Showing posts with label reader-response criticism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reader-response criticism. Show all posts

22 Aug 2016

Miodrag (HS1) Comics and Language. ‘[Discussion of Wolfgang Iser in Miodrag’s Comics and Language]’

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[Central Entry Director]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

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[The following, except for the brief summary, is quotation from Miodrag’s text. Note: please check my transcriptions against the original text, as I probably added typos that are not found in the book.]

 

 

 

Hannah Miodrag

 

Comics and Language:

Reimagining Critical Discourse on the Form

 

Discussion of Wolfgang Iser in Miodrag’s Comics and Language

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

Miodrag references two main ideas in Wolfgang Iser’s “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach”. The first is the idea of the “intentional sentence correlatives.” These are the parts of the story world (constituted in the reader’s phenomenal consciousness) that correspond to the literary text’s sentence clauses. They are composed of an open sort of structure that invites linkages with other intentional sentence correlatives. And, sentences in literature tend to have conceptual “gaps” between them (parts left out of descriptions and accounts of events) that invite the reader to bring closure by finding their own connections between the intentional sentence correlatives. [See also section 5.2.1 of Iser’s The Act of Reading.] Likewise in comics, each panel can be said to have an intentional correlative, and the gaps between panels as well invite the reader to find their own network of coherence connections between the correlated story parts. This is a lot like Scott McCloud’s notion of the closure process that the reader contributes at the invitation of the comics gutter. [See chapter 3 of McCloud’s Understanding Comics.] Miodrag often uses the term “suturing” for this notion of creating coherence between comics panels. The other notion from Iser’s text that Miodrag references is the way the intentional sentence correlatives involve anticipation and retrospection in how they tie given parts of the story world to others that are given in the text (or are temporally located in the story) before and after that particular sentence.

 

 

The following (up to bibliography) is quotation from Miodrag’s Comics and Language:

 

 

In a direct challenge to McCloud, Robert C. Harvey examines a very different kind of “gap” in comics, between picture and caption, which the reader similarly “fills in”  so that each illuminates the other, revealing their full import only through their mutual relationship (Harvey 2001). Though Harvey’s analysis provides a valuable counterpoint to McCloud’s emphasis on the “gutter” as the most – even only – pertinent gap within the comics form, by examining Simmonds’s compartmentalization of text in particular, we can see how the spaces in comics over which readers must make imaginative links are far more diverse than either of these conceptions admits.

 

This “filling in,” especially as described by McCloud, is no more than the comics version of the “intentional sentences correlatives” [sic? intentional sentence correlatives] that Wolfgang Iser describes in prose fiction, which “disclose subtle connections” between the “component parts” of the text that together create “the world of the work” (Iser 1980: 52). McCloud attempts to claim that comics’ “demand for active interpretation” and “participation” (McCloud 1993: | 136) is somehow unique to the form, an assertion symptomatic of the widespread urge to find some aspect of the medium entirely specific to it. Many critics are apt to follow his lead. Thierry Groensteen and Charles Hatfield, on the other hand, both acknowledge the similarity between the operations that McCloud and Iser describe, though Hatfield does so with more characteristic hyperbole, stating that comics are intrinsically more fractured and thus inherently more demanding of active participation that prose (Hatfield 2005: xiv), while admitting the two share in the general narrative principle that “no author worth his salt will ever attempt to set the whole picture before his reader’s eyes” (Iser 1980: 57). The pertinent difference between comics and prose literature is that in the former these narrative gaps are visible, physical spaces on the page over which a range of elements – segments of text, whether brief caption, extended narration, or speech bubble; individual pictures; and whole panels – are all drawn into the reader’s imaginative construction of the world of the work.

(Miodrag 66-67, bracketed insertion mine)

 

 

 

The collaborative “filling in gaps” between sequential panels, previously discussed primarily in relation to Iser’s notion of sentence correlatives, is in fact “an experientially rooted way of making sense of the world” (Christiansen 2000: 117). Ernst Gombrich explains that “there is no representation [that] leaves nothing to the imagination” (1952: 181): we fill in odd unheard words in conversation, overlook misprints and deduce the correct word when reading, and infer familiar images from loose or abstracted representations. The readiness with which we do so is testimony to the “importance of guided projection” (Gombrich 1952: 171) in interpreting all representational material. The process McCloud terms “closure,” then, has sundry counterparts beyond Iser’s theory (indeed, McCloud himself acknowledges this sort of guided projection informs all acts of perception, though critics citing his work tend to promote the simultaneous claim that the comics medium rests on this process “like no other” [1993: 65]). The process compares, for example, with the way we mentally group broken lines and proximate forms into continuous gestalts, and, as some critics acknowledge, with the way we suture | cinematic cuts, understanding fractured film scenes as whole narratives (Pratt 2009: 111–14, Beaty 1999: 68).

(Miodrag 108-109)

 

 

 

 

It is common to foreground the elliptical nature of comics and contrast the effort that goes into mentally linking discrete panels with the supposedly “passive” (Hatfield 2005: 33) and “effortless” (Harvey 1996: 175) viewing of motion picture frames that flow seamlessly and automatically from one to the next. However, the closely linked action of Fig. 5.1 and 5.2 here passes so smoothly that the act of mentally suturing their content becomes near-automatic, a “largely unconscious and mechanical operation” (Groensteen 2006: 10). Equally, the more jarring, imaginatively demanding cuts that can occur between comics’ panels can also be emulated cinematically. Films such as Memento (2000) or 21 Grams (2003) test the viewer with scrambled plotlines that unfold backwards to piece together the overarching story from fragments that reveal further information gradually, continually clarifying or modifying what has gone before. This operation works by the same principle as Iser’s sentence correlatives, and the visibility of the gap the reader must bridge in comics does not set the form apart from other narrative media that have recourse to similar narrative elision.

(Miodrag 113)

 

 

 

These panels finally recur intercut with the confession of the Comedian’s killer, as startling revelation that assaults the expectations the reader has built up, forcing a reassessment of everything previously read and exemplifying the interruptive process of “anticipation and retrospection” that Iser describes (1980: 54).

(Miodrag 138)

 

 

 

 

The network model proves a valuable one here, illuminating how comics  can create bridges between non-consecutive panels that are visibly co-present on the page, and conceptually co-present with all other panels throughout the text. Some of these connections are glaringly evident, but they may be more subtle, only revealing themselves upon closer, active analysis. The extent to which these networks contribute to our understanding of the text, which examination of Watchmen and Metronome has shown can be considerable, suggests that it is the very ability of comics to violate the sequential nature of narrative that in fact distinguishes the form. The dispersed connections may mirror the sentence correlatives Iser describes, but differ in being embodied, physical repetitions.

(Miodrag 140)

 

 

 

 

Miodrag quotations from:

Miodrag, Hannah. Comics and Language: Reimagining Critical Discourse on the Form. Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 2013.

 

 

 

 

Miodrag’s citations (and her own quotations of others’ works)  from:

 

Beaty, Bart. “The Search for Comics Exceptionalism.” Comics Journal, 211 (1999): 67–72.

 

Christiansen, Hans-Christian. “Comics and Film: A Narrative Perspective,” in Comics and Culture: Analytical and Theoretical Approaches to Comics, ed. by Hans-Christian Christiansen and Anne Magnussen, pp. 107–21.

 

Gombrich, E.H. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (London: Phaidon, 1952).

 

Groensteen, Thierry. The System of Comics, trans. by Bart Beaty and Nick Nguyen (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2006).

 

Harvey, Robert C. The Art of the Comic Book: An Aesthetic History (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1996).

 

Harvey, Robert C. “Comedy at the Juncture of Word and Image: The Emergence of the Modern Magazine Gag Cartoon Reveals the Vital Blend,” in The Language of Comics: Word and Image, ed. by Robin Varnum and Christina Gibbons (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2001), pp. 75–96.

 

Hatfield, Charles. Alternative Comics: An Emerging Literature (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005).

 

Iser, Wolfgang. “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,” trans. by Catherine Macksey and Richard Macksey, in Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. by Jane Tompkins (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 50–69.

 

McCloud, Scott. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art (New York: Kitchen Sink Press, 1993).

 

Pratt, Henry John. “Narrative in Comics.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67.1 (2009): 107–17.

 

 

 

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Iser (5.2.1) The Act of Reading, ‘[The open structure of the intentional sentence correlates]’, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

[Literary Criticism, Entry Directory]

[Wolfgang Iser, Entry Directory]

[Iser, Act of Reading, entry directory]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Wolfgang Iser

 

The Act of Reading:

A Theory of Aesthetic Response

 

 

Part III.

