Causing Backwards TF§96 The Series of Associations May be Merely an Ex Post Facto Attempt. Bergson. Time and Free Will

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary; my commentary is in brackets.]

Causing Backwards

Henri Bergson

Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness

Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

Ch.III

The Organization of Conscious States; Free Will

De l'organization des états de conscience: la liberté

Part XXX: Physical Determinism

Previously Bergson explained how psychological determinism sees mental states as associated by necessarily relations. They assume that one psychological state necessarily results from previous ones. Bergson admits that mental states are related. But he questions whether this is a causal relation.

§96 The Series of Associations May be Merely an Ex Post Facto Attempt to Account for a New Idea

Bergson will now illustrate with an example from everyday life. We are holding a conversation with our friend. We are interrupted for a few moments. Then we return to our discussion. We notice that although our discussion was broken, when we return, we are both thinking about the same thing. The psychological determinist explanation would be that there was a natural development of our ideas, and that they were inherently bound to move to that next subject anyway. For, "the same series of associations has been formed on both sides" (156c).

Bergson notes, however, that although both people come to the same idea, they will not trace it to the same previous notions. And also, during the interruption, our chain of associated mental states will likely be different. Bergson thinks that the common idea arises by some mysterious cause, perhaps some [commonly shared] physical influence. But because the cause is unknown, our minds then fabricate the links between a chain of preceding mental states which supposedly explain the present common one. We see then, that although the determinist presumes these states are the antecedent causes, they really are thrown together after the event, and in a sense are the effects of the current mental state.

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Images of the pages summarized above, from the English translation [click to enlarge]:

Images of the pages summarized above, from the original French [click to enlarge]:

Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Transl. F.L. Pogson. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published, Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft