23 Feb 2009

Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 3, Sect 9 Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits §§245-263



by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary, up to the end where I reproduce this section in full. My commentary is in brackets. Paragraph headings are my own.]



David Hume

A Treatise of Human Nature

Book I: Of the Understanding

Part III: Of Knowledge and Probability


Section IX: Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits




§245 We Will Examine the Matter Thoroughly

We have discussed many convincing arguments regarding the experiential causes of our beliefs. But Hume will continue analyzing the matter for more evidence and illustration of these fundamental principles.

A scrupulous hesitation to receive any new hypothesis is so laudable a disposition in philosophers, and so necessary to the examination of truth, that it deserves to be complyed with, and requires that every argument be produced, which may tend to their satisfaction, and every objection removed, which may stop them in their reasoning. (107a)


§246 Objection to Reasoning by Contiguity and Resemblance

We know that cause and effect impel our imagination to move from one idea to another. Resemblance and contiguity do the same. These are the associating principles of thought. One impression evokes the idea connected with it. And because the idea is evoked by a sense-impression, it is called-up with additional force and vigor.

Now, some may object that our reasoning does not result from relations of contiguity and resemblance, but rather only from cause and effect.


§247 Association Systems

Hume will now solve this objection.
First we note that when we have an immediate impression, it is of such a strong force that we can easily distinguish it from imagined fictions. We remember these impressions as being once present. These memories form a system that is joined to our present impressions; we call it a "reality."

Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleased to call a reality. (108b)

Within this system of perceptions we also have habits of associating impressions with certain ideas. We come to regard these as necessarily linked by causation. These rigid patterns within the broader system of associations itself forms another system. This new system as well is considered to contain realities. The broader system is the object of memory and senses. The smaller system of regularities is the object of our judgments.



§248 Roaming Rome's Reality

The causal relations allow us to reason about things removed from time and place, lying beyond the reach of our senses and memory.


By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please. I form an idea of ROME, which I neither see nor remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and books of travellers and historians. This idea of Rome I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object, which I call the globe. I join to it the conception of a particular government, and religion, and manners. I look backward and consider its first foundation; its several revolutions, successes, and misfortunes. All this, and everything else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; tho' by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination. (108cd)



§249 Poetic Transportation to Elysian Fields

The objection we are addressing is that we do not reason from contiguity and resemblance. Rather we reason from causal relations between ideas. Hume now explains that contiguity and resemblance only serve to enhance causal relations.

if the contiguous and resembling object be comprehended in this system of realities, there is no doubt but these two relations will assist that of cause and effect, and infix the related idea with more force in the imagination. (109a)

Hume extends this principle to even imagined things. He has us consider how poets may call to mind vivid images of fictional regions by first receiving impressions of similar places.

A poet, no doubt, will be the better able to form a strong description of the Elysian fields, that he prompts his imagination by the view of a beautiful meadow or garden; as at another time he may by his fancy place himself in the midst of these fabulous regions, that by the feign'd contiguity he may enliven his imagination. (109b)

Thus not only does contiguity and resemblance enhance inferences to real objects, these relations as well increase the force of inferred fictional ideas as well.


§250 Contiguity and Resemblance have Little Power Over Our Minds without Causation

So contiguity and resemblance influence our imagination's inferential operations in this way. But consider when there is no relation of causal necessity between the impression and the evoked idea. In these cases when there are just relations of resemblance and contiguity, their influence on the imagination is "feeble and uncertain." Only causal relations can compel us to believe in something's reality. If we want this same force of persuasion for such other relations as contiguity and resemblance, the ideas need also have causal necessity.

As the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence, so is this persuasion requisite to give force to these other relations. (109c) For when there is only a weak association between ideas, they do not force themselves upon us with vibrancy. And they also could appear in any variety of variations. So after a while we come less to believe in these weaker associations.


§251 The Power of Causality

So contiguity and resemblance are weak and variable. Causal relations however present fixed and unalterable objects, and reliable inferences from one to the other.

The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination as something solid and real, certain and invariable. The thought is always determin'd to pass from the impression to the idea, and from that particular impression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation. (110bc)


§252 Augmenting Belief with Contiguity and Resemblance

Hume will now show that contiguity and resemblance can "augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception." (110c) This will lend further proof that "belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression."


§253 Red Sea and Galilee Miracals Made More Lively

Hume begins first with an example. Muslims and Christians enliven their faith by visiting Mecca or the Holy Land.

A man, whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red-Sea, and the Desert, and Jerusalem, and Galilee, can never doubt of any miraculous events, which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists. (110d)

The believer never saw the miraculous events themselves. He only heard their stories. But when visiting these sights and viewing their details, he also considered the accounts described in the holy writings. Now the ideas for these events build contiguity with the imagery of their location. Later when back in his home land, the believer might again read or hear the stories. The contiguity of the concrete images from the locales will make the ideas of these miracles more vibrant and persuasively forceful. Hence they will increase his belief.


§254 Resemblance & Inference

We often note that there are no qualities in the object that by themselves inferentially imply some other object.

'tis impossible to determine, otherwise than by experience, what will result from any phenomenon, or what has preceded it. (111b)

Some philosophers argue otherwise. They firstly hold that objects are already causally related by the laws of motion. Then by applying these laws, we may rationally infer motional communications without drawing from past experiences.

Hume counter-argues. He says firstly that if we make such an inference, it must be based on certainties. So also it would be a demonstration. This means that contrary suppositions would have to be impossible.

As we often note, anything that is imaginable is possible [see §73 for more on this principle.] And we can easily imagine motions occurring other than the ways that laws predict them. For, we may form

a clear and consistent idea of one body’s moving upon another, and of its rest immediately upon the contact, or of its returning back in the same line in which it came; or of its annihilation; or circular or elliptical motion: and in short, of an infinite number of other changes, which we may suppose it to undergo. These suppositions are all consistent and natural. (111c.d)

We think that we may rely on these laws because each of our experiences of causes so much resembles other experiences of causes, which correlate as well to effects that consistently resemble each other. As well, we know that communicated forces remain proportionally consistent. Hence the cause of motion strongly resembles its effect, although most times we must take into account differences in mass. Nonetheless, the same amount of impulsion moves from one body to the next. Both objects seem linked by their common force of impulsion transferred from one to the other. This tie

binds the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseparable. (112a)

Resemblance, then, serves to reinforce other inferential associations, which are the sources of our beliefs. Hence "all belief arises from the association of ideas, according to my hypothesis." (112ab)


§255 Oceans Magnificence More Vividly Seen than Heard

Hume will further explain the role of experience in making inferential judgments. He begins by noting that we always see the same size field of vision, no matter the size of the objects we view.

'Tis universally allow'd by the writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points, and that a man on the top of a mountain has no larger an image presented to his senses, than when he is cooped up in the narrowest court or chamber. (112b)
We assess the differences between objects by means of judgments based on past experiences. But sometimes we confuse this judgment of size difference with an actual perception of size differences.

Now consider the difference between when we hear the ocean, or when we see it from a very high place. We get a much more profound sense of its magnificence when we see it. But whether we see it or hear it, we nonetheless make the inferential transition to our idea for it. The difference in vivacity must only be then from the fact that the visual impression more closely resembles our idea for the ocean than does the sound.


§256 Believing Lies

Often we too easily believe other people. We are victims of our credulity.

[Imagine that someone purports to see spirits. He claims he can channel messages from our dead relatives. Our late grandmother has something gentle and sweet to say to us, it seems. That's just like how she was to her grandkids, gentle and sweet. And the way the medium communicates the message is not very different than the way messengers sometimes convey absent peoples' greetings. But the medium is making-up grandmother's conversation. Nonetheless, the way he communicates the false dialogue, and the things he says, strongly resemble cases when we have every reason to believe what we are being told.]

When someone else makes something up, their words are still strongly connected to ideas in their minds. And these ideas are still connected with reality in one way or another, even though they are used to misrepresent reality. So when we hear their false words, our minds still make inferential associations to ideas whose vivacity causes us to believe in their reality. We have

a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation. The words or discourses of others have an intimate connexion with certain ideas in their mind; and these ideas have also a connexion with the facts or objects, which they represent. This latter connexion is generally much over-rated, and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts. (113b)


§257 DisBelieving a DisResembling Afterlife

So stronger resemblances between impressions and ideas fortifies our inferential reasoning based on them. But sometimes there is no such resemblance. In those cases our inference's strength are profoundly diminished.

