Luhtala (5.5.4.8) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Simple Propositions”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.4

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

 

5.5.4.8

Simple Propositions

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

The Stoics discussed simple propositions using intransitive sentence forms with neuter predicates. In other words, instead of using transitive forms that indicate how one subject acts upon another, they instead used intransitive forms that state the properties or accidents of some subject. (Some example predicates are “sitting” and “walking”.) What is crucial and interesting in this discussion is the way this analysis of syntax relates to their metaphysics and correspondence theory of truth. They use the same term ὑπάρχειν to mean that something exists (or that something is the case) and also to mean that a proposition is true. Situations in the world (that are relevant to these intransitive constructions) are the case (exist) when to some subject properly belongs certain attributes. And, a proposition is true when the predicate holds for the subject. This is determined when in reality the stated thing indeed does bear the attributes indicated in the proposition’s predicate.

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.4.8.1

[Propositions are either simple or non-simple. Simple propositions are classified as either negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definite and the indefinite. We concern ourselves with definite and indefinite, because they involve important issues regarding referentiality in Stoic logic.]

 

Luhtala notes that Chrysippus, “Like many other Stoic philosophers [...] divided propositions into simple and non-simple,” and he defines simple in the following way.

Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as ‘It is day’, (...) and are classified into negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definite and the indefinite. (Diog. Laert. VII,68-69)¹⁸⁶

(111)

186. ἁπλᾶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συνεστῶτα ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὴ διαφορουμένου (ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων), οἷον τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν” ... Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ἀξιώμασίν ἐστι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρνητικὸν καὶ τὸ στερητικὸν καὶ τὸ κατηγορικὸν καὶ τὸ καταγορευτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον.

(111, text copied from Perseus)

Luhtala says we will only be concerned with definite and indefinite simple propositions, because they “reveal the crucial part that referentiality played in Stoic logic (see Kneale/Kneale 1962: 146; Pinborg 1975: 94; Goulet 1978: 171 ff.)” (111). [Luhtala then mentions higher and lower degrees of referentiality, but I do not know what they are. But it is on the basis of that distinction that simple affirmative propositions are divided into three types. She then quotes Diogenes Laertius, but it seems she unpacks it in the following paragraphs. The quotation will make the following distinctions. It will distinguish: assertoric, demonstrative, and indefinite. I am not sure, but I perhaps assertoric and demonstrative are both definite. Assertoric seem to simply state a situation, where the subject is a nominative like a name. In demonstrative propositions, the subject is a demonstrative phrase like ‘this one’. And in indefinite propositions, the subject is of course indefinite, like ‘someone’ or ‘that one.’ (I am not sure why ‘that one’ is not demonstrative, however. The Greek words are quite different looking, οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος, but I do not know Greek, so I cannot comment further.)]

According to the higher or lower degree of referentiality of the subject, the Stoics divided simple affirmative propositions into three types. I will follow closely the report given by Diogenes Laertius:

An assertoric proposition consists of a nominative case and a predicate, e.g. ‘Dion is walking’. A demonstrative proposition consists of a nominative demonstrative case and a predicate, e.g. ‘This one (οὗτος) is walking’. An indefinite proposition consists of one or more indefinite parts and a predicate, e.g. ‘Someone (τὶς) is walking’; ‘that one (ἐκεῖνος) is moving’. (Diog. Laert. VII,70, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 205)¹⁸⁷

(111)

187. κατηγορικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “Δίων περιπατει”: καταγορευτικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς δεικτικῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “οὗτος περιπατεῖ”: ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου μορίου ἢ ἀορίστων μορίων καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “τὶς περιπατεῖ,” “ἐκεῖνος κινεῖται.”

(111, text copied from Perseus)

 

 

5.5.4.8.2

[The definite pronoun makes the most specific reference. The Stoics’ examples for simple propositions do not have active or passive predicates and are thus not matters of transitive states of affairs.]

