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Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §11 The Political Object Now Reappears

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On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§11 The Political Object Now Reappears

Back in section 2, Clausewitz explained that we will defeat the enemy only after a long series of actions. But we need always to make precise calculations. We make matters easier by focusing just on our immediate aim: the disarmament of our enemy.

Clausewitz now returns to the long-term political object of War. For while the law of disarmament "loses its force, the political must again come forward." In fact, the political aim was the original purpose. So if we are going to calculate probabilities on the basis of definite persons and relations, then our political objective should be found as a factor in the final product.

Now, if we make fewer sacrifices, then the enemy will only need to put-up less resistance. Likewise, the less ready our enemy, the less we need to prepare. But also, the lesser the importance of our political aim, the more likely we are to give it up altogether.

Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.

But the political object's importance alone does not tell us precisely the aim and amount of force we need to employ. For we must also take into account the real circumstances of both parties. So if our enemy is weak but our political aims are extraordinarily important, we might not need to expend too much force anyway to obtain those ends. The political motivation will inspire people to take action. But one political aim will affect different people in different ways, and the same people differently at different times. So we must take into consideration the masses that the motivation will move.

It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political motive for War may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in fact, a perfect explosion. (boldface mine)

The efforts each State needs to attain their political goal and the aim for the military action needed to achieve it might be disproportional. In some cases the military aim might be to conquer a province. In other cases there may not be any suitable military end to attain political goals. In those cases, some other military-like aim should be established so to signify when peace has been established. Yet we also keep in mind the attitudes of the warring states. Sometimes one side will not have an important political purpose, but will have to put forth a disproportional military effort to attain it. But if the people on both sides are indifferent to the political motive and not very hostile towards each other, then whichever side has the more pressing political aim will probably win.

Now consider if the military aim and the political object are equal. Then as the political aim diminishes, so will the military action, and vice versa.

Thus it is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a War of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation.

From the Graham translation:

11. THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS.

Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration (see No. 2), viz., the political object of the War. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from ours, the smaller, it may be expected, will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether.

Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself, but it is so in relation to both the belligerent States, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political motive for War may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in fact, a perfect explosion.

This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two States, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as, for example, the conquest of a province. At other times the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace. But also, in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the States concerned is always supposed. There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object, in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two States from other causes, and therefore there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive.

If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and in a greater degree the more the political object dominates. Thus it is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a War of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation. This, however, leads to a question of another kind which we have hereafter to develop and answer.

From the original German:

11. Nun tritt der politische Zweck wieder hervor

Hier drängt sich nun von selbst ein Gegenstand von neuem in die Betrachtung, den wir (s. Nr. 2) daraus entfernt hatten: es ist der politische Zweck des Krieges. Das Gesetz des Äußersten, die Absicht, den Gegner wehrlos zu machen, ihn niederzuwerfen, hatte diesen Zweck bisher gewissermaßen verschlungen. Sowie dieses Gesetz in seiner Kraft nachläßt, diese Absicht von ihrem Ziel zurücktritt, muß der politische Zweck des Krieges wieder hervortreten. Ist die ganze Betrachtung ein Wahrscheinlichkeitskalkül, aus bestimmten Personen und Verhältnissen hervorgehend, so muß der politische Zweck als das ursprüngliche Motiv ein sehr wesentlicher Faktor in diesem Produkt werden. Je kleiner das Opfer ist, welches wir von unserem Gegner fordern, um so geringer dürfen wir erwarten, daß seine Anstrengungen sein werden, es uns zu versagen. Je geringer aber diese sind, um so kleiner dürfen auch die unsrigen bleiben. Ferner, je kleiner unser politischer Zweck ist, um so geringer wird der Wert sein, den wir auf ihn legen, um so eher werden wir uns gefallen lassen, ihn aufzugeben: also um so kleiner werden auch aus diesem Grunde unsere Anstrengungen sein. So wird also der politische Zweck als dasursprüngliche Motiv des Krieges das Maß sein, sowohl für das Ziel, welches durch den kriegerischen Akt erreicht werden muß, als für die Anstrengungen, die erforderlich sind. Aber er wird dies nicht an und für sich sein können, sondern, weil wir es mit wirklichen Dingen zu tun haben und nicht mit bloßen Begriffen, so wird er es in Beziehung auf die beiderseitigen Staaten sein. Ein und derselbe politische Zweck kann bei verschiedenen Völkern, oder selbst bei ein und demselben Volk, zu verschiedenen Zeiten ganz verschiedene Wirkungen hervorbringen. Wir können also den politischen Zweck nur so als das Maß gelten lassen, indem wir uns ihn in Einwirkungen auf die Massen denken, die er bewegen soll, so daß also die Natur dieser Massen in Betrachtung kommt. Daß dadurch das Resultat ein ganz anderes werden kann, je nachdem sich in den Massen Verstärkungs- oder Schwächungsprinzipe für die Handlung finden, ist leicht einzusehen. Es können in zwei Völkern und Staaten sich solche Spannungen, eine solche Summe feindseliger Elemente finden, daß ein an sich sehr geringes politisches Motiv des Krieges eine weit über seine Natur hinausgehende Wirkung, eine wahre Explosion hervorbringen kann.

