Vergauwen, A Metalogical Theory of Reference, 1.2, §22

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. Paragraph headings are my own.]

Roger Vergauwen

A Metalogical Theory of Reference: Realism and Essentialism in Semantics

Chapter 1.2 Primitive Reference and Satisfaction

§22 Tarski's Truth Definition and his Dissatisfaction with Truth Predicates

For Tarski, the notions 'primitive reference' and 'satisfaction' did not ultimately matter to his description of truth. For, he really wanted to eliminate the truth predicates and replace them with metalanguage definitions. But it is not clear how we might do that. We will now outline Tarski's reasons for wanting a strict separation between object language and metalanguage.

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Vergauwen, Roger. A Metalogical Theory of Reference: Realism and Essentialism in Semantics. London: University Press of America, 1993.