 

Luhtala says that the the definite pronoun, as in οὗτος or ‘that man’ most adequately represents the subject “because of its immediately obvious reference” (111). [Note, in the above quotation, οὗτος came beside ‘this one’. Here is seems a bit more specific, because it designates the type of thing being referred to.] What makes the definite pronouns so important for reference is that they pick out specific things: “The importance of the definite pronoun lies in its being the linguistic equivalent of a gesture point to an object which is present (Long/Sedley 1987: 206-207)” (111). The Stoics’ examples of simple propositions have neuter predicates like ‘sitting’ and ‘walking’, which means they were  not concerned in these cases with active and passive predicates and thus with “transitive states of affairs” (111-112).

 

 

5.5.4.8.3

[Sextus Empiricus’ account of the simple proposition is not a Stoic sort, like what is given by Diogenes’ Laertius.]

 

Sextus Empiricus’ account of these matters is probably not about the Stoics’ theory but instead about the Megarian Dialecticians, Philo and Diodorus. Luhtala notes some differences between Sextus’ account and Diogenes Laertius’ more properly Stoic account of propositions. In Sextus’ Megarian account, common nouns that refer to universals play a role in indeterminate propositions, but in Diogenes’ account, common nouns “are absent” (112). In fact, “In Stoic logic propositions were generally made about individuals rather than universals” (112). [This is perhaps important when considering the correspondence theory of truth, below.) Luhtala adds one more distinction. While in Stoic accounts the simple proposition receives a linguistic description, “analyzing it into predicate and case,” in Sextus’ account it is treated “in purely non-linguistic terms” (112). [This perhaps emphasizes the importance of linguistic matters in Stoic philosophy, with regard to issues of truth and reality.]

 

 

5.5.4.8.4

[There is an important Peripatetic notion that probably made its way into Stoic logic, namely, συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’ / ‘attributes’). The importance of this concept is that it is tied to the notion ὑπάρχειν, which can mean either that an object exists or that a proposition is true. And the statement is true when the predicate holds for the subject (is properly attributed to it) which is also the case when the thing referred to also has the attributes mentioned. (In other words, something exists or ‘is the case’ when in reality there exists such a thing with its proper attributes, and a statement expressing that situation is true if the stated predicate holds for the subject, as they are in reality.)]

 

Luhtala notes Sextus Empiricus using “the term συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’ / ‘attributes’)” when describing definite propositions (112).

the definite proposition such as ‘this one is sitting’ or ‘this one is walking’ is said by them (the dialecticians) to be true (ὑπάρχειν) whenever the predicate, such as ‘sitting’ or ‘walking’, belongs (συμβεβήκε) to the thing which falls under the demonstrative reference (δεῖξιν). (Adv. math. VIII,100 = SVF 2.205, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 204)¹⁹²

(112)

192. καὶ δὴ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ “οὗτος κάθηται” ἢ “οὗτος περιπατεῖ”, τότε φασὶν ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκῃ κατηγόρημα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν.

(112, text copied from Ancient Philosophy Source. Note a discrepancy. Above what Luhtala has as “συμβεβήκε” in the online source has as “συμβεβήκῃ”, and the Opera text might have as  “συμβεβήκοι”

 

)

Although Sextus is referring to the Dialecticians, Luhtala cites sources providing “evidence of genuinely Stoic usage of this terminology,” (namely, Duhot 1990: 94-96 and Long 1971: 88ff). So it is possible that “Peripatetic terminology” survived “in Stoic usage” (112). There is other evidence, like how Stobaeus attributes a usage of κατηγόρημα (‘predicate’) and συμβεβηκόσ (‘attribute’) to Chrysippus.

Only the present exists (ὑπάρχειν); the past and the future subsist (ὑφεστάναι); in the same way, as attributes (συμβεβηκότα), only the accidents are said to be the case (ὑπάρχειν); for example walking (τὸ περιπατεῖν) is true of me (ὑπάρχειν), when I walk; but when I sit or when I lie down, it is not true. (SVF 2.509)¹⁹⁴

(113)

194. [taken from  the SVF pdf, with Luhtala continuing after:]

It is noteworthy that the attributes are expressed by an infinitive rather than an abstract noun.

(133)

Also, “Seneca associates the notion of accident with the feature of the predicate of being incorporeal and being an attribute of something else, ‘accedens alteri’ ”(113). We also here see the survival of Aristotle’s notion of ὑπάρχειν (it was seen in the Stobaeus passage above). [This notion seems very important for understanding the way that statements correspond with reality. The same word ὑπάρχειν is applied both to mean that an object exists and also that a proposition is true, or in the wording of the above Stobaeus quote, it means the predicate holds for the subject.

