Somers-Hall, (1.5), Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, ‘1.5 Spinoza (40/49–50)’, summary

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos and other distracting mistakes. Somers-Hall is abbreviated SH.]

Summary of

Henry Somers-Hall

Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition:
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide

Part 1
A Guide to the Text

 

Chapter 1. Difference in Itself

1.5 Spinoza (40/49–50)

Very brief summary:

Spinoza has a univocal conception of God/substance/being. There is one substance, but it expresses infinite essences and infinite intensive modal determinations, which are quantitative degree-variations of an essence. Thus although substance is univocally one, it is infinitely self-differential internally.

Brief summary:

Spinoza is a philosopher of univocal being, and under Deleuze’s original interpretation, Spinoza is a philosopher of univocal self-differential being. For Spinoza, there is one infinite substance, which is also both God and the world in all its entirety. Since substance is infinite, that means its essence is infinite. In fact, it has infinitely many essences. The essence as our minds understand it would be substance’s ‘attribute’. Our minds are able to comprehend just two of substance’s infinitely many attributes, namely, thought and extension (the ‘realm’ of ideas and the parallel ‘realm’ of physical bodies). There is one substance, but it expresses itself through (at least these) two unique essences. And there are infinitely more. But since there are infinitely many, we cannot characterize substance on the basis of the sum of all its essences, since there is no limit and thus no determinate totality of essence. However, each essence is different from the others. And yet, consider how all of substance’s modifications or determinations are expressed in each attribute. For one attribute to differ from another then, is for substance to internally differ from itself, since each attribute fully contains substance and yet the essences are not identical. Thus, since there are infinitely many essences that fully express all of substance’s determinations, that means there are infinitely many self-differential relations that constitute substance’s essentiality. So instead of conceptualizing substance by means of this or that essence or by means of all essences taken in sum, we can instead conceptualize substance as being infinite self-differentiation. In addition, all of substance’s modal determinations are like intensive degrees and as such are in a way part of an unbroken continuum of variation. Thus both on the levels of essence and determination, substance is a univocal multiplicity: it is one thing but it is thoroughly composed of self-variation (self-differentiation).

Summary

 

[We previously saw how Duns Scotus is for Deleuze the first major thinker on univocity. Scotus made being be a matter of degree, with God having an infinite amount of being and we a finite amount. In an Aristotelian / Aquinian system we would make God’s and humanity’s being be different in kind, since God is transcendental. Thus although we use the term being for both us and God, we are using the term equivocally. Scotus says that instead there are different degrees of being, with God having an infinite amount and we a finite. In this way, being is said of both God and humanity, but it is meant univocally. This view sees being as admitting of intensive variations.] Spinoza is for Deleuze the second major thinker of the metaphysical concept of univocity. For Scotus being is abstract, where for Spinoza it is something we encounter in life, and is thus a matter of pure affirmation. [I am not sure why Scotus would say we never encounter being in our experiences. We encounter beings, why not being? Perhaps this is because being is considered only something we can understand about beings but not directly experience in them. And what makes encountering being in life a matter of affirmation? Perhaps this results from an immanent understanding of divinity which does not deny our world any being, value, or reality.] SH will review Spinoza’s basic notions of substance, attributes, and modes. Descartes defined substance as something which depends on nothing else for its existence. Descartes thinks that for example the mind and the body are not dependent on one another for their existence, and thus they are numerically distinct substances. He even thinks that we have as many numerically distinct substances as we have minds and bodies (SH 35).  Spinoza’s definition of substance is similar. For him a substance is whatever exists in itself [that is, not as a part or attribute of something else] and is conceived in itself [that is, does not have a genus above it which is needed to conceptualize it, and it does not require any other concepts to (co-definitionally) conceive it.] For Descartes, there are numerical distinctions between the many different minds and bodies, and these are real and substantial distinctions. There really are some number of different substances. Spinoza argues against this. [Take first Descartes’ view. We have your mind and my mind. We cannot distinguish them on the basis of their attributes, since both are mind, that is to say, there is no difference attributionally. We can only distinguish them on the basis of their modalities, with this being my mind, having the attribute mind, and that being your mind, with the attribute mind. Spinoza says we cannot distinguish substances by means of modifications. His reasoning is not easy to grasp. Consult Proposition 5 of Book 1 of his Ethics. It seems he is saying the following. The conceptualization of a substance does not involve the conceptualization of other concepts, including its modalities. Therefore, if we are only able to conceive of a certain substance by also conceiving of one of its modalities, then we are misconceiving it (See Ethics Book 1, Prop. 5). Thus, we could not properly distinguish substances on the basis of their modes. We already eliminated the only other way to distinguish them, their attributes. That means that no difference between one substance and another can be conceived. It seems that we must also assume that whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Since any substance being numerically distinct from another is inconceivable, there must not be numerically distinct substances. Instead, there must only be one substance.]

Spinoza defines substance as follows: ‘By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing, from which it has to be formed’ (Spinoza 1992: Part I D3). Spinoza is here very close to Descartes’ definition of substance as ‘a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence’. At this point, however, an important difference arises in regard to how we distinguish substances. For Descartes, the fact that a substance exists implies that it is numerically distinct from other substances. Thus, for Descartes, the mind and the body are two actually distinct substances. In fact, we have more than just two substances. Each person has a separate mind, or soul, and so there are a number of real, numerically distinct, substances which share the same attribute. How does this relate to the question of how to distinguish or determine entities? For Descartes, ‘there are numerical distinctions which are at the same time real or substantial’ (EPS 30). Spinoza disputes this claim, arguing that substances with the same attribute could only be distinguished by their particular mode (i.e. whether the substance of thought is your or my thought). As substance is logically prior to its modes, it is impossible to distinguish substances with the same attributes numerically (Spinoza 1992: Part I P5). This does not just mean that there is only one substance, but as it falls outside of numerical distinctions, substance is better described as singular (without number).
(SH 35)

We move now to attribute. “In Descartes’ terms, an attribute is the essence of a substance, so, for instance, the essence of material substance is extension. So in answer to the question, ‘what is it to be a material substance?’, we would reply, ‘it is to be extended’ ” (SH 36a). And as we saw, for Descartes, substances are numerically distinct. We would distinguish one from another merely by indexical means, for example, by saying: “ ‘this is my body, and that is yours’ ” (SH 36ab). [Here, bodies are instances of extended substances. I am not exactly sure, however, what is meant by: “Extension plays a purely definitional role in this case” (SH 36). What is being defined, and how is it being defined? It seems in this context, we define one substance as different from another, and we do so by pointing them out separately. Is that separation extensional?] But since for Spinoza there cannot be more than one substance, that means thought and extension are two expressions of being’s essence. That is to say, there is one substance that has at least these two attributes, and not many substances sharing these two attributes.

As Deleuze notes, this problem is similar to the one Scotus dealt with, namely, if God is simple (that is, not composed of parts), then how can God (understood as substance) have many attributes?  [Regarding the following, I am not certain if this is a reference to the prior section’s (1.4) ideas regarding intensive difference or if it is a general summarization of Scotus ideas we have not seen yet. The conclusion we come to is that for Scotus, the different attributes of God such as truth, goodness, and unity are somehow formal but not real features of God’s infinite being. If we are continuing with the prior ideas, then perhaps this means that intensively speaking there is no essential difference between God’s infinite goodness and our finite goodness, but our minds can make that distinction when we take into account just how very different they are in degree. Or maybe he is saying that there is no real difference between God’s goodness and his truth and unity, although there is a formal difference. I will quote it.]

Scotus’ solution was to rely on the notion of a formal distinction between the different attributes so that while they were not actually distinct as things separate from one another, they were nevertheless formally distinct in that they picked out genuine differences for reason within the infinite being. Truth, goodness and unity were therefore formally, but not really, distinct features of the infinite being (Scotus uses a similar logic for the Trinity).
(36)

For Spinoza, attributes also are formally distinct but not really distinct, since “they express the essence of the same substance” (SH 36). SH then describes key differences between Scotus’ and accounts of God’s attributes Spinoza’s accounts of God’s / substance’s attributes. Difference 1) [This first difference I do not entirely grasp, but it seems that for Scotus the attributes are not real but are rather ways that our minds understand the nature(s) of God, while for Spinoza it might be either or both subjective and objective, which may be similar to the distinction SH is making between formal and real.] “First, Scotus’ attributes are really just what Deleuze calls ‘signs’ for the intellect. They express a way in which the nature of God is to be taken up by the finite subject. It is to an extent ambiguous how they are to be read in Spinoza. His definition of ‘what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence’ can be read both as subjective (by focusing on the intellect’s perception) or as objective” (36). The second difference: Scotus’ God is separate from the world, while for Spinoza the world and God are not distinct. [In cases where God is distinct, that in a sense might be a denial of our world, that is, a denial of its substantiality, reality, goodness, perfection, and so on. However, were we to see God as absolutely immanent to our world, then perhaps that would be affirmative in the sense that we deny nothing of the reality or worth of our world.]

Second, for Scotus, God is a separate entity to the world, whereas for Spinoza, as there is only one substance, the expression of the essence of God in the attribute cannot merely be a formal feature. Rather, the expression is the world. For Spinoza, therefore, the intellectual and physical realms are just the expression, or explication, of the | essence of God. In this sense, ‘instead of understanding univocal being as neutral or indifferent, he makes it an object of pure affirmation’ (DR 40/49). Whereas the essence of God is known formally for Scotus (as a ‘sign’), it is now known expressively and concretely. We therefore have a progression between the nature of God being known analogically for Aquinas; univocally, but only in a formal manner for Scotus; and now univocally and affirmatively for Spinoza.
(SH 36-37)

With Spinoza’s “expressionism” in mind, we turn now to modes. Previously we saw that for Descartes there are numerical distinctions which are real [in the sense that distinct substances are each on their own and are numerically countable.] Spinoza does not think that there are such real numerical distinctions [between substances, but it seems there are numerical distinctions between attributes, since they are qualitatively different and are separately nameable.] Modes, however, modify the one substance, and are not distinct [from substance, since they inhere to it and depend on it for their existence, and also perhaps, they are not distinct from each other, if they are intensive degrees of the attribute, that is, of an essence of substance.] Modes, unlike substance, cannot be thought as though they were separable from the substance they modify. Spinoza [in Ethics Book 1, definition 5] defines modes as “the affections of substance; that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else’ (Spinoza 1992: Part 1 D5)” (SH 37). We saw already modal distinction in Scotus. They were intensive differences of some substantiality, like degrees of perfection of being. However, modes still in a way are numerically distinct. [This seems to be incompatible with SH’s above claim that they are not distinct. If we mean, distinct from one another, perhaps previously he means not really distinct as there is only one substance to which all of them modify, and thus are not substantially separated from one another, but in the second case they are numerically distinct in the sense that they can each be distinguished in our minds on the basis of their degree.]

Earlier on, I mentioned how Spinoza disagrees with Descartes’ equation of real and numerical distinction. Spinoza instead argues that substance is really distinct, but not numerically distinct. Modes operate in the opposite manner. Modes are modifications of a singular substance, and so are not really distinct. They are, however, numerically distinct from one another. If modes are to be distinct, but not seen as existentially distinct from one another (as they are all moments of a singular substance), we need some other way of distinguishing them. This is in essence the same problem that we found in Scotus’ attempt to develop a univocal conception of being which was at the same time applicable to finite and infinite beings. Scotus’ solution was to replace Aquinas’ notion of the finite/infinite distinction (which was founded on limit) with a distinction founded on intensity. Thus being is like the concept of whiteness. While we can formulate a concept of whiteness separately from the intensity by which it manifests itself, such a concept would be inadequate. Intensity is the mode by which whiteness manifests itself. According to Deleuze, Spinoza develops a similar account of the nature of finite modes. Just as intensity is only modally distinct from whiteness, finite modes are only modally distinct from substance itself.
(SH 37)

