"if you think childlike, you'll stay young. If you keep your energy going, and do everything with a little flair, you're gunna stay young. But most people do things without energy, and they atrophy their mind as well as their body. you have to think young, you have to laugh a lot, and you have to have good feelings for everyone in the world, because if you don't, it's going to come inside, your own poison, and it's over" Jerry Lewis "I don’t believe in the irreversibility of situations" Deleuze
As long as time remains on its hinges, it is subordinated to extensive movement [....] This characteristic of ancient philosophy has often been emphasized: the subordination of time to the circular movement of the world as the turning Door [....] [...] Time no doubt tends to free itself when the movement it measures itself becomes increasingly aberrant or derived [dérivé], marked by material, meteorological, and terrestrial contingencies; but this is a downward tendency that still depends on the adventures of movement. [Footnote 3: "Eric Alliez, in Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, trans. George van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), has analyzed, in ancient thought, this tendency toward the emancipation of time when movement ceases to be circular: for instance, in the "chrematism" and time as a monetary movement in Aristotle."] (Deleuze 1997: 27bc; c.d; 187bc)Deleuze in fact wrote the forward to this book, and we quote from two different translations.
Tant que le temps reste dans ses gonds, il est subordonné au mouvement extensif [….] On a souvent souligné ce caractère de la philosophie antique : la subordination du temps au mouvement circulaire du monde comme Porte tournante. […] Sans doute y a-t-il une tendance du temps à s’émanciper, quand le mouvement qu’il mesure est lui-même de plus en plus aberrant, dérivé, marqué de contingences matérielles météorologiques et terrestres ; mais c’est une tendance vers le bas, qui dépend encore des aventures du mouvement. [Note 2. Eric Alliez a analysé, dans la pensée antique, cette tendance à l’émancipation du temps quand le mouvement cesse d’être circulaire : par exemple la « chrématistique » et le temps du mouvement monétaire chez Aristote (Les temps capitaux, Cerf).] (Deleuze 1993: 40bc; c.d)
One might say that thought can only grasp time through several speeds [....] (Deleuze 2006: 372a)
It might be said that thought can grasp time only through a number of strides [....] (Deleuze 1996: xi/bc)
[...] on dirait que la pensée ne peut saisir le temps qu’à travers plusieurs allures (Deleuze 1991: 7b)
An aberrant time may be undone to become more rectilinear, independent, abstracted from other speeds, and sometimes it may trip or fall. (2006: 373a)
At the limit, an aberrant time undoes itself, becoming more and more linear, autonomous, abstracted from other strides, and sometimes falling and tripping. (1996: xii/a)
A la limite, un temps aberrant se défera pour devenir de plus en plus rectiligne, autonome, abstrait des autres allures et parfois chutant et trébuchant. (1991: 7d)
One would say that time falls ideally, like light in a way (intensive quantity or zero distance from the moment) [....] (2006: 373bc)
It could be said that time falls, a little the way light does, with an idealized fall (the intensive quantity or distance from the moment zero) [....] (1996: xii/b)
On dira du temps qu’il tombe, un peu comme la lumière, d’une chute idéelle (quantité intensive ou distance de l’instant à zéro) [….] (1991: 8ab)
Kantian time as [...] like a line that one can only see at first in fleeting bits and pieces revealing itself at the end. The pure line of time becomes independent.... Time shrugged off its dependency on any extensive movements [....] (2006: 374a)We will look more closely at how Alliez' explanation of Aristotle's chrematism portrays a sort of unhinged, intensive, straightened time.