In Aristotle’s theory ὑπάρχειν was a crucial feature of both the predicate and the proposition – a notion which is ambiguous between ‘exist’ of objects and ‘be true’ of propositions (Kneale/Kneale 1962: 151).¹⁹⁶

(113)

196. “In Stoic terms the whole theory may be summed up thus: a statement or lekton hyparchei (is the case) if what it describes hyparchei (exists) and what is described is true if the statement describing it is true” (Long 1971: 93) ; cf. Long/Sedley (1987: 206): “A true proposition corresponds to the actual state of the item(s) in the world, to which it refers. Unmistakably correct evidence about existing things is conveyed to us through ‘cognitive impressions’, and a proposition which describes that evidence will be true. The Stoics expressed this correspondence theory of truth by using the same verb, (huparchei/ouch huparchei) ... to differentiate true and false propositions and existing and non-existing things.”

(113)

 

 

5.5.4.8.5

[It is probably significant that the Stoics only spoke of accidents (and of this correspondence theory of truth and reality) using intransitive sentences. (For, the issue of truth and reality is a matter of the concord between a real subject and its accidents, and the intransitive structure is a matter of a nominative subject and its predicated attributes.)]

 

Given the textual evidence provided above,

There would thus seem to be no reason to doubt the persistence of the Peripatetic notions of ὑπάρχειν (‘subsist’) and συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’) in Stoicism. They are associated with the ability of the proposition to assert truth or falsity in terms of some state of affairs being the case, and the predicate belonging to the subject at the time the statement is made. 

(113)

Luhtala then notes that the Stoic sentences in these analyses are intransitive. As far as we can tell, the Stoics only discussed the notion of συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’) when dealing with intransitive sentences (other types of sentences include transitive and impersonal). In intransitive sentences, “the two constituents pertain to the same referent and [...] show grammatical concord” (114). [This is an important point, but I do not grasp it. It will guess the following. Intransitive sentences seem to be ones of a simple subject predication structure where we are stating some attribute of some thing. (Were it transitive, we might instead be stating how one object is acting upon another, without mentioning the attributes of each.) Thus both the nominative/subject and the predicate pertain to the same referent, namely, the object in the world with those properties.) The grammatical concord might then be the grammatical agreement between subject and predicate, but I am just guessing. It must be something else.] Thus the fact that the Stoics only discussed accidents with intransitive sentences probably means that “these constructions [...] show concord of grammatical accidents” (114).

 

 

 

 

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

[1-160]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

[1-160]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

 

Duhot, Jean-Joel. 1989. La conception stoicienne de la causalité. Librairie philosophique. Paris: Vrin.

 

Goulet, Richard. 1978. “La classification stoïcienne des propositions simples selon Diogene Laërce VII 69-70”. Brunschwig (1978: 171-198).

 

Kneale, William C. / Kneale, Martha. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

Long, Anthony A. 1971. “Language and Thought in Stoicism”. Long (1971a: 75-113).

 

Long, Anthony A. 1971a. (ed.) Problems in Stoicism. London: The Athlone Press.

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Pinborg, Jan. 1975. “Classical Antiquity: Greece”. Sebeok (1975: 69-126).

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

Another version available online:

https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext

Online text transcription at:

http://socratics.daphnet.org

[specifically here]

Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner].

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/05/stoic-logic-and-semantics-simple.html

 

 

.

Luhtala (5.5.4.1) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “The Notion of Self-Sufficiency (Αὐτοτέλεια)”, summary

by Corry Shores

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[Stoicism, entry directory]
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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.5 Stoic Logic

5.5.4

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

5.5.4.1

The Notion of Self-Sufficiency (Αὐτοτέλεια)

Brief summary:

