14 Jul 2017

Luhtala (5.6.1) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Corporeals in Stoic Physics”, summary


by Corry Shores


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Summary of


Anneli Luhtala


On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic


Ch.5 The Stoics


5.5 Stoic Logic



Stoic Physics



Corporeals in Stoic Physics





Brief summary:

For the Stoics, a corporeal body is understood as the capacity to act and undergo action and thus is conceived in terms of causality. The Stoics were against the idea in Plato and Aristotle that incorporeals had causal efficacy. As we see from the sources, the Stoics understood incorporeals both linguistically and physically/metaphysically. And they understood statements as being incorporeals that express how some corporeal body has certain corporeal features, mentioned in the predicate. Statements do not refer to abstract generalities but rather only to concrete circumstances happening in the world. Thus when giving examples of statements, the Stoics used proper nouns instead of common ones. Also, for the Stoics, parts of speech are corporeal even though statements are incorporeal.





[Of the definitions the Stoics gave for corporeal body, the most prevalent one is: the capacity to act and undergo action.]


The Stoics defined corporeal body in a variety of ways, including: {1} “three-dimensionality and resistance (Diog. Laert. VII,135; Apollodorus 6; Galen De qual. incorp. 10 = SVF 2.381)”; {2} “contact and separation (Nemesius De nat. hom II,46,81,6-10 = SVF 2.790)” and {3} “the capacity to act and undergo action” (Luhtala 118). Luhtala says that the third definition of having the capacity to act and undergo action was the one that “figured most prominently in the Stoic conception of body”, and she will focus on that one (118, saying in footnote that her treatment follows Hahm 1977).

[The Stoic notion of corporeal bodies as acting and undergoing action comes from Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic (incorporeal) Ideas, which Aristotle thought did not exist separately from individual particulars but rather were inherent to them, in that universals are predicated of many things.]


Hahm attributes the Stoic view of corporeality as action and undergoing of action to Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Ideas. For Plato, Ideas have ontology primacy, and the Ideas are “incorporeal real entities” (118). Aristotle, however, did not think that Ideas exist separately from their individual particulars but were instead “inherent in the particulars” (118).

The Stoic view of corporeality, and the adoption of the notion of action and undergoing of action as the crucial characteristic of body, owe a number of features to contemporary philosophical discussion. Hahm claims that the Stoics adopted a peculiar usage of this feature, which was already familiar to Plato and Aristotle. He relates the Stoic theory of corporeality to Plato's theory of Ideas and its criticism by Aristotle which was adopted by the Stoics.205 Plato and his successors assigned ontological primacy to incorporeal real entities, the Ideas. Aristotle, who presented many arguments against the theory of Ideas in his works, was especially keen to refute the view that the Ideas exist separate from the individual particulars, insisting that the Ideas must be considered universals inherent in the particulars. Aristotle, who regarded universals as inseparable from objects, spoke of a universal as something predicated universally of more than one thing. Hahm relates this question to the introductory paragraph of the Peri hermeneias (Hahm 1977: 7-8).


205. Of course, even the dialecticians denied the existence of Ideas.


[Since the Stoics thought that only bodies exist, that probably means they did not derive their notion completely from Aristotle, who though there were different kinds of being for corporeal and incorporeal things.]


For the Stoics, “the Platonic Ideas are thoughts in our mind and as such are nonexistent (Strob. Ecl I,136,21 = SVF 1.65; Syrianus SVF 2.364; Aet. I,10,5 = SVF 2.360)” (118). But we cannot “derive the Stoic corporealism from Aristotelian ontology in any straightforward manner” (118). Aristotelianism recognized “different kinds of being for corporeal and incorporeal things,” which is not much different than the Stoic denial of the existence of anything except corporeals [see section]. Hahm notes that the crucial notion of acting and being acted upon is found in Plato’s Sophist, where it is used in application to a notion of a soul. Aristotle does not use this notion in his metaphysical writings, but he does employ it with his physics.