Kantian time [...] as a line discovered at the end and of which a furtive segment here and there is at first only glimpsed. The pure line of time has become autonomous... Time has shaken off its dependency on all extensive movement [....] (1996: xiii/d)
[...] le temps kantien [...] comme une ligne qui se découvre à la fin et dont on n'avait d'abord aperçu que tel ou tel segment furtif. La pure ligne du temps devenu autonome... Le temps a secoué sa dépendance à l'égard de tout mouvement extensif [....] (1991: 8d)
Alliez notes how for Aristotle, there is something unnatural about wealth-acquisition. Normal acquisition for our needs in household management is something that comes naturally [just like how a bird brings worms home to nesting young]. But endlessly acquiring surplus wealth for its own sake is not something that comes naturally but rather involves some learned and perfected craft (techne). (1996: 4a / 1991: 32b)What about the system of this practice for the Aristotle of the Politics, for the Philosopher grappling with the "chrematistic" subversion of a mercantile economy that detaches wealth from property, wrenches money from its mediating condition, withdraws exchange from the law of equivalence to derive a profit from it - that substitutes interest for the social unit of need, the natural referent of the monetary sign? (Alliez 1996: 3cd)
Qu’en est-il du système de cette pratique pour l’Aristote de la Politique, pour le Philosophe aux prises avec la subversion « chrématistique » d’une économie mercantile qui détache la richesse de la propriété, arrache la monnaie de sa condition de médiation, soustrait l’échange à la loi de l’équivalence pour en tirer profit – qui substitue l’intérêt à l’unité sociale du besoin, référent naturel du signe monétaire ? (Alliez 1991: 31bc)
As opposed to barter, monetary circulation splits the immediate identity of these two acts by introducing the antithesis of selling and buying, which appear as mutually indifferent, separate in space and time. The linkage C-M-C should really be written C-M/M-C. "And for future exchange [huper de tes mellouses allages]," writes Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, "if we do not need a thing now [ei nun meden deitai], we shall have it if ever we do need it [ean deethei] - money is as it were our surety [egguetes]." (1996: 6d)As we learned, the basis of M-C-M exchanges was that the intention of the process is to make profit, that is, for the second M to be of a greater quantity of monetary value than the initially invested first M, which was signified as M-C-M'. We also learned in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics that money is a unitary measure of need or demand. A greater need or demand for a commodity is a factor that can increase its monetary worth. Consider two pairs of shoes, each requiring the same value of materials and labor to produce. If one has practical or stylistic features that are greater in demand (and if the supply is equal), the more desired or needed shoes will have a greater monetary value.
A la différence du troc, la circulation monétaire scinde l'identité immédiate de ces deux actes en y introduisant l'antithèse de la vente et de l'achat, qui se présentent comme réciproquement indifférents, séparés dans l'espace et le temps. L'enchaînement M-A-M doit en réalité être écrit M-A/A-M. « Pour les échanges à venir (huper de tes mellouses allages), écrit Aristote dans l'Éthique à Nicomaque, la monnaie nous sert en quelque sorte de garant (egguetes), et, si aucun besoin ne se fait sentir maintenant (ei nun meden deitai), nous l'aurons à notre disposition en cas de besoin (ean deethei). » (1991: 35c)
It is as if money had never been a mere means of exchange, as if its function as "common measure" was legitimating in advance, behind the formal equality of the terms made commensurable, the inscription of an infinite debt turning virtually every exchange into a means of monetary production and appropriation and all money into money "with interest," into time-money, and turning all wealth that escapes its natural place, the oikos, into "progressive value, money that is forever burgeoning and growing, and, as such, capital." From there, every "economic exchange is turned into a "chrematistic" exchange. (1996: 8a.b)Now let's recall Hölderlin's concept of caesura from his analysis of the Sophocles' tragedies, which he says have something like a variation in their pace. There will be a transition point where the rhythm alters. This functions as a “counter-rhythmic rupture” (gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung), which he calls the caesura (Cäsur). (Hölderlin, 102a; V,196). Consider Oedipus Rex. Do you remember how it feels, as far as its pacing is concerned? Do you not recall a gradual building up, and then at the end, things falling apart rapidly? Gradually we learn about the curse, and slowly it becomes less and less deniable that Oedipus is the cause. When Oedipus comes to terms with this fact, he blinds himself and is exiled from Thebes, while Jocasta, his wife and mother, hangs herself. So there is a rush at the end. His moment of realization is the caesura, the counter-rhythmic rupture in the speeds of dramatic development. On the one hand, we might say that the beginning and the end do not 'rhyme', because the speeds are different. But they do not rhyme for another reason too. Normally in Greek tragedies we would expect the tragic character to die at the end, as a sort of justice. Consider first Aeschylus' Agamemnon. For the structure, we imagine the movement of a planet in the heavens. All the other stars make perfect circles, returning to where they were a year prior. The planets in a way veer off from these circular patterns and they make their own path through the sky. However, they eventually return to where they once were. This regularity and constancy is like the limitations the gods place on mortals. Agamemnon is the king, and to kill him is a moral and legal transgression. His wife Clytemnestra commits this transgression by murdering her husband to avenge him for having killing their daughter. It is not until after a long delay that their son Orestes returns to take vengeance on the death of his father by killing his mother. So like the planet that is continuously broken out of the circular paths of the stars, but nonetheless eventually returns to where it once was, the development of Greek tragedies normally involves a transgression that after a delay finds resolution, even though that resolving action will itself be an act of transgression (a murder), keeping the deviant cycles in motion. However, in the Oedipus tale, the tragic character does not die. So his story does not develop like how a planet returns to where it once was. He is rather more like a planet let loose from its orbit, left wandering, as Oedipus does in Oedipus at Colonus. So in this sense the end does not rhyme with the beginning, because the vengeance cycle is broken, and the story does not begin and end with a crime of some sort.
