Pt3.Ch8.Sb7 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Teratology and Teleology’. summary

by Corry Shores
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[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 7: Teratology and Teleology

Brief Summary:

Geoffroy’s homological theory provides an account of the variations in anatomy, which becomes central to the theory of evolution. For Darwin different species have homologous forms on account of common ancestors. And anatomical parts can evolve according to how their functions alter. Cuvier's teleological theory of anatomy is not compatible with evolution, [because were a part’s function to change, it is no longer the same part, and thus such an evolutionary connection cannot be observed using this approach.] Also, Geoffrey’s homology or unity of composition is like Deleuze’s Idea.

Summary

Previously we examined Geoffroy’s homology theory of anatomy. Structures in different species can be identified on the basis of sharing one-to-one correspondences with an abstract, transcendental model which may be expressed in numerous species. Unlike Cuvier’s anatomy, Geoffrey’s is not based on teleological function; so for Cuvier a fin and an arm would not be the same anatomical part, because they have different purposes, however they would be the same for Cuvier, because its relation to the other parts correspond isomorphically with the transcendental model.

Deleuze characterizes Geoffroy as ‘calling forth monsters’ and Cuvier laying ‘out all fossils in order.’ (229) We saw two sections back that “Cuvier claimed to be able to show the structure of the entire animal from a small set of bones and used this technique successfully to prove the prior existence of now extinct species.” (229d) However, this approach led to there being gaps between species “where the combinations of different parts were not able to form a harmonious, purposive organism.” (230a) In Cuvier’s teleological approach major organs [compared between species] show less differentiation, but “Deviations in minor organs were less likely to affect the optimal functioning of the organism as a whole and could therefore be sustained.” (230) So there is more differentiation found in the lesser important organs. For Aristotle’s teleological account, if there are differences [in terms of deformations], they are deviations from the essence of the species, and were therefore understood as a lack. They were monsters by excess or defect. But Geoffroy provides a positive account of deformity. A deformity is an arrest in a part of the organism that leads to the unity of composition [the isomorphism to the transcendental model] in a different form [so the homology remains but in another expression/actualization]. 

Thus, he attempted to show that aberrations still followed the principle of the unity of composition: "Monstrosity exists, but not, however, exceptions to the ordinary laws [of nature]." (230)

Also Geoffrey could explain organs changing to new or null functions.

Furthermore, as the form of the organism was not understood in purposive terms, Geoffroy was able to give a positive description of these changes that allowed the organ either to no longer function in the new organism or to change its function. Thus, while we might argue teleologically that the bones in the human skull are separate in infants and later fuse together by claiming that this aids parturition, a teleological account seems implausible of the separation of the same bones in birds, which peck their way out of a shell. (230)

 

Theory of evolution would benefit from a positive account of the structure of variation, thus both the notions of positive contingency and identity irrespective of function [because they explain variations] would serve a theory of evolution. “This variation will eventually lead to speciation.” (230) Cuvier rejects an evolutionary theory that would say there is a transformism of species, because this would contradict the teleological account [because it would mean that parts change their function, but that means they are not the same parts any more so they cannot be thought of as linked developmentally?] Geoffroy however on the basis of his homological account produces a theory of evolution. Yet “While Geoffroy's account of evolution was incorrect, as it was based on purely environmental factors affecting the developing embryo, what is important is that in moving to a nonteleological account of the organism, an evolutionary account of the organism became possible.” (230) But Darwinian theory is based on the idea of two species with similar structures being homogeneous on account of a common ancestor.

Turning to Darwinian evolution, we can see that the main modification is the replacement, or perhaps grounding, of the unity of composition in an evolutionary account of the organism. For Darwin, therefore, homologies exist because organisms from different species share an ancestor. The theory of homologies thus plays a central role in the formulation of his own account of the organism:

Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire has strongly insisted on the high importance of relative position or connexion in homologous parts; they may differ to almost any extent in form and size, yet remain connected together in the same invariable order . . . what can be more different than the immensely long spiral proboscis of a sphinx-moth, the curious folded one of a bee or bug, and the great jaws of a beetle?--yet all these organs, serving for such widely different purposes, are formed by infinitely many modifications of an upper lip, mandibles, and two pairs of maxillae . . . Nothing can be more hopeless than to attempt to explain this similarity of pattern in members of the same class, by utility or by the doctrine of final causes. (231)

 

Deleuze thinks Geoffroy is seeking differential relations, and they would fulfill Deleuze’s criteria for the Idea.

He argues that what Geoffroy is aiming at with his emphasis on connections is a field of differential elements (the ideal correlates of the bones) forming specific types of relations (the connections which are central to Geoffroy's account). On this basis, Deleuze claims that the unity of composition functions like a Deleuzian Idea, attempting to fulfill his three criteria, which we discussed in chapter 4 (DR, 184). The elements of the Idea "must have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification," and the unity of composition seems to fulfill this requirement due to the fact that it is essentially nonmetric and topological, therefore differing from the actual structures that express it. Second, "these elements must be determined reciprocally," which in the case of the unity of composition, Deleuze takes to mean that what is central is not the bones themselves, but the connections they hold with other bones. Third, "a multiple ideal connection, a differential relation, must be actualized in diverse spatiotemporal relationships, at the same time as its elements are actually incarnated in a variety of terms and forms." In both Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze emphasizes that the unity of composition implies that homologies do not exist directly between actual terms "but are understood as the actualisation of an essence, in accordance with reasons and at speeds determined by the environment, with accelerations and interruptions" (DR, 184). That is, we note a homology by recognizing that the actual parts of both organisms are actualizations of the same transcendental essence, the unity of composition, rather than | by a direct correlation of actual terms, as in Cuvier's comparative anatomy. The unity of composition therefore functions, according to Deleuze, much like the virtual, as that which is actualized, while differing in kind from its actualization. (231-232)

Also, for Deleuze, the concept of essence in Geoffroy’s approach is not like the classical understanding of essence but is instead “functions more like a field of accidents, with no privileged form or level of organization.” (232)

 

However, Deleuze in Difference and Repetition thinks that “Geoffroy's anatomical elements may not be able to support the difference between virtuality and actuality required by the Idea”. (232) Yet in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze thinks that Geoffroy’s anatomical elements are like molecular relations that a single abstract animal or machine presents everywhere. But “Geoffroy's anatomical elements may not be able to support the difference between virtuality and actuality required by the Idea”. (232)

 

So we cannot formulate a theory of evolution on the basis of Cuvier’s teleological approach to anatomy. For, evolution [1] requires the existence of suboptimal organisms and [2] accepts that “structure cannot be determined simply by function, as homologies can be found regardless of the function of the parts in question.” (232) Change of function, which Geoffrey’s approach can describe, is central to the theory of evolution.  We turn now to Hegel to see if his philosophy is compatible with evolution. (233)

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb6 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Deleuze, Geoffroy, and Transcendental Anatomy’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 6: Deleuze, Geoffroy, and Transcendental Anatomy

Brief Summary:

Geoffroy offers a theory of anatomy based on homology. There is a transcendental unity of parts to which actual empirical cases correspond isomorphically. The theory was most demonstrable in application to embryonic forms. Thus both fish and human embryonic skeleton’s share a one-to-one correspondence to a transcendental arrangement of parts. This goes against Cuvier’s anatomy, and Hegel’s as well, because for them, anatomical parts are understood teleologically, in terms of their purposes or functions for the organism. So a fin and arm in Cuvier’s and Hegel’s approaches would not share the same designation, because their functions are different, however in Geoffrey’s they will. The relation between transcendental and empirical resonates with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism.

Summary

Previously we saw how Cuvier, like Hegel, thinks that animals should not be classified in terms of differences of degree. Unlike Hegel, he uses a non-unified system, one with four branches. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Cuvier’s system is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes.

Now we turn to Deleuze’s connection with Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire to better see Deleuze’s account of the organism. Geoffroy proposes a transcendental anatomy.

Geoffroy was a contemporary of Cuvier. They first worked together but later sharply disagreed. Geoffroy rejects two important tenets in Cuvier’s anatomy. (224) [1] Geoffroy favors the principle of morphology over teleological function. He was concerned more with the connections between parts and with the parts’ genesis.

First, Geoffroy rejected Cuvier's principle of the correlation of parts in favor of his own "principle of connections." Rather than arguing that comparisons between organisms should be grounded in an analysis of the form or function of their parts, Geoffroy instead proposed that anatomical classification should proceed along morphological lines. In rejecting form and function, Geoffroy argued that what was key was the relations between parts themselves. Parts were therefore understood in terms of their connections with other parts and their genesis, according to an abstract schema. Such an account presented a radical break with teleology. (224)

We will contrast Geoffroy’s approach with that of comparative anatomists. For comparative anatomists, if parts between species share the same form and function, they may be given the same name.

For the comparative anatomist, the names of the parts of animals are, to a certain extent, derived analogically with those of other animals, archetypally with man. Thus, for instance, we can apply the term legs to other animals as they share certain characteristics of form and function with human legs. When the function or form of parts differs from those of man, however, a different term must be assigned to the part in question. Thus, although there is a similarity between the fins of a fish and the arm of a man, on a teleological account, the functional and structural differences mean that different terms must be applied to each. (225)

For Geoffroy, however, “parts in different animals may play different functional roles but may nevertheless be classified as essentially the same.” (225) This means that fins and arms could be classified together, even though they have different functions. A homology is a similarity across different organisms. But we are here rejecting the teleological account of anatomical function as the basis for classification. The teleology, purpose, would explain similar features in different species (like leg in men and dogs). But now we need some other rational ground to explain such similarities for parts whose functions might differ. Geoffroy proposes the ‘principle of the unity of composition.’ (225) [It is not specified yet, but parts are similar according to similarities to an abstract model for the part.]

The principle that Geoffroy employs for this role is the principle of the unity of composition. In order to posit similarities, Geoffroy posited an underlying abstract structure for particular animal forms. This structure was not to be understood in teleological terms, the function of the structure emerging depending on the particular form this structure took in the animal in question. The underlying plan allows the homology to be defined without reference to teleology. The British comparative anatomist Richard Owen was later to define it as "the same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function," whereas Cuvier's analogies were defined as "a part or organ in one animal which has the same function as another part or organ in another animal." Thus, to use Appel's example, the legs of a crab are analogous to those of a quadruped, as they share the same function, but they are not homologous to them. Fins and arms, on the contrary, would be homologous without being analogous. (225)

A classical example of Geoffroy’s method is fish skeletons. We are concerned with similar connections of parts in different creatures.  There needs to be a one-to-one correlation. Geoffroy shows such a correlation between fish and human skeletons, although because there are more bones in the fish, he examined the creatures in their embryonic state. “Despite the differences in the final number of bones, the same number of centers of ossification were found in both types of embryos, although these fused together as mammalian embryos developed.” (226) One difference is the bone structure of the gill cover in fish, not apparently found in humans, but Geoffroy thinks it is homologous with the human hearing bones in the ear. “That is, the bones that provided the function of hearing within mammals were part of the respiratory system of fishes. Thus, the field of homologies extended beyond those that could be discovered by teleological means.” (226)

Deleuze takes interest in Geoffroy and in his difference with Cuvier. Their 1830 public debate was