Dies gilt für die Anstrengungen, welche der politische Zweck in beiden Staaten hervorrufen, und für das Ziel, welches er der kriegerischen Handlung stecken soll. Zuweilen wird er selbst dieses Ziel sein können, z. B. die Eroberung einer gewissen Provinz. Zuweilen wird der politische Zweck selbst sich nicht dazu eignen, das Ziel der kriegerischen Handlung abzugeben; dann muß ein solches genommen werden, welches als ein Äquivalent für ihn gelten und beim Frieden ihn vertreten kann. Aber auch hierbei ist immer die Rücksicht auf die Eigentümlichkeit der wirkenden Staaten vorausgesetzt. Es gibt Verhältnisse, wo das Äquivalent viel größer sein muß als der politische Zweck, wenn dieser damit errungen werden soll. Der politische Zweck wird als Maß um so mehr vorherrschen und selbst entscheiden, je gleichgültiger sich die Massen verhalten, je geringer die Spannungen sind, die auch außerdem in beiden Staaten und ihren Verhältnissen sich finden, und so gibt es Fälle, wo er fast allein entscheidet.

Ist nun das Ziel des kriegerischen Aktes ein Äquivalent für den politischen Zweck, so wird er im allgemeinen mit diesem heruntergehen, und zwar um so mehr, je mehr dieser Zweck vorherrscht; und so erklärt es sich, wie ohne inneren Widerspruch es Kriege mit allen Graden von Wichtigkeit und Energie geben kann, von dem Vernichtungskriege hinab bis zur bloßen bewaffneten Beobachtung. Dies führt uns aber zu einer Frage anderer Art, die wir noch zu entwickeln und zu beantworten haben.

Clausewitz. Vom Kriege. Available online at:

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/Book1Ch01VK.htm

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §10 The Probabilities of Real Life Take the Place of the Conceptions of the Extreme and the Absolute

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On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§10 The Probabilities of Real Life Take the Place of the Conceptions of the Extreme and the Absolute

Previously we saw that when war is resolved, one or both parties still keep in mind the possibility of restarting aggressions. Nations might call for truces. They might even retreat. In fact, they could fully surrender. Neither side ever presumes resolution, no matter the outcome. So they temper their efforts in order to live and fight another day, even if they concede the battle today.

In this manner, the whole act of War is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. (emphasis mine)

Neither side escalates to the absolute extreme. Rather, they must use their judgment to determine just how much effort to exert.

and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the LAWS OF PROBABILITY.

If we merely regarded all the elements of warfare abstractly, then we could use mathematics to calculate the winner from the very beginning. But the real world cannot be pre-calculated. For it is not deterministic. War is wild. Much is mystery. We must calculate unknowns probabilistically.

Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments, once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.

From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly. (emphasis mine)

Original text from the translation:

10. THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE ABSOLUTE.

In this manner, the whole act of War is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgment to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it, and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the LAWS OF PROBABILITY. Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments, once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.

From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §9 The Result in War is Never Absolute

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Clausewitz, On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§9 The Result in War is Never Absolute

Previously Clausewitz explained that we may prefigure abstractly how a war might play out, if we only consider basic principles rather than concrete realities. His thesis is that war will happen in this abstract way only if three conditions are fulfilled. He then proceeds to demonstrate how these conditions cannot be fulfilled. We saw already the first condition: that the war needs to be an isolated act. But we discovered it never is. The second was that the war must only involve a single act, or many simultaneous acts. This as well was demonstrated to be impossible. Now Clausewitz will explore the third condition: a war's outcome is absolute.

Consider firstly that the conquered nation never considers the matter settled. To maintain their pride, they believe that they will meet their opponents in battle again sometime in the future. Victory hovers still on their horizon.

For this reason, nations often retreat. But not always do they do so because they surrender themselves entirely. Often accepting defeat is a strategic move to increase readiness for the next war.

