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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.5 Stoic Logic

5.5.0 [introductory material]

Brief summary:

The Stoics regarded logic as being comprised of rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric deals with continuous speech, while dialectic deals with argument by means of question and answer. Logic and all its many subtopics are matters of logos / λόγος (reason, speech), which is the rational principle of causality in the cosmos and of right human action. Logos is also speech, and since humans have “internal speech”, they can think rationally about the logical sequence of things. Truth is a matter of correspondence between a statement, made on the basis of our “rational impressions,” and some specific event happening in the world. The Stoics in fact did not consider universals to be real things, and thus their logic was concerned primarily with particulars and almost never with universals, as in Aristotle’s logic.

Summary

5.5.0.1

[The Stoics regarded logic as being comprised of rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric deals with continuous speech, dialectic with argument by question and answer.]

For the Stoics, logic was a matter of rhetoric and dialectic.

The term ‘logic’ was used by the Stoics to refer to the branch of their philosophy which covered the subdisciplines of rhetoric and dialectic.⁹³

93. According to Bocheński, “the Stoics elaborated a refined semiotic theory ...” (1951: 80). According to Graeser, “it is a theory of meaning that has invited comparison with modern theories and obviously stood it well. In fact, it is generally agreed that the Stoic account of semantics is superior to and more sophisticated than the more influential one offered by Aristotle in the De Interpretatione (16a3-18)” (1978: 77).

(64)

But this combination of rhetoric and dialectic was not seen for example in Aristotle, who had no special term to include both (65). This dual signfiicance probably comes the Stoics’ adoption of the usage from Xenokrates. What characterizes rhetoric for the Stoics is that it “deals with continuous speech (Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1047A-B, SVF 2.297-298);’ however, what characterizes dialectic is that it is “argument by question and answer (Diog. Laert. VII,42)” (65). She continues:

Moreover, in a simile attributed to Zeno, dialectic is compared to a clenched fist, while rhetoric is compared to the hand spread out and extended, illustrating the compactness and brevity of dialectical discourse as opposed to rhetorical. This simile enjoyed some popularity in characterizing the two kinds of speech (λόγος, oratio) studied by the two arts of discourse in Antiquity, dialectic and rhetoric, respectively (Varro apud Cass. Inst. II,3,2; Isid. Etym. II,xxiii; Cic. De fin. II,6,17; Or. 32,113; Quint. Inst. or. II,20,7; Sen. Ep. 89, 17; Sext. Emp. Adv. math. II,7 = SVF 1.75).

(65)

[In his De finibus bonorum et malorum, which Luhtala cites, Cicero writes:

“That is the view of Zeno the Stoic,” I rejoined; “he used to say that the faculty of speech in general falls into two departments, as Aristotle had already laid down; and that Rhetoric was like the palm of the hand, Dialectic like the closed fist; because rhetoricians employ an expansive style, and dialecticians one that is more compressed.

(Cicero 1914: 99. II,6,17)

I also note an image form of this metaphor. John Bulwer’s Chirologia has a similar sort of picture on its title page. Samuel Howell writes regarding it:

Still another interesting thing about it is its illustrations, one of which precedes the title page and pictures “Eloquentia” as an open hand, “Logica” as a fist.

(Howell 341)

Below are images of this picture from Bulwer’s book [the detail is taken from the bottom right].

The title page of Howell’s book has its own adaptation of this image:

]

5.5.0.2

[Logic and all its many subtopics are matters of logos / λόγος (reason, speech), which is the rational principle of causality in the cosmos and of right human action. Logos is also speech, and since humans have ‘internal speech’, they can think rationally about the logical sequence of things.]

There is a wide range of subjects that fall under logic for the Stoics, including “formal logic, theory of knowledge, semantic and phonetic aspects of language, as well as stylistics, all of which had λόγος (‘reason’, ‘speech’) as their subject matter” (65). For the Stoics, reason and speech are united in the notion of λόγος. Reason is something found in “rational order of the universe” and in the “parallelism between cosmic events and human action in that both are manifestations of a causal relation of cause and effect” (65, see section 5.1.2). Furthermore, “One of the characteristics of the human being as a rational creature is the ability to use language, which is based on ‘internal speech’, and an understanding of the logical sequence of things.” (65).

5.5.0.3

[The Stoics did not see universals as being real, and thus Stoic logic is concerned with particulars rather than universals.]

A wise person has ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος), which means that the person can make true statements about actual states of affairs happening in the world. [The next idea seems to be that in Aristotelian logic, truth (or maybe proper inference) is a matter of the relations between terms, especially between universal terms, where for the Stoics it is a matter of correspondence between statements and events in the world. Let me quote, as I am guessing:]

A mature person, if he is a wise man, has ‘right reason’ (ὀρθὸς λόγος). This means that he is able to make statements which are demonstrably true about some actual events that are taking place. The fact that Stoic logic is primarily concerned with states of affairs involving particulars marks an important distinction from Aristotelian logic which deals with relations between terms and mainly with universal terms.

(66a, emphasis mine)

The Stoics, then, were interested in particulars and diminished the importance of universals,

claiming that they are merely figments of our imagination.⁹⁸

98. Diogenes Laertius attributes to Zeno the doctrine that concepts (ἐννόημμ) are neither somethings nor qualifeid but figments of the soul which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified (Diog. Laert. VII,60-61). Stobaeus adds that these concepts are what the old philosophers called Idea (Ecl. 1,136,21-137,6 = SVF 1.65). Like the Megarian Stilpo, Zeno wanted to remove the incorporeal Idea from the centre of philosophy (Rist 1978: 395).

