Showing posts with label compensation of errors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label compensation of errors. Show all posts

6 Dec 2008

Carnot's Compensation of Errors, according to João Caramalho Domingues

by Corry Shores
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Lazare-Nicolas-Marguerite Carnot held that differential calculus operated by means of a compensation of errors:

in the traditional process of infinitesimal calculus, we start by regarding a curve as a polygonal line; here an error is being committed; afterwords, during the calculations, the neglect of infinitesimals introduces a second error that cancels the first. (59-60)

Carnot tried to prove the compensation of errors' efficacy by means of "imperfect equations:"

The members of one of these were in fact not equal, but had the same limit, which means that they had to involve variables, or as Carnot said, “auxiliary quantities”; imperfect equations were operated upon by replacing quantities with other, infinitely close, quantities; once all the auxiliary quantities had disappeared, an exact equation would remain. (60a)

And yet, Carnot's proof did not convince other mathematicians (60b).


Domingues, João Caramalho. Lacroix and the Calculus. Basel: Birkhäuser, 2008.

3 Dec 2008

Carnot in the History of the Calculus

by Corry Shores
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L.N.M Carnot wanted to make rigidly precise the theory of the calculus, and in particular the notion of the infinitesimal. But

in his selection of the unifying principle, however, he made a most deplorable choice. He concluded that "the true metaphysical principles of the Infinitesimal Analysis . . . are nevertheless . . . the principles of the compensation of errors," as Berkeley and Lagrange had suggested. (257-259)

Carnot reverts to Leibniz' ideas, and held that we may be certain that quantities are "rigorously equal" if we can prove that "their difference cannot be a 'quantité designée." Carnot further followed Leibniz in saying that we may substitute one quantity for another if there is only an infinitesimal difference between them. He also claimed that "the method of infinitesimals is nothing more than that of exhaustion reduced to an algorithm" (258a).

Carnot also followed Leibniz' law of continuity, holding that we may view the infinitesimal analysis according to two points of view: 1) by taking the infinitesimals as "quantités effectives," or 2) by taking them as "quantités absolument nulles."

In the first case, he felt that the calculus was to be explained upon the basis of a compensation of errors: "imperfect equations" were to be made "perfectly exact" by the simple expedient of eliminating the quantities whose presence occasioned the errors. (258b)

In the second case, calculus is an "art" of comparing vanishing quantities so to determine the relationships between them.

Vanishing quantities for Carnot were not null in themselves, but were rather assigned null values by Leibniz' law of continuity (285d).

Carnot assessed that all the calculus methods (and their precursors) throughout history were based on the method of exhaustion reduced to a "convenient algorithm" (259b).

However, Carnot did not develop much past Leibniz, because he considered derivatives in terms of equations rather than as functions, and he was more concerned with applying the method than with the logical reasoning involved (259d).



Boyer, Carl B. The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development. New York: Dover Publications, 1949.


2 Dec 2008

Lagrange in the History of the Calculus

presentation of Edwards & Penney's work, by Corry Shores
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Joseph Louis Lagrange was skeptical of the infinitely small; for him, the accuracy of calculus results from a “compensation of errors.” And yet, he rejected the limit concept on account of its poor metaphysical grounding. The tangent was not a limit, for Lagrange, because after becoming the tangent, the secant could very well continue to the other side of the point and become a secant again. Nor did he accept the method of fluxions, because it made use of “the irrelevant notion of motion.” He rejected Euler’s presentation of dx and dy as 0, because Lagrange felt that we do not have a clear and precise notion of the ratio of two terms which become zero. As a result, Lagrange sought out a simple algebraic method that was free from these objections.

Lagrange found his means in the Taylor Series.

The series f (x + h) = f (x) + f ' (x)h + f '' (x)h^2/2! had been known at least from the time of Taylor, whose name it bears. In this series, the coefficients of the powers of h involve the ratios of differentials, or of fluxions. However, the series can be derived without reference to these notions. What would be more natural than to define differentials and fluxions in terms of the coefficients of such a series? This procedure would (only on the surface, as we know now) obviate the necessity of introducing either limits or infinitesimals into the work, and the calculus would thus be reduced to simple algebraic operations. (252c)

Taylor thought that such an approach would free calculus from "all metaphysics and of any theory of infinitely small or vanishing quantities" (Boyer quoting Lagrange 252d). Although his method was not completely satisfactory, it had the advantage that it did not make use of ideas from geometry, mechanics, or philosophy (253b).

And yet, Lagrange was later criticized for "giving up, in favor of mathematical formalism, the 'generative' concept which has frequently been felt to be the basis of the methods of fluxions and differentials" (253bc).

But Lagrange continued seeking a formalization of the notion of limit based on Euler's function concept.

Incidentally, in so doing he focused attention for almost the first time upon the quantity which is now the central conception in the calculus -- that of the derived function, or the derivative, or the differential coefficient. Lagrange, in this connection gave not only the name from which the word derivative was adopted, but also the notation f 'x, modifications of which are still conveniently used. (253d)

Newton did not interpret the ratio of infinitesimals as such a single number or quantity (derivative), for he considered it more as a ratio of increments or fluxions (254a).

Similarly, Leibniz did not consider the ratio of infinitesimals as a single number, but instead as a quotient of "inassignables" (254b).

Lagrange's method was first to properly make use of the notion of derivative as "merely a single coefficient of a term in an infinite series" that is also "completely divested of any idea of ratio, or limiting equality" (254c).


Boyer, Carl B. The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development. New York: Dover Publications, 1949.