So in warfare, nations know that the end will not be final. This fact might lessen the tensions and vigor of their efforts, or modify them some other way.

Original text from the translation:

9. THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE.

Lastly, even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension, and the vigour of the efforts made, is evident in itself.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §8 War does not Consist of a Single Instantaneous Blow

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Clausewitz, On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§8 War does not Consist of a Single Instantaneous Blow

Previously Clausewitz claimed that war will occur according to our abstract conceptions only under three conditions. The first was that the war must be an isolated act. But we discovered it never is. The second is that the war must be limited to either a single solution or to multiple simultaneous solutions. Clausewitz will now examine certain considerations which will show this never to be so.

If we made a mistake in conducting the war, then we would have to take an extra step to complete it. Or, if we did not put forth enough resources or go to the proper extremes, we also would need additional actions to resolve the conflict. Hence for wars to end in a single solution or in many simultaneous ones, all preparations would need to be taken to extreme extents. All we would then need is information of the enemy's preparations, so that we may out-prepare them. In this way, the war might proceed in the way we pre-conceive it abstractly, [as though dominoes were to fall as planned.]

However, if the war's solution requires a series of steps, then we learn how to proceed based on changing conditions, "and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme."

Now, if we commit one act, this will consume resources. Then, if we need to make another action, we will have diminished means to do so. But, if both sides raised all resources at once, and expended them all at once, then the war would be decided in one single solution or through the sum of many simultaneous ones.

However, we found that war is always a matter of escalation. So real wars will not play-out as they might in our abstract conceptions. And the real world prevents war resources to be instantly raised and deployed.

It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. These forces are THE ARMIES ACTUALLY ON FOOT, THE COUNTRY, with its superficial extent and its population, AND THE ALLIES.

Also, the country's land and people are themselves essential war resources. They provide "either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same."

A country may mobilize all its military forces at once. However, it cannot instantaneously place into action all its fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, and so on. Also, allies need to be persuaded to join the war, and usually they do not enter until after the war has begun.

We often neglect the importance of allied forces in deciding wars. Clausewitz will explain their role later. For now "it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War."

So we cannot begin and finish a war all at once. Rather, we must take a series of steps. But, the first action often decides many factors which condition the following steps. So we should not neglect the importance of making the first action as effective as possible.

Yet, men are disinclined to make unnecessary efforts. So they tend not to put forth enough force at the outset. But if one chooses to restrain his efforts, then the other side might choose to do the same in order to conserve resources, "and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale."

Original text from the translation:

8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW.

The second point gives rise to the following considerations:—

If War ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an omission could not in any way be repaired; the utmost, then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us would be the preparations of the enemy, as far as they are known to us; all the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme.

Yet every War would necessarily resolve itself into a single solution, or a sum of simultaneous results, if all the means required for the struggle were raised at once, or could be at once raised; for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means, then if all the means have been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be supposed. All hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first, and form, in reality only its duration.

But we have already seen that even in the preparation for War the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception—a material standard into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme: that therefore in that way both parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction, remain below the line of extreme effort, and therefore all forces are not at once brought forward.

It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. These forces are THE ARMIES ACTUALLY ON FOOT, THE COUNTRY, with its superficial extent and its population, AND THE ALLIES.

In point of fact, the country, with its superficial area and the population, besides being the source of all military force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in War, providing either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same.

Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, &c.—in short, not the whole country, unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the War. Further, the co-operation of allies does not depend on the Will of the belligerents; and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other, this co-operation is frequently not afforded until after the War has commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of power.

That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously affected by the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War.

Now this, in itself, furnishes no ground for relaxing our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the first result, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would purposely expose himself, and also because the first decision, although not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events, the greater it is in itself.

But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men to take refuge in that expectation, owing to the repugnance in the human mind to making excessive efforts; and therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used. Whatever one belligerent omits from weakness, becomes to the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts, and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §7 War is Never an Isolated Act

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Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§7 War is Never an Isolated Act

Previously Clausewitz claimed that there were three conditions required for war to play-out in reality as it would in our abstract conception of it. The first was that the war must be an isolated act. Clausewitz will now explain why this is never so.

If our opponent were an abstraction, then we could expect him to act according to whatever is ideally best for him, and to do so without changing plans the next day. However, he is a real person. Our wills supposedly have nothing to do with objective things. Nonetheless, that does not make them abstractions. Someone's will indicates how he will behave in the future. So in that sense it seems abstract. However, one's will is based on the material conditions happening in the present.

Also, wars occur through a series of events. They do not "spring up quite suddenly," and they do not "spread to the full in a moment."

Because people are not abstractions, they need not be expected to act as though they never made mistakes in their decision-making. For, the course of a war unfolds through a largely unpredictable process with so many complexities of interwoven contingencies that no real person can possibly know exactly what to do next.

If men were perfect, then the abstract principles of war would manifest in their purity when actualizing in reality. However, the imperfection of mankind serves as a modifying principle to these more basic abstract principles.

Original text from the translation:

7. WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT.

With regard to the first point, neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even as regards that factor in the sum of resistance which does not depend on objective things, viz., the Will. This Will is not an entirely unknown quantity; it indicates what it will be to-morrow by what it is to-day. War does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment; each of the two opponents can, therefore, form an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do. But, now, man with his incomplete organisation is always below the line of absolute perfection, and thus these deficiencies, having an influence on both sides, become a modifying principle.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §6 Modification in the Reality

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Clausewitz, On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§6 Modification in the Reality

We have seen that both sides reciprocally escalate their force. If we merely think about this abstractly, we only obtain a basic principle that is not yet in a practically applicable form. If we only say that the basic principle of warfare is that both sides escalate to the extreme, than we have done little more than given a "paper law" that is unadaptable to the real world.

But, States have limited resources. So they cannot escalate to infinity. Also, wars do not always require an absolute expenditure of resources. And if all a nation's resources are exhausted in warfare, then there exists none left to run the country. War protects the country, so if we deplete the country in the process, we defeat our purposes for fighting. So we need a more concrete way to conceive the basic principle of warfare.

There three conditions requisite for an actual war to play-out the way it would in its abstract conception: if the war

1) is a completely isolated act that suddenly arises and bears no relation to the States' histories.

2) is limited to either one single solution or to several simultaneous solutions

3) contains within itself its own perfect and complete solution. This ideal outcome must result in a political situation that cannot result in further conflict. And, that outcome must have been calculable before the war began.

Clausewitz will proceed to explain why all three conditions are unrealistic.

If the enemy's resistance is greater than our powers, then he will defeat us. Thus

If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance.

To calculate one's powers, one multiplies

1) the sum of one's available means, by

2) the strength of one's Will

We can total our troops and resources, so we can numerically calculate our available means. Will power is not something so objectively manifest, so it is harder to quantify determinately. Our best means is to estimate the strength of one's motives.

We can thereby calculate the proportional difference between our power and our enemy's. Also, after determining our available means for warfare, we can then try to increase them as much as possible.

Yet we should expect that the enemy likewise is increasing his power as much as possible too. Since both sides continue calculating their proportional differences of power while trying to increase them, we see a "new mutual enhancement" which escalates the power of both sides. This is the THIRD RECIPROCAL ACTION.

[Next entry in this series.]

Original text from the translation:

6. MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY.

Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of War an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If, adhering closely to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world.

Even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could easily be ascertained, still we must admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself to this kind of logical chimera. There would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power, which would be in opposition to other principles of statecraft; an effort of Will would be required disproportioned to the proposed object, which therefore it would be impossible to realise, for the human will does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties.

But everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality. In the former, everything must be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the one side as well as the other striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? It will if,

(1) War becomes a completely isolated act, which arises suddenly, and is in no way connected with the previous history of the combatant States.

(2) If it is limited to a single solution, or to several simultaneous solutions.

(3) If it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete, free from any reaction upon it, through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §4 The Aim is to Disarm the Enemy

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Clausewitz, On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§4 The Aim is to Disarm the Enemy

Previously we learned that War's aim is disarming the enemy.

We want our enemy to serve our will. He will not voluntarily fulfill our wish. We must corner him into a choice:

1) fulfill or will, or

2) endure the worse circumstances we impose.

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand.

.

This oppression must seem inescapable. They cannot think it temporary. Otherwise they hold out.

Every change in our opponent's condition should be a change for the worse. The worst possible change is full disarmament. To reduce our enemy to submission, we must either:

1) positively disarm him, or

2) bring him to see its inevitability.

War is conflict between opposing forces. The enemy resists us.

As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him.

Both sides escalating to full force was the first reciprocal action. THE SECOND RECIPROCAL ACTION is the mutual effort to disarm the opposition.

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Original text from the translation:

4. THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY.

We have already said that the aim of all action in War is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is indispensable.

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand; but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the War should therefore be a change for the worse. The worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of War, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it. From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of Warfare. Now War is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be making War; therefore, what we have just said as to the aim of action in War applies to both parties. Here, then, is another case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a second extreme (SECOND RECIPROCAL ACTION).

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm