Showing posts with label Letter on the Infinite. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Letter on the Infinite. Show all posts

4 Jul 2012

Difference & Sensation: Deleuze's Spinozistic Affect


by Corry Shores
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The following is my presentation at the Nederlands Genootschap voor Esthetica (Dutch Association of Aesthetics) Utrecht Expertmeeting Kunstfilosofie in Utrecht, November 2011


Corry Shores

Difference & Sensation:
Deleuze's Spinozistic Affect



Photobucket
(Animation above is my own, made with GIMP and Unfreeze,
image from Spinoza, Opera vol. 2, archive.org
, p.233)

Deleuze is commonly considered an anti-phenomenologist. However, I would like to explore the phenomenological value of his aesthetical ideas regarding affection and bodily sensation. The aim of this presentation is to offer a Spinozistic interpretation of certain concepts in Deleuze’s Francis Bacon book. For this aim, I draw primarily upon Deleuze’s writings on Spinoza’s affection. We will regard affection phenomenologically as involving a sort of affective awareness of bodily-given phenomena. We do this because Deleuze explains Spinoza’s kinds of knowledge in terms of the rhythm of affection.

Deleuze specifically refers to affective awareness as ‘the phenomenon of passage.’ It is the lived transition that we undergo when affections transfer us from one bodily state to another.


There are two primary dimensions, then, to such affective alterations.

One is the physical composition of bodies that becomes changed by the affection. The other is the dynamic of the alteration. Deleuze combines these two dimensions of affection, the compositional and the dynamic, by analyzing two sorts of infinities in Spinoza’s theory of affection, namely, extensive and intensive infinities. There is a cryptic diagram in Spinoza’s Twelfth Letter: the ‘letter on infinity.’ Deleuze’s novel interpretation of the diagram shows how it illustrates the two infinities.


Spinoza writes of the diagram that “all the inequalities of the space lying between the two circles ABCD in the diagram exceed any number, as do all the variations of the speed of matter moving through that area.”


We find similar diagrams in Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. In the left diagram, both semi-circles share the same center. The space between their circumferences is everywhere the same. However, if the semi-circles do not share the same center, then the space between their circumferences will be everywhere unequal.


He also has us consider the circulation of water moving through the space between offset circles. And on account of the geometry of the non-concentric circles, every place along the circuit has a different width and hence “the fluid body that moves through the tube ABC receives an indefinite number of degrees of speed.”

The infinity diagram would then seem to be a hybrid of these two other figures.


Yet, Spinoza explains in his 81st letter that the infinity here is not obtained from the fact that there are more parts than can be counted. Instead, the diagram according to Deleuze, illustrates a mode’s infinite division into differential relations between infinitely small partitions.

Now, although Spinoza’s ‘letter on the infinite’ predates the inception of differential calculus, Deleuze locates in it what he considers to be seminal calculus notions. To explain the concept of infinitely small vanishing values, Deleuze guides us through the remarkably simple and illuminating visualization in one of Leibniz’ letters.


The diagonal line moves to the right, which diminishes the top triangle, all while increasing the bottom one; yet, because the triangles stay proportionally similar throughout the alteration, the ratio between the smaller one’s legs always remains proportional to the ratio between the larger one’s legs.


Photobucket
(Animation above is my own, made with OpenOffice Draw and Unfreeze)

The vanished triangle, Deleuze says, is not actually there, but is there “virtually,” because the vanishing lines have not yet entirely merged together at the corner. So the infinitely small legs of the smaller triangle are still distinct from each other and from the corner they are collapsing upon; and yet, they also do not extend beyond it. Thus, they do not bear extensive magnitudes but rather only intensive ones, which we will treat as degrees of variation. The philosophical idea here – difference without terms – is essential to Deleuze’s Spinozistic notion of affection. And it will allow us to see how Deleuze can use Spinoza’s diagram to illustrate both the intensive and extensive infinities that are involved in affection.

Photobucket
(Thanks en.wikipedia.org/ A.Greg)

Extensive bodies, for Spinoza, are divisible until reaching what he calls simplest bodies. Simplest bodies form compounds when ones moving at the same or at different speeds maintain a fixed relation in their mutual motions and when “the laws or nature of one part adapts itself to the laws or nature of another part in such wise that there is the least possible opposition between them.”