Comme si, donc, l'argent n'avait jamais été un simple moyen d'échange, comme si sa fonction de « commune mesure » légitimait par avance, derrière l'égalité formelle des termes rendus commensurables, l'inscription | d'une dette infinie faisant virtuellement de tout échange un moyen de production et d'appropriation monétaires, de toute monnaie une monnaie « à intérêt », une monnaie-temps, de toute richesse échappant à son lieu naturel, l'oikos, une « valeur progressive, argent toujours bourgeonnant, poussant et comme tel capital »... De là à faire de tout échange « économique » un échange « chrématistique »... (1991: 37-38)
Interest is the effect of a disproportion establishing inequality in terms of a caesura by which the permanence of money no longer coincides with the social presence of need, or with the immanence of an end with each act of exchange, but with the différance of a power (and not of a consuming) obliged to ignore the "concrete time" of presence in order to drain the surplus formed by each sequence of chrematistic exchange. (1996: 10b)So in a way, there is a break in the current flow that in the same stroke places the future into the present, "a future that is banking on the current value / un futur s'escomptant en valeur actuelle". (1996: 12bc / 1991: 43bc)
Effet d'une démesure qui établit l'inégalité en fonction d'une césure d'après laquelle a permanence de la monnaie ne coïncide plus avec la présence sociale du besoin, avec l'immanence de la fin à chaque acte d'échange, mais avec la différance d'un pouvoir (et on d'une consommation) qui se doit d'ignorer le « temps concret » de la présence pour drainer le surplus formé en chaque séquence de l'échange chrématistique. (1991: 40c)
designates finally that depoliticizing (de-realizing) anticipation that can derive profit from exchange because it is inscribed above and before the monetary equivalence it develops, on the tangent of the space of comparison and on the curve of appropriation that it keeps inextricably enveloped. (1996: 13bc, emphasis mine)Chrematistics is an aberration of the cyclical return of commodity value. It produces time not only as an empty form, as the form of an undetermined future given in a hollowed-out present, but it also produces time as a straight line, as the line of intention or intensity for that bought-temporality to try to extend further (to have a longer period of ensured sustained satisfaction). Time, then, comes out of its circular joint and becomes linear, by means of an empty form of time that is as well a cut in time.
Money is [....] Nothing but the all-powerfulness of exponentiality. (1996: 13d, emphasis mine)
désigne au final cette anticipation dépolitisante (dé-réalisante) qui peut tirer profit de l'échange parce qu'elle s'inscrit en amont de l'équivalence monétaire qu'elle développe, à la tangente de l'espace de comparaison et de la courbe d'appropriation qu'elle tient inextricablement enveloppés. (1991: 44cd, emphasis mine)
La monnaie n'est [....] Rien que la toute-puissance de l'exponentiation. (1991: 45b, emphasis mine)
"Firstly, the idea of an assembly of time corresponds to this: that any caesura whatever must be determined in the image of an action, of a unique and formidable event, adequate to time in its entirety. That image itself exists in torn form, in two unequal parts; nonetheless it draws together the assembly of time. It must be called symbol, in function of the unequal parts that it subsumes or draws together, but as unequal to one another. Such a symbol, adequate to the whole of time, is expressed in many ways: to make time out of joint, to make the sun shatter, to throw oneself in the volcano, to kill God or the father. (DRf, 120)" (99a)The image for an action must be adequate to time in its entirety. (100a) And events are "situated in relation to the caesura as before and after." We cannot assume that events are first given in linear order and that between moments are cuts, because this means that events are first representational, and thus the caesura does not determine the before and after. (100ab)
"In the Spinoza book, Deleuze explains that ‘adequate’ means ‘the internal conformity of the idea with something it expresses’ (Deleuze, 1990: 118). However, in Spinoza, this something is the idea’s cause, something that it cannot be in the case of the symbolic image, since the whole of time is not the cause of the image, a term never used | in these sections of Difference and Repetition. In its place, we have the concept of determination and a specific form of determination as a caesura and processes dividing, assembling and ordering time in its entirety. Thus the symbolic image must express these processes in relation to the whole of time in its internal conformity. This is why it must be formidable and a great event, not through any sense of scale or horror, but rather in its range, internal division and internal asymmetry." (100-101)Because the image must express a fracture and inequality, it can never "imply a perfect expression or one with a final identity." (101b) And there is a fracture in the self and time, and the before is the image that is 'too great for me' (101b). "The symbol has no final identity because it is composed of two unequal parts that cannot be subsumed into a whole resolving the inequality." (101c) "So the adequacy of the symbol lies in how well it draws together the entirety of time while still maintaining the inequality of before and after, and the fracture of the subjects creating the new within the time it assembles." (101d)
