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by Corry Shores
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Sometimes when cooking we test our creation and find that it needs something. We are not sure what, but we 'have an idea' of what we want. Before we select the new ingredient, we are already aware of it in a way. But it has not taken a determinate form in our mind. Perhaps while trying to make that decision, we need to take into account all the other ingredients we have added so far. We need to keep them in mind, so that we do not make a bad combination with the new addition. However, we do not actually recollect specifically each thing we had already put in. We are marginally aware of those memories, but they are also indeterminate in a way. So we have an awareness of what is going on now. But we also have a marginal awareness of what we were just aware of and what we will soon be aware of. These other awarenesses are on the horizon of our attention. And what we expect comes into our awareness all while our current awareness moves into what we retain. There seems then to be a flow in our stream of awareness.
Let's consider seeing things a different way. Imagine again we are searching for that new ingredient. Is it that we are aware of what we will add, but in an indeterminate way? Or is it that we are aware that there is a big difference between what we are now aware of, and what we will soon be aware of? The reason the coming awareness is 'indeterminate' is really because we are aware more of the difference between now and then. We feel that we are on the brink of time, so to speak, that the next moment will not be continuous with this one, because it will hold something very new in it. In fact, because we often have these moments when we feel the difference with the future, we do not really feel time as a continuous flow. Rather, we feel it as us always being on the edge of a change. And what about our past awarenesses? Don't they flow-off continuously? But what makes the current moment not a past one is the fact that it stands out from them. What makes the present the present is its difference with the past. There is not an unbroken continuum between our current awareness and the one we just had. There was a leap over a cliff. We only live in a present because time is not a continuous flow. Otherwise we could blend our current selves in with our past. But this we cannot do. Time is a moment breaking out of itself. The present is momentous.
For Husserl, we are not just aware of what is now appearing to us. We also retain past intentions (as retentions) and we anticipate future ones (protentions). The now moment swells outside the boundaries of the pure present, because the future continually flows through the present into the past, like a stream.
For a Deleuzean time consciousness, we are not immediately aware of what lies in our past and future acts of consciousness. Rather, we are immediately aware of the difference between the moment we experience and ones from the past and the future. If the past is retained in the now, it is as a difference, as us feeling like we have changed, gotten older for example. And if we anticipate the future, it is only when the future appears to us as different from the now and the past. When we anticipate something in the future, we are really just currently aware that the now will be different from the future. In other words, when we retain the past or protend the future, we are actually just being aware of the incoherence of time, its not-being-glued-together; we sense our present lying between the infinitely small crack between the past and the future.
Husserl developed a theory of our internal consciousness of time. Consider first how when we are conscious, our awareness is directed toward something. We use the term 'intend' for this being-pointed-toward and object of our attention. Husserl explains time consciousness in terms of three modes of our intentional awareness. We are directly intending what appears to us now. But we are also indirectly maintaining an awareness of past intentions. This is retention. And we are also indirectly aware of what we expect to come. And this would be protention.
Regarding the retentions, Husserl provides a famous diagonal line diagram. Perhaps this animation below illustrates it. As time moves forward, we retain our intention of our prior moment of awareness. So when moment of consciousness B arrives on the scene, it is marginally aware of its just prior intention A. But now that A is a retention, we call it A'. Then when C arrives, it retains it's just prior moment B, now B'. And B' retains its prior moment, now A''. The diagram also keeps the prior B moment with just its own previous A'. So we are continually adding layers and layers of retentional awareness of past moments.
The following is part of a student paper I wrote for my first philosophy masters degree. It explains Husserl's retentional, intentional, and protentional structure of time consciousness.
We find a description of the complex intentional structure and its stream in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, in which Husserl speaks of consciousness as having “running off modes of an immanent temporal object” which have “a beginning, a source-point, so to speak. This is the running-off mode with which the immanent object begins to exist. It is characterized as now” (30). This now “changes into a past,” because a new now “is always entering on the scene” (30). This running-off happens in a “steady progression,” and each phase of it “is itself a continuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a continuity of pasts” (30). These past acts of consciousness that were once happening now are retained as retentions in a continuous series “pertaining to the beginning-point” which is the “impressional consciousness” that is “constantly flowing” and that “passes over into ever new retentional consciousness” (31). And, not only does consciousness extend into its past, but it extends into its future as well, in the form of protensions; for, he says, “[e]very process that constitutes its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment” (54). Thus, for Husserl, consciousness happens across a steady continuum of acts of consciousness, and those that have passed relative to the ones now happening are retained and available to consciousness for recollection; while at the same time, part of the structure of consciousness happening now is its protended anticipation of what it expects to later enter into consciousness. It would seem, then, that the different temporal phases of consciousness are thoroughly linked with each other.
We find a more detailed description of their interconnection in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, in which Husserl explains that objects are not isolated; rather, they accompany an “objective background,” which contains objectivities that were apprehended along with the intended object (Basic Problems of Phenomenology 68); however, they were not thematically intended in that prior act. Despite their not having been previously intended thematically, these previously non-thematically intended objects that accompanied the thematically intended ones can be thematically intended retrospectively by first recollecting the previously thematically intended object and then attending to its background, which contains the yet-thematically intended objects (69). Husserl then describes a method of attending to non-thematically intended intentional backgrounds in order to bring consciousness into an awareness of its unified, stream-like structure and movement. He explains that when we direct our phenomenological perception at our acts of consciousness (cogitationes), these acts of consciousness will be self-present for as long as they perdure (71). When one act of consciousness has expired, its trace is retended; yet, it fades away (71). However, the retention may occur in such a way that the fading act of consciousness is connected to a new one, resulting in a consciousness of a succession of acts of consciousness (71). When we have a recollection of this series, it is as though we re-live that sequence of acts of consciousness (71). Also, along with this temporal background of intentions, there is a simultaneous background, which would include those objects that one perceived, but only marginally and non-thematically (72). By attending to these yet-thematized retended and protended backgrounds, we may connect all acts of consciousness and their objects into a unified stream extending, to a great extent, before and after us (72). Thus, we can renew the phenomenological experience of the unified stream of consciousness by recollecting a previous act of consciousness along with its unintended simultaneous and successive background, and in so regarding their inter-connectedness, come upon an awareness of the stream (72). Although unclear memories may seem to pose an obstacle to a consciousness of the stream, they can be made clear by remembering a clearer memory connected with the unclear one; this way one is able to reconnect the continuous stream of consciousness (73).
We have considered, then, two of the features that enable the stream character of consciousness. The first was the intentional structure: in it, acts of consciousness and their objects are never fully given at one singular place along the continuum; rather, acts of consciousness undergo a fluid temporal alteration and cannot be fully identified in any given moment. These acts of consciousness and their objects are so pervasively interconnected across the temporal continuum of the stream, that we may imagine the movement of alteration as being a fluid one rather than a disconnected one.
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Three Times Time Equals Flow:
Husserl's Tripartite Stream of Consciousness
Husserl's Tripartite Stream of Consciousness
What does Husserl's tripartite structure of time consciousness got to do with us?
Sometimes when cooking we test our creation and find that it needs something. We are not sure what, but we 'have an idea' of what we want. Before we select the new ingredient, we are already aware of it in a way. But it has not taken a determinate form in our mind. Perhaps while trying to make that decision, we need to take into account all the other ingredients we have added so far. We need to keep them in mind, so that we do not make a bad combination with the new addition. However, we do not actually recollect specifically each thing we had already put in. We are marginally aware of those memories, but they are also indeterminate in a way. So we have an awareness of what is going on now. But we also have a marginal awareness of what we were just aware of and what we will soon be aware of. These other awarenesses are on the horizon of our attention. And what we expect comes into our awareness all while our current awareness moves into what we retain. There seems then to be a flow in our stream of awareness.
Let's consider seeing things a different way. Imagine again we are searching for that new ingredient. Is it that we are aware of what we will add, but in an indeterminate way? Or is it that we are aware that there is a big difference between what we are now aware of, and what we will soon be aware of? The reason the coming awareness is 'indeterminate' is really because we are aware more of the difference between now and then. We feel that we are on the brink of time, so to speak, that the next moment will not be continuous with this one, because it will hold something very new in it. In fact, because we often have these moments when we feel the difference with the future, we do not really feel time as a continuous flow. Rather, we feel it as us always being on the edge of a change. And what about our past awarenesses? Don't they flow-off continuously? But what makes the current moment not a past one is the fact that it stands out from them. What makes the present the present is its difference with the past. There is not an unbroken continuum between our current awareness and the one we just had. There was a leap over a cliff. We only live in a present because time is not a continuous flow. Otherwise we could blend our current selves in with our past. But this we cannot do. Time is a moment breaking out of itself. The present is momentous.
Brief Summary
For Husserl, we are not just aware of what is now appearing to us. We also retain past intentions (as retentions) and we anticipate future ones (protentions). The now moment swells outside the boundaries of the pure present, because the future continually flows through the present into the past, like a stream.
Points Relative to Deleuze
For a Deleuzean time consciousness, we are not immediately aware of what lies in our past and future acts of consciousness. Rather, we are immediately aware of the difference between the moment we experience and ones from the past and the future. If the past is retained in the now, it is as a difference, as us feeling like we have changed, gotten older for example. And if we anticipate the future, it is only when the future appears to us as different from the now and the past. When we anticipate something in the future, we are really just currently aware that the now will be different from the future. In other words, when we retain the past or protend the future, we are actually just being aware of the incoherence of time, its not-being-glued-together; we sense our present lying between the infinitely small crack between the past and the future.
Husserl developed a theory of our internal consciousness of time. Consider first how when we are conscious, our awareness is directed toward something. We use the term 'intend' for this being-pointed-toward and object of our attention. Husserl explains time consciousness in terms of three modes of our intentional awareness. We are directly intending what appears to us now. But we are also indirectly maintaining an awareness of past intentions. This is retention. And we are also indirectly aware of what we expect to come. And this would be protention.
Regarding the retentions, Husserl provides a famous diagonal line diagram. Perhaps this animation below illustrates it. As time moves forward, we retain our intention of our prior moment of awareness. So when moment of consciousness B arrives on the scene, it is marginally aware of its just prior intention A. But now that A is a retention, we call it A'. Then when C arrives, it retains it's just prior moment B, now B'. And B' retains its prior moment, now A''. The diagram also keeps the prior B moment with just its own previous A'. So we are continually adding layers and layers of retentional awareness of past moments.
We find a description of the complex intentional structure and its stream in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, in which Husserl speaks of consciousness as having “running off modes of an immanent temporal object” which have “a beginning, a source-point, so to speak. This is the running-off mode with which the immanent object begins to exist. It is characterized as now” (30). This now “changes into a past,” because a new now “is always entering on the scene” (30). This running-off happens in a “steady progression,” and each phase of it “is itself a continuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a continuity of pasts” (30). These past acts of consciousness that were once happening now are retained as retentions in a continuous series “pertaining to the beginning-point” which is the “impressional consciousness” that is “constantly flowing” and that “passes over into ever new retentional consciousness” (31). And, not only does consciousness extend into its past, but it extends into its future as well, in the form of protensions; for, he says, “[e]very process that constitutes its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment” (54). Thus, for Husserl, consciousness happens across a steady continuum of acts of consciousness, and those that have passed relative to the ones now happening are retained and available to consciousness for recollection; while at the same time, part of the structure of consciousness happening now is its protended anticipation of what it expects to later enter into consciousness. It would seem, then, that the different temporal phases of consciousness are thoroughly linked with each other.
We find a more detailed description of their interconnection in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, in which Husserl explains that objects are not isolated; rather, they accompany an “objective background,” which contains objectivities that were apprehended along with the intended object (Basic Problems of Phenomenology 68); however, they were not thematically intended in that prior act. Despite their not having been previously intended thematically, these previously non-thematically intended objects that accompanied the thematically intended ones can be thematically intended retrospectively by first recollecting the previously thematically intended object and then attending to its background, which contains the yet-thematically intended objects (69). Husserl then describes a method of attending to non-thematically intended intentional backgrounds in order to bring consciousness into an awareness of its unified, stream-like structure and movement. He explains that when we direct our phenomenological perception at our acts of consciousness (cogitationes), these acts of consciousness will be self-present for as long as they perdure (71). When one act of consciousness has expired, its trace is retended; yet, it fades away (71). However, the retention may occur in such a way that the fading act of consciousness is connected to a new one, resulting in a consciousness of a succession of acts of consciousness (71). When we have a recollection of this series, it is as though we re-live that sequence of acts of consciousness (71). Also, along with this temporal background of intentions, there is a simultaneous background, which would include those objects that one perceived, but only marginally and non-thematically (72). By attending to these yet-thematized retended and protended backgrounds, we may connect all acts of consciousness and their objects into a unified stream extending, to a great extent, before and after us (72). Thus, we can renew the phenomenological experience of the unified stream of consciousness by recollecting a previous act of consciousness along with its unintended simultaneous and successive background, and in so regarding their inter-connectedness, come upon an awareness of the stream (72). Although unclear memories may seem to pose an obstacle to a consciousness of the stream, they can be made clear by remembering a clearer memory connected with the unclear one; this way one is able to reconnect the continuous stream of consciousness (73).
We have considered, then, two of the features that enable the stream character of consciousness. The first was the intentional structure: in it, acts of consciousness and their objects are never fully given at one singular place along the continuum; rather, acts of consciousness undergo a fluid temporal alteration and cannot be fully identified in any given moment. These acts of consciousness and their objects are so pervasively interconnected across the temporal continuum of the stream, that we may imagine the movement of alteration as being a fluid one rather than a disconnected one.
Husserl, Edmond. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-1911. From the German “Aus den Vorlesungen, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Wintersemester 1910/1911” in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivität, Husserliana XIII, edited by Iso Kern. Vol. 12 of Edmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Netherlands: Springer, 2006.
Husserl, Edmond. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 of Edmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Husserl, Edmond. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 of Edmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
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