(66)

In fact, universals do not even fit within the Stoics’ ontological scheme and instead are considered “not-somethings.⁹⁹” [Footnote 99: According to Simplicius, Chrysippus too raised the question of whether the Idea can be called a this something’ (In Ar. cat. 105,8-16 = SVF 2.278). Syrianus attributes to the Stoic school in general the view that only particulars exist (In Ar. met. 104,17-21 = SVF 2.361). For the ontological scheme of the Stoics, see Long & Sedley (1987: 163) as well as table 1 on page 85.] (66) Thus “In Chrysippean logic propositions are usually made concerning individuals and the prototypical subject is represented by a definite pronoun” (66).

5.5.0.4

[For Stoics, logic deals with rational discourse, and rhetoric more specifically is about speaking well and dialectic about discovering truth by means of correct statements regarding real world events that are based on our rational impressions.]

Stoic logic for the most part deals with rational discourse in general. Both rhetoric and dialectic are matters of speaking well (66), but dialectic was “associated with the discovery of truth” (67). Truth for the Stoics is both a logical and an epistemological issue. It is logical in that “truth is discovered by means of correct statements about real world events”, and it is epistemological, because these correct statements “are based on what are known as ‘rational impressions’ (λογιὴ φαντασία)” (67). But Chrysippus also defined dialectic in accordance with a two-fold theory of meaning “as the doctrine of σημαίνοντα (“that which signifies”) and σημαινόμενα (“that which is signified”) (Diog. Laert. VII,62)” (67).

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

[Note, for “Cic. De fin.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Cicero’s De finibus.]

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

Graeser, Andrea. 1978. “The Stoic Theory of Meaning”. Rist (1978: 77-100).

Bocheński, Innocentius M. 1951. Ancient Formal Logic. Studies in Logic and the Foundation of Mathematics. Amsterdam: North- Holland Publishing Co.

[Note, for “Isid. Etym.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Isidorus’ Etymologiae.]

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plutarch: De Stoicis repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos in Plutarchi Moralia V.1 .2. Ed. by Ma Pohlenz. Leipzig: Teubner 1972.

Quintilian: M. Fabi Quintiliani Institutionis Ortorae libri duodecim. Ed. by Michael Winterbottom. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1970.

Rist, John M. 1978. (ed.) The Stoics. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Rist, John M. “Zeno and the Origins of Stoic Logic”. Brunschwig (1978: 387-400).

Seneca: Ad Lucilium epistulae morales. Ed. by Leighton D. Reynolds. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965.

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

Simplicius: In Arstotelis Categoras Commentarium. CAG VIII. Ed. by Carl Kalbﬂeisch. Berlin: Reimer 1907.

[Note, for “Stobaeus ... Ecl.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Stobaeus’ Ἐκλογαί / Eclogae physicae et ethicae.]

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

Syrianus: In Metaphysica commentaria. CAG VI.1. Ed. Wilhelm Kroll. Berlin: Reimer 1902 .

[Note, I do not know what “Varro apud Cass. Inst.” refers to. Perhaps it is simply Cassiodorus’ Institutiones. I could not find what it might be in the Bibliography.]

Texts I refer to:

Bulwer, John. 1644. Chirologia / Chironomia. London: Harper. PDF available at: https://archive.org/details/gu_chirologianat00gent

Bulwer image from: Folger Shakespeare Library.

http://luna.folger.edu/luna/servlet/detail/FOLGERCM1~6~6~651682~144325:Chirologia--or-The-naturall-languag#

Cicero. 1914. De finibus bonorum et malorum. With English translation by H. Rackham. London: Heinemann. / New York: Macmillan. PDF available at: https://archive.org/details/definibusbonoru02cicegoog

Howell, Samuel. 1961. Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. New York: Russell & Russell. Available at: https://archive.org/details/logicandrhetoric0 11815mbp.

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-in-ch-55.html

3 Feb 2017

Luhtala (5.4) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Evaluation”, summary

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[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.4 Evaluation

Brief summary:

Stoic logic did not catch on, partly due to its focus on linguistics. It was overshadowed by Peripatetic logic until the 20th century. Only recently has it gained the respect and attention it deserves.

Summary

5.4.1

[Stoic logic’s focus on linguistic issues led to it not being widely adopted.]

Stoic logic never really caught on in ancient Greece. In fact, it was heavily criticized by other ancient thinkers. Galen for example “accused the Stoics for paying more attention to linguistic expressions than to what they meant (Inst. log. 11,5ff.)” (64).

5.4.2

[Even though the majority of Chrysippus’ works are on logic, most preserved quotations from his texts are in his other topics.]

“Chrysippus devoted more than a third of his books to logic (262 books as opposed to 443 on others) (Gould 1970: 47).” Nonetheless, only 76 of his quotations regarding logic have been preserved, while 400 others on his ethics and physics were preserved (65).

5.4.3

[Stoic logic has for long been overshadowed by Peripatetic logic and only recently has gained the attention and respect it deserves.]