"The Latin root for ‘gond’ is ‘cardo’ the hinge or axle, the north–south axis in a city, or orienting direction and cardinal points for a circle, for instance north on a compass. The number of revolutions of a circle can then be measured thanks to cardinal points, for instance, in the number of times a clock passes midday or a horoscope passes a birthday. The passing of time, as much for the soul as for the world, he says, is measured thanks to such cardinal points. When these go missing time goes out of joint and becomes maddened and disordered, as it does for Hamlet and the kingdom of Denmark when he receives the news, from his father’s ghost, of his uncle’s betrayal: ‘Thus was I, sleeping, by a brother’s hand / Of life, of crown, of queen, at once dispatched’ (Hamlet: I, v, 74–5)." (88b.c)
"Time out of joint or the third synthesis of time is therefore empty, in the sense of lacking cardinal numbering, and pure, in the sense of lacking hierarchies associated with numbering. We can understand this disruption further by returning to Deleuze’s critique of Plato. In the Platonic context, time out of joint means that the ideal is removed from the circle; we therefore are left with simulacra with no principle of resemblance. For Hamlet, once | his father’s ghost has spoken, the numbering and legitimacy of kings is out of joint and his time becomes empty (there is no next numbered ruler) and pure (there is no legitimate ruler). Hamlet’s task is then to revenge his father by killing his uncle, thereby re-establishing numbered order and legitimacy based upon it." (88-89)Rather than cardinal, time becomes ordinal, pure ordering without orientation to that order. (89b) In the third synthesis, this ordering is a cut or caesura. Every present is a cut in the present into an ordering of before and after. (89c) "the third synthesis is static because its sole characteristic of order always remains the same, the before and after of each cut always remain." (89cd) "If novelty is accepted in any process (animal, vegetable, mineral) then a third synthesis of time is implied as condition for the new." (90a)
"Each point on the line has a set of points before and after it. This is not Deleuze’s model. Instead, the caesura is an event and has a depth to it. It is not instantaneous but rather must be considered with its effect on the points before and after it. This is why the caesura implies a drama: it divides time such that a drama is required to encompass this division. This event-like and dramatic division is in contrast with the thin logical point and set account of the line of time where an arbitrary point is taken on a line and every point before it is defined as before in time and every point after as after in time." (91b.c)
"the ensemble is rather a process of gathering and tearing apart. Why is this? It is because the whole of time is ordered, but it is ordered differently, that is, into before and after. The events of time are gathered in an ordering, but they are also torn apart, since some are irreparably before and others irreparably after the dividing event." (91d)
"A series is ordered by a dramatic event according to the following principles: ‘before’ is determined in accordance with the assembly of the line of time in an image operating as a symbol for that assembly. When the image is posed as ‘too great for me’ for a given event, then we have something before." (92b)We should not, as the English translation suggest, consider the action under consideration as being imagined. (92d) "However, the difficulty remains that Deleuze is referring to actions by subjects and to what certainly appears to be a conscious awareness of an image that is ‘too great for me’ is posed as ‘too great for me’ for a given event, then we have something before." (93b)
"the image is too great for the self, that is, for the underlying processes the subject is passive to. It exceeds those processes as past or before. None of this depends upon an empirical experience. It is rather a formal connection between processes of cutting, assembly and setting into series in relation to the future as novelty: As for the third time that uncovers the future: it signifies that the event and the action have a secret coherence that excludes the coherence of the self. It has become equal to them and they shatter it into thousands of pieces, as if the bearer of the new world were taken up and dissipated by the shattering of what it, in the multiple, gives birth to. The self is equal to the unequal in itself. (DRf, 121)" (93d)The cut, assembly, and serialization produces the future not as a dimension of the past and present. Williams then offers a helpful summary.