The Phenomenology of Reading:

The Processing of the Literary Text

 

 

Chapter 5:

Grasping a Text

 

5.2

The Wandering Viewpoint

 

5.2.1 [up to the first subdivision]

‘[The open structure of the intentional sentence correlates]’

 

 

 

Brief summary:

When we read a literary text, our eyes pass over its series of sentence clauses. Each clause tells us something about the literary work’s world and its unfolding. The way this happens is that when we read the sentence, our phenomenal, “intentional” consciousness constitutes that part of the world that the sentence describes. It performs this constituting act by means of interpretation, imagination, and inference. So, each sentence in the text is correlated with a part of the story world – which is constituted in our intentional consciousness – that the sentence is describing. Thus this phenomenalized part of the literary work’s world (which corresponds to some particular sentence evoking it in our phenomenal awareness) is called the “intentional sentence correlate.” Intentional sentence correlates, as parts of our phenomenal awareness, bear the tripartite structure of temporalized consciousness that holds for all acts of conscious awareness, namely, {1} a present intentional part directed at the currently given intentional sentence correlate (that is,  the presently described situation in the story world), {2} a protentional part that expects certain things (more or less concretely) about the future, and {3} a retentional part that keeps what was previously intended and protended in the background of our current awareness. The second two parts serve as connecting structures that allow the reader to find coherence among the fragmented intentional sentence correlates that call for connection but do not explicitly provide it. Normally in a literary text, not every new sentence fulfills the protentional expectations of the prior sentences. Rather, there is often a defiance of expectations (which means that there is a tension between the retentional part of the correlate, which retains the prior expectation, and the current intentional part, which contains something in defiance to that retained protentional expectation). The overall process of reading a literary work, on account of these twists and turns in the story development, is a “wandering viewpoint,” because the way the reader configures the story world is continually under variation, as it navigates through the swings in the story’s progress.

 

 

 

Summary

 

Iser notes that “the whole text can never be perceived at any one time” (Iser 108). Rather, “the text can only be imagined by way of different consecutive phases of reading” (109). This is different than how objects are given to us, since they are all given more in their wholeness [even though it might take time to explore all their aspects], and also, “We always stand outside the given object, whereas we are situated inside the literary text” (109). [So when we view an object, our viewpoint largely remains from a particular outside perspective on the object. (Of course however we do move around the object and perhaps look inside it and so on. I am not sure how this differs from the experience of a literary text except perhaps that we do this exploration to a much greater degree with literary texts and also the constitution of the literary text involves much more irregularity and dramatic modification. Iser also notes that we explore the literary work from inside it rather than from outside it. One exception to this distinction could possibly be things like puzzle boxes, where their constitution is something obtained through an active participation with it and where its constitution unfolds gradually and through a series of unexpected discoveries.)]

The relation between text and reader is therefore quite different from that between object and observer: instead of a subject-object relationship, there is a moving viewpoint which travels along inside that which it has to apprehend. This mode of grasping an object is unique to literature.

(109)

 

Iser then notes a complication with understanding texts as objects. The text does not simply denote objects in the empirical world. Rather, literary texts remove objects from this context, which invites us to reconsider them and perhaps even develop new judgments of them. “Instead of finding out whether the text gives an accurate or inaccurate description of the object, he [the reader] has to build up the object for himself – often in a manner running counter to the familiar world evoked by the text” (109, bracketed insertion mine).

 

Iser now refers to this moving viewpoint as the “reader’s wandering viewpoint” (109). We apprehend the object in phases, and it is always incomplete. [So we look at the text sentence by sentence. None of them is final (except perhaps the last, but even that last is not final in the sense that we might continue to reconsider the whole text upon further reflection and additional rereadings). This means that we must constantly synthesize each part with the prior and following parts. Because this is an act of consciousness, the synthesizing activity brings the text into the reader’s consciousness.] “The incompleteness of each manifestation necessitates syntheses, which in turn bring about the transfer of the text to the reader’s consciousness. The synthetizing [sic?] process, however, is not sporadic – it continues throughout every phase of the journey of the wandering viewpoint” (109).

 

Iser will examine this synthesizing activity in greater detail. He has us consider the “span of the text which can be encompassed during each phase of reading and from which we anticipate the next phrase,” and this has been called the “eye-voice span” (109-110). [Iser will then use the notion of ‘intentional sentence correlates’. The idea seems to be that when we read a sentence in a literary text, correlated to it in our phenomenal awareness is the part of that literary work’s world. All these partial determinations of the literary work’s world (that is, all these intentional sentence correlates) form connections (on the basis of the reader’s interpretative and imaginative interacting with the correlates) to constitute the entire world of the literary work.]

It may help us to understand the nature of this synthetizing [sic?] activity if we examine in detail one paradigmatic moment in the process of reading. We shall, for the present, restrict our analysis to the sentence perspective of the text, and here we may turn for support to the empirical findings of psycholinguistics. What is known as the “eye-voice span,”when applied to the literary text will designate that span of the text which can be encompassed during each phase of reading and from which we anticipate the next phase: “. . . decoding proceeds in ‘chunks’ rather than in units of single words, and . . . these ‘chunks’ correspond to the syntactic units of a sentence.”6 The syntactic units of sentences are residual ‘chunks’ for perception within the literary text, although here they cannot be identified merely as perceptual objects, because the denotation of a given object is not the prime function of such sentences. The main interest here lies in the sentence correlate, for the world of the literary object is built up by these intentional correlates.

Sentences join in diverse ways to form semantic units of a higher order which exhibit quite varied structures; from these structures arise such entities as a story, a novel, a conversation, a drama, a scientific theory. By the same token, finite verbs constitute not only states of affairs which correspond to the individual sentences, but also whole systems of very diverse types of states of affairs, such as concrete situations, complex processes involving several objects, conflicts and agreements among them, etc. Finally, a whole world is created with variously determined elements and the changes taking place in them, all as the purely intentional correlate of a sentence complex. If this sentence complex finally constitutes a literary work, then I call the whole stock of interconnected intentional sentence correlates the ‘portrayed world’ of the work.7

 

How is one to describe the connections between these correlates — especially as they do not have that degree of determinacy pertaining to a declarative sentence? When Ingarden speaks of intentional sentence correlates, the statement and information are already qualified in a certain sense, because each sentence can achieve its end only by aiming at something beyond itself. As this is true of all the sentences in a literary text, the correlates constantly intersect, giving rise ultimately to the semantic fulfillment at which they had aimed. The fulfillment, however, takes place not in the text, but in the reader, who must ‘activate’ the interplay of the correlates prestructured by the sequence of sentences. The sentence themselves, as statements and assertions, serve to point the way toward what is to come, and this in turn is prestructured by the actual content of the sentences. In brief, the sentences set in motion a process which will lead to the formation of the aesthetic object as a correlative in the mind of the reader.

[Footnote 5 on p.109 (quoting):

5 See I.M. Schlesinger, Sentence Structure and the Reading Process (The Hague, 1968), pp.27ff. The similarity between and indeed congruence of the “eye-voice span” and the span of short-term memory has been demonstrated with psycholinguistic experiments by Frank Smith, Understanding Reading A Psycholinguistic Analysis of Reading and Learning to Read (New York, 1971), pp. 196–200. His book also contains important observations on the part played by the “eye-voice span” in “identification of meaning”.

Footnotes 6 and 7 on p.110 (quoting):

6 Schlesinger, Sentence Structure, p. 42; see also Ronald Wardhaugh, Reading: A Linguistic Perspective (New York, 1969), p. 54.

7 Roman Ingarden, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, transl. by Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston, 1973), p. 31.]

 

 

Iser then notes Husserl’s notion of protention [the temporalized mode of intentional consciousness that is directed toward the future and by which we have expectations of what will later enter our present awareness]. Since all intentional correlates are structured with protentional expectation, this means that none of them will entirely fulfill our expectations [including even the final sentence correlate, which also will keep the literary text’s world open to further development, even if that development does not unfold by means of the text itself.]

The semantic pointers of individual sentences always imply an expectation of some kind – Husserl calls these expectations “protentions.” As this structure is inherent in all intentional sentence correlates, it follows that their interplay will lead not so much to the fulfillment of expectations as to their continual modification.

(111)

Iser locates the wandering viewpoint in this temporalized structure of intentional consciousness.

Now herein lies a basic structure of the wandering viewpoint. The reader’s position in the text is at the point of intersection between retention and protension [sic?]. Each individual sentence correlate prefigures a particular horizon, but this is immediately transformed into the background for the next correlate and must therefore necessarily be modified. Since each sentence correlate aims at things to come, the prefigured horizon will offer a view which — however concrete it may be — must contain indeterminacies, and so arouse expectations as to the manner in which these are to be resolved.