SH then discusses the role that univocity plays in Spinoza’s philosophy. In sum, on account of the univocity of substance, it is determined not by conceptual difference but rather by a difference internal to it. [[We will need to work through this I think. Let us begin with an assessment of what this means. I am going to suppose that the main idea here is that we have two different conceptions of reality. In the Aristotelian/representational conception, we view everything in reality as having a certain sense or essence that is determinable by distinguishing it from the sense or essence of something else. This necessitates a fundamental multiplicity, since everything needs something else for its own unique being, and so even the supposed one ‘unique’ being (of beings) itself must somehow have multiplicity built into it in order for it to have any sense. We saw one way that could be is equivocity. Now consider the other view of reality. This view also regards everything as having an essence. However, essence is not determined by means of differences between substances, as there is only one substance anyway. Yet, that one substance has many essences. The nature of substance then is not some singular essence, since there are many. But also, there are infinitely many essences, according to Spinoza. Since there is no limit to substance’s essences, each of which differ from one another qualitatively, then we cannot say that substance is the sum of all its essences. For, there is no such numerical sum. However, we can generally characterize this situation. Each essence of substance differs from all the others. We can say for any pair of them that they express not only the quality of each essence but also they express the difference between them. Since both are expressions of substance, one such pair expresses one way that substance has an internal difference, or we might put it in other words that such a pair expresses one of substance’s self-differentiations. Substance is truly one and univocal. However, its essences are inconsistent. Substance is by nature self-differential, self-inconsistent. And there is an infinity of different essential expressions. Thus we can say generally speaking that the most fundamental nature of substance is that it is infinitely self-differentiating. The essence of substance is self-differentiation. SH perhaps is making a different point. Perhaps the self-differentiation he refers to is the intensive difference of modal differences and not essential difference of attributes. I quote for your judgment.]]

What is the role, therefore, that univocity is playing in Spinoza’s philosophy? First, we can see that the nature of substance itself is not given according to a categorial form of definition. In order to define something for Aristotle, we need a genus and a difference. This led to the problem | of the highest genus, as the highest genus would seem to require a higher identity in order to be defined, but the presence of such a higher identity would imply that the highest genus was not, in fact, the highest genus. In such a case, determination relies on a numerical distinction between terms. We must be able to separate the rational animals from the nonrational animals (as separately existing entities) in order to define man as a rational animal. We define something by saying that it is ‘this and not that’. Spinoza’s substance, however, has an essence which is expressed through the attributes. This essence is not one that can be given in terms of the categories, however, as Spinoza’s substance is not subject to any form of numerical distinction – it is singular. On this basis, it cannot be determined through the ‘this and not that’ structure of representation, even in relation to a possible but non-existent object. Substance does have a structure and an essence, however, as is shown by the finite modes which as a whole express substance, and which are distinguished from one another in terms of their intensity. Substance is determined by a difference, but it is not a difference between concepts (everything is substance), but rather a difference that is internal to substance. This is therefore one of the most difficult ideas in Deleuze’s metaphysics: substance expresses its essence by differing from itself. This is made possible on the basis of the univocal conception of being, whereby all modes express the same being. Spinoza’s system therefore makes no distinction between different ways in which things exist. Although the world appears to be made up of different substances, in actual fact, everything is simply an expression of the same substance.
(37-38)

 

 

 

 

Citations from:

Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.

Or if otherwise noted:

DR:
[Deleuze] Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994/London: Continuum, 2004.

EPS:
[Deleuze] Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: Zone Books, 1990.

Spinoza (1992), Ethics, trans. Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.