Vergauwen, A Metalogical Theory of Reference, Introduction, §11

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. Paragraph headings are my own.]

Roger Vergauwen

A Metalogical Theory of Reference: Realism and Essentialism in Semantics

Introduction: the Temperature of a Hot Topic

§11 Searle and Dummett

Searle has demonstrated that intentionality is an essential trait of certain mental states. Intentionality is our mental states' directedness to or about objects and worldly states of affairs. Our intentionality is linked to our biology.

Searle constructs the Chinese Room experiment to demonstrate that it is impossible to program intentionality into a computer. His demonstration supposed shows computers cannot grasp the language's intentionality, that is, the relation between language and reality. Machines can have syntax but not semantics. Hence intentionality and referentiality might be related phenomena. Searle thinks that intentionality is biological and not metalogical. However, we have seen that we need not say that referentiality has nothing to do with models. Searle thinks that beliefs exemplify intentionality. Beliefs demonstrate the linguistic effect of propositional attitude verbs. They are examples of model-theoretic reference. We may also apply Cantor's diagonalization to these verbs. Doing so shows the difference between partial standard models and non-standard models. The result is "metalogical realism," which satisfies correspondence theory. Such a metalogical realism holds against Putnam's critique and Dummett's epistemological critique. Dummett thinks that any theory of meaning must explain how meaning comes about. His solution is an intuitionistic-constructivistic semantics. It is incompatible with any realism. Dummett does not recognize a difference between truth conditions and assertibility conditions. As a result, there can be no basis for realism in a semantic theory.

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Vergauwen, Roger. A Metalogical Theory of Reference: Realism and Essentialism in Semantics. London: University Press of America, 1993.