The Stoics maintained that the Platonic Ideas are thoughts in our mind and as such are nonexistent (Strob. Ecl I,136,21 = SVF 1.65; Syrianus SVF 2.364; Aet. I,10,5 = SVF 2.360). But Hahm emphasizes that it would be misleading to derive the Stoic corporealism from Aristotelian ontology in any straightforward manner; to deny existence to anything but bodies is a far cry from Aristotelianism which recognized different | kinds of being for corporeal and incorporeal things, and an eternal unmoved being, the prime mover. According to him, it would be more appropriate to try to explain Stoic ontological views by tracing the origins of the crucial notion of action and undergoing of action, in terms of which the Stoics defended their view of corporeality. This notion as a feature of being can be found in Plato’s Sophist (247DE), in which it is used to assert the existence of the soul and its virtues as against materialistic arguments based on visibility and tangibility as a characteristic of being. Aristotle shows in Top. 5,9,139a4-8 that he knows of this notion; but he never used it in his own metaphysical writings. Acting and being acted up on are nevertheless vital concepts in his physical theory in which he stressed, for instance, that there can be no action or suffering without contact; he further tended to equate acting and being acted upon to moving and being moved. While admitting that there can be no motion apart from the physical body, Aristotle came very close to asserting that there can be no acting or suffering without body (Cael. 1.9.279a15-16; Gen. corr. 1.6.323a17-20; Met. 5.21.1022b15). However, he never made quite this statement, as Hahm concludes, suggesting that this was because the most important mover or agent, the eternal prime mover, was incorporeal (Hahm 1977: 9-14).


[The Stoics as far as we know did not defend this notion of causality involving bodies acting and undergoing action. They were interested in countering the thesis of Plato and Aristotle that says incorporeals can have causal efficacy.]


So the Stoic notion of causality gives an important place for bodies [which are causally related through action and undergoing of it.] But, Hahm notes that “we do not quite know how the Stoics argued their case” for this (119). Long and Sedley note that the capacity to act and be acted upon is never given as a defining characteristic of bodies, although it is said to be peculiar to them.  They continue to write that “In confining this capacity to bodies, the Stoics were not redefining body but radically rejecting the thesis, accepted by Plato and Aristotle, that incorporeals can have any causal efficacy. (Long/Sedley 1987: 273)” (119).

[In the Stoic sources, incorporeals are said to be unable to act or be acted upon by corporeal bodies, although corporeal bodies do have this power. In an ethical context we see predicates being labeled incorporeal, thus pointing to the linguistic nature of their argumentation regarding corporeals and incorporeals.]


Luhtala will now examine passages that discuss this notion of body “to throw light on the linguistic nature of the argumentation used by the Stoics” (119). The first set of three will all make the point that incorporeals cannot causally interact with corporeal bodies.

1. “According to them the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to be acted upon.”

(Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII,263 = SVF 2.363, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 272)206


206. τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν.

(120. Note, in Luhtala’s text, the γὰρ is omitted, but it is found in the second volume of the Long/Sedley [p.269], the online text, and in the Opera text [p.475]:

Sextus Empiricus. Adv Math Bk8 ln.263


2. Zeno also differed from the same philosophers in thinking that it was totally impossible that something incorporeal (to which genus Xenocrates and his predecessors too had said the mind belonged) should be the agent of anything, and that only a body was capable of acting or of being acted upon.” (Cic. Act. post. I,39 = SVF 1.90, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 272)


207. “Discrepabat etiam ab iisdem (scil. Zeno a Peripateticis et Academicis), quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea (natura), quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.”


3. He (Cleanthes) also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body and no body with an incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale respectively. Therefore the soul is a body. (Nemesius 78,7-79,2 = SVF 1.518, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 272)207



[Luhtala’s footnoted quotation follows SVF (p.117).]


[In the 1987 Nemesius text (pp.20-21), it is given as:]



Luhtala then gives a quote from [I think] Stobaeus. The first part is too enigmatic she says to comment upon, “But towards the end of the passage nouns and verbs are contrasted in a way which represents more common themes in Stoic thought. The author argues that we should wish to have ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’ instead of ‘acting prudently’ and ‘acting moderately’ because the latter are incorporeal and predicates” (120). [See p.121 for the full quotation and its Greek original. Here I will select the more relevant part.]

For we choose what-should-be-chosen and wish what-should-be-wished and desire what-should-be-desired. For choices and desires and wishes, just like impulses, are of predicates. Yet we choose and wish and likewise desire to have goods, and so goods are choiceworthy and wishworthy and desirable. For we choose to have prudence and moderation, but not of course (to have) acting prudently and acting moderately, which are incorporeal and predicates.

(Stob. II,97 ,1 5-98,6 = SVF 3.91, tr . Long/Sedley 1987: 197)

(121, boldface mine)

Luhtala notes that “The Stoics seem to have argued that it is ethically more desirable to have prudence and moderation than to act prudently and moderately” (121). Here we are less interested in the ethical side of this argument, because we will focus on “the linguistic side of the argumentation” (121). [In the quotation, we distinguish for example ‘prudence’ and ‘acting prudently’. So] “What are contrasted here are common nouns and verbs (in the infinitive)” (121). [In the quote, ‘acting prudently’ and ‘acting moderately’ were said to be incorporeal and predicates. But there was no linguistic (or metaphysical) description of ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’. Thus] “It is then incorporeal items of linguistic theory which are said to be less desirable than that which is represented by σωφροσύνη (‘moderation’) and φρόνησις (‘prudence’)” (121). But, “These desirable items are not linguistically specified; they are labeled neither nouns (προσηγοριαί) nor cases (πτώσεις)” (121).

[In the Stobaeus extract, we see that the linguistically designated predicate is discussed not in a linguistic context but in a non-linguistic one. We see the same sort of non-linguistic application of incorporeal predicates in some passages by Sextus Empiricus discussing truth.]


Luhtala notes now the above Stobaeus extract demonstrates “that the Stoics made use of items of linguistic theory such as predicates in contexts other than statement-making” (121). She provides the following reasoning for how we can know that in this context the linguistic concepts were not meant simply to refer to statement-making. [I do not follow this part well, so please consult the quotation below. She might be saying the following, but it is a guess. In the ethical arguments, we had the incorporeal predicates ‘acting prudently’ and ‘acting moderately’. She says that if we are to think of them just  in terms of making statements using these predicates, then they would have been joined to an incorporeal case. Perhaps she means that somehow we would be making reference to the part of the sentence that would serve as the subject of the activity. But we did not turn the discussion in that direction. Rather, these incorporeal predicates were compared to such corporeals as ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’, which are not thought of linguistically as case, subjects, nouns, etc.]

if statement-making were at issue, the incorporeal predicate would be joined to an incorporeal πτῶσις (‘case’). But in this ethical argument incorporeal predicates are contrasted with corporeal items which are not items of linguistic theory.


[Luhtala next gives a quotation from Sextus Empiricus to show a similar sort of structure in reasoning about incorporeals. I will not summarize this well. But I will guess Luhtala is saying the following. Sextus will make a distinction between truth (ἀλήθεια) and an incorporeal, true (ἀληθὲς). When distinguishing them with regard to substance, we say that ‘truth’ is a corporeal body while ‘true’ is an incorporeal, a judgment (ἀξίωμα), and a sayable (λεκτόν). These features are those of the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) (see section Now, true (ἀληθὲς) is here formulated as an adjective. Luhtala says it also represents the predicate ‘to be true’. Like before, we have the non-linguistically specified corporeal body, truth (ἀλήθεια) being contrasted with the linguistically specified incorporeal, true (ἀληθὲς).]

“True is said (by the Stoics) to differ from truth in three ways, substance, structure, and function. In substance, since what is true is incorporeal, for it is a proposition and sayable; but truth is a body, for it is scientific knowledge capable of stating everything true; and scientific knowledge is the commanding-faculty disposed in a certain way, just as a fist is the hand disposed in a certain way; and the commanding-faculty is a body. In structure, since what is true is something simple, e.g. ‘I am conversing’, but truth consists of the knowledge of many true things. In function, since truth pertains to scientific knowledge but what is true does not do so at all. Hence they say that truth is only in a virtuous man, but what is true is also in an inferior man; for the inferior man can say something true.” (Sext.Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. II,81-83, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 198)210

‘Truth’ (ἀλήθεια) is said to differ from ‘true’ (ἀληθὲς) in three ways: in substance, in composition and in potency. Where substance is concerned, ‘truth’ is a body whereas ‘true’ is incorporeal, a judgment ἀξίωμα) and a sayable (λεκτόν). The characteristics of ‘true’ are, again, those of the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) in Stoic linguistic theory. I take the adjective ‘true’ (ἀληθὲς) to represent the predicate ‘to be true’. ‘Truth’ (ἀλήθεια) is a noun; but it is not characterized in linguistic terms, only in terms of its corporeal nature. It is contrasted with something that is linguistically specified: a propositional item, an ἀξίωμα (‘proposition’), a λεκτόν (‘sayable’), an incorporeal. This passage lends further support for my claim that the Stoics contrasted items of linguistic theory such as predicates and propositions with corporeal entities, which are common | nouns, though they are not linguistically specified. They are specified only in terms of their corporeal nature. Where structure is concerned, ‘truth’ is composite, consisting of the knowledge of many things; it is a particular state of the leading part of the soul, the ἡγεμονικόν, which is corporeal. ‘True’ is something simple, a proposition such as ‘I converse’ (διαλέγομαι). ‘Truth’ and ‘true’ differ in function in that ‘truth’ is the scientific knowledge of many things, pertaining to a wise man, whereas ‘true’ (a true proposition) is something that even a less virtuous man can say.


210. λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ συστάσει δυνάμει. οὐσίᾳ μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντική, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πὼς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμή, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα. ἔστι γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα), συστάσει δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἁπλοῦν τί ἐστιν, οἷον, “ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι”, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ (τῆς) πολλῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως συνίσταται, δυνάμει δέ, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως. διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον ἀληθές τι εἰπεῖν.

(122, copied from socratics.daphnet.org and modified to make it more similar to Luhtala’s rendition)

[Seneca discusses a Stoic ethical claim that wisdom is a Good while being wise is not. For, something can only be a good if its usefulness can be put into actuality. That can only happen if it acts as a body. Since wisdom is useful, it must be a body. But being wise is an incorporeal predicate. It cannot be a Good, because it cannot act like a body.]


Luhtala says that Seneca “is our best witness to the linguistic nature of the argumentation used by Stoic philosophers in discussing non-linguistic issues,” and we will examine a lengthy passage by him to see this (123). There is an ethical controversy attributed to the Stoics that is the following: “wisdom (sapientia) is a Good (bonum) whereas being wise (sapere) is not” (123). Seneca disagrees with this Stoic view. In the quotation below, we see the Stoics reasoning. A Good is a body. Why? Whatever is useful must be able to act as a body (in order to put its usefulness into actuality). And whatever can act is a body. A Good is useful, therefore it is a body. And wisdom is a Good, therefore wisdom is a body.  However, being wise is an accident [and thus perhaps a predicate] and so it is incorporeal. It thus cannot act or be useful. [This and the following passages seem to be cited as: Seneca, Ep. 117,2-13.]

“According to our school”, Seneca declares, “whatever is a Good (bonum) is a body (corpus), because it can act (facit); whatever acts, is a body. Whatever is a Good is useful (prodest). In order to be useful, one has to do something (faciat aliquid oportet); that which acts is a body. The Stoics say that wisdom (sapientia) is a Good; consequently, it must be called a body. But being wise (sapere) is not regarded as partaking of the same condition. It is incorporeal (incorporalis) and an accident of something else (accidit alteri), that is wisdom; therefore it neither acts nor is useful (nec facit quidquam nec prodest).”

(123, quoting Seneca)

[I do not follow the next point so well. It might be that Seneca criticizes this view by saying that two things are possible. So, the incorporeal as an accident belongs to something else. {1} It belongs inside the object. But the object is corporeal, and if belongs to the object, it must be corporeal too. To belong to the object would mean being in contact with it, and only corporeal things can make contact with other corporeal things. {2} It belongs outside the object. But if it is outside the object while belonging to it, it must be receding from the object, and only bodies are capable of motion. His next criticism it seems is that the Stoics would seem to be saying that wisdom is of a fundamentally different nature than being wise, but surely what can be said of the one should be attributable to  the other. Let me quote as I may have this wrong.]

The corporeal nature of wisdom is defended in terms of the crucial feature of the body being able to act (and undergo action). But being wise is altogether different; it is incorporeal and belongs to something else. “Is that which belongs to something”, Seneca asks, “outside the object to which it belongs, or does it inhere in the object? If it is in the object to which it belongs, it is as corporeal as the object to which it belongs. Nothing can occur without contact; that which touches, is a body. If it is outside, it withdraws after having belonged to the object. That which recedes, has motion. That which has motion, is a body. You wish that I did not say that ‘race’ (cursus) is different from ‘running’ (currere), ‘heat’ (calor) from ‘to being hot’ (calere), and ‘light’ (lux) from ‘to give light’ (lucere); I admit that these are different things, but not of an altogether different nature. If health is a matter of indifference, so is even ‘being healthy’; if ‘beauty’ is indif-| ferent, so is ‘being beautiful’. If justice is a Good, so is ‘being just’. If ugliness is a bad thing, so is even ‘being ugly’, and for heaven’s sake, if bleary-eyedness is a bad thing, so is even ‘being bleary-eyed’.”


Luhtala finishes this paragraph with another quote where Seneca elaborates on this Stoic distinction. [The idea seems to be that the Stoics insist that wisdom and being wise must be distinguished, because wisdom is something possessed and being wise refers to one doing the possessing or having the wisdom. See p.124 for the quotation.]

[We see in Seneca’s account a linguistic understanding of this distinction.]


