Henri Bergson
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience
Ch.III
The Organization of Conscious States; Free Will
De l'organization des états de conscience: la liberté
Part XXX: Physical Determinism
Previously Bergson discussed two sorts of determinism. Physical determinism says that physical events are determined necessarily by previous conditions. Psychological determinism holds that a given mental state was determined by previous ones. Bergson notes that those who are psychological determinists often ground their theory in physical determinism. They think that our brain's physical states produce our mental states. Hence we might predict the chain of mental states that are to come by knowing enough about the physical situation of the brain at a given moment.
§92 Is the Principle of Conservation of Energy Universally Valid?
[Recall also the role that the principle of the conservation of energy plays in these determinist theories (see §88 and §89). Supposedly the forces determining the movement of molecules already are acting on them. If any were to change their course of motion, that would require extra energy to arise in the system, so that the molecule could break from the forces already acting on it, and go another direction or speed. Now also consider what it would mean for us to have a free thought or action, under this theory of mind/brain-molecule correlation. Some brain molecule would need to behave against the forces acting on it. Hence free thoughts and actions require that extra energy spontaneously arise in a system. Yet the law of the conservation of energy says that energy quantities may be transferred, but the sum total of energy may not increase. Hence those who take up these theoretical positions would conclude on this basis that free action is impossible.]
Bergson begins by noting that the law of the conservation of energy leaves us with little possibility for freedom. And even if it has no influence over the ideas we form, it at least will determine our bodily motions. So even though we might have some internal life of our own, to the outside observer, we cannot be distinguished from automata (158-159). [But this says something about the way our minds work already. It seems already to suppose that our mental states are not free to choose our actions. Hence] we might then wonder if this use of the law of energy-conservation does not already presuppose some psychological theory. We also wonder about a scientist who does not begin by assuming that human beings have no freedom. Would she still consider the law of the conservation of energy to be a universal law [that applies even to psychological states]? (150ab)
Images of the pages summarized above, from the English translation [click to enlarge]:
Images of the pages summarized above, from the original French [click to enlarge]:
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