(111)

So, because each correlate has an open protentional horizon generating expectations that are either fulfilled or not, and also because even with every fulfillment there are indeterminacies that still call for further fulfillment, the reader’s viewpoint is always in a state of flux. Another consequence of this is that if the described object confirms expectations, that means “the range of possible semantic horizons will be correspondingly narrowed” (111). Normally writers use this pattern (of expectation fulfillment) for describing objects in the literary work’s world, because in these cases, “their concern is to narrow the range in order to bring out the individuality of that object” (111). But normally literary texts are formulated so that it is like a series of defied expectations [and perhaps we might think of it as a series of more or less drastic plot twists, with many being very subtle and others drastically defying expectations and causing significant retroactive revision of the reader’s configuration of the story world. (A notable film that is structured on the basis of these drastic sorts of turns is the original Total Recall. Kafka novels also seem to have a constantly reconfiguring story world.)] “In most literary texts, however, the sequence of sentences is so structured that the correlates serve to modify and even frustrate the expectations they have aroused. In so doing, they automatically have a retroactive effect on what has already been read, which now appears quite different” (111). [I am not sure, but I think the next point is the following. As we acquire new information about the story world, the prior information recedes into the background of our retentional consciousness. For, the new information takes precedence, as it is adding something that now seems most important to consider. However, since each new piece of information calls for us to reconsider something in the past, it also calls up from our retentional awareness something that we were only marginally attending to in the background.]

Furthermore, what has been read shrinks in the memory to a foreshortened background, but it is being constantly evoked in a new context and so modified by new correlates that instigate a restructuring of past syntheses. This does not mean that the past returns in full to the present, for then memory and perception would become indistinguishable, but it does mean that memory undergoes a transformation. That which is remembered becomes open to new connections, and these in turn influence the expectations aroused by the individual correlates in the sequence of sentences.

(111)

 

 

So as we can see, each new sentence we read can both revise what we have read and modify what we expect to transpire next: “throughout the reading process there is a continual interplay between modified expectations and transformed memories” (111). Iser then notes that the text does not tell the reader how to perform these modifications. It does not tell us specifically exactly what to expect nor how to connect our memories in the proper way to account for the present circumstances. Iser then describes the basic structural features of the intentional sentence correlates. It has two temporally connecting parts of its structure. One part is hollow, and it is the protentional expectation that is related to the forthcoming correlates, in that it “looks forward to the next correlate”. The other structural linking part of the intentional sentence correlate is the retrospective section, “which answers the expectations of the preceding sentence (now part of the remembered background)” (112). [This point about the retrospective section is a bit complicated. Let us take for example the Aesop fable of the fox and grapes. We first learn that the fox is thirsty and sees grapes somewhat high up on the vine. The sentence correlate to this is what comes into our mind as we form the story world in our imagination on the basis of that sentence. We might picture the fox standing underneath the grapes, looking longingly at them. Since this is the first sentence, the retrospective part is perhaps not as obvious. But we would also presume, by means of inference, that the fox was somewhere else walking toward the grapes and suddenly noticed them. We would also presume that in the past the fox had not had anything to drink. The important part in this first correlate is our expectation that the fox will see the grapes as an opportunity to solve its problem of thirst, and perhaps try to get the grapes. That is the protentional expectation section of the intentional correlate. Then we read the next sentence(s). It tells us that the fox tries over and over to get the grapes, and then quits. So here, the retentional part “which answers the expectations of the preceding sentence (now part of the remembered background)” is the part of it that recalls how the fox was thirsty and had the motivation for his current actions. Our expectations, which began vague, are now fulfilled by current correlate, which is thus continuous with these prior expectations. Let us for convenience lump into this correlate his quitting. We might now sense some uncertainty about what will happen next. Will the fox devise some clever trick to get the grapes? Will the fox accept defeat? Since the fox was thirsty at the beginning, and there is no indication yet of him being clever, we might just assume he will leave thinking that he failed. However, the final sentence tells us that he concludes regarding the grapes, “They looked sour anyway”. This implies that he never wanted them. It would be an example of our expectations being defied. How does that defiance of our expectations occur with regard to this structure? It is a conflict between our retained protention and current intention. Or more precisely, it is a tension within our current intentional sentence correlate between its retrospective section (which retains the prior protentional expectation of him regretting not getting the grapes) and its intentional section (which conflicts with that prior protentional expectation, now found in the retrospective section. So, instead of regretting his failure, he instead thinks it was not a loss anyway). We might also note in this example how even the final sentence leaves a lot open in this story world. Will the fox later realize it was being dishonest with itself? Did we misinterpret the beginning where it said he was thirsty? Did the fox actually learn by jumping and getting a better view and smell of the grapes that they really were sour? The final sentence of a story, by necessity of its structure, leaves parts of the story world open. Some endings, however, leave a lot more open and encourage further rereadings to explore all the interpretative possibilities. And perhaps that openness or ambiguity of the ending is itself something significant, as for example it captures an important way that things often work in life.]

It is clear, then, that throughout the reading process there is a continual interplay between modified expectations and transformed memories. However, the text itself does not formulate expectations or their modification; nor does it specify how the connectability of memories is to be implemented. This is the province of the reader himself, and so we have a first insight into how the synthetizing [sic?] activity of the | reader enables the text to be translated and transferred to his own mind. This process of translation also shows up the basic hermeneutic structure of reading. Each sentence correlate contains what one might call a hollow section, which looks forward to the next correlate, and a retrospective-section, which answers the expectations of the preceding sentence (now part of the remembered background). Thus every moment of reading is a dialectic of pretension and retention, conveying a future horizon yet to be occupied, along with a past (and continually fading) horizon already filled; the wandering viewpoint carves its passage through both at the same time and leaves them to merge together in its wake. There is no escaping this process, for — as has already been pointed out — the text cannot at any one moment be grasped as a whole. But what may at first sight have seemed like a disadvantage, in comparison with our normal modes of perception, may now be seen to offer distinct advantages, in so far as it permits a process through which the aesthetic object is constantly being structured and restructured. As there is no definite frame of reference to regulate this process, successful communication must ultimately depend on the reader’s creative activity.

(111-112)

 

Iser will “now take a closer look at the basic structures that regulate this process” (112). Iser’s first observation is that “on the level of the sentences themselves, it is clear that their sequence does not by any means bring about a smooth interaction of protention and retention” (112). Iser then quotes Ingarden on this issue, where Ingarden observes that often times the next sentence flows continuously from the prior one. But in some cases there is a gap that the reader must overcome somehow.

Once we are transposed into the flow of thinking the sentence, we are prepared after having completed the thought of one sentence, to think its “continuation” in the form of another sentence, specifically, a sentence which has a connection with the first sentence. In this way the process of reading a text advances effortlessly. But when it happens that the second sentence has no perceptible connection whatever with the first, the flow of thought is checked. A more or less vivid surprise or vexation is associated with the resulting hiatus. The block must be overcome if we are to renew the flow of our reading.9

(Iser 112, the above is entirely Iser quoting Ingarden)

[Footnote 9 on p. 112 (quoting except for curly brackets):

9 {Roman} Ingarden, {The} Cognition {of the Literary Work of Art, transl. by Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston, 1973),} p. 34.]

Ingarden thinks that there should not be such gaps and frustrated expectations. Iser assess this as a result of his classical notion of an art work “as polyphonic harmony” (Iser 112). However, “in literary texts, not only is the sequence full of surprising twists and turns, but indeed we expect it to be so – even to the extent that if there is a continuous flow, we will look for an ulterior motive. There is no need for us now to go into Ingarden’s reasons for demanding a ‘flow of sentence thinking’; what concerns us here is the fact that there is such a hiatus, and that is has a | very important function” (112-113). The important structure here is this gap or hiatus that “enables the sentence correlates to be set off against one another” (113). [The function it seems is to enable the literary work to unfold in a dynamic way:] “On the level of sentences themselves, the interruption of expected connections may not be of any great significance; however it is paradigmatic of the many processes of focusing and refocusing that take place during the reading of the literary text. This need for readjustment arises primarily from the fact that the aesthetic object has no existence of its own, and can consequently only come into being by way of such processes” (113).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. London / Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.

 

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21 Aug 2016

Iser. The Act of Reading, entry directory

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

[Literary Criticism, Entry Directory]

[Wolfgang Iser, Entry Directory]

 

 

 

 

Entry Directory for

 

Wolfgang Iser

 

The Act of Reading:

A Theory of Aesthetic Response

 

 

Part III.

The Phenomenology of Reading:

The Processing of the Literary Text

 

 

Chapter 5:

Grasping a Text

 

5.1

Interplay between Text and Reader

 

5.2

The Wandering Viewpoint

 

5.2.1 [up to the first subdivision]

‘[The open structure of the intentional sentence correlates]’

 

 

 

 

 

Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. London / Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.

 

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18 Aug 2016

Groensteen (2.2) The System of Comics, ‘A Plurivectorial Narration’, summary


by Corry Shores

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]
[Graphic Literature, Entry Directory]
[Thierry Groensteen, entry directory]
[Groensteen’s The System of Comics, entry directory]

[The following is summary. Boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please excuse my distracting typos.]



Summary of
 
Thierry Groensteen
 
The System of Comics
 
Chapter 2:
Restrained Arthrology: The Sequence
 
2.2
A Plurivectorial Narration



Brief summary:
Narration in comics is accomplished in a non-linear fashion, as subsequent panels cause us to return to prior ones to retroactively revise our interpretations of what they are saying with regard to the parts of the narrative that they contribute to.



Summary

Groensteen will now have us “come to terms with what a sequence of fixed images really communicates, and how, subsequently, narration is accomplished” (108). He begins by analyzing a page from Muñoz’ and Sampayo’s Rencontres. He writes: “What seems to be narrated in this page can be summarized in a few words: The hero, Alack Sinner, is awakened by the noise of a newspaper that the wind has blown up against his window. The headline splashed across the front page informs him of the death of John Lennon. The authors use seven panels to produce the equivalent of this statement” (108).
00017
 


 
Groensteen first makes two basic observations: {1} “The first two panels are sufficient to deliver the apparent narrative content of the entirety of the sequence, whereas the following images do not appear to add anything except an anecdotal prolongation (Alack lights a cigarette)” (Groensteen 108). {2} “The seven images break down into two series: on the one hand, four panels in which the protagonist appears, and on the other, three panels showing the newspaper and its large headline in shots that are increasingly tightened. No images simultaneously present Alack and the newspaper on which we can read the words ‘John Lennon Killed’” (Groensteen 008).
 
Groensteen’s first argumentative point is that “If the first two images summarize the sequence, neither can be held to be intrinsically narrative. It is from their juxtaposition that I can deduce a narrative proposition” (108). [I am not entirely sure I follow the reasoning. Is it not possible for two images, in which either or both is intrinsically narrative, to be combined to further create more narrative content? The fact that the two together summarize the narrative to me does not seem like sufficient evidence to conclude that neither on its own has intrinsically narrative features. But it does seem to be true when looking at them that there is no intrinsic narrative content to them.] [Groensteen’s next point reminds me of Charles Hatfield’s distinction between symbols that show and symbols that say, from section 2 of “The Art of Tensions”. I am not certain, but Groensteen might be making the following point. Each panel shows part of the situation. But only through their “confrontation” do they say something (narratively speaking) about that situation.]
Again, this involves no small amount of interpretation. Is Alack really sleeping? If he was awake, was his attention drawn to the noise (no onomatopoeia is signaled) or only to the sight of the newspaper? Nothing allows me to categorically respond to these questions. As a reader, I construct meaning on the basis of inferences that appear to be the most probable. There is the content that each of these images shows, and there is the meaning that their confrontation permits them to say.
(108)
 
[For the next point, we recall a quotation from section 2.1 by Roger Odin (I did not include the quotation there, because I did not understand the part that is now relevant, so let us examine it here): (quoting Odin) “A fixed image can certainly have a narrative structure: it suffices that the vectorization corresponds to an actantial structure of a conflicting type between a subject and an anti-subject or of a relational type between a subject and an object of desire” (104, citing, on page 174: ““Le cinéma: langue ou langage?” Communications, no. 4, Paris, Le Seuil, 1964, p. 63. Text reprised in Essais sur la signification au cinema, t. 1, 1968.”) The part that I did not understand was the notion of “a relational type between a subject and an object of desire”. Now I think Odin might mean the following. A still image can show a subject and also an object of that subject’s desire. Groensteen here will note the panel above where the man is reaching for a cigarette. Because there is a subject and an object of desire, and because also the effort exerted toward fulfilling that desire by interacting with that object is depicted, that means we can say there is an intrinsic narrative element to the image. (I suppose that narrative structure would be something like: character wants something; character tries to get it.) Groensteen then notes the retroactive inferential nature of how we come to see that image as showing the man reaching for the cigarette and lighter. It is only later that we see him holding these items rather than having turned on the lamp, which was another possible outcome of his reaching action. (This notion of the retroactive inferential construction of the story is similar to points Wolfgang Iser made in section 2 and section 4 of “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach”.)]
Nevertheless, in the rest of the sequence, certain images, considered on their own, are instantly translatable to linguistic statements expressing an action; and, faithful to the wishes of Roger Odin, this action puts into relation “a subject and an object of desire.” Thus, for the fourth panel: Alack lights a cigarette. The third panel itself can be translated by a statement of this sort, which would be: Alack reaches out his arm to grab a cigarette and a lighter. But I only opt for this translation because it is verified retroactively by the following panel. Considering only the third panel, I could have also imagined that our friend wanted to turn on his bedside lamp. The fourth panel, which shows him lighting his cigarette, informs | me a posteriori11 of the precise signification of his gesture, at once positively — he had to have taken out the cigarette and lighter for I can see him light the first by means of the second — and negatively — he did not light the lamp, since the room is still plunged in darkness.
(Groensteen 108-109)
[Endnote 11 on p.175 (quoting):
11. This retroactive effect should always be relativized, to the degree that, during the first glance at the entirety of the page it is likely that the contents of the fourth panel.]
 
Groensteen then pushes this point about retroactive revision a step further: the fact that a subsequent panel invites us to reconsider what is going in a prior one can mean that our eyes will often travel not just in the left-to-right vector but also in right-to-left [and probably in all directions depending on the points of origin and destination].
Furthermore, wasn’t it already a retroactive determination that permitted me to know that the newspaper appears to me, in the first panel, as something seen by Alack—or better: that I see it with him and “through his eyes”? By itself, the first panel only shows me a newspaper flattened against a window, without allowing me to wonder which house this window belongs to, or if the sight of the newspaper is remarked upon by some other occupant. We can therefore formulate this first rule, that the meaning of a panel can be informed and determined by the panel that preceded it much like the one that follows it. If there is a vectorization of reading, there is no unidirectional vectorization in the construction of meaning.
(110)
 
Groensteen then says the best example of “retroactive determination” is the next image to appear, that is, the first one on the next page (110). This might make us [even turn the page backward] and reinterpret the sixth panel (above) where he is coughing (110). [Previously we might have interpreted him coughing just from the cigarette smoke. Now we might interpret him as having been beginning to retch.]
00018


Groensteen then shows how this revises the narrative sequence.
The best example of retroactive determination is furnished by an image that does not appear on this page, since it is the first panel of the following page. We see Alack Sinner leaning over a sink, in a position that leaves no doubt that he is vomiting. This panel provides its own meaning, not only with regard to the images that immediately preceded it (and notably the sixth panel of the reproduced page, which shows Alack coughing and shaking), but to the entirety of the preceding page. In light of this delayed revelation, I must correct my initial spontaneous linguistic translation. The sequence is now reduced to the following statement: The news of the assassination of John Lennon affects Alack to the point that it makes him sick. All the rest (Alack’s awakening, the newspaper, the window, the cigarette) are reduced to the rank of simple circumstances.
(Groensteen 110)
 
[I am not sure I follow Groensteen’s last point. He seems to be saying the following. Each panel might seem to present some objective independent fact. However, the images of the newspaper headline are more impressions hitting and affecting Alack. We at first might have seen them as objective depictions, but after the vomiting panel, we retroactively realize that they were more of an indication of the intensity of Alack’s subjective experience of the shock they gave him. Let me quote as I think I got that wrong:]
This panel — which we should consider to close the sequence — sheds light on, and justifies a posteriori, the nearby image, as well as the very tight image of some of the letters that compose the title of the newspaper (cf. panels 5 and 7). It is now evident that they materialize the emotional impact of this news on the hero. Shocked, he feels it resonate stronger and stronger within him, at the same time that the nausea rises. The status of these two panels is therefore different from the others: they are not objective representations — otherwise the wind should have already carried the paper away; and also, Alack did not approach the window, so there is no objective reasoning for the enlargement of the letters — but rather they are graphic translations of effects. What they express happens entirely in the head (and stomach) of Alack Sinner.
(110)
 
 
 

Groensteen, Thierry. The System of Comics. Translated from French to English by Bart Beaty and Nick Nguyen. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2007. Originally published as Systém de la bande desinée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.
 