Seneca was discussing action and undergoing of action, and this “echoes the Stoic view of causation which takes place between bodies”. This distinction is given in terms of active and passive verbs (124). The Stoics distinguishes ‘field’ (ager) and ‘having a field’ (agrum habere). But we do not know too much more about how to conceptualize this distinction (125). Probably the distinction began as a linguistic one, and we see Seneca give a linguistic example.

Bodies have their particular natures, such as ‘man’ and ‘horse’. They are accompanied by motions of the soul which make statements about bodies. Their proper nature is derived from bodies. When I see Cato walk, the senses reveal this to me, and the soul believes it. What I see is a body on which I focus my eyes and my mind. Then I say: ‘Cato is walking’ . What I say is not a body, but a statement about a body, which is called by some effatum (‘utterance’) , by the others enuntiatum (‘declaration’) , and by yet others dictum (‘statement’) . Therefore when we say ‘wisdom’, we understand something corporeal; when we say ‘he is wise’, we talk about a body. It makes a big difference whether you name something or say something about it.


[For the Stoics, statements are incorporeals expressing that a body has certain features. Statements do not refer to abstract generalities but rather to concrete circumstances happening in the world; thus they used proper nouns instead of common ones.]


Luhtala notes that the passage illustrates certain “principles of Stoic logic”. [The first idea seems to be that bodies have features, which are corporeal but take the form of predicates and are expressed in incorporeal statements. When discussing bodies, they are understood generally, and thus we use common nouns. But for the Stoics, statements are made in reference not to abstract generalities but rather to express real situations in the world, and thus the Stoics when discussing statements used proper nouns.]

This passage is a good illustration of the principles of Stoic logic. Statements are made of bodies, which are specified in terms of their particular natures, i.e. in terms of common and particular qualities. They are thus men or horses or individuals such as Cato. By making a statement such as ‘Cato is walking’, we abstract a feature from a body, and what we say is an incorporeal statement. It is noteworthy that when discussing the nature or bodies, Seneca mentions men and horses which are precisely the two examples of common nouns in Diogenes Laertius’ report. But when he proceeds to discuss statement-making, a proper noun occurs in the example (Cato ambulat). This is fully in accordance with the fact that the Stoic made propositions essentially about individuals.


[For the Stoics, parts of speech are corporeal while statements are incorporeal.]


[I may not get the next points right, so see the quotation below. The idea seems to be the following. For the Stoics, the individual parts of speech we utter, like nouns for example, are corporeal. I am not sure however if the part of speech as a syntactical/grammatical structure is corporeal or if it is just simply that the thing named is corporeal. The second option is more conceivable but less interesting. However, the statement itself is incorporeal.]

Seneca finally draws a distinction between ‘saying something’ and ‘speaking about something’ in a way which is reminiscent of the ancient division between the levels of naming (ὀνομάζειν) and statement-making (λέγειν). When we utter an individual nominal part of speech, such as the noun ‘wisdom’, we understand, according to the Stoics, something corporeal. When we make a statement, we understand something incorporeal. This passage throws additional light on the corporeal nature of the parts of speech as such, which must have been a source of ambiguity.







Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.





Other texts, cited by Luhtala:


[Note, for “Aet. I, I did not see something for it in the Bibliography.]


[Note, I could not find Apollodorus in the Bibliography.]


Cic. Act. post: Cicero. Academica posteriora.

Online text available at:



Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.


[Note, I did not see Galen’s De qual. incorp in the Bibliography list. Perhaps it is a part of the text that is listed:

Galen. Gelaeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Edition, translation and Commentary by Phillip de Lacy. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum. V.4.1.2. Berlin: Academie-Verlag 1978-80.]


Hahm, David E. 1977. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.


Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


[Note, I did not see Nemesius’s De nat. hom in the Bibliography list.  Perhaps it is De natura hominis.]


Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

Another version available online:


Online text transcription at:


[specifically here]


[Note, for Pyrrh. hyp. I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is:

Sextus Empiricus. Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis.

Online text at:


(Specifically here)]


Seneca: Ad Lucilium epistulae morales. Ed. by Leighton D. Reynolds. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965.


[Note, for “Stobaeus ... Ecl.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Stobaeus’ Ἐκλογαί / Eclogae physicae et ethicae.]


SVF. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.


Syrianus: In Metaphysica commentaria. CAG VI.1. Ed. Wilhelm Kroll. Berlin: Reimer 1902.





Texts I cite:


Nemesius. 1987. Nemesii Emeseni. De natvra hominis, ed. Moreno Morani. Leipzig: Teubner. Available online at:



Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner]. Available online:



Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, vol. I. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1964.

PDF available at:






This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:





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