[Recall from section 5.5.4.0 that the sayable (λεκτόν) is the incorporeal, rational component of some situation in the world, that is to say, it is a state of affairs. Also, it is the propositional sense of a statement expressing that state of affairs, taking the form of either a full proposition with both a subject and a predicate or a bare predicate without a subject.] When a sayable has a propositional sense of simply a predicate (and thus it represents an incomplete thought), it is an incomplete sayable, and when the sayable has a propositional sense of both a subject and its predicate (and thus represents a complete thought), it is a complete sayable. Incomplete sayables leave a question in the hearer’s mind, while complete ones do not. For example, “Socrates writes” leaves no question, but “writes” leaves the question “who writes?”. An expression has self-sufficiency (αὐτοτέλεια) when it expresses either a complete sayable in its full subject-predicate form or when it simply refers somehow to the predicate part of a complete sayable. One way to determine if an expression is a sayable is if is sufficient (or maybe if it is simply complete). Another ways is if it truly corresponds to an actual state of affairs. Thus there is no consistent criterion for what constitutes a sayable. [Please read the quotations below, as I am quite possibly misunderstanding these distinctions.]

Summary

5.5.4.1.1

[A sayable is incomplete (and insufficient) when it is a bare predicate and it is complete (and has self-sufficiency, αὐτοτέλεια) when the predicate is joined to a subject so to form a proposition. (As well, such a complete proposition is self-sufficient).]

As we noted in the previous section, “A sayable (λεκτόν) can represent a complete or an incomplete thought;” but this is not something that our Stoic sources define clearly (87). We do know that predicates are the only thing that are certainly incomplete sayables. What makes a sayable incomplete, according to Diogenes Laertius, is that it “leaves a question in the mind of the hearer” (87). Thus simple predicates would be incomplete, while completed one would be a proposition. Luhtala gives this example: “an incomplete sayable consisting of the predicate only such as ‘writes’ leaves a question in the mind unless it is joined to a nominative case, e.g. ‘Socrates’. The complete sayable ‘Socrates writes’ satisfies the mind of the hearer.” [This seems similar to Frege’s notion of saturation. See “Function and Concept,” “On Concept and Object,” and “On Sense and Reference.”] [Another  important concept here is self-sufficiency, but I do not understand it. I am not sure if it is simply a matter of completeness or not. In other words, an expression or thought that is complete is sufficient and insufficient otherwise. But, Luhtala says that self-sufficiency is applied not just to propositions but also to predicates. From the wording of the last sentence, my guess is that we would say the following: a predicate that is within a proposition and taking a subject is to be understood as itself being sufficient. And if the predicate is not part of a sentence, it itself is insufficient. Please see the quote.]

Α sayable (λεκτόν) can represent a complete or an incomplete thought – a notion which is not very clearly defined in our sources. Predicates are incomplete sayables, and they figure as the only subdivision of this component. Moreover, predicates are the only items that can be regarded with any certainty as incomplete sayables. According to Diogenes Laertius, an incomplete sayable leaves a question in the mind of the hearer. He points to the incompleteness of a simple predicate, contrasting it with complete sayables, which are various kinds of propositions. For instance, an incomplete sayable consisting of the predicate only such as ‘writes’ leaves a question in the mind unless it is joined to a nominative case, e.g. ‘Socrates’. The complete sayable ‘Socrates writes’ satisfies the mind of the hearer. The notion of self-sufficiency (αὐτοτέλεια) seems to have been applied primarily to predicates and propositions while the status of the nominal part of the complete sayable remains unspecified in this respect.

(87)

5.5.4.1.2

[The Stoics had a couple consistent ways to determine if something is a sayable. {1} It is self-sufficient, that is, a competent native speaker would say that the predicate can sensibly belong to the subject, regardless of whether in fact it does, and {2} It truly corresponds to some state of affairs in the world.]