 
Image credits:
Muñoz & Sampayo. Alack Sinner #3 Rencontres. ©1984 Casterman.
 
 
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16 Aug 2016

Collected summaries of Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach”

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

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Collected Summaries for

 

Wolfgang Iser

 

“The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach”

 

 

 

 

Brief summary of the whole text:

From a phenomenological point of view, a literary work has three main components: {1} the text itself, which provides the concrete phenomenal givens, {2} the reader who is reading the text itself [and perhaps here it is appropriate to add the author, who crafted the text in a way meant for the reader to have a certain experience], and {3} the ‘virtual’ literary work itself as being the product of the reader’s creative phenomenal collaboration with the author, where the reader contributes the connecting and gap-filling contents to the literary work on the basis of the fragments and intentional gaps that the author provides. In a sense, the literary work lies between the reader and the text and is constituted by the union of the author’s and the reader’s phenomenal consciousnesses. In the reader there are a number of faculties or operations that work together so that the reader’s consciousness can help craft the literary work. One element is their imagination, which brings to their awareness the sensible features of the situations that were left out of from the text’s descriptions. The second element is the structure of time-constituting consciousness, by which the past, present, and future of the story, as it unfolds, is shaped and related by means of shifting interpretations in the present that revise understandings and configurations of the past and revise [previse?] expectations of future events. The third main element is an inferential faculty or activity whereby the connections of the work’s situations and events are configured in an orderly, logical, and coherent way. This cognitive activity is not different from what we bring to bear in everyday life, only in the case of the literary experience, instead of our normal perceptual givens, we instead work with the textual givens. This also means that we learn from our literary experiences in the same way that we learn from our everyday experiences. And literary experience, in this regard, has an advantage over normal experience: when we read a literary text, we adopt the foreign consciousnesses of the author and characters. This forces us to experience things in ways that are normally not part of our everyday palate of experience, and thus we are more apt to learn new valuable things through the literary experience.

 

 

 

 

I

 

 

For any literary work, we have two poles of its reality: the text and the reader. But the literary work itself cannot exist exclusively on either pole. If it is just text without reader, it is meaningless scribbles. But if it is reader without text, then there is nothing in the reader’s mind that is substantially related to that work to begin with. The real literary work, then, is found at the intersection between reader and text, when the reader engages with the text and brings it to life through their imaginative and interpretative activities. This elusive existence of the literary work means that it has a virtual reality rather than a substantial actuality. This also means that readers are not passive receivers of the literary work. Rather, they play an artistic, creative role as well, since they must fill in gaps and add senses, significances, and meanings to the work wherever they are not explicitly given. Writers, then, are often aware of the vital role the reader plays in the creation of the literary work, and so they intentionally leave much out of the text so that the reader may contribute more productively to the work’s realization.

 

 

 

II

 

 

Phenomenologically speaking, to each sentence we read in a literary text there is a mental experience providing conscious content corresponding to that sentence. This content we may call the intentional correlates of the sentence. Each correlate gives us a part of the story’s world. But these parts in sum do not make up that world, because they are not inherently inter-connected within a fully coherent and complete system of facts. Rather, our minds creatively generate that coherence by filling in gaps in the story-world and in its series of events. The way we construct that series of events can be understood in terms of Husserl’s analyses of time consciousness, in which he identified three inter-penetrating layers of our awareness: {a} awareness of current mental contents, or intentions, {b} awareness of passed contents, or retentions, and {c} awareness of future contents, or protentions. In Iser’s terminology, these three are perspectives, recollections, and preintentions, respectively. Just as in our everyday time-constituting consciousness that provides the temporal coherence to our world, this process of story-world realization is under continual modification across all three temporal dimensions as we proceed through the text. For, new events cause us to modify our understanding of past ones and to anticipate certain other ones to come. When we reread a text, we know the outcomes. However, we still constitute the text using the same process, only this second time we see the events under a new light, which alters again with each subsequent rereading.

 

 

 

III

 

 

The literary work of art is not merely an objective given. It arises through the imaginative interaction of the reader with the raw text. It is important for the author to leave out details so that the reader’s imagination is activated and put to the artistically creative task of determining those story features for herself. Thus the exact same text will be imaginatively pictured and conceptually interpreted in different ways by different readers and also in different ways by the same reader upon additional readings. But the reader’s becoming artificially and imaginatively aware  of the perceptible features of the story’s elements is not the only important component of the imaginative literary experience. As well there is the awareness of what would need to be different from the reader’s given reading experience in order instead to have the experience of the story elements. So for example, to read about a mountain that is mentioned in a text involves not only creatively picturing that mountain’s details in one’s own particular way. It also involves becoming aware of what about our current situation (reading the book in a chair, for example) would need to be different in order for us to have the experience of seeing that mountain (as for example realizing the way we would be awed by it and influenced by the other perceptual and emotional components of such an experience.)

 

 

 

IV

 

 

The literary work is created when a reader takes the givens of the text and fashions a coherent world with them. But that fabricated coherence of the fictional world is something open to constant reconfiguration. The author leaves out gaps in the plot and in the descriptions of situations, events, and characters. The reader, then, by using imagination and logical inference, fills in those gaps to generate an interpretation of what they think the author wants the reader to conclude at that point of the text. The reader thus supplies elements that are not given in the text, and since these parts are not given, they can be thought of as illusory. The reader oscillates between a mode of immersing themself in these illusions they fabricate and a mode of standing outside the illusory world to question the viability of its interpretational connections and to reconfigure the world as new inferences compel the reader to believe that alternate interpretations are more appropriate.

 

 

 

V

 

 

When we read a literary text, our interpretations are acts of creation. And they are phenomenological in the sense that we experience what it is like to be a participant in the described situations. But these situations and the characters in them are unfamiliar to us. So when we read, we absorb that unfamiliarity into our own conscious life, as if we are living it for ourselves. By doing so, the reader’s own consciousness is modified in such a way that it is as if it is really the consciousness of the character or of the author. The reader’s own personal subjectivity is placed in the background, while an “alien me” comes into the reader’s direct awareness. By means of this structure, not only do readers, by reading literary works, have new sorts of experiences that they learn from, they also develop their own personalities, as they integrate into their inner lives the lessons and ideas they learned by adopting the foreign consciousness provided by the text.

 

 

 

 

Wolfgang Iser. “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach.” New Literary History 3 (1972): 279-99.

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15 Aug 2016

McCloud (ch.3) Understanding Comics, ch.3 “Blood in the Gutter”

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[[Central Entry Director]

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[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary and boldface (unless noted otherwise) is my own. I apologize in advance for any distracting typos you might encounter. I have not finished proofreading.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Scott McCloud

 

Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art

 

 

Chapter 3: Blood in the Gutter

 

 

Brief summary:

Comics is an art form and medium that functions largely by means of the Gestalt process of closure. The panels give the reader fragments of the story world, with the vast majority of that world being left out of the frame of each panel and also with much of the development that transpires in the story being excluded between the  panels. Closure is operation that the reader uses to imaginatively fill in the gaps that the comics creator leaves out. There are six main types of panel transitions that make use of closure: {1} moment-to-moment, which gives a continuous cinematic decomposition of an unbroken sequence of motion, {2} action-to-action, which presents differing states of affairs as points of accomplishment of activities or events, {3} subject-to-subject, which moves from one character or thing to another, often following their active contribution to events or situations, {4} scene-to-scene, which makes significant jumps in time and/or location, {5} aspect-to-aspect, which shows the same situation from varying spatial perspectives, and {6} non-sequitur, where there is no logically coherent connection at all. However, on account of the force of closure, no matter how disjointed a series of panels are, our minds will still find some way to bring unity to them. Conventional Western comics give a priority primarily to action-to-action transitions and to a relatively lesser degree to subject-to-subject and scene-to-scene. This functions to progress a story, understood as a series of events, as efficiently as possible. Eastern comics place much more emphasis on moment-to-moment and aspect-to-aspect transitions. This has the effect of drawing out the movement of the story and setting moods. There is an inferential element to how closure works, and so depending on which panels in a series are excluded, the reader will draw different conclusions about what is transpiring and what the significance is of the events. There is also a synaesthetic sort of closure at work where, by the power of closure generally speaking and as well as a result of the sensory-unlimited nature of the gutters, all other modes of sensation are activated when reading comics. The nature of the pictures can affect closure activities, because more iconic (that is, less detailed cartoony sorts of) images facilitate closure while photorealistic images hinder it. This special role of closure in comics makes it a unique art form, as the others do not involve the same sort and/or degree of audience creative participation by means of closure. And also, closure brings together into a phenomenal collaboration the creator and reader, and it causes the invisible component (what is left out of the imagery) with the visible parts (what is included visually) to enter into a productive bond and interaction. For, closure is what brings the “invisible art” to light.