We saw that one way we err is by believing too strongly inferential relations with a high degree of resemblance. Likewise, we may wrongly disbelieve true inferential ideas if the resemblance is too weak. We see this happen when disbelieving in certain future states. For example, it seems that many people do not believe in an afterlife, which would not resemble our lives now.

A future state is so far removed from our comprehension, and we have so obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we can invent, however strong in themselves, and however much assisted by education, are never able with slow imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future condition, derived from its want of resemblance to the present life, than to that derived from its remoteness. For I observe, that men are everywhere concerned about what may happen after their death, provided it regard this world. (114c.d)


§258 Earthly Eternal Damnation

So on account of the lack of resemblance between this life and the afterlife, many cannot believe in it. Hence often religious believers would say that certain people will surely suffer eternal infinite punishment in hell, while also saying that their mistreatment on earth was cruel and barbarous. For, they really only believe in the reality of this world and not that of the other.


§259 We are Transfixed by Hellfire Sermons Because We Do not Believe Them

Hume offers another reason why many religious people probably do not actually believe in the afterlife. We do not like to feel fear and terror in our everyday lives. However, we enjoy it when it is a matter of fiction. Many people enjoy fiery preachers who terrify their congregation with horrific descriptions of hell. But if people believed they were real, they would not enjoy the experience. So they must not really believe these descriptions, probably because they do not resemble our experiences.


§260 The Strength of Sole Ideas Repeating

Consider what we have so far found:
1) Some objects we often find conjoined in our experiences.
2) So when we have the impression of one, custom causes us to make an idea transition to the idea of the other object.
3) The ease of this transition also explains the strength and liveliness of the inferred idea.

Now consider a different situation. Imagine that there is some idea that repeatedly enters our mind without being provoked by some other impression. Because it is recurrent, it will build force. But this vivacity alone will not allow us to draw conclusions to other ideas. For it presumably does not recur conjoined with other impressions or ideas.

Hume now raises the issue of how repeated experiences "educate" us of certain things. When we repeated experience things as conjoined, we are right to make inferences from one to the other. But what about ideas that repeat themselves without causal relations? Is their "education" just as potent as things that repeat by causal necessity?


§261 Habits of Belief

If from our births we develop the habit of believing something, then it will become impossible by means of reason to eradicate it. In fact, even the inferential power of causal relations might not be able to change these beliefs. So if we repeatedly think some idea all our lives, we will believe it. But we cannot believe something just because we reason it.


§262 Loss Habitually Retained

So consider people who lose their legs or arms. For some period after the loss, they will still initiate actions or motions as though their limbs were still there. For their appendages have repeatedly shown themselves throughout their lives. But after losing them, the amputees can easily reason that they should never begin to attempt walking or reaching for something. Nevertheless, there is an adjustment period where they have to become accustomed to not having their limbs. These people will have sense impressions leading them to infer that they do not have limbs, but nonetheless they believe that they still do.


§263 Both Prejudices and Reasonings Result from Repetition and Custom

Hence those ideas we long hold teach or "educate" us of things that we more strongly believe than what we know by reasoning. We see this in liars. They eventually come to believe the lies they repeat.

But these ideas which educate us through repeated non-inferential appearances do not qualify in philosophy as grounds for knowledge. And yet, both these beliefs and our rationally inferred ideas result from the same foundation: custom and repetition.




From the original text:

Sect. ix. Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits.

However convincing the foregoing arguments may appear, we must not rest contented with them, but must turn the subject on every side, in order to find some new points of view, from which we may illustrate and confirm such extraordinary, and such fundamental principles. A scrupulous hesitation to receive any new hypothesis is so laudable a disposition in philosophers, and so necessary to the examination of truth, that it deserves to be complyed with, and requires that every argument be produced, which may tend to their satisfaction, and every objection removed, which may stop them in their reasoning.

I have often observed, that, beside cause and effect, the two relations of resemblance and contiguity, are to be considered as associating principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another. I have also observed, that when of two objects connected to-ether by any of these relations, one is immediately present to the memory or senses, not only the mind is conveyed to its co-relative by means of the associating principle; but likewise conceives it with an additional force and vigour, by the united operation of that principle, and of the present impression. All this I have observed, in order to confirm by analogy, my explication of our judgments concerning cause and effect. But this very argument may, perhaps, be turned against me, and instead of a confirmation of my hypothesis, may become an objection to it. For it may be said, that if all the parts of that hypothesis be true, viz. that these three species of relation are derived from the same principles; that their effects in informing and enlivening our ideas are the same; and that belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea; it should follow, that that action of the mind may not only be derived from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance. But as we find by experience, that belief arises only from causation, and that we can draw no inference from one object to another, except they be connected by this relation, we may conclude, that there is some error in that reasoning, which leads us into such difficulties.

This is the objection; let us now consider its solution. It is evident, that whatever is present to the memory, striking upon the mind with a vivacity, which resembles an immediate impression, must become of considerable moment in all the operations of the mind, and must easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination. Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleased to call a reality. But the mind stops not here. For finding, that with this system of perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas; and as it feels that it is in a manner necessarily determined to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by which it is determined, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses; the second of the judgment.

It is this latter principle, which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please. I form an idea of ROME, which I neither see nor remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and books of travellers and historians. This idea of Rome I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object, which I call the globe. I join to it the conception of a particular government, and religion, and manners. I look backward and consider its first foundation; its several revolutions, successes, and misfortunes. All this, and everything else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; though by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination.

As to the influence of contiguity and resemblance, we may observe, that if the contiguous and resembling object be comprehended in this system of realities, there is no doubt but these two relations will assist that of cause and effect, and infix the related idea with more force in the imagination. This I shall enlarge upon presently. Mean while I shall carry my observation a step farther, and assert, that even where the related object is but feigned, the relation will serve to enliven the idea, and encrease its influence. A poet, no doubt, will be the better able to form a strong description of the Elysian fields, that he prompts his imagination by the view of a beautiful meadow or garden; as at another time he may by his fancy place himself in the midst of these fabulous regions, that by the feigned contiguity he may enliven his imagination.

But though I cannot altogether exclude the relations of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy in this manner, it is observable that, when single, their influence is very feeble and uncertain. As the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence, so is this persuasion requisite to give force to these other relations. For where upon the appearance of an impression we not only feign another object, but likewise arbitrarily, and of our mere good-will and pleasure give it a particular relation to the impression, this can have but a small effect upon the mind; nor is there any reason, why, upon the return of the same impression, we should be determined to place the same object in the same relation to it. There is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same, without any difference or variation. And indeed such a fiction is founded on so little reason, that nothing but pure caprice can determine the mind to form it; and that principle being fluctuating and uncertain, it is impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. The mind forsees and anticipates the change; and even from the very first instant feels the looseness of its actions, and the weak hold it has of its objects. And as this imperfection is very sensible in every single instance, it still encreases by experience and observation, when we compare the several instances we may remember, and form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feigned resemblance and contiguity.

The relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages. The objects it presents are fixt and unalterable. The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination as something solid and real, certain and invariable. The thought is always determined to pass from the impression to the idea, and from that particular impression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation.

But not content with removing this objection, I shall endeavour to extract from it a proof of the present doctrine. Contiguity and resemblance have an effect much inferior to causation; but still have some effect, and augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception. If this can be proved in several new instances, beside what we have already observed, it will be allowed no inconsiderable argument, that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression.

To begin with contiguity; it has been remarked among the Mahometans as well as Christians, that those pilgrims, who have seen MECCA or the HOLY LAND, are ever after more faithful and zealous believers, than those who have not had that advantage. A man, whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red-Sea, and the Desert, and Jerusalem, and Galilee, can never doubt of any miraculous events, which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy transition to the facts, which are supposed to have been related to them by contiguity, and encreases the belief by encreasing the vivacity of the conception. The remembrance of these fields and rivers has the same influence on the vulgar as a new argument; and from the same causes.