Luhtala next discusses the ways that the Stoics understood how the sayable is defined. [I may misunderstand this part, so after giving my interpretation, I will quote. She wrote above: “Α sayable (λεκτόν) can represent a complete or an incomplete thought – a notion which is not very clearly defined in our sources. Predicates are incomplete sayables, and they figure as the only subdivision of this component.” Perhaps we are to gather the following from it. A thought can be either complete or incomplete, and thus the sayable expressing (or corresponding to or being the same as)  the thought can be complete or incomplete. When formed in terms of a syntactical or logical structure, a bare predicate without an argument expresses an incomplete sayable, while one with an argument expresses a complete one. (I might be wrong in that interpretation, but this is what I gather so far.) Now we have the concept of “a criterion for the definition of a sayable”, but I am not sure I know what is meant by definition here. It seems simply to be whether or not an utterance can be said to be a sayable or not. From what is written, I gather there are at least two ways to make this determination. The first might be if a native speaker competent in the language of the utterance would agree that the predicate belongs to the subject (or at least could sensibly belong). The second might be whether one would assent that the proposition truly corresponds to the real states of affairs they express. Here the specificity of referentiality of the terms seems is important, with pronouns being the most specific (as compared to general nouns, but I am not sure how they compare to proper nouns, which would seem to have at least as much specificity if not more. Actually, the term Luhtala uses is “referentiality” and not specificity, so I may be misunderstanding it.) Luhtala also says that the truthfulness of the proposition (its correspondence to reality), depends on the sight of the observer (who presumably must examine the states of affairs in the world to deem the sentence truthful). Luhtala then says that this criterion of truthfulness is not compatible with the criterion for self-sufficiency. I do not follow this very well; for, I would think that to know whether a predicate belongs to a subject (does “is white” belong to “snow” in “Snow is white”?) also involves seeing if the proposition corresponds to reality (seeing if snow in fact is white). Perhaps the criteria for self-sufficiency (and thus perhaps for something being a sayable) is not a matter of whether the predicate truly belongs to the subject but whether or not the predicate in combination with its subject makes sense to a native speaker. So “snow is red” under this view is a sayable, but under the criterion of correspondence it is not. I wonder also if the distinction I should make is between a priori and a posteriori, where self-sufficiency is a matter of deducing the fittingness of the predicate to the subject on the basis of the meanings of the terms, while truthfulness is a matter of using our senses to see if the sentence corresponds to the world. At any rate, Luhtala says that there is a diversity of approaches, which means that the two criteria are incompatible, even though I can imagine them being combinable in the way I mention above where “snow is white” is said to self-sufficient because it truly corresponds to states of affairs.]

The Stoics seem to have introduced into linguistic analysis a criterion for the definition of a sayable, which relies on the competence of a (native) speaker to decide about the acceptability of a statement in | terms of its completeness. This takes place on hearing the expression. On the other hand, we know that the Stoics were keen to relate propositions to events in the real world whereby their truthfulness depended on the state of affairs being demonstrably true. In such contexts the question of lower and higher referentiality of the subject is crucial, as is the case in the Stoic discussions of simple propositions . Thus the subject position in the prototypical Stoic proposition is occupied by the pronoun, which is taken to be the most highly referential linguistic item, equalling the gesture of pointing to the referent . Importantly, the criterion of truthfulness depends on the sight of the observer. But the criterion of self-sufficiency (αὐτοτέλεια) is surely incompatible with the strictest requirements of the truthfulness of the statement which can be proved by sight. As far as I can see, we here witness a diversity of approach within the Stoic theory.

(87-88)

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:
http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/05/stoic-logic-and-semantics-compound.html


.

Luhtala (5.5.0) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Stoic Logic [introductory material]”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.0 [introductory material]

 

 

Brief summary:

The Stoics regarded logic as being comprised of rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric deals with continuous speech, while dialectic deals with argument by means of question and answer. Logic and all its many subtopics are matters of logos / λόγος (reason, speech), which is the rational principle of causality in the cosmos and of right human action. Logos is also speech, and since humans have “internal speech”, they can think rationally about the logical sequence of things. Truth is a matter of correspondence between a statement, made on the basis of our “rational impressions,” and some specific event happening in the world. The Stoics in fact did not consider universals to be real things, and thus their logic was concerned primarily with particulars and almost never with universals, as in Aristotle’s logic.

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.0.1

[The Stoics regarded logic as being comprised of rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric deals with continuous speech, dialectic with argument by question and answer.]

 

For the Stoics, logic was a matter of rhetoric and dialectic.

The term ‘logic’ was used by the Stoics to refer to the branch of their philosophy which covered the subdisciplines of rhetoric and dialectic.⁹³

93. According to Bocheński, “the Stoics elaborated a refined semiotic theory ...” (1951: 80). According to Graeser, “it is a theory of meaning that has invited comparison with modern theories and obviously stood it well. In fact, it is generally agreed that the Stoic account of semantics is superior to and more sophisticated than the more influential one offered by Aristotle in the De Interpretatione (16a3-18)” (1978: 77).