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

McCloud notes that as a child, he sometimes daydreamed “that the whole world was just a show put on for my benefit, that unless I was present to see things, they just - - ceased to exist” (60). But now, even as an adult, McCloud recognizes that he just has to believe many things “exist outside of what my five senses report to me” (61). He explains, “All of us perceive the world as a whole through the experience of our senses. Yet our senses can only reveal a world that is fragmented and incomplete” (62). He makes this point very effectively with a panel showing how we only see relatively very small fragments of the surface of the earth, but we regard our world as one whole unified thing.

 photo Understanding.p62.2_zpsi7vx8t6d.jpg

 

Yet, as children, before we develop this cognitive capacity, we can be surprised when things reappear in our vision, as when playing peek-a-boo.

 

McCloud explains this phenomenon with the Gestalt notion of closure, which he defines as the “phenomenon of observing the parts but perceiving the whole” (63). It is a feature of our consciousness that we use in everyday life so to properly recognize objects that only show themselves partly or indirectly. It is used also in story-telling to create suspense. It often operates automatically as a normal feature of our consciousness. We even use it to recognize and relate to other people. And in fact, “In an incomplete world, we must depend on closure for our very survival” (63).

 

Closure operations take many forms. Sometimes we just need to see a shape or outline in order to fill in the fuller form it calls to mind. For example, just a circle with two dots and a line inside it can be recognized by most people as a face, even though faces are full of much more distinguishing detail.

 

If we look very closely at newspaper photographs, for example, we see it is made of fragments, like dots, yet we perceive it as an internally continuous whole (64).

 

McCloud also notes how by means of the persistence of vision our minds in this Gestalt manner perceive continuous motion rather than a rapid series of still photographs (65). [For a discussion of the phi phenomenon, see this entry on Barry Dainton’s “The Experience of Time and Change”.] A similar sort of mental process is involved when we watch cathode ray tube television sets, since it does not even flash a full image but only a rapidly moving point of light scanning over the surface of the screen.

 

McCloud thinks that comics is a medium that is notable for its use of closure, particularly on account of the way the readers/viewers collaborate with the authors/artists to create the changes and motions of the story.

 photo McCloud. p.65.5-6_zpstm76tpvu.jpg

 

McCloud then describes the role of closure in the operation of the gutter, which is the gap between panels: “See that space between the panels? That’s what comics aficionados have named ‘the gutter.’ And despite its unceremonious title, the gutter plays host to much of the magic and mystery that are the very heart of comics!” (66). He continues, “Here in the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes two separate images and transforms them into a single idea” (66). [This reminds me of Eisenstein’s theory of montage editing where the combination of two different images edited in direct sequence form a third idea in the viewer’s mind.] McCloud shows a very useful example. First we see what seems to be an ax murderer about to chop to death some victim, with action lines in the background giving us the impression that it is right at the beginning of the ax’s swing. There are two other elements that presage the forthcoming event. There is the look of determination in the ax murder’s face and the look of utter fright in the victim’s face, which suggests the characters’ bodies realize that what will almost certainly come next is a gruesome murder. And also, the dialogue announces and suggests the murder. The murderer says, “NOW YOU DIE!!” and the victim responds, apparently in recognizing what is to come, “NO! NO!” (66). The subsequent “EEYAA” also suggests that the victim is screaming in pain from the ax cutting him to death.

 photo McCloud. p.66.1-2_zps1urpdurb.jpg

McCloud notes that “Nothing is seen between the two panels, but experience tells you something must be there!” McCloud then shows a series of stills in a sequence of continuous motion to make that point that “Comics panels fracture both time and space, offering a jagged, staccato rhythm of unconnected moments. [...] But closure allows us to connect these moments and mentally construct a continuous, unified reality” (67).

 photo McCloud. p.67.2_zpshpqid3sy.jpg

 

McCloud will then draw the inference that comics itself is closure. We first make an analogy. In the way that visual iconography is the vocabulary of comics, closure is the grammar. [Perhaps he means that the individual components of comics, which function like words, are the visual iconic images. But these are combined like how syntax combines words into meaningful sentential units. Since closure is the mechanism that brings the iconic elements together, it is like the syntactical element of comics story-telling and is thus the medium’s ‘grammar’.] The next step of the inference is to appeal to the definition we are using of comics, which defines it on the basis of the arrangement of its elements. Since it is arranged by closure, that means it is defined by closure. [And whatever defines something is what it is.] Therefore, “in a very real sense, comics is closure” (67 boldface his).

 

McCloud then makes an important point in distinguishing the operation of closure in comics from that of other electronic media:

The closure of electronic media is continuous, largely involuntary and virtually imperceptible. But closure in comics is far from continuous and anything but involuntary! Every act committed to paper by the comics artist is aided and abetted by a silent accomplice. An equal partner in crime known as the reader. I may have drawn an axe being raised in this example, but I’m not the one who let it drop or decided how hard the blow, or who screamed, or why. That, dear reader, was your special crime, each of you committing it in your own style. All of you participated in the murder. All of you held the axe and chose your spot.

(68)

 

[I think we should elaborate on these points further. The first observation I would like to make is on the ways that McCloud’s ideas correspond to what we learned from Wolfgang Iser’s “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach.” Generally speaking, it could be said that McCloud in this section is taking a phenomenological or reader-response sort of approach to the gutter-structure in comics. What makes the gutter what it is, is not what it actually is, which is a space (or just the line of a panel outline, as Groensteen notes in section 1.7.2 of The System of Comics). Rather, the gutter from this view is constituted by the contents of the reader’s consciousness, who creatively constructs the missing story elements in their imagination. This is the reader’s participation (as in the murder) that McCloud is emphasizing. The other point of elaboration is on the difference between the comics medium and other electronic media like film and television. In these cases, he referred to the passive illusory operation of forming continuous imagery in our perception on the basis of fragments in the medium’s mode of presentation of its imagery. McCloud, also by drawing a suspense scene, may have been indirectly referring to film and video editing, where discontinuities of time and space are much more drastic than mere slight variations of frames in a continuous cinematographic sequence. The question then is, to what degree and in what way is the experience of the comics gutter different from the film cut? At first sight, there seems to be little or no difference of any substantial kind, as they function in the same way. Even edits like in the ax-murder comics scene is common in film, where gruesome actions are shown right up to the really disturbing part, when there is a cut away and perhaps you hear the sounds of the actions without seeing them. (Or perhaps there is some sort of match cutting, like going from the fall of an ax in an ax murder to a close up of a carrot getting chopped on a cutting board, after an abrupt scene change.) I think that so far in our examination, we phenomenologically speaking do not have a substantial enough of a difference to use gap-closure as a means to distinguish comics from film. However, if we do pay close phenomenological attention to our modes of experience when watching a film with these sorts of cuts involving Gestalt closures and comics, there is a notable difference. Before I note my own observation, let us look first at McCloud’s. He says that the difference is that the comics gap-closing is less involuntary than in these other media. He is contrasting here the illusion of motion with the comics gutter, rather than a film cut with a comics cut. But perhaps we can still use his justification were we to consider the difference between an ax murder film scene that has a cut identical to the one he depicted with comics frames and the comics ax murder sequence he drew. In a film, the machinery of the projector or playback mechanism puts us into a passive state of involuntary perceptual reception where what we come to experience is given without our control. The images appear in the way and at the pace that the director/editor wants them to appear. The comics creator has the same range of options for the cuts, but the difference is that the reader of comics has more control over how those images will be received. When watching a film, our bodies are like marionettes that the director controls. In the comics experience, we are still affected directly by the imagery, but we are invited to go at our own pace and have some sense of feeling of control. In other words, the primary difference that I notice in the comics experience with regard to cut transitions is the degree of activity and feeling of control we have in how we fill in the gaps. This I think corresponds to McCloud’s point that the reader is an “equal partner” in the crime, rather than a helpless witness. There is one more distinction between film and comics closure that I would like to propose. First note some exceptional and important cases in film that will call into question the accuracy of my observation, namely, Soviet montage editing and chaos cinema, and also Chris Marker’s La Jetée. In La Jetée, for example, there story is told near-exclusively with a sequence of still images. This deserves much more analysis, which we will have to do another time. Phenomenologically speaking, it could potentially constitute a “comics experience”. The other examples of hard, discontinuous editing of motion sequences (as in Soviet montage and chaos cinema) might also function in the way that I think is more particular to comics. But let us see. According to my examination of my own comics experience, I do not experience film and comics editing identically. For me, reading a comics work is like proceeding through a series of flashes, with each one packed with implicit data that unpacks suddenly in my imagination. In Warren Ellis’ and Darick Robertson’s “What Spider Watches on TV” (Transmetropolitan #5), the character Spider is watching television, and note that he exists in a sort of slightly dystopic future with technology that is a bit more advanced than ours.

