Different Nows, Husserl, para 167-168, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

by Corry Shores
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Different Nows

Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

II

The Suspension of Objective Time, The Temporal Object, The Phenomenology of Objectivation and its Aporiae

No. 25 Adequate Memory. Earlier Perception. – Perception of the Past. Attemp (Aporia).

Why Is Fresh Memory Not Simply the Original Perception Continuing to Endure?

Perception of the Past. Attempt (Aporia)

Paragraph 167

What distinguishes the original perception from the later perception, from the perception that is present? Well, perception begins as a now. Each later perception has a different now. That is, the perceptual character differentiates itself, and a now corresponds to each difference. Each now is thus pushed back, and the new now is privileged, furnishing the reference point for the apprehension of the whole.

Paragraph 168

How do we know, then, that we have an enduring consciousness of the earlier now? Consciousness of duration: The content is continuously perceived, although this is to put matter too generally; rather, the perception continuously assumes a new character while the perception with the old character is still preserved. A better formulation is therefore the following: New perceptions arise continuously while the old remain preserved. (209b)

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Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.