These infinitely small simplest bodies are never found alone, but rather only in infinite sets. These sets reciprocally unite with other infinite sets to compose a more complex body. These compound bodies are then combined with other bodies, and so on to higher orders until reaching the whole of Nature.

Photobucket
pulsing blue balls animated gif
heart cell beating
circulatory system pulsing beating pumping animated gif
circulatory system animation
Egypt protest bridge animated gif
amazon river animated gif
earth from space animated gif
solar system gif
spiral galaxy animated gif
galaxies animated gif


(Credits in order)
(colliding particles: Thanks A.Greg / en.wikipedia.org)
(blue molecule: Thanks M.L. Rahman / faculty.bracu.ac.bd)
(heart cell: Thanks Bluegrass Pundit / scinewsblog)
(heart beating: Thanks Sterile Barrier Solutions / sbsmed.net)
(circulatory system: Thanks John U / quietmoment.org)
(Egypt bridge protest: Thanks Freemanfilmsuk / youtube.com)
(Amazon river: Thanks BestofAttenborough /youtube.com)
(earth: Thanks UweTube / youtube.com)
(solar system: Thanks animated-sun.weebly.com)
(spiral galaxy: Thanks Kanal von beltoforion1 /youtube.com)
(galaxies: Thanks BrainMind.com / youtube.com)

In his letter on blood, Spinoza has his correspondent imagine a tiny worm so small that it can swim through the blood and observe how its tiniest particles collide and communicate their motion. The worm would see that the simple bodies of blood, the lymph and chyle, continually affect one another’s speeds. Yet, because they maintain their mutual affections without one destroying the other, they together make up the composite body that is our blood. The ratio of their speeds is a level of power that must stay within certain limits.


For otherwise, the simple bodies could decompose and enter into other relations. This happens, for example, when arsenic enters the blood. They will not combine. Rather, on account of their incompatible levels of power, arsenic will decompose our blood.

This sends a chain reaction of affective shockwaves throughout the body, decomposing all the other higher orders of differentially related parts. If it decreases our whole body’s power below a certain threshold, we die. Our body no longer expresses our modal essence, but instead its rearranged parts express the essences of other modes, such as the worms and soil we recompose into.

Thus, Deleuze interprets the infinity diagram as showing how a finite body extending between the limits of its size is divisible into an infinity of simplest bodies.

Photobucket
(Animation above is my own, made with GIMP and Unfreeze,
image from Spinoza, Opera vol. 2, archive.org, p.233)


Now to understand intensive infinities, first consider a ball on a chain swung in a circle. There are competing forces acting on the ball: on the one hand, it wants to fly outward, but on the other hand, its chain pulls it inward. As a result, the ball is always tending to go some certain way at each moment in its circular motion. If we were to cut the ball loose, it would not fly-off in a spiral, but instead outward in a straight line. This would also be the tangent to a circle’s curve at that point.
Photobucket
(Animation above is my own, made with OpenOffice Draw and Unfreeze)

The tangent on curves is like a tendency in the line’s change of direction at that place that is only implied in the movement. Physicists use techniques to find the instantaneous velocity of a moving object; it is something like the speed it is tending to go at that moment.


But how can a velocity be instantaneous? Well, nonetheless, it is a real quantity in the physical world, although it exists only as a virtuality.

Now, for a curve moving in a somewhat more irregular path, finding its tendency-toward-change is more complex, and here is where we might use Leibniz’ method.

Photobucket
(Animation above is my own, made with OpenOffice Draw and Unfreeze)

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(Thanks Dr. Siddique / faculty.uncfsu.edu)

Sometimes we can almost feel where a certain part of the curve is heading just by judging its pattern of change. We can also create a triangle showing how the curve’s dimensions extend in a certain region. Then, like with Leibniz’ triangles, we slowly diminish the two triangle legs, and the third diagonal side gives us the tangent, which also tells us which way the curve is tending at that place.

Now, when sets of simplest bodies affectively impact the parts of our own bodies, their shocking collision corresponds with the production of an idea of that object in our imagination. “I look at the sun,” says Deleuze, “and the sun little-by-little disappears and I find myself in the dark of night; it is thus a series of successions, of coexistences of ideas, successions of ideas.” These ideas also correspond to an increase or decrease in our power of acting, and the variations are continuous.