This neglect of Stoic logic has continued up to the 20th century, as Peripatetic logic received the bulk of attention. Only recently has it gained the respect and attention it deserves (64).

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

[Note, I did not see Galen’s Institutio Logica in the Bibliography list. Perhaps it is a part of the text that is listed:

Galen. Gelaeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Edition, translation and Commentary by Phillip de Lacy. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum. V.4.1.2. Berlin: Academie-Verlag 1978-80.

]

Gould, Josiah B . 1970. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Leiden: E. J. Brill / Albany: State University of New York Press.

Luhtala (5.3) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Sources”, summary

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Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.3 Sources

Brief summary:

There are no original sources of Stoic logic, and the second-hand sources are often unreliable.

Summary

5.3.1

[There are no original sources for Stoic logic. Diogenes Laertius is the best second-hand source, followed by Sextus Empiricus, Galen, and sparse references in logical and grammatical texts.]

All our primary sources for Stoic logic have been lost. We instead have late and fragmentary sources. The most important of these comes from Diogenes Laertius, and his is the only source that provides a systematic overview of Stoic logic (62). The next best sources are from Sextus Empiricus and Galen, although this material is less substantial. And besides these sources, there are only sparse fragments “in various grammatical and logical manuals” (62). But for the purposes of this book, Luhtala will examine “the entire framework of Stoic philosophy” (62).

5.3.2

[Our earliest texts regarding Stoicism as a whole body of thought come later in the 1st century AD.]

“The evidence for Stoicism as a whole is late, the best documented authors being Seneca (1st cent. A.D.), Epictetus (1st/2nd cent. A.D .)and Marcus Aurelius (2nd cent. A.D.)” (62). [Perhaps Luhtala is saying that our earliest sources that speak of Stoicism as a whole system of thinking are those mentioned.] These authors however were not interested in Stoic logic or physics but more so in Stoic ethics. Our knowledge of early and middle period Stoicism comes mainly from Plutarch.

5.3.3

[We should not be too trusting of our sources, as many were hostile toward Stoicism.]

We cannot entirely trust these sources, as many, like Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch, were hostile toward Stoicism, and also, “many of those who report on logical doctrine are not genuinely interested in logic” (62). There are other problems, like the incorrect use of terminology attributed to Stoicism but instead meant with Peripatetic or Platonic meanings (63).

5.3.4

[Given this situation, common practice is to regard all Stoic logic as Chrysippean logic.]

Given the lack of sources for other Stoics’ logical thinking, “The generally accepted practice is to assume that all Stoic accounts reproduce essentially Chrysippean views or views which he would have approved (Long 1974: 114; Frede 1974b: 9-10)” (63).

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

Frede, Michael. 1974b. Die stoische Logik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschafen in Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, 88).

Long, Anthony A. 1974. Hellenistic Philosophy. London, New York: Charles Scribner’s sons.

Luhtala (5.2) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Chrysippus, the Founder of Stoic Logic”, summary

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Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.2 Chrysippus, the Founder of Stoic Logic

Brief summary:

Chrysippus’ great contribution to Stoic logic is of notable historical importance. He thought logic was the means by which all other studies can be conducted.

Summary

5.2.1

[Chrysippus altered the course of Stoic philosophy.]

Chrysippus altered the course of Stoic philosophy, but we are not exactly sure how (59).

5.2.2

[Chrysippus’ major contribution was in logic, which he thought to be the means by which all other things are studied.]

Chrysippus’ contribution to Stoic philosophy is especially notable in the field of logic. In fact, “he has correctly been called the founder of Stoic logic” (59). He was the first to give a systematic account of logic and to deal with it in great detail (59). His work in logic became standard for the Stoics (59). Chrysippus favored logic so highly because it was the means to do all the other sorts of studies (60).

It is said that Chrysippus ascribed such enormous importance to the study of logic for the same reason as one examines the measure before measuring the grain; logic is that with which one distinguishes and examines things other than logic (Epict. Diss. 1,17,10 = SVF 2.54). Through the study of logic one comes to understand thoroughly the standard of other things (Epict. Diss. I, 17,8).

(60)

5.2.3

[Chrysippus’ logic was influenced by the Peripatetic school.]

Chrysippus’ logic was not influenced by the Megarians, as his predecessors were, but rather it seems by the Peripatetic school (60).

5.2.4

[Chrysippus’ contemporaries and successors were much less dedicated to logic.]

“Chrysippus's contemporaries and successors did not abandon the study of logic, though their interest in logical issues was far less lively” (60).

5.2.5

[The study of logic was most prominent during the early period when Chrysippus lived, and much less so in the Middle and Late Stoa periods.]

“The study of logic did not fnd favour with the representatives of the Middle and Late Stoa” (61). Stoicism later become prominant in Rome, but there the concerns were more with ethics (61).

5.2.6

[Chrysippus’ importance was widely well known in the ancient world.]

Many other philosophers, including Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Clement of Alexandria, Cicero, and Martianus Capella, all revered Chrysippus. And “The crucial role of Chrysippus is reflected in that the writers who attacked the school – Plutarch, Galen and Alexander Aphrodisias – aimed their polemic first and foremost at Chrysippus (Gould 1970: 13; cf. von Arnim, RE III: 2506 )” (61).

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

[Note, I did not see Epictetus’ Discourses in the bibliography.]