"The third synthesis of time, or pure and empty time, is a cut, an assembly, an ordering and a seriation. It is deduced as an a priori condition for action, which in simple terms claims that any novel action depends on a cut in time. This cut though must also assemble what comes either side of it. This assembly is itself dependent on a putting of time into an order of before and after the cut. The third synthesis of time is therefore a division of time and an ordering of time. This ordering though is also a seriation; it distinguishes the before and the after, rendering time asymmetrical. This complex third synthesis is the time of the future making the present and the past, which become dimensions of it, because the action it is posited upon is essentially determined by an open future. Neither the subject nor the self is a foundation for Deleuze’s philosophy, because in the third synthesis of time they are both ungrounded. The subject is divided by selves it is passive to. These selves though are shattered by the structure of the third synthesis that makes them past in relation to a future they cannot determine. All of these components of time are formal and deduced as necessary conditions for any novel action. So though Deleuze depends upon examples and vocabulary from drama to introduce and explain the third synthesis of time, this drama is strictly defined formally as the cut, assembly, ordering and seriation which can be explained by reference to Shakespearean drama but is not derived from it. As Deleuze insists all the way through his work on the third synthesis of time, it is a priori and not dependent on empirical observation." (94b.d)
"On the one hand, there are aspects shared by the two philosophies: a circular notion of time, a relation between a phenomenal world and a world of Ideas (the actual and the virtual in Deleuze), and the foundation of time through the past rather than the present (explaining the priority of reminiscence for Plato and the necessity of the second synthesis of time for Deleuze). " (84-85)Yet there are important differences between Deleuze and Plato. For Plato, the circle of time has layers of resemblance that culninate in the in-itself of the ideal. Things resemble the ideal, and they do so to more or less of a degree. If the soul can preserve the ideal or in-itself, it can escape the circle. "It does not return but is always the same ideal other things return to – to greater or lesser extent in relations of resemblance. In Deleuze’s circle, taken from Nietzsche’s eternal return, there will be no order of resemblance, no ideal or in itself and no escape through true knowledge." (85a)
"But each soul can return to the ideal or immortal part of its former incarnations through knowledge of the Idea, that is, through a return of the Idea as the same origin from which all phenomena decline. This means escaping the circle, because the ideal remains the same and hence does not revolve." (85b)The only things that revolve are things that resemble, the simulacra. Deleuze's pure past is a 'founding' rather than a 'foundation', because it is a process that allows the present to pass. Plato's
"still a present, because it is a present that has become past. However, it is not a present like any other, since all other presents | exist in relation to that foundation. So the present as foundation has to be a mythical present: ‘[. . .] the Idea is like the foundation from which successive presents are organised into the circle of time such that the pure past that defines it must necessarily still be expressed in terms of the present, as an ancient mythical present’ (DRf, 119)." (85-86)Thus
"Deleuze’s objection to Plato is then two-fold. First, the past becomes the ground for identity and representation in the circles of resemblance of presents to mythical present. Second, this mythical present subsumes the past itself to representation and identity, and thereby it turns the past back on to presents that it is supposed to found, in the sense of make pass or dissolve in terms of identity: ‘This is the insufficiency of the founding, to be relative to what it founds, to borrow the character of what it founds, and to be proven by them’ (DRf, 119)." (86a.b)
"This is because it is not the subject of the active conception that is directly passive, but rather, it is passive through a self positioned in time. The ‘I’ that conceives of the proposition is different from the ‘me’ positioned in time by being a living and sleeping thing. So now being is divided between an active subject and passive self where any action by the subject presupposes that self because the subject is only passively determinable in time through the self. A passive self is the condition for any active subject. The ‘I’ is therefore fractured or traversed by a fault line, because of the way the self is determinable in time" (81d)Deleuze concludes from this that the "I" is an other, which is the paradox of inner sense. (82b)
"The identity of the ‘I’ must therefore remain fractured through an ongoing process, and the self, as constituted by passivity, must not have a prior identity restricting this passivity, for instance, through the Kantian definition of receptivity." (84a)
