Stoic Logic, Mates, Chapter 1, §5 Exposition of the Stoic Theory (§1), Subsection 1

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Stoics, Stoic Logic, Stoic Semantics, Entry Directory]

[Benson Mates' Stoic Logic Entry directory]

Benson Mates

Stoic Logic

Chapter II: Signs, Sense, and Denotation

§5 Exposition of the Stoic Theory (§1)

Subsection 1: The Anatomy of Sense

Stoics connect three things: the significans, 'that which exists,' and the significate.

1) significans (semainon σημαινον): the sign, signal, sound, or Zeichen.

We are friends with Dion. We say his name to get his attention.

We do so by making sounds, "Di - on". This is the sign for Dion.

We also call it the significans for Dion.

2) 'that which exists' (tygchanon τυγχάνον): the denotation, extension, meaning, external object, or Bedeutung.

'That which exists' is the actually external existing object. When we call "Di - on," our friend who goes by the name 'Dion,' who is Dion himself, is in this case 'that which exists.'

Here is something quite important, [especially for those of us interested in Deleuze's intensional Stoic logic]: Both the sound and that which exists are bodies, or physical objects.

3) the significate (semainomenon σημαινομενον) the connotation, intension, sense, thought/concept, Sinn, or lekton (λεκτον).

The significate is not a body. Although, it is an "actual entity."

Consider a Barbarian listening to Greeks speak. The Greek calls to his friend, Dion. The Barbarian hears the sound-word "Dion," and he happens by chance to be looking at Dion. However, he does not know that the sounds he hears are referring to the person he sees.

The Stoic's technical name for the significate is lekton: 'that which is meant.'

So consider the fact that the sound is physical, because it it is vibrating air. And Dion himself is a physical body as well. But when we refer to things, there is something else non-physical involved that is neither the symbol nor the object referred-to. In a way, it is the "sense" of the term or proposition. It is a little like the concept we have for the referenced thing.

Sextus Empiricus writes that the signficate is "the actual entity indicated or revealed by the sound and which we apprehend as subsisting together with [i.e., in] our thought." (Adversus Mathematicos VIII, 12, qtd and translated in Mates, 11c)

Seneca offers another example:

Let's suppose that we see Cato walking nearby. We have a sense of sight. And it shows us Cato in the act of walking. Because we perceive it, the mind believes it. Now, our eyes see Cato's body. For, "that which I see, and to which I direct my eyes and my mind, is a body." But now we say something: 'Cato is walking.' We made a sound. But what we mean by those sounds (the lekton) is not a body. Rather, it is a certain affirmation about a body.Some call this meaning 'affirmation.' Others call it 'assertion.' But Seneca notes that there is an important difference between what we mean (the lekton) and what we are talking about (the body).

(Epistulae 117, 13.)

[Entry directory for other entries in this series.]

From:

Mates, Benson. Stoic Logic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. [Originally published in 1953 as Volume 26 of the University of California Publications in Philosophy.]