Affection for Our Body Image. MM§1. Henri Bergson. Matter and Memory

Corry Shores

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Bergson, Entry Directory]

[Other entries in the Bergson Matter and Memory series]

[The following is summary; my commentary is in brackets. Texts are reproduced at the end. May I thank very much the sources:

web.archive.org

classiques.uqac.ca]

Affection for Our Body Image

Matter and Memory

Matière et mémoire

Ch.1

Of the selection of images for conscious presentation. What our body means and does.

De la sélection des images pour la représentation. - Le rôle du corps

§1 The unique place and function of the living body.

Bergson begins with this assumption. We have no knowledge of theories of matter or of spirit. And we know nothing of the discussion about reality and ideality or about the external world. We in the first place admit this: we are in the presence of images. We perceive them when our senses open-up to them. These images that we perceive seem to interact and be governed by laws, which would allow us to predict on the basis of current images which other ones should follow. "All these images act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which I call laws of nature, and, as a perfect knowledge of these laws would probably allow us to calculate and to foresee what will happen in each of these images, the future of the images must be contained in their present and will add to them nothing new" (1bc).

However, consider that one such image that we have is an image of our own bodies. It stands out absolutely from the rest, because we sense it from within by means of affections, and not externally by means of perceptions.

We have excitations caused from the outside. And as well we react with bodily movements executed as though we assumed they could have some effect on the final outcome of our experience. Our affections, then, find themselves interposed between one such externally-induced excitation and the movement that follows.

When we examine our affections more closely, we notice that they invite us to act, but also allow us to deliberate or do nothing. And we then notice evidence of this in certain movements which begin but end before they are executed. We also notice this sort of decision-inviting affection in other animals, when they alert other members of their species of a danger, by giving them a sort of sense-impression that provides them the information they need for escaping the danger. In this process, consciousness is there when we are having the sensations and when we take initiative to act. But as soon as our activities become automatic, consciousness is not longer needed, and it seems to fade away.

[What we notice from the above examination is that there is a sort of freedom involved in affections. They do not seem to be part of a deterministic chain of events.] "the act in which the affective state issues is not one of those which might be rigorously deduced from antecedent phenomena, as a movement from a movement; and hence it really adds something new to the universe and to its history" (2-3, emphasis mine). [But everything else in the world are images that seem to have deterministic relations; hence, we get the impression that] "in this aggregate of images which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except through the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished me by my body" (3a).

Bergson will consider what makes-up our bodies. We have nerves that transmit disturbances to our nerve centers. These inward-moving nerves are called afferent nerves. Then there are nerves that conduct the nervous disturbance from the centers to the periphery. These we call efferent nerves. They "set in motion parts of the body or the body as a whole" (3bc).

Psychologists have this to say about the purpose of these different nerves. The outward-moving (centrifugal) nervous disturbances cause our body or parts of it to move. The inward-moving (centripetal) ones (some at least) "give birth to the representation of the external world" [The translator notes that these representations are mental pictures, which are often perceptual in nature]. (3d)

Bergson ends by wondering what we should make of all this.

From the English translation:

WE will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of matter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of the external world. Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which I call laws of nature, and, as a perfect knowledge of these laws would probably allow us to calculate and to foresee what will happen in each of these images, the future of the images must be contained in their present and will add to them nothing new.

§1 The unique place and function of the living body

Yet there is one of them which is distinct from all the others, in that I do not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by affections : it is my body. I examine the conditions in which these affections are produced : I find that they always interpose themselves between the excitations that I receive from without and the move-

(2)

-ments which I am about to execute, as though they had some undefined influence on the final issue. I pass in review my different affections it seems to me that each of them contains, after its kind, an invitation to act, with at the same time leave to wait and even to do nothing. I look closer: I find movements begun, but not executed, the indication of a more or less useful decision, but not that constraint which precludes choice. I call up, I compare my recollections I remember that _ everywhere, in the organic world, I have thought I saw this same sensibility appear at the very moment when nature, having conferred upon the living being the power of mobility in space, gives warning to the species, by means of sensation, of the general dangers which threaten it, leaving to the individuals the precautions necessary for escaping from them. Lastly, I interrogate my consciousness as to the part which it plays in affection : consciousness replies that it is present indeed, in the form of feeling or of sensation, at all the steps in which I believe that I take the initiative, and that it fades and disappears as soon as my activity, by becoming automatic, shows that consciousness is no longer needed. Therefore, either all these appearances are deceptive, or the act in which the affective state issues is not one of those which might be rigorously deduced from antecedent phenomena, as a movement from a movement; and hence it really adds something new to

(3)

the universe and to its history. Let us hold to the appearances ; I will formulate purely and simply what I feel and what I see: All seems to take Place as if, in this aggregate o f images which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except through the medium o f certain particular images, the type o f which is furnished me by my body.