"through his study of reminiscence, has shown how the past can be saved for us without reducing it to representations of a former age or to representations of our age (the past as how it could be). Instead, the past is given ‘as it was never lived, as a pure past revealing its double irreducibility to the present that it was, but also to the actual present that it could be, in favour of a telescoping of the two’ (DRf, 115)." (77c)Thus "Reminiscence shows that the past is lost and forgotten as a past present. It accepts it." (77c) But also, reminiscence takes both the past and present representation together, and makes a third image, and in this way saves the past. "It is in this special kind of forgetting and recreating that the past is lived with in forgetting." (77cd)
"‘condition’ has a different meaning to Deleuze’s. Bergson is not deducing a general transcendental condition for a formal process (such as the passing away of the present). Instead, like Deleuze, he is offering an alternative to the concept of cause, but unlike Deleuze, he is doing so in order to give an account of how each individual consciousness relates to its past as shown in the true operation of memory. This is where we can raise the question of the legitimacy of Deleuze’s work when compared with Bergson’s. What is the validity of an account of the past that does not base itself on a scientific account of causality (or some other contemporary candidate for explaining relations between states of affairs scientifically) but equally does not observe the operations of memory in detail or offer a full theory of memory in relation to consciousness, but instead constructs a speculative transcendental frame with abstract terms such as the pure past?" (68a.b)Williams now addresses a possible objection to Deleuze, "that he does not observe memory or consciousness in a thorough or consistent way." (68bc) Williams offers as an answer to this objection:
"He is not primarily concerned with human memory or consciousness, but rather in a general study of repetition in relation to time. He is not constructing a philosophy according to an empirical approach, but rather combining a minimal observational element with a series of transcendental deductions guided by a speculative conceptual frame." (68c)The way that repetition operates in the first synthesis is different from how it works in the second. In the first, repetition is based on a succession of elements that are contracted. In the second, repetition is found in "degrees of contraction of a whole ‘that is in itself a coexistent totality’ (DRf, 112)." (68d) [It does not seem here that Williams is thinking yet of the degrees as layers of the cone.]
"‘Nevertheless, we have the impression that, however strong the possible incoherence or opposition of successive presents, each one plays “the same life” at a different level. This is what we call destiny’ (DRf, 113)." (Deleuze qtd in Williams 69d)To explain [again, rather than turning here to the layers of the cone], Williams notes that we have durations of differing lengths, like the time we have to finish our coffee or our life as a father. These can be incoherent. To explain destiny, Williams writes: "This preliminary definition of destiny is explicitly loose and Deleuze is careful to point out that it is based on an ‘impression’, that the incoherence and opposition are ‘possible’." (70a)
"We are not free to change determined relations between actual presents. Here, changes in level and degree can be understood as changes in the intensities of distinctness and obscurity of relations in the pure past, that is, some relations in the past will be made more distinct as others become more obscure. For example, an act of atonement in the present can change nothing of the actual acts it seeks to atone for. It is free, though, to change the hold such acts have on new passing presents, perhaps by making them less significant in their relations to other events, or by making them more obscure and distant, and thereby diluting their hold on novel ones. Thus, to heap betrayal upon betrayal might increase the intensity of treach- | ery as a line leading from the past to the present, whereas to forgive might weaken it. Within Deleuze’s metaphysics, this freedom exists because the pure past makes all presents pass and coexists with them." (72-73)To distinguish the second synthesis with actual presents, Deleuze appeals to Kant's noumenal and Bergson's virtual. The pure past is virtual, not actual, and as the condition for the present's passage, it is noumenal. (73b) Deleuze's noumenal then is not like Kant's realm of things-in-themselves but rather a transcendental pure past, a "realm that all actual things determine and are determined by. It becomes a virtual and ideal realm as condition for all events and not just those of human memory." (73c)
"Since each one is a passing present, a life can take another on, at a different level: as if the philosopher and the pig, the criminal and the saint played the same past, at different levels of a giant cone. This is what is called metempsychosis. (DRf, 113)" (Deleuze qtd 74a)Williams explains: "for Deleuze, humans are not fully human until they express the pig within them and the true philosopher is one who is also or even foremost a fool." (74b)
"In material repetition, the synthesis of the living present or first synthesis of time, difference is subtracted, because a selection is made of a particular series within many differences. In ‘spiritual repetition’, the second synthesis of time, difference is included, because all differences are taken up, but at a particular level and degree." (74d)
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