We may form a like observation concerning resemblance. We have remarked, that the conclusion, which we draw from a present object to its absent cause or effect, is never founded on any qualities, which we observe in that object, considered in itself, or, in other words, that it is impossible to determine, otherwise than by experience, what will result from any phenomenon, or what has preceded it. But though this be so evident in itself, that it seemed not to require any, proof; yet some philosophers have imagined that there is an apparent cause for the communication of motion, and that a reasonable man might immediately infer the motion of one body from the impulse of another, without having recourse to any past observation. That this opinion is false will admit of an easy proof. For if such an inference may be drawn merely from the ideas of body, of motion, and of impulse, it must amount to a demonstration, and must imply the absolute impossibility of any contrary supposition. Every effect, then, beside the communication of motion, implies a formal contradiction; and it is impossible not only that it can exist, but also that it can be conceived. But we may soon satisfy ourselves of the contrary, by forming a clear and consistent idea of one body’s moving upon another, and of its rest immediately upon the contact, or of its returning back in the same line in which it came; or of its annihilation; or circular or elliptical motion: and in short, of an infinite number of other changes, which we may suppose it to undergo. These suppositions are all consistent and natural; and the reason, Why we imagine the communication of motion to be more consistent and natural not only than those suppositions, but also than any other natural effect, is founded on the relation of resemblance betwixt the cause and effect, which is here united to experience, and binds the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseparable. Resemblance, then, has the same or a parallel influence with experience; and as the only immediate effect of experience is to associate our ideas together, it follows, that all belief arises from the association of ideas, according to my hypothesis.

It is universally allowed by the writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points, and that a man on the top of a mountain has no larger an image presented to his senses, than when he is cooped up in the narrowest court or chamber. It is only by experience that he infers the greatness of the object from some peculiar qualities of the image; and this inference of the judgment he confounds with sensation, as is common on other occasions. Now it is evident, that the inference of the judgment is here much more lively than what is usual in our common reasonings, and that a man has a more vivid conception of the vast extent of the ocean from the image he receives by the eye, when he stands on the top of the high promontory, than merely from hearing the roaring of the waters. He feels a more sensible pleasure from its magnificence; which is a proof of a more lively idea: And he confounds his judgment with sensation, which is another proof of it. But as the inference is equally certain and immediate in both cases, this superior vivacity of our conception in one case can proceed from nothing but this, that in drawing an inference from the sight, beside the customary conjunction, there is also a resemblance betwixt the image and the object we infer; which strengthens the relation, and conveys the vivacity of the impression to the related idea with an easier and more natural movement.

No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others; and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the influence of resemblance. When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony, our faith arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to causes; nor is there anything but our experience of the governing principles of human nature, which can give us any assurance of the veracity of men. But though experience be the true standard of this, as well as of all other judgments, we seldom regulate ourselves entirely by it; but have a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation. The words or discourses of others have an intimate connexion with certain ideas in their mind; and these ideas have also a connexion with the facts or objects, which they represent. This latter connexion is generally much over-rated, and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts. Other effects only point out their causes in an oblique manner; but the testimony of men does it directly, and is to be considered as an image as well as an effect. No wonder, therefore, we are so rash in drawing our inferences from it, and are less guided by experience in our judgments concerning it, than in those upon any other subject.

As resemblance, when conjoined with causation, fortifies our reasonings; so the want of it in any very great degree is able almost entirely to destroy them. Of this there is a remarkable instance in the universal carelessness and stupidity of men with regard to a future state, where they show as obstinate an incredulity, as they do a blind credulity on other occasions. There is not indeed a more ample matter of wonder to the studious, and of regret to the pious man, than to observe the negligence of the bulk of mankind concerning their approaching condition; and it is with reason, that many eminent theologians have not scrupled to affirm, that though the vulgar have no formal principles of infidelity, yet they are really infidels in their hearts, and have nothing like what we can call a belief of the eternal duration of their souls. For let us consider on the one hand what divines have displayed with such eloquence concerning the importance of eternity; and at the same time reflect, that though in matters of rhetoric we ought to lay our account with some exaggeration, we must in this case allow, that the strongest figures are infinitely inferior to the subject: And after this let us view on the other hand, the prodigious security of men in this particular: I ask, if these people really believe what is inculcated on them, and what they pretend to affirm; and the answer is obviously in the negative. As belief is an act of the mind arising from custom, it is not strange the want of resemblance should overthrow what custom has established, and diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter principle encreases it. A future state is so far removed from our comprehension, and we have so obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we can invent, however strong in themselves, and however much assisted by education, are never able with slow imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future condition, derived from its want of resemblance to the present life, than to that derived from its remoteness. For I observe, that men are everywhere concerned about what may happen after their death, provided it regard this world; and that there are few to whom their name, their family, their friends, and their country are in any period of time entirely indifferent.