 photo Ellis. Transmetropolitan.p6.3_zpsrts9sbin.jpg

But what is remarkable about television in this future is that there is a certain kind of advertisement technique called “block consumer incentive bursts” or “buybombs.” The idea is that you are exposed to some bizarre psychedelic imagery for some brief period of time. While this is going on, no advertisements are apparent. But somehow, countless ads are encoded phenomenally in an implicit way in the image, packed like compressed phenomenal data conveyed through normal perception.

 photo Ellis. Transmetropolitan.p20.2-4_zpsewjyr99u.jpg

So, when you next go to sleep, all the compressed advertisements unpack in your dreams in a discernible, linear sequence.

 photo Ellis. Transmetropolitan.p22_zpsypqvv384.jpg

I use this as an analogy for how I experience what happens between the gutters in the comics experience. Each panel is like a flash of compressed phenomenal data that unpacks like a burst in my imagination. This is very different even from Soviet montage and chaos cinema, where the contents between film cuts unpack in a more or less graduated, temporally extended way, which makes the experience less intense. For, all the important information that needs to be processed is given at least implicitly – but still somewhat overwhelmingly (or at least stimulatingly) – in an initial “burst” when first viewing the panel, even though it might unpack somewhat gradually afterward. What can make the cuts intense in both film and comics is the abruptness of the transition, such that differences in the following image are forced suddenly upon our perceptual and cognitive systems without them being sufficiently ready and able to fill those gaps as fast as the changes are made. But what makes the comics experience unique in this regard is that because the contents of each panel are like flashes or bursts of unpacking information (being as such because they are still-images whose temporal extent is first given instantaneously and only secondarily being unpacked gradually), the comics transitions are often more intense. Reading comics, unlike watching a film with its series of more or less discontinuous edits, is like a series of shocks between bursts, or we might say, disruptions between eruptions, whereas the film experience is often more at best a series of disruptions between gradual proceedings. But note that Groensteen in section 7.3 of Comics and Narration discusses a stroboscopic effect in a particular comics work. This is something much more visually apparent than what I have in mind. The sort of experience I have in mind is also best described as stroboscopic, but I would use the term as a description of the structure and dynamic of the experience of nearly any comics sequence rather than just ones that show interchanging sorts of flashing imagery paced in a more or less metrically homogeneous way.]

 

McCloud explains that thus audience participation is a vital element in comics. In fact, it is important in other media too. He depicts for example a film-like sequence where a pending romantic interaction moves gradually off-screen. McCloud then distinguishes the way this participation is employed in film as opposed to in comics: “[...] while film makes use of the audience’s imaginations for occasional effects, comics must use it far more often” (McCloud  69). [So while the illusion of motion can be used for showing time and motion] “[...] the reader’s deliberate, voluntary closure is comics’ primary means of simulating time and motion” (69).

 

McCloud then says that this intimacy of creator and audience resulting from closure is in fact greater in purely written texts. [I am not sure why. I would think it is greater in comics, as the creators give the visual data which would bring the reader’s imagined comics work closer to what the creators had in mind. Perhaps the idea is that the more the reader must contribute, the closer they must move toward the author. But I am not sure.] McCloud will now look at the craft in comics which brings about this intimacy (69).

 

McCloud will distinguish six kinds of panel transitions:

{1} moment-to-moment [showing moments from one continuous action, in a cinematic sort of way]

{2} action-to-action [where we move between one character’s or thing’s actions or activities in the sense of a series of joined actions, as in when we enumerate a series of things a person said or did in some event.]

{3} subject-to-subject [which moves from one character or thing to another]

{4} scene-to-scene [which jumps across large extents of time and space, rather then merely showing the same event from different temporal and spatial perspectives]

{5} aspect-to-aspect [where time is more or less not changing but spatial perspective on the scene are]

{6} non-sequitur [where there is no logical relation between panels at all.]

 

So let us look more closely at the illustrations.

 

1) Moment-to-Moment Transitions

These require very little closure [and the closure involved in them seems to tend toward the automatic perceptual closure at work in the cinematic illusion of motion. From the examples, we see differences between the panels, but in most cases, the material in the panels is largely the same from one panel to the next. However, some small detail or slightly modified aspect will tell us that change or motion have occurred.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.70.1_zps0a7wwtr4.jpg

 

 

 

2) Action-to-Action Transitions

 

[Here depicted actions seem to be accomplishments or points where states of affairs have shifted to the point where they can obtain a different propositional sort of description. In the prior case, we might say: The spider is close. Now, the spider is a little closer. In these cases, it seems more like roughly the same state of affairs or brute fact in the world that has modulated slightly. Or, if the state of affairs did change enough to warrant a very different propositional description, perhaps that shift came about gradually and foreseeably. In action-to-action, it seems that we are dealing with one subject for which different states can be attributed. So in the example, we might have: The baseball player is waiting for the pitch. The baseball player hits the ball. For the next example: The man pours the champagne. The man drinks the champagne. The man burps the gas. And for the last one: The car is moving quickly. The car hits a tree.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.70.2_zps0ob9dbsm.jpg

 

 

3) Subject-to-Subject Transitions

 

These transitions involve a change of subject. [The idea here seems to be that it is a combination of change of subject and change of status. Also, the subject seems like it can be a character or thing, including a landscape, as in the first example. So in a propositional form, we might have for the examples below: The ax murderer is about to kill the victim. The sound of the victim’s screams were heard outside in the city. For the second example: A man wonders what more can go wrong. A woman replies that at least Jerry has not called. The phone rings (and is possibly Jerry after all). The third one suggests that the events are not in sequence but are instead simultaneous; however, they are distinct actions made by separate characters: A runner crosses the finish line. At the same moment, the time-keeper clicks the stopwatch.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.71.1_zpsaiyojomm.jpg

 

 

Scene-to-Scene Transitions

 

Here we jump significant distances in time and space. [It seems that in order to make the transition fluid, certain devices might be used, like a narrator’s ‘voice’ telling us we have changed time and/or place. Otherwise, perhaps the jump will be obvious on account of the context or the available visual clues.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.71.2_zps0ro1brew.jpg 

 

 

Aspect-to-Aspect Transitions

 

Here the change is one of spatial perspective, with less emphasis on a change of time. [We are quite familiar with camera angle and focus shifts films. We see a continuously unfolding event, but all the while we jump from one perspective to another, with continuity techniques helping the transitions to be ‘invisible’. In the examples below, there does not seem to be an importance on continuity as much as giving a broadened outlook on a situation.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.72.1.b_zpsynxqfxor.jpg

 

 

Non-Sequitur Transitions

 

Here there is no logical connection whatsoever between the panels. [There is thus no inherent continuity.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.72.2_zpsewfbitxi.jpg

 

McCloud then further discusses the non-sequitur transitions. He wonders, “is it possible for any sequence of panels to be totally unrelated to each other?” He does not think so. For, “No matter how dissimilar one image may be to another there is a kind of [...] alchemy at work in the space between panels which can help us find meaning or resonance in even the most jarring of combinations” (73). He then seems to hint that the connections are made secondarily upon further consideration [as the machinery of phenomenal synthesis works to homogenize the heterogeneity by bringing the differences under possible commonalities.] He writes,

By creating a sequence with two or more images, we are endowing them with a single [...] overriding identity, and forcing the viewer to consider them as a whole. However different they had been, they now belong to a single organism.