He has us imagine that we encounter on the street our enemy Peter who makes us afraid. Yet, we suddenly turn our glance toward our friend Paul, whose charm reassures us. While moving from the ideas of Peter to Paul, we underwent a continuous increase in our power of action. These variations, Deleuze explains, are ever-altering quantities: “In other words, there is a continuous variation in the form of an increase-diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force of existing of someone according to the ideas which she has,” and “this kind of melodic line of continuous variation will define affect.”

In the 22nd letter, we find “nothing else pertains to an essence than that which it possesses at the moment it is perceived.” Deleuze reinterprets this as, “there belongs to an essence only the present, instantaneous affection that it experiences.” Deleuze offers an example of this instantaneity of an affective alteration.


We are meditating in a dark room. Then without warning, someone enters the room and abruptly turns on the lights, which completely dazzles us and renders us no longer able to maintain mental focus.

We pass between two very different states in a “lightning fast” alteration: “Two successive affections, in cuts. The passage is the lived transition from one to the other.” Every passage between affections is then necessarily an increase of power or a decrease of power. So if instead we are looking for our glasses in the complete dark, and then someone turns on a dim light, we appreciate him, because then the light increased our power of action. What we note here especially is that the affection’s increase or decrease is seen as instantaneous, which means it does not extend in time. Rather, it is an intensity.

Hence Deleuze’s other illustrative use of the diagram. A body has a certain range of affective power, and when an affection takes it beyond its limits, the body’s parts decompose into other bodies, like when arsenic enters the blood. So consider how there is a largest and smallest limit in the diagram, and throughout it is a continuum of an infinity of differential variations. Deleuze has us conceive this range of variation as representing the range of affective power that we can sustain before we decompose. So this is the intensive infinity.

Photobucket
(Animation above is my own, made with GIMP and Unfreeze,
image from Spinoza, Opera vol. 2, archive.org, p.233)


Now, according to Deleuze, we obtain Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge through our interactive contact with affecting bodies. As we saw with arsenic, the affections of other bodies can decompose us. Yet, in many cases when we are threatened by certain affections, we might know how to modify our own bodies so that we may sustain ourselves.

Deleuze cites an example in Dante’s Inferno. A damned soul is pelted with rain. Yet, rather than let the rain destroy him, he continually modifies the relations of his own body’s parts by twisting around, so that he may co-sustain with the rain’s affections. By making changes in the relations of our body-parts, we send waves of affective alteration throughout us on the level of our simplest bodies.


These internal self-affective shock-waves are in a dance of sorts with the external waves of affection, and their perpetuated interaction is what Deleuze here calls “rhythm.” Another example he offers is swimming. While in the water, a wave draws near us. When it strikes, we and the wave affect each other’s simplest-body arrangements. In that very instant we might be learning how to adjust to the wave’s decompositional forces. By modifying our own body’s composition, we may stay afloat and swim in conjunction with the wave, causing our body and the wave to become a compound, a larger body.

Another illustration better expresses how the rhythm of affection is a matter of differential relations. Deleuze explains that a violin and a piano playing independently do not really produce affective rhythm. However, they may achieve a rhythmic relationship during a joint performance if the violin plays in response to the piano all while simultaneously the piano performs in response to the violin. In this way, they each affectively modify one another while at the same time they modify themselves, which sustains their dual improvisation. And according to Deleuze, Cézanne also describes this rhythmic interaction when he wrote about “how to compose the canvas-easel relation with the relation of wind, and how to compose the relation of the easel with the sinking sun, and how to end up in such a way that I might paint on the ground, that I might paint lying on the ground.”

This portrayal of Spinoza’s affection will now serve to interpret some difficult terminology in Deleuze’s Francis Bacon book. Deleuze writes here that in simple sensations, rhythm “appears as the vibration that flows through the body without organs, it is the vector of the sensation, it is what makes the sensation pass from one level to another.”


The vector here is like the intensity of the affective variation to change its quantitative value. We could then conceive the body without organs as the Spinozistic body composed of continually altering differential relations. Hence, Deleuze writes that the body without organs is “an intense and intensive body. It is traversed by a wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to the variations of its amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels.” As the damned soul in Dante’s Inferno twists his once protected side toward the pelting rain, waves of affective variation now impact the newly exposed part directly. It then becomes the site of sensation, where the internal waves of self-affection meet the external waves of affective variation. Yet this status is temporary, because he continually twists in the rain, making instead other parts of his body the new sites of affective reception.