(64)

But this combination of rhetoric and dialectic was not seen for example in Aristotle, who had no special term to include both (65). This dual signfiicance probably comes the Stoics’ adoption of the usage from Xenokrates. What characterizes rhetoric for the Stoics is that it “deals with continuous speech (Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1047A-B, SVF 2.297-298);’ however, what characterizes dialectic is that it is “argument by question and answer (Diog. Laert. VII,42)” (65). She continues:

Moreover, in a simile attributed to Zeno, dialectic is compared to a clenched fist, while rhetoric is compared to the hand spread out and extended, illustrating the compactness and brevity of dialectical discourse as opposed to rhetorical. This simile enjoyed some popularity in characterizing the two kinds of speech (λόγος, oratio) studied by the two arts of discourse in Antiquity, dialectic and rhetoric, respectively (Varro apud Cass. Inst. II,3,2; Isid. Etym. II,xxiii; Cic. De fin. II,6,17; Or. 32,113; Quint. Inst. or. II,20,7; Sen. Ep. 89, 17; Sext. Emp. Adv. math. II,7 = SVF 1.75).

(65)

[In his De finibus bonorum et malorum, which Luhtala cites, Cicero writes:

“That is the view of Zeno the Stoic,” I rejoined; “he used to say that the faculty of speech in general falls into two departments, as Aristotle had already laid down; and that Rhetoric was like the palm of the hand, Dialectic like the closed fist; because rhetoricians employ an expansive style, and dialecticians one that is more compressed.

(Cicero 1914: 99. II,6,17)

I also note an image form of this metaphor. John Bulwer’s Chirologia has a similar sort of picture on its title page. Samuel Howell writes regarding it:

Still another interesting thing about it is its illustrations, one of which precedes the title page and pictures “Eloquentia” as an open hand, “Logica” as a fist.

(Howell 341)

Below are images of this picture from Bulwer’s book [the detail is taken from the bottom right].

The title page of Howell’s book has its own adaptation of this image:

]

 

5.5.0.2

[Logic and all its many subtopics are matters of logos / λόγος (reason, speech), which is the rational principle of causality in the cosmos and of right human action. Logos is also speech, and since humans have ‘internal speech’, they can think rationally about the logical sequence of things.]

 

There is a wide range of subjects that fall under logic for the Stoics, including “formal logic, theory of knowledge, semantic and phonetic aspects of language, as well as stylistics, all of which had λόγος (‘reason’, ‘speech’) as their subject matter” (65). For the Stoics, reason and speech are united in the notion of λόγος. Reason is something found in “rational order of the universe” and in the “parallelism between cosmic events and human action in that both are manifestations of a causal relation of cause and effect” (65, see section 5.1.2). Furthermore, “One of the characteristics of the human being as a rational creature is the ability to use language, which is based on ‘internal speech’, and an understanding of the logical sequence of things.” (65).

 

 

5.5.0.3

[The Stoics did not see universals as being real, and thus Stoic logic is concerned with particulars rather than universals.]

 

A wise person has ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος), which means that the person can make true statements about actual states of affairs happening in the world. [The next idea seems to be that in Aristotelian logic, truth (or maybe proper inference) is a matter of the relations between terms, especially between universal terms, where for the Stoics it is a matter of correspondence between statements and events in the world. Let me quote, as I am guessing:]

A mature person, if he is a wise man, has ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος). This means that he is able to make statements which are demonstrably true about some actual events that are taking place. The fact that Stoic logic is primarily concerned with states of affairs involving particulars marks an important distinction from Aristotelian logic which deals with relations between terms and mainly with universal terms.

(66a, emphasis mine)

The Stoics, then, were interested in particulars and diminished the importance of universals,

claiming that they are merely figments of our imagination.⁹⁸

98. Diogenes Laertius attributes to Zeno the doctrine that concepts (ἐννόημμ) are neither somethings nor qualifeid but figments of the soul which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified (Diog. Laert. VII,60-61). Stobaeus adds that these concepts are what the old philosophers called Idea (Ecl. 1,136,21-137,6 = SVF 1.65). Like the Megarian Stilpo, Zeno wanted to remove the incorporeal Idea from the centre of philosophy (Rist 1978: 395).

(66)

In fact, universals do not even fit within the Stoics’ ontological scheme and instead are considered “not-somethings.⁹⁹” [Footnote 99: According to Simplicius, Chrysippus too raised the question of whether the Idea can be called a this something’ (In Ar. cat. 105,8-16 = SVF 2.278). Syrianus attributes to the Stoic school in general the view that only particulars exist (In Ar. met. 104,17-21 = SVF 2.361). For the ontological scheme of the Stoics, see Long & Sedley (1987: 163) as well as table 1 on page 85.] (66) Thus “In Chrysippean logic propositions are usually made concerning individuals and the prototypical subject is represented by a definite pronoun” (66).

 

 

5.5.0.4

[For Stoics, logic deals with rational discourse, and rhetoric more specifically is about speaking well and dialectic about discovering truth by means of correct statements regarding real world events that are based on our rational impressions.]

 

Stoic logic for the most part deals with rational discourse in general. Both rhetoric and dialectic are matters of speaking well (66), but dialectic was “associated with the discovery of truth” (67). Truth for the Stoics is both a logical and an epistemological issue. It is logical in that “truth is discovered by means of correct statements about real world events”, and it is epistemological, because these correct statements “are based on what are known as ‘rational impressions’ (λογιὴ φαντασία)” (67). But Chrysippus also defined dialectic in accordance with a two-fold theory of meaning “as the doctrine of σημαίνοντα (“that which signifies”) and σημαινόμενα (“that which is signified”) (Diog. Laert. VII,62)” (67).

 

 

 

From:

 

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

[Note, for “Cic. De fin.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Cicero’s De finibus.]

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

 

Graeser, Andrea. 1978. “The Stoic Theory of Meaning”. Rist (1978: 77-100).

 

Bocheński, Innocentius M. 1951. Ancient Formal Logic. Studies in Logic and the Foundation of Mathematics. Amsterdam: North- Holland Publishing Co.

 

[Note, for “Isid. Etym.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Isidorus’ Etymologiae.]

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Plutarch: De Stoicis repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos in Plutarchi Moralia V.1 .2. Ed. by Ma Pohlenz. Leipzig: Teubner 1972.

 

Quintilian: M. Fabi Quintiliani Institutionis Ortorae libri duodecim. Ed. by Michael Winterbottom. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1970.

 

Rist, John M. 1978. (ed.) The Stoics. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Rist, John M. “Zeno and the Origins of Stoic Logic”. Brunschwig (1978: 387-400).

 

Seneca: Ad Lucilium epistulae morales. Ed. by Leighton D. Reynolds. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965.

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

 

Simplicius: In Arstotelis Categoras Commentarium. CAG VIII. Ed. by Carl Kalbfleisch. Berlin: Reimer 1907.

 

[Note, for “Stobaeus ... Ecl.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Stobaeus’ Ἐκλογαί / Eclogae physicae et ethicae.]

 

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

 

Syrianus: In Metaphysica commentaria. CAG VI.1. Ed. Wilhelm Kroll. Berlin: Reimer 1902 .

 

[Note, I do not know what “Varro apud Cass. Inst.” refers to. Perhaps it is simply Cassiodorus’ Institutiones. I could not find what it might be in the Bibliography.]

 

 

Texts I refer to:

 

Bulwer, John. 1644. Chirologia / Chironomia. London: Harper. PDF available at: https://archive.org/details/gu_chirologianat00gent

Bulwer image from: Folger Shakespeare Library.

http://luna.folger.edu/luna/servlet/detail/FOLGERCM1~6~6~651682~144325:Chirologia--or-The-naturall-languag#

 

Cicero. 1914. De finibus bonorum et malorum. With English translation by H. Rackham. London: Heinemann. / New York: Macmillan. PDF available at: https://archive.org/details/definibusbonoru02cicegoog

 

Howell, Samuel. 1961. Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. New York: Russell & Russell. Available at: https://archive.org/details/logicandrhetoric0 11815mbp.

.

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-in-ch-55.html