Gould, Josiah B . 1970. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Leiden: E. J. Brill / Albany: State University of New York Press.

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

.ss

Luhtala (5.1) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “The Unity of Stoic Philosophy”, summary

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Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.1 The Unity of Stoic Philosophy

Brief summary:

Stoic philosophy is composed of a unified system where its three main branches – ethics, logic, and physics – are of equal priority in the system itself. They are all concerned with logos or reason, and more specifically with consequence, understood physically, logically, or ethically. Nonetheless, the Stoics thought that logic should be learned first.

Summary

5.1.1

[The Stoics had a unified system where none of the main branches, namely, ethics, logic, and physics, had a greater priority. However, they thought that logic should be learned first.]

Luhtala notes that “The Stoics divided the study of philosophy into logic, ethics and physics maintaining a vital interconnection between these three parts of their study (Diog. Laert. VII,39-40, Adv. math. VII, 19)” (57, note, the second cited text is Sextus Empiricus). The Stoics had a unified philosophical system (57) in the sense that “the study of its various parts were inextricably linked to each other” (58). The ultimate goal of Stoic education was ethics. But the study of ethics “was firmly integrated with the study of physics and logic” (58). In fact, there is no real hierarchy among the subdivisions of philosophy for the Stoics, and so, they were mixed together when teaching them (58). Nonetheless, there was overall a general order still that the subdivisions were taught in. One order was: logic, physics, then ethics. Another: logic, ethics, then physics. There could have been that different teachers taught one or the other order, or perhaps there was just one order, and our sources are confused (58). But above all, linguistic study was the most important:

The importance of linguistic study in philosophical education is even separately stressed by Diogenes: “For all things are intuited by means of investigation in language, both the subject matter of natural science and that of ethics”.⁸²

82. πάντα γὰρ τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῆς ἐν λόγοις θεωρίας ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅσα τε τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου τυγχάνει καὶ αὖ πάλιν ὅσα τοῦ ἠθικοῦ (εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν) (Diog. Laert . VII,83).

(58)

5.1.2

[Logic, physics, and ethics are all concerned with the same issue, reason (logos). Logic is concerned with consequence relations between propositions, physics with causal relations between events, and ethics with making actions harmonious, perhaps on the basis of their consequences.]

Logic, physics, and ethics all share the same subject-matter, namely, the rational universe (58).

The subject-matter of logic, physics and ethics is one thing, the rational universe, considered from three different but mutually consistent points of view; this is because nature as a whole is informed by reason, | λόγος (Long 1974: 19).

(58-59)

[The next idea seems to be the following. Human action is guided by reason or logos. It is the same logos that guides the universe. To understand what is right conduct in the world, we need to understand the logos underlying the causal events in the world, so that we can work reasonably with the real way things are, and we need to understand our relation to the universe, because we are inserting our activity into it and affecting its causal chains. Let me quote, as I may have misunderstood the reasoning.]

Human actions are related to cosmic events in being manifestations of one and the same λόγος (‘reason’) and the question of right conduct could not be settled without understanding the relation of man to the universe and its causal processes (Sandbach 1975: 14).
(59)

Luhtala then quotes Bréhier, who notes that the logos is found in logical consequence, physical causality, and harmonious human activity. [I am not sure I understand the parallel in ethics, but perhaps the notion of consequences for certain actions is involved.]

They [the various parts of Stoic philosophy] are indissolubly linked together since it is one and the same reason which in dialectic binds consequential propositions to antecedents, which in nature establishes a causal nexus and which in conduct provides the basis for perfect harmony between actions ... it is impossible to realize rationality independently in these three spheres. (Brehier 1931 1: 299, tr. by Long 1974: 120)
(59, quoting Bréhier, bracketed insertion mine)

But it is the unity of Stoic philosophy and the primacy of its linguistic concerns that will concern us mostly here (59).

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

Brehier, Emile. 1931. Histoire de la philosophie. Vol. I. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Fance.

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

Long, Anthony A. 1974. Hellenistic Philosophy. London, New York: Charles Scribner’s sons.

Sandbach, Fancis H. 1975. The Stoics. Ancient Culture and Society. London: Chatto & Windus.

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

.ss

Luhtala (5.0) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “[introductory material]”, summary

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Summary of

Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.0 [introductory material]

Brief summary:

There are three major Stoic philosophers: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Zeno was influenced by the Cynics, Crates, Xenocrates, and the Megarian dialecticians. Cleanthes had some interest in logic. But Chrysippus made an enormous contribution to Stoic logic. Yet, some other Stoics stood against the study of logic.

Summary

5.0.1

[The founder of Stoicism is Zeno of Citium, who was influenced by the Cynics, Crates, Xenocrates, and the Megarian dialecticians.]

The founder of Stoicism is Zeno of Citium (333/332-262/261 B.C.). He began his teaching around 300 B.C. at the Porticoes [or the “stoa”], and he “was familiar with the teaching of several philosophical schools active in Athens at the time” (55). Among his influences are the Cynics, Crates, and Xenocrates. He also probably studied logic under the Megarian dialecticians (55).

5.0.2

[Zeno and other early Stoics were probably interested in parts of speech and syntax, but we do not have the details.]

It was not logic but ethics that Zeno was most interested in. However, a number of his lost works have titles that are related to linguistics (56). There are more clues that Zeno and other early Stoics were interested in syntax.

A passage attributed to Zeno by Epictetus suggests that a fundamental importance was assigned to linguistic aspects in all philosophical inquiry by the Stoics even at this early stage. According to this fragment, the philosopher's activity consists in “knowing the elements of speech (στοιχεῑα λόγου),⁷⁵what each of them is like, how they fit together and what follows from them” (IV,8,12 = SVF 1.51).⁷⁶Something like the doctrine of the parts of speech and their ‘syntax’ seems to have played a part in early Stoic philosophy but we are here in the realm of speculation.

75. Στοιχεῑα λόγου is an equivalent for the more standard μέρη του λόγου, ‘parts of speech’.

76. θεωρήματα τοῡ φιλοσόφου ... ἃ Ζήνων λέγει, γνῶναι τὰ τοῡ λόγου στοιχεῑα, nοῑόντι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι χαὶ πῶς ἁρμόττεται nρὸς ἄλληλα χαὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθά ἐστι (tr. Long 1974: 111).

(56. From the bibliography, page 204:

Long, Anthony A. 1974. Hellenistic Philosophy. London, New York: Charles Scribner’s sons.
)

5.0.3

[The second leader of the Stoic school is Cleanthes, who was interested in logic.]

The second main leader of the Stoic school is Cleanthes. From the titles of his lost works, we see that along with his interests in natural philosophy and theology, he was also concerned with logic, including the notion of λεκτόν (‘sayable’), which he used “in its typically Stoic technical sense as referring to the predicate” (56, citing Clem. Strom. VIII, 9,26,4. From the Bibliography page 197: Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata. Ed. by Otto Stählin. Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte II-III. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1960-70.).

5.0.4

[Chrysippus is the third leader of the Stoic school, and he made an enormous contribution to Stoic logic.]

The third leader of the Stoic school is Chrysippus. What is notable about him is that logic took on a real importance in his thinking (57). Diogenes Laertius attributes to Chrysippus over three hundred works dealing with language. Many involve topics on the theory of meaning, including the issues of propositions, predicates, cases, and the elements of speech. And, “They also reveal the existence of a theory of meaning as set out in terms of the components of σημαίνοντα (‘that which signifies’) and σημαινόμενα (‘that which is signified’), which is standardly understood as Stoic logic” (57). Chrysippus’ contribution to Stoic logic was so great that Stoic logic for the most part has come to be understood as Chrysippean logic (57). He seems also to have broken from Aristotelian logic (57).

5.0.5

[Some Stoics were against the study of logic.]

But not all Stoics thought highly of logic. For example, Aristo of Chion thought that studying logic was futile and even harmful (57).

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

Luhtala, On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, entry directory [newer]

by Corry Shores

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Luhtala (CBS) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, collected brief summaries

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Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Ch.5 The Stoics

5.0

[introductory material]

5.1

The Unity of Stoic Philosophy

5.2

Chrysippus, the Founder of Stoic Logic

5.3

Sources

5.4

Evaluation

5.5

Stoic Logic

5.5.0

[introductory material on Stoic logic]

5.5.1

Rational Impressions

5.5.2

The Components of Expression (Σημαίνοντα) and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

5.5.3

Parts of Speech

5.5.4

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

5.5.4.0

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

5.5.4.1

The Notion of Self-Sufficiency (Αὐτοτέλεια)

5.5.4.2

Compound Predicates and the Notion of Action

5.5.4.3

Stoic Predicate Types

5.5.4.4

Πτῶσις (‘Case’)

5.5.4.5

Stoic versus Peripatetic Notion of Subject

5.5.4.6

The Status of Case (Πτῶσις) as Sayable (Λεκτόν)

5.5.4.7

The Proposition

5.5.4.8

Simple Propositions

5.5.4.9

The Pronoun

5.6

Stoic Physics

5.6.0

[introductory material on Stoic Physics]

5.6.1

Corporeals in Stoic Physics

5.6.2

Action and Undergoing Action in Stoic Physics

[The older entry directory for this book is here, but it links to previous versions of the summaries.]

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

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On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

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Sambursky (1.4) Physics of the Stoics, “The Four Categories”, selective summary

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[The following is a selective summary, meaning that I select certain ideas to discuss rather than thoroughly summarize the text. All bracketed commentary and boldface is mine. Proofreading is incomplete, so you will encounter distracting typos. I apologize in advance.]

Samuel Sambursky

Physics of the Stoics

Ch.1

The Dynamic Continuum

1.4 The Four Categories

Selective summary

Brief summary [of selected ideas]:

The Stoics held that all things can be metaphysically classified under four hierarchical categories, all of which fall under the concept of the something. In their consecutive order they are: substratum, quality, state, and relative state. The fourth category is divided into two subcategories. {a} A relative state, which is defined by something outside it, like the father-son relation. And {b} a relative, which is something capable of undergoing change between states by matters of degree that are measure by comparing the two states, like being at a level of two degrees of sweetness compared to bitterness. A hexis is an example of a relative, because it is comprised of pneumata that each express a quality such that a continuous variation in the composition of the pneuma will result in a continuous variation in its quality. The four categories fit within the Stoic theory of the dynamic continuum. The substratum is the pneuma which binds the parts of all things and which endows them with qualities. The qualities are determined by the [physical] states of the pneuma, which are always in relative states, given that they are constantly under variation as their pneumata alter their compositions.

