21 Jun 2009

The Passing Time of Time-Past, para 27, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

by Corry Shores
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The Passing Time of Time-Past

Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

I "On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between 'Fresh' Memory and 'Full' Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time"

No. 2

Evidence Pertaining to the Perception of Time, to Memory, etc

Paragraph 27

Previously we discussed the immediate past. We hear a melody. The first note plays. Then the second. While we are aware of note number two, we are also aware of note one in its process of passing-away into the past.

Husserl wonders now about a more distant past. For example, yesterday we heard a melody. We recall it now. Each note plays again in our phantasy, just as we experienced it the day before. In this way, we obtain a sense of time’s flow, even though it is based on our reviewing an event in the more distant past.

If I remember something I experienced yesterday, I have a phantasy-representation of yesterday’s experienced event. I may reproduce in this representation the whole event consisting of various successive steps. In doing this, I have an apprehension of temporality. First one step is reproduced, then in definite sequence the second, and so on. (156c)

Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

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