L. (1975). A Universal History of Infamy. London: Penguin Books.

Kampmann Walther, B. (May 2003). PLaying and Gaming, Reflections and Classifications. Hentet fra Game Studies: http://gamestudies.org/0301/walther/

Bateson, Kant & Differences that Make a Difference, in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity

by Corry Shores
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[The following is citation.]

Kant & Differences that Make a Difference

Gregory Bateson

Mind and Nature:

A Necessary Unity

Ch. IV

Criteria of Mental Process

Criterion 2. The Interaction between Parts of Mind is Triggered by Difference

Kant argued long ago that this piece of chalk contains a million potential facts (Tatsachen) but that only a very few of these become truly facts by affecting the behavior of entities capable of responding to facts. For Kant’s Tatsachen, I would substitute differences and point out that the number of potential differences in this chalk is infinite but that very few of them become effective differences (i.e., items of information) in the mental process of any larger entity. Information consist of differences that make a difference. (110a, strong emphasis mine)

Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. London: Wildwood House, 1979.

More information at:

http://books.google.be/books?id=aQtHAAAAMAAJ&q=Mind+and+Nature:+A+Necessary+Unity&dq=Mind+and+Nature:+A+Necessary+Unity&ei=CWcpSpDIF5TyzQSqiZj7Cg&hl=en&pgis=1