Selective summary

Sambursky will now consider a methodological principle of the Stoics, called the Stoic doctrine of categories, which is directly relevant to their physical theory and which “was possibly developed first to fit the conceptual frame of physics and later generalized as a directive for other fields of scientific and philosophical thought” (17). Although they are called “categories”, they share nothing in common with Aristotle’s categories that classify concepts. The categories are not systematized hierarchically in the sense that the categories are not subclassifications of a higher notion. [I am not certain if this is related, but it reminds me of Henry Somers-Hall’s account of how there is no highest genus of being for Aristotle. See section 1.3 of his guide to Difference and Repetition. There he writes, “the ultimate categories through which being is understood must be multiple, as they themselves are species in relation to the undefined genus” (Somers-Hall 27)].

Aristotle’s ten categories⁸²are an attempt – in accordance with a principle not known to us – to compile a list of concepts such that every word of non-compounded meaning can be shown to belong to one of them. This list thus forms a horizontal classification. In other words-the various points of view from which one can look at objects are regarded by Aristotle as a group of co-ordinated notions not bound together by a higher notion embracing all of them.

82. Substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, affection.

(17)

The Stoic’s four categories, in contrast, “are a vertical classification according to which every object is determined by four successive steps of increasing specification such that every category includes the preceding one” (17). By means of this system, one can provide a “complete ontological definition of an object” (17). Now, although there are four categories, there is a notion that comprises all four, namely, the something. Under it are substratum, quality, state, and relative state (17). [Sambursky here cites in footnote 83: “Simpl., Categ., 66, 32 f.; Plotin, loc. cit., VI, i, 25: ὑποκείμενον, ποιόν, πως ἒχον, πρός τί πως ἒχον.” Refering to footnote 60 on page 11: “60. Plotin, Ennead., II, vii.”]

We can relate the categories to the conceptual structure underlying the Stoic’s notion of the physical continuum. [The first category, substratum, is the pneuma. The second category, qualities, arise when the pneuma, which is by itself quality-less, mixes with matter. The third category, state, corresponds to the ratio of Air and Fire making up the pneumata of an object’s hexis and determining its qualities. The sum total of all the pneumata constituting the hexis defines the thing’s physical state. I am not sure if this is the fourth category, relative state. There is a subdivision of this state into two sorts of relations: relative state and the relative. The relative state is defined by something outside it, like the father-son relation. A relative is something capable of undergoing change between states by matters of degree that are measure by comparing the two states, like being at a level of two degrees of sweetness compared to bitterness. I am not sure I follow the next idea. It seems to be the following. Hexis is an example of a relative. The hexis of a thing is the mixture of its pneumata, with each of which expressing one of its qualities and the entire mixture also serving to actively cohere the parts together. Now, if the pneumata alter their composition, they will do so continuously, thereby altering the property they carry continuously. Hexis, it would then seem, is a relative but in a more general sense, because a hexis would seem to contain a variety of relatives, that is, a varied set of many different continuously changeable qualities.]

If we look at the conceptual structure of the physical continuum as we have come to know it in the preceding pages, we perceive a striking analogy with the set-up of the Stoic categories. Shapeless and passive matter is the primary substratum of the cosmos and as such without any qualities.⁸⁷It is the all-pervading pneuma which, by totally mixing with matter, imbues it with all its qualities,³⁹and thus represents the second category. The third category, the state, is given by the fact that to each specific quality of the body there is attributed a specific mixture of the pneuma defined by a certain proportion of its two components, air and fire. The sum total of all pneumata permeating the body then defines its physical state. There is a lack of consistency in the extant sources with regard to terminology. Thus we find no direct reference to hexis as a physical state, but Alexander once mentions the “physical property of a body”, which is much the same as hexis, and calls it “pneuma in a certain state”.⁸⁸Hexis, however, is mentioned expressly in connection with the fourth category, and the passage in Simplicios referring to it⁸⁹is of great significance for the understanding of the whole subject. Simplicios informs us of a subdivision of the fourth category: the Stoics distinguished between two kinds of relations, the relative state⁹⁰ and the relative⁹¹. The first denoted a state defined by that of another thing outside it, such as the relation father-son or left- and right-hand neighbour. The relative referred to things capable of change (the examples given are sweet and bitter), whereby | the relation is given through comparison of two states of this change (e.g. two degrees of sweetness) . Simplicios quotes hexis as another example of the relative which throws into relief the dynamic notion of Stoic physics, because hexis is the key term of the physical continuum which embraces an infinity of different states. Each of these states can evolve from another by a continuous transition produced through the “change of the former quality”,⁹²a change which corresponds to that of the spectrum of all pneuma tensions permeating the body involved.

87. Diog. Laert., VII, 137.

[Footnote 39 is on page 7:

39. Plut., De Stoic. repugn., 1053 f.
]
88. Alex. Aphr., Topica. 360, 10.

89. Simpl., Categ., 165, 32-166, 29.

90. πρός τί πως ἔχον.

91. πρός τι.

92. Galen, Method. med., I, 6 (Arnim, II, 494) .

(18-19)

From:

Sambursky, Samuel. 1973. Physics of the Stoics. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood. [First published 1959, London: Routledge and Kagen Paul.]

Or if otherwise noted:

Somers-Hall, Henry. 2013. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University.