Deleuze continues: “When the [internal] wave encounters external forces at a particular level, a sensation appears. An organ will be determined by this encounter, but it is a provisional organ that endures only as long as the passage of the wave and the action of the force, and which will be displaced in order to be posited elsewhere.” Sensational rhythm, Deleuze explains, can be the unpredictable variance of intensity waves that continually alters our bodily composition.

Thus Deleuze’s body without organs and its waves of sensational intensity can be viewed in light of his conception of the Spinozistic body and its continuous variations of affection, with the concept of ‘rhythm’ playing a similar role in both cases.

This provides us with a more substantial explanation for one of Deleuze’s few attacks on traditional phenomenology, in this case regarding the body without organs in contrast to the phenomenological lived body.

He writes: "this rhythmic unity of the senses can be discovered only by going beyond the organism. The phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it merely invokes the lived body. But the lived body is still a paltry thing in. We can seek the unity of rhythm only at the point where rhythm itself plunges into chaos, into the night, at the point where the differences of level are perpetually and violently mixed. Beyond the organism, but also at the limit of the lived body, there lies […] the body without organs."


Thus, Deleuze breaks from traditional phenomenology’s manner of conceiving the composition of the body as being made of harmoniously integrated parts that work organically with each other and with the world around them during phenomenal experiences. Nothing in its environment would stand out and appear to such a body that is completely accustomed to all the affective influences around it. Rather, for phenomena to appear to us, our bodies would need to sense things that stand out; we would need to detect differences.

A Deleuze-inspired phenomenology would explain bodily-given phenomena that appear to our affective awareness as being based on differential relations within us, throughout the phenomenal world around us, and between our bodies and the world.


Image credits:

Blue and red particles in motion
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Translational_motion.gif
Thanks A.Greg

Blue molecule in motion
http://faculty.bracu.ac.bd/~mlrahman/Research.html
Thanks M.L. Rahman

Heart cell
http://scinewsblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/scientists-turn-blood-cells-into.html
Thanks Bluegrass Pundit

Heart beating
http://sbsmed.net/
Thanks Sterile Barrier Solutions

Circulatory system animated gif
http://www.quietmoment.org/my_weblog/2011/03/mysteries-of-the-human-body.html
Thanks John U.

Egypt protestors on a bridge
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rXbRdumboZ0
Thanks Freemanfilmsuk

Amazon river
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dn53PtW0AnA
Thanks BestofAttenborough

Earth
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hALtHnu4WEo
Thanks UweTube

Solar system
http://animated-sun.weebly.com/animated-solar-system.html
Thanks animated-sun.weebly

Spiral Galaxy
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AD9OV1Zrs4I
Thanks Kanal von beltoforion1

Galaxies
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5zVlEywGZg
Thanks BrainMind.com

Spinoza. Opera, vol. 2. Edited by Carl Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Winter, 1972.
http://archive.org/details/operaquotquotre00landgoog

Geometrical Derivative animation:
http://faculty.uncfsu.edu/msiddiqu/Maple_Animations.htm
http://faculty.uncfsu.edu/msiddiqu/images/images/Gif_Folder/Definition%20of%20Derivative18.gif
Thanks Dr. Siddique of Fayetteville State University

15 Jul 2009

A Variation on Infinity, §11, Logic of Expression. Simon Duffy



[The following summarizes part of Simon Duffy's extraordinary book, The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. My commentary is in brackets. Duffy's work is remarkable, so I highly recommend this book. If it costs too much, perhaps encourage your library to obtain a copy.]





A Variation on Infinity


Simon Duffy

The Logic of Expression:
Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel andDeleuze

Chapter 1
"Spinoza from the point of view of an idealist or a materialist dialectic"


§11 The adequate and the inadequate idea of the actual infinite


Macherey follows Hegel’s translation of Spinoza’s geometrical example in the 12th letter, “The Letter on the Infinite.” There is an irregular distribution of space between lines AB and CD.

Thus there are many “inequalities of space” between the two lines.