And indeed the want of resemblance in this case so entirely destroys belief, that except those few, who upon cool reflection on the importance of the subject, have taken care by repeated meditation to imprint in their minds the arguments for a future state, there scarce are any, who believe the immortality of the soul with a true and established judgment; such as is derived from the testimony of travellers and historians. This appears very conspicuously wherever men have occasion to compare the pleasures and pains, the rewards and punishments of this life with those of a future; even though the case does not concern themselves, and there is no violent passion to disturb their judgment. The Roman Catholicks are certainly the most zealous of any sect in the Christian world; and yet you’ll find few among the more sensible people of that communion who do not blame the Gunpowder-treason, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew, as cruel and barbarous, though projected or executed against those very people, whom without any scruple they condemn to eternal and infinite punishments. All we can say in excuse for this inconsistency is, that they really do not believe what they affirm concerning a future state; nor is there any better proof of it than the very inconsistency.

We may add to this a remark; that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrifyed, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and it is only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure. In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being softened by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention.

The present hypothesis will receive additional confirmation, if we examine the effects of other kinds of custom, as well as of other relations. To understand this we must consider, that custom, to which I attribute all belief and reasoning, may operate upon the mind in invigorating an idea after two several ways. For supposing that in all past experience we have found two objects to have been always conjoined together, it is evident, that upon the appearance of one of these objects in an impression, we must from custom make an easy transition to the idea of that object, which usually attends it; and by means of the present impression and easy transition must conceive that idea in a stronger and more lively manner, than we do any loose floating image of the fancy. But let us next suppose, that a mere idea alone, without any of this curious and almost artificial preparation, should frequently make its appearance in the mind, this idea must by degrees acquire a facility and force; and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and unusual idea. This is the only particular, in which these two kinds of custom agree; and if it appear, that their effects on the judgment, are similar and proportionable, we may certainly conclude, that the foregoing explication of that faculty is satisfactory. But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION?

All those opinions and notions of things, to which we have been accustomed from our infancy, take such deep root, that it is impossible for us, by all the powers of reason and experience, to eradicate them; and this habit not only approaches in its influence, but even on many occasions prevails over that which a-rises from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects. Here we most not be contented with saying, that the vividness of the idea produces the belief: We must maintain that they are individually the same. The frequent repetition of any idea infixes it in the imagination; but coued never possibly of itself produce belief, if that act of the mind was, by the original constitution of our natures, annexed only to a reasoning and comparison of ideas. Custom may lead us into some false comparison of ideas. This is the utmost effect we can conceive of it. But it is certain it coued never supply the place of that comparison, nor produce any act of the mind, which naturally belonged to that principle.

A person, that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeavours for a long time afterwards to serve himself with them. After the death of any one, it is a common remark of the whole family, but especially of the servants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him to be in his chamber or in any other place, where they were accustomed to find him. I have often heard in conversation, after talking of a person, that is any way celebrated, that one, who has no acquaintance with him, will say, I have never seen such-a-one, but almost fancy I have; so often have I heard talk of him. All these are parallel instances.

If we consider this argument from EDUCATION in a proper light, it will appear very convincing; and the more so, that it is founded on one of the most common phaenomena, that is any where to be met with. I am persuaded, that upon examination we shall find more than one half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to education, and that the principles, which are thus implicitely embraced, overballance those, which are owing either to abstract reasoning or experience. As liars, by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to remember them; so the judgment, or rather the imagination, by the like means, may have ideas so strongly imprinted on it, and conceive them in so full a light, that they may operate upon the mind in the same manner with those, which the senses, memory or reason present to us. But as education is an artificial and not a natural cause, and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves in different times and places, it is never upon that account recognized by philosophers; though in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects.

7 In general we may observe, that as our assent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas, It resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination. By this expression it appears that the word, imagination, is commonly usd in two different senses; and tho nothing be more contrary to true philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings I have often been obligd to fall into it. When I oppose the Imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings. When I oppose it to neither, it is indifferent whether it be taken in the larger or more limited sense, or at least the context will sufficiently explain the meaning.




From:

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L.A Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Text available online at:

http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92t/


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