2 Feb 2017

Sambursky (1.3) Physics of the Stoics, “The Problem of Mixture”, selective summary

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Samuel Sambursky

Physics of the Stoics

Ch.1

The Dynamic Continuum

1.3 The Problem of Mixture

Selective summary

Brief summary [of selected ideas]:

Pneumata combine with substantial parts, binding them together, to compose whole things and to provide them with their qualities. We can characterize the sort of mixture pneumata make with physical parts as being a special kind of mixture that the Stoics invented. Note first that they regarded there being three types of mixtures. {1} Mingling or mechanical mixtures, which are granular in that its smallest parts sit side by side like a mosaic. {2} Fusions, which are like chemical compounds where the properties of the component parts are lost, while the new whole compound gains its own unique properties. {3} Mixtures proper (krasis for liquids and mixis for non-liquids), where the components interpenetrate entirely and thoroughly such that there is no mosaic-like distribution on the smallest scale. Yet somehow despite this constituent homogeneity, each part retains its own properties and can be separated out again. This is the sort of mixture pneumata make with the other physical parts of a thing so to form its hexis.

Selective summary

[Recall that pneuma is has a two-fold function. On the one hand, it is the binding force that coheres the parts of the world. Here there is a mixture of pneuma with inert matter. On the other hand, it itself is composed of a mixture, being a combination of Fire and Air. See section 1.1 and section 1.2.]

We are thus led to the conclusion that the Stoic theory of hexis was based in a double sense on the process of mixture. On the one hand, mixture of pneuma with inert matter imbues the latter with physical properties, whereas pneuma itself, on the other hand, is a mixture of two components, fire and air. This easily explains the fact that the Stoics were occupied to such a large extent by the problem of mixture [...].

(11)

The sources of the Stoic theory of mixtures “are of a fragmentary nature;” nonetheless, “they give us some idea of how the Stoic view on mixture was heavily influenced by their extreme notions of continuity and their basic assumptions concerning the function of the pneuma” (11).

In the Stoic theory of mixtures, there are three types. {1} Mingling or mechanical mixture. An example is if we mix wheat and barley. It is characterized as having a “mosaic-like composition”. Its basic parts stand side-by-side rather than interpenetrating one another: “it applies essentially to bodies of a granular structure where a mosaic-like mixture results, each particle of one component being surrounded by particles of the other” (12). It is thus not homogeneous on the smallest scale, although on larger scales it might appear as homogeneous (11-12). {2} Fusion. Here the parts synthetically form a new substance altogether, like chemical compounds. The individual properties of each component are lost, as their compound gains its own new unique properties (12). {3} Mixture proper (krasis for liquids and mixis for non-liquids). This is the most important sort of blending for the Stoics. All the components interpenetrate completely and thoroughly. They retain their own properties, and they can be separated out again (12). [See this summary from John Sellars Stoicism on these mixture types.]

Between these two types lies a third case of “mixture” proper | (krasis for liquids, mixis for non-liquids) which, from the Stoic point of view, represents the most important category of blending. Here a complete interpenetration of all the components takes place, and any volume of the mixture, down to the smallest parts, is jointly occupied by all the components in the same proportion, each component preserving its own properties under any circumstances, irrespective of the ratio of its share in the mixture. The properties are preserved in all cases where – as opposed to the case of fusion – the components can be separated out again from the mixture by physical contrivances.

(12-13)

Using current terminology, we might call krasis a solution or a suspension (13). Even a minute portion of one part into a large portion of another can result in the smaller part thoroughly spreading throughout the larger part, keeping its properties, like a drop of wine in the whole sea, where that wine’s properties then are imbued throughout the entirety of the sea.

On the whole, krasis would apply to what in the language of today is called a mixture in any of the three phases, or to a solution or a suspension. Of special interest to the Stoics were, of course, cases of extreme dilution or rarefaction, because they regarded the pneuma which permeates bulky matter without losing its properties as one of these cases. Chrysippos, obviously referring to the passage in Aristotle quoted above,⁶³ stresses this point with deliberate exaggeration: “There is nothing to prevent one drop of wine from mixing with the whole sea.”⁶⁷

63. loc. cit., 328 a 27.

[Referring to footnote 56 on page 11:

56. Arist., De genr. et corr., I, 10.

]

67. Plut., loc. cit., 1078 e.

[Referring to footnote 59 on page 11:
59. Plut., De com. not., ch. 37.
]
(13)

This Stoic notion of mixture proper was misunderstood by other philosophers, who thought that the Stoics were claiming that to add to one cup of wine with two parts of water would result in four parts of mixture instead of three. This is because the one cup of wine, now mixing with the water, becomes two cups of wine, which when added to the original two cups of water, makes a total of four cups of mixture. [From Plutarch’s On Common Notions Against the Stoics: “But to the Stoics it is a matter of truth, that when one cup of wine is mixed with two of water, if it is not to be lost but the mixture is to be equalized, it must be extended through the whole and be confounded therewith, so as to make that which was one two by the equalization of the mixture. For the one remains, but is extended as much as two, and thus is equal to the double of itself. Now if it happens in the mixture with two to take the measure of two in the diffusion, this is together the measure both of three and four,—of three because one is mixed with two, and of four because, being mixed with two, it has an equal quantity with those with which it is mixed. ” (Plutarch 411. Also, Perseus Project. See as well the beginning of this summary on the Plutarch text for more discussion.)]