I pass now to the study, in bodies similar to my own, of the structure of that particular image which I call my body. I perceive afferent nerves which transmit a disturbance to the nerve centres, then efferent nerves which start from the centre, conduct the disturbance to the periphery, and set in motion parts of the body or the body as a whole. I question the physiologist and the psychologist as to the purpose of both kinds. They answer that as the centrifugal movements of the nervous system can call forth a movement of the body or of parts of the body, so the centripetal movements, or at least some of them, give birth to the representation[1] of the external world. What are we to think of this ?

From the original French:

Nous allons feindre pour un instant que nous ne connaissions rien des théories de la matière et des théories de l'esprit, rien des discussions sur la réalité ou l'idéalité du monde extérieur. Me voici donc en présence d'images, au sens le plus vague où l'on puisse prendre ce mot, images perçues quand j'ouvre mes sens, inaperçues quand je les ferme. Toutes ces images agissent et réagissent les unes sur les autres dans toutes leurs parties élémentaires selon des lois constantes, que j'appelle les lois de la nature, et comme la science parfaite de ces lois permettrait sans doute de calculer et de prévoir ce qui se passera dans chacune de ces images, l'avenir des images doit être contenu dans leur présent et n'y rien ajouter de nouveau. Pourtant il en est une qui tranche sur toutes les autres en ce que je ne la connais pas seulement du dehors par des perceptions, mais aussi du dedans par des affections : c'est mon corps. J'examine les conditions où ces affections se produisent : je trouve qu'elles viennent toujours s'intercaler entre des ébranlements que je reçois du dehors et des mouvements que je vais exécuter, comme si elles devaient exercer une influence mal déterminée sur la démarche finale. Je passe mes diverses affections en revue : il me semble que chacune d'elles contient à sa manière une invitation à agir, avec, en même temps, l'autorisation d'attendre et même de ne rien faire. Je regarde de plus près : je découvre des mouvements commencés, mais non pas exécutés, l'indication d'une décision plus ou moins utile, mais non pas la contrainte qui exclut le choix. J'évoque, je compare mes souvenirs : je me rappelle que partout, dans le monde organisé, j'ai cru voir cette même sensibilité apparaître au moment précis où la nature, ayant conféré à l'être vivant la faculté de se mouvoir dans l'espace, signale à l'espèce, par la sensation, les dangers généraux qui la menacent, et s'en remet aux individus des précautions à prendre pour y échapper. J'interroge enfin ma conscience sur le rôle qu'elle s'attribue dans l'affection : elle répond qu'elle assiste en effet, sous forme de sentiment ou de sensation, à toutes les démarches dont je crois prendre l'initiative, qu'elle s'éclipse et disparaît au contraire dès que mon activité, devenant automatique, déclare ainsi n'avoir plus besoin d'elle. Ou bien donc toutes les apparences sont trompeuses, ou l'acte auquel l'état affectif aboutit n'est pas de ceux qui pourraient rigoureusement se déduire des phénomènes antérieurs comme un mouvement d'un mouvement, et dès lors il ajoute véritablement quelque chose de nouveau à l'univers et à son histoire. Tenons-nous en aux apparences ; je vais formuler purement et simplement ce que je sens et ce que je vois : Tout se passe comme si, dans cet ensemble d'images que j'appelle l'univers, rien ne se pouvait produire de réellement nouveau que par l'intermédiaire de certaines images particulières, dont le type m'est fourni par mon corps.

J'étudie maintenant, sur des corps semblables au mien, la configuration de cette image particulière que j'appelle mon corps. J'aperçois des nerfs afférents qui transmettent des ébranlements aux centres nerveux, puis des nerfs efférents qui partent du centre, conduisent des ébranlements à la périphérie, et mettent en mouvement les parties du corps ou le corps tout entier. J'interroge le physiologiste et le psychologue sur la destination des uns et des autres. Ils répondent que si les mouvements centrifuges du système nerveux peuvent provoquer le déplacement du corps ou des parties du corps, les mouvements centripètes, ou du moins certains d'entre eux, font naître la représentation du monde extérieur. Qu'en faut-il penser ?

Bergson, Henri. Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit. Ed. Félix Alcan. Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Bailliere et Cie, 1903. Available online at: http://www.archive.org/details/matireetmmoiree01berggoog

- HTML available at [and text reproduction taken very gratefully from]:
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/bergson_henri/matiere_et_memoire/matiere_et_memoire.html

Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Transl. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004; originally published by George Allen & Co., Ltd.,London, 1912. Available online at: http://www.archive.org/details/mattermemory00berg

- Word Document available at [and text reproduction taken very gratefully from]:
http://web.archive.org/web/20060424080926/spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Bergson/Bergson_1911b/Bergson_1911_toc.html