(73)

[The following is the page where the quotation comes from, and it visually demonstrates his point.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.73_zpsq2xlf1kw.jpg

 

In the next part of this chapter, McCloud examines the prevalence of these six types of transitions in different kinds of comics or different creators. It is a sort of quantitative analysis, as he counts the occurrences, and compares them using graphs. We learn that in a Jack Kirby superhero comic, transitions were predominantly action-to-action, with subject-to-subject and scene-to-scene trailing behind. McCloud finds roughly this same distribution in a wide variety of genres and creators, both American and European (75). He explains the prevalence of these transition types as being the result of certain story-telling needs that we have when we treat a story as being a series of events (76). These three transition types “show things happening in concise efficient ways” (76). However, the first type, which decomposes one continuous action down into a series of temporally proximate moments, accomplishes (with regard to story-telling purposes) what can be accomplished in just two or so panels of the action-to-action type. The fifth type of transition, which only gives different visual aspects of the same situation, accomplishes nothing with regard to advancing the events of a story (77). And non-sequiturs have no narrative purpose at all. [I can imagine however that certain sequences, like surreal hallucinatory sorts, can fit within a conventional story, when a character’s deranged mental state is being portrayed. But here the whole non-sequitur structured sequence can be seen as one unit that fits within the logical narrative sequence surrounding it.] McCloud notes that some experimental comics, as for example early Art Spiegelman works, have very unconventional distributions of transition types.

 

McCloud then examines the transition-type distributions for works by Japanese cartoonist Osamu Tezuka. We find that action-to-action transitions are still predominant but not as much as in the other cases we considered. And subject-to-subject are nearly as prevalent as action-to-action. In addition to these types, we also find many moment-to-moment transitions, and as well we find many aspect-to-aspect ones, which are uncommon in the west. [We might here think for example of the sorts of still-life scenes we see often in films by Ozu.] McCloud says that these aspect-to-aspect transitions are “most often used to establish a mood or a sense of place,” and when they appear, “time seems to stand still in these quiet, contemplative combinations” (79). McCloud continues, “Rather than acting as a bridge between separate moments, the reader here must assemble a single moment using scattered fragments” (79). McCloud finds many other Japanese works to have a high incidence of this fifth transition type, and he wonders why. One reason he offers is that the page-length of Japanese works was much greater, as instead of the stories being told in short installments they were originally printed in large anthologies. For this reason, “the pressure isn’t as great on any one installment to show a lot ‘happening’” (80). The second explanation McCloud offers is a cultural difference between East and West. Western culture, he says, is more goal oriented and usually does not wander, while “in the East, there’s a rich tradition of cyclical and labyrinthine works of art” (81). McCloud further explains the differences between Japanese and Western comics with the idea that the Eastern style has a preference for intervals. [At this point I am a little confused. The Western style was supposedly more apt to exclude intervening details of activity, for the sake of giving just the important events that advance the story toward some goal. So would not the Western style make more use of exclusions and intervals? McCloud might be speaking more about an exclusion of activity in the Eastern style, where significance is conveyed without reference to patterns of development but rather somehow elliptically through absences of different sorts. In sum, McCloud’s point might be that there is an absence of action in Eastern comics, but not an absence of depiction. And these absences of action are intervals in a sense. But I do not know. See pages 82-84.] McCloud notes that excluded elements in artistic works in the East were still regarded as being a part of that work (82). This can take the form of negative space in visual art or silence in music (82). McCloud then observes that in the last century or so, Western artistic styles have come to adopt ideas of fragmentation and rhythm from Asia and Africa. This came to be seen in many new styles, with one prominent example being minimalism (83).

 

McCloud then moves to a demonstration of the role of subtraction in comics story crafting, especially in how simple removals of panels can vary the story drastically. He has us consider the following relatively elaborate story.

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.84.b_zpsvd7brjzp.jpg

He then shows how the apparent meaning of the story changes by subtracting a large number of the panels. Then he shows this principle again by subtracting a few more. And we see it demonstrated one last time when we are down to just two panels.

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.85.1-4_zpsjh65apph.jpg

 

[McCloud’s next point reminds me of Iser’s notion that the author select’s the fragments on the basis of how they think the reader might creatively configure the elements and interpretatively and imaginatively fill in the gaps.] McCloud explains that to strike the balance between too much subtraction and not enough, “creators regularly make assumptions about their readers’ experiences” (85). One such assumption, which is culturally contingent, is that the audience will read the panels from left to right.

 

Another problem is that “As closure between panels becomes more intense, reader interpretation becomes far more elastic” (86). [The idea here seems to be that the less connected the contents of consecutive panels are in an obvious way, the less control the comics creator has in the way the reader fills in the gaps.] Sometimes the connections are intentionally ambiguous so that there will not be some certain interpretation on the reader’s part [but rather they are left guessing or wondering, being uncertain as to what to make of the situation]. Also, closure can happen within a panel when for example we only see a small part of a situation and we need to fill in the rest using our imagination and inferential faculties. He writes, “By showing little or nothing of a given scene [...] and offering only clues to the reader [...] the artist can trigger any number of images in the reader’s imagination” (86).

 

McCloud then gives a sequence of six panels with just dialogue and sounds to show how the reader makes visual closure on the basis of sound clues (87). [This could be interesting in that it might be a sort of synaesthetic sort of closure.]

 

[So these are instances of closure happening within a panel.] Yet McCloud is still the most fascinated with inter-panel closure. [He then notes the element of animation involved in this sort of closure. In the same way that an animator might ‘tween’ two distant moments of action by drawing the series of small continuous intermediary steps, our minds in a sense conduct this same procedure.] “We already know that comics asks the mind to work as a sort of in-betweener - - filling in the gaps between panels as an animator might” (88).

 

But McCloud thinks there is more to closure than this inter-panel tweening. [As we will see, this other element is possibly a sort of synaesthetic closure.] To bring this other feature to light, he shows a four panel aspect-to-aspect sequence of a woman cooking. He asks if the sounds were confined merely to the panels where they were displayed, or if we hear them outside the panels as well. [At this point, what McCloud is saying is not entirely clear to me. At first we might think he is saying that we still hear for example the chopping sound from the second panel after having moved to the third panel where we simply see the woman’s face. But then he says that the reason we hear sounds outside the panels is for the following reason. When looking at the panels, we are confined to no more than the visual sensory mode. But in between panels, we are confined to no sense whatsoever. And thus between the panels we are liberated to engage all our senses. So what is not clear to me is whether he is saying that we only introduce our other senses in the transition between panels, or if in fact they can carry over such that we hear sounds within the panels. Also, what about the panels where the sounds appear. Is it that we do not hear them in those panels of first appearance, where vision dominates the experience, and we have to wait for the gutter to hear them? I think McCloud might be making a more general point about the functioning of the gutter, and maybe that point is that because intermittently throughout the comics work we have periods of sensory non-constriction, that has a global effect on our capacities to be liberated from the strictly visual mode of perception even when simply looking at the panel contents. Below are the passages I am discussing, and I think they are important from a phenomenological standpoint, given their relevance to synaesthesia.]

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.88.5-8_zps73q30jyz.jpg

 

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.89_zpsibyrmp4i.jpg

 

McCloud then uses the metaphor of the reader leaping into a sort of unrestricted void between each panel, and he wonders, “is it possible that closure can be so managed in some cases [...] that the reader might learn to fly?” (90). [He does not follow up on this question, and it is also not clear to me what he means exactly by the reader flying. Perhaps the idea is that instead of the reader coming to the next panel, they remain in their own story imagination and let it develop all through their own free accord. But I am not sure.]

 

McCloud then returns to the topic in chapter 2 about iconic and non-iconic drawing styles, and he wonders if they affect closure. [We have not summarized this section yet, so the following will simply restate McCloud, and later we can elaborate more after we do that section.] Closure seems to be more fluid when the drawing style is iconic rather than photorealistic. This second case of realistic imagery seems to present an experience of seeing a series of still pictures rather than one of continuous action. He also says that “when comics art veers closer to concerns of the picture plane, closure can be more difficult to achieve, though for different reasons. [...] Now it’s the unifying properties of design that make us more aware of the page as a whole, rather than its individual components, the panels” (91). McCloud says that when readers are more aware of the drawing art, achieving closure involves more effort on the reader’s part (91).

 

McCloud’s next point is a sort of reiteration of his running idea that the special role of closure makes comics a unique art form, and this element brings the creator and reader together into an intimate bond [a sort of co-consciousness like Iser describes] and it also brings together into intimate contact the seen and the unseen [what is shown and left out visually, along with all the other non-visual modes of perception that come into our imaginative awareness when reading comics].

 

 photo McCloud. Understanding.p.92_zpsaxjeamce.jpg

 

McCloud ends the chapter by noting that as the creator of this comics work we are reading, he has been working with our power of closure as best he can, asking us as readers to contribute our “world of imagination” (93).

 

 

 

 

McCloud, Scott. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. Northampton, Mass.: Kitchen Sink Press, 1993.

 

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