Plutarch, giving an account of the Stoic theory of mixture, also reveals in his criticism a complete lack of understanding of the nature of dilution. According to the Stoics, he says, one measure of wine mixed with two measures of water should give four measures of mixture, as the wine will extend into the whole volume occupied by the water.⁷¹
71. Plut., De comm. not., 1078 a.

(14)

[So that is a form of misunderstanding of the theory rather than a valid criticism.] The main reason that the Stoic’s theory was rejected was because of its notion of “total mixture:” the mixture means that it is homogeneous even at the smallest parts. Now, if the parts retain their properties, but the mixture is thoroughly homogeneous, implying that the smallest parts do not lie side by side, then how are they arranged instead? One conclusion was that they superposed, thereby destroying volume. [So one cup of wine plus two water will result in two cups of mixture, but we know that not to be true.] Plotinus however notes that since the parts retain their properties, and since volume is a property, the volume would not be destroyed in the combination.

But the Stoics, taking a radical position with regard to continuity, conceived of mixture as a complete interpenetration of the components which existed simultaneously in the given proportions down to the most minute elements of volume. This conception of total mixture was understood by them in the sense that every element of volume, however small, would be homogeneous with regard to the mixing of the components, and that from no point on would this homogeneity dissolve itself into a mosaic-like structure with bits of the components lying side by side. Alexander Aphrodisiensis and all the later critics – with one exception – saw in this notion of total mixture an infringement upon the principle that one body cannot occupy the place occupied by another. Their view was⁵⁸that complete interpenetration of bodies must necessarily lead to the volume of the mixture not being the sum of the volumes of the components, but instead it would remain constant as compared with the volume of the largest of the components.⁷³ Plotin⁷⁴gives a two-dimensional picture in explanation: Total mixture would be comparable not to the juxtaposition of two (material) lines drawn side by side – which would mean an increase in area – but to the superposition of the two lines whereby no increase occurs. In view of the obvious fact that generally a mixture occupies a larger volume than each of its components, the Stoic theory, as interpreted by its critics, was generally rejected. Plotin alone, in his endeavour to give the Stoic ideas a fair trial, attempts to reconcile their views with the facts.⁷⁵Volume, he says, is one of the many qualities of a body. According to the Stoics, the qualities of the components are preserved in the mixture; in fact, the properties of the latter result from the mixing of those of its components. In the same way, he concludes, the mixture will possess a volume which is exactly or nearly the sum of the volumes of the components – thus resulting in an increase of volume.

[Footnote 58 is on page 11

58. Alex. Aphr., Quaest. et solut., II, 12.
]
73. Cf. Simp., Phys., 530, 29: “A ladle mixed with another one in total mixture shall give again a ladleful.”

74. Plotin, loc. cit. , II, vii, 1, 45.

75. Plotin, loc. cit. , II, vii, 1, 35.

[Footnotes 74-75 refer to footnote 60 on page 11.
60. Plotin, Ennead., II, vii.
]
(15)

[Sambursky’s next point seems to be the following. It is one challenge already to conceive of how the physical parts of a mixture can form a total mixture of the kind we described. But the reason we went into that account was not simply to work on that problem. Rather, we are concerned with how to conceptualize hexis. It involves the thorough interpenetration of pneuma throughout the parts of some object. Thus we should think then of the mixture between pneuma and the other physical parts of something as a total mixture. Perhaps this is because the pneuma carries the qualities, and those qualities need to penetrate and inhabit the physical parts.]

We must look at the Stoic theory of total mixture in the light | of the main purpose it was supposed to serve – to give a firm foundation for its conception of hexis. We must remember that pneuma was thought to be an extremely rarefied substance and that its total interpenetration of matter would thus create a case analogous to that of the mixture of a small drop of wine with a large measure of water, i.e. of one component being negligible in bulk as compared with the other. Here again the starting-point for the argument was the organic world. Soul (psyche), the hexis of the living body, was itself corporeal according to the Stoics, who included it in the group of things which are capable of acting and being acted upon. Mutual interpenetration of soul and body, of physis and plants, of hexis and inorganic matter, have all one common feature – the total mixture of a very tenuous and rare component, the pneuma, with a much bulkier one.^{76, 77} The common denominator in all these cases are the physical qualities or properties which themselves are nothing less than pneumata mixed in definite proportions. And as we have seen, qualities are bodies, like the soul itself, and therefore their mixture with matter – organic and inorganic alike – must be of the nature of a total mixture.⁷⁸
76. Galen, Comm. 5 in Hippocr. epid. 6 (Arim, II, 715).

77. Alex. Aphr., De anima, 26, 10.

78. Simpl., Phys., 530, 9.

(15-16)

From:

Sambursky, Samuel. 1973. Physics of the Stoics. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood. [First published 1959, London: Routledge and Kagen Paul.]

Or if otherwise noted:

Plutarch. 1878. On Common Notions Against the Stoics. In Plutarch's Morals, vol.4, pp.372-427. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by William W. Goodwin. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge: Press Of John Wilson and son. Available online at:

https://archive.org/details/plutarchsmorals04plut

Sambursky (1.2) Physics of the Stoics, “The Physical State of a Body”, selective summary

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