Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Supplementary B1, paragraph 4

by Corry Shores
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Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

I "On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between 'Fresh' Memory and 'Full' Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time"

No. 1 "How Does the Unity of a Process of Change that Continues for an Extended Period of Time Come to Be Represented?

Intuition and Re-presentation"

Paragraph 4

Previously Husserl addressed our feeling that a melody should continue when it is incomplete. So let's imagine that we come to the last note in a series, but we can tell there should be more to follow. We ask, how do we know that all the notes played so far are not the entire melody? If perception or phantasy continued the melody for us, we would have them as obvious indications that the melody should go on. But without these two influences, what tells us that "something really should follow, that something is missing from the entirety of the melody?"

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Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 of Edmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.