Macherey considers them in terms of the variation that might appear if there was motion from end to end:

The ‘inequalities of the space’ should then be understood to refer to ‘the set of the differences between these unequal distances’, or, what Macherey emphasizes as ‘the variation’ of these ‘differences’, which is determined by the rotation of the segments from AB towards CD, ‘in the sense of hands of a watch’. This set, which is ‘the sum of the inequalities of distance included in this ... total space’, is a continuous and therefore infinite variation. (27bc, emphasis mine)

For Hegel, the differences are limited by the maximum, AB, and the minimum, CD. But for Macherey, the variations are limited by how much they may vary. So the difference between the length of AB and CD is the margin that limits the range of variation.

According to Hegel’s interpretation, it would not matter if the circles were concentric or not. He merely considered infinity as the infinite divisibility of continuous magnitudes. But for Macherey, the actual infinite is the infinite variation of differences in the middle-space. Substance expresses itself through an infinity of different qualities or attributes. Extension is one of them. Finite extended things, then, would be modes or modifications of substance as expressed extensionally. When we use our reason to understand the limited expanse in the geometrical example, we see that it is caused by infinite substance, and for that reason the mode itself is infinite by force of its cause. However, if we use our imagination to conceive the infinity between the limits, then we begin to imagine it being divided into smaller and smaller parts on to infinity. This would be to inadequately understand it as unlimited or indefinite. (27-28)

According to Spinoza, some things are indefinite because we cannot describe them in terms of numbers. But even though we cannot give them a number, we can still know that certain ones are larger or smaller than certain other ones. (28a)

When we conceive of the geometrical example with our imagination, we can consider it as being divisible into an infinite number of variations. Ones with a greater range of variation could then be seen as having a greater infinity of differences. Hegel thinks that this would be the bad infinite. For, to say that one infinity is larger is to indicate that it has a greater number of parts. But number does not apply to the actual infinite, so we cannot say that one actual infinite is greater or lesser than another, says Hegel. (28b.c)

According to Macherey, we encounter such contradictions when we conceive the infinite by means of the imagination, “which wants to represent everything by numbers.” (28d) However, reason can clearly and distinctly conceive the notion of the continuous without encountering paradoxes. (28-29)

Macherey disagrees with Hegel’s interpretation. For Hegel, Spinoza’s geometrical example first indicates an infinity that is a negation of the finite: when we infinitely divide something, there is always something beyond or more than the finite parts that division produces. But this is the bad infinite. When we negate this notion, we realize that the actual infinite is such because no number applies to it in the first place. So Spinoza’s geometrical example illustrates the dialectical mediation leading to the actual infinity by means of the negation of negation. [again, see this entry for more.] But for Macherey, the example depicts both infinites at the same time. For when we use our imagination, we inadequately conceive it as indefinite and unlimited. And when we use our reason, we adequately understand it as infinite by force of its cause. (29b)

So no negation is involved for Macherey. We adequately and positively know the infinite as resulting from the infiniteness of its immanent cause: substance. Hence Hegel’s formulation omnis determinatio est negatio does not apply [for more see this entry and this one.]

We only partially understand the infinite when we use our imagination. But when using reason, we may have “knowledge of the third kind.” (29-30)



Duffy, Simon. The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006.



Affirming the Infinite, §10, Logic of Expression. Simon Duffy



[The following summarizes part of Simon Duffy's extraordinary book, The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. My commentary is in brackets. Duffy's work is remarkable, so I highly recommend this book. If it costs too much, perhaps encourage your library to obtain a copy.]





Affirming the Infinite


Simon Duffy

The Logic of Expression:
Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel andDeleuze

Chapter 1
"Spinoza from the point of view of an idealist or a materialist dialectic"


§10 The problem of the ‘bad infinite’



Previously we discussed Hegel’s misinterpretation of Spinoza’s infinite. It is not merely the infinite divisibility of finite extensions. Conceiving it so is often the doing of our imaginations rather than our more able rational faculties.

Macherey builds from Gueroult’s commentary to argue that Hegel misses Spinoza’s point: finite things are not infinite by force of their cause. Finitely-extended modes are nonetheless infinite insofar as they express the infinite of substance, which is their immanent cause. (25c)

Macherey evokes the distinction between

1) what is infinite by its nature. Substance is absolutely infinite; and

2) what is infinite by force of its cause. The attributes or modes of substance are infinite in this way.

He further distinguishes

1) what is infinite because it has no limits; and

2) what is infinite because it cannot be determined by numbers. It is unlimited or indefinite despite the fact that it is bound within a maximum and minimum.

When we use reason, we may adequately understand things. But our imagination is inadequate for this purpose. Substance is absolutely infinite. We can only conceive it through reason, and not through imagination. We can, however, imagine substance’s affections. But when we do so, we understand them inadequately as unlimited and indefinite. Only reason can adequately understand affections as infinite by force of their cause. (26a)

Unless we maintain these distinctions, we will run into contradictions when conceiving the infinite.

According to Macherey, the bad infinite is the unlimited or indefinite. It is the same thing as the actual infinite. When using reason, we understand it adequately as the actual infinite, but when using our imagination, we inadequately conceive it as the bad infinite.

For Macherey, we adequately understand something when we grasp it affirmatively in terms of its cause. Hegelian dialectic views the infinite in terms of negations, and hence does not understand it adequately.

According to Macherey, the actual infinite, as apprehended adequately in the mode, ‘is not different to that infinity constitutive of substance, but is formally the same’. The actual infinite is therefore the immanent expression in the affections, or the finite modes, of infinite substance, which is their cause. (26-27)



Duffy, Simon. The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006.


14 Jul 2009

Good Infinities Gone Bad, §9, Logic of Expression. Simon Duffy

[The following summarizes part of Simon Duffy's extraordinary book, The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. My commentary is in brackets. Duffy's work is remarkable, so I highly recommend this book. If it costs too much, perhaps encourage your library to obtain a copy.]





Good Infinities Gone Bad

Simon Duffy

The Logic of Expression:
Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze

Chapter 1
"Spinoza from the point of view of an idealist or a materialist dialectic"

§9 Infinite actu and the ‘bad infinite’


Hegel discusses Spinoza’s bounded infinite in Science of Logic and the History of Philosophy. And he refers specifically to Spinoza’s geometrical example in the 12th Letter.

Hegel interprets Spinoza as saying that the space between AB and CD is filled with an infinity of “inequalities of space.” (21d) One might think then that the infinite for Spinoza results when we try to count all the infinitely many unequal spaces. Just as soon as we think we counted them all, more pop-up in-between the ones we just counted. Hence this would be an infinity resulting from a continuously incomplete series. However, Hegel claims that this is not how Spinoza actually viewed infinity. For Hegel, a continuum is by nature not divisible into any number of parts. Hence, we misrepresented a continuous value when we regard it as being made-up of a determinate number of discrete elements. And there is nothing incomplete about Spinoza’s infinity, because it is all entirely there between the two boundaries. Such is the “actual infinite.” (22b.c)

So the actual infinite can be found within the finite. We would instead be dealing with the “bad infinite” if we were to think of infinity as more finite parts than can be counted. (22c)

The bad infinite is a negation of the finite, (because it says that the finite is never enough, and the infinite is always something more). The actual infinite is a negation of the bad infinite, (because it says that the infinite is found within bounds, and need not always be more more more.) Thus the actual infinite is “the negation of negation.” (22-23)

Hegel portrays mathematicians as incorrectly conceiving the infinite in the “bad” way. Spinoza thinks instead that mathematicians conceive the infinite correctly, however. He says that something is infinite for them not on account of the number of its parts, but rather because it is not expressible by any number. So we need not consider the actual infinite in terms of a contradiction or negation. It is not something that exceeds number. It is merely something that cannot be expressed by numbers. Hegel does not recognize this of mathematicians. He wants to contrast the mathematical (bad) infinite with the philosophical (good/actual) infinite. This fits his dialectical logic. The bad mathematical infinite is the first negation, and the philosophical infinite is the negation of negation.

Hence we see that Hegel misrepresents Spinoza’s characterizing the mathematical infinite as being the same as the actual infinite. Instead for Hegel, the mathematical infinite is a sort of dialectical stepping-stone leading to the philosophical infinite:

The infinite, when opposed to the finite, is conceived as the bad infinite, which is then sublated and subsumed in the actual infinite, that is, the finite realizes itself as actually infinite. This is how Hegel resolves the relation of the infinite to the finite from the point of view of his interpretation of Spinoza. (24a)

Yet Hegel’s interpretation of Spinoza’s geometrical example misses its subtle but important peculiarities. [See Macherey’s commentary.] The circles are off-set. Hegel’s rendition could also be expressed if the example were of concentric circles. For he also thinks that the infinity of points on a line also exemplifies the actual infinite. In his view, all finite things contain the philosophical infinite in this way. (24c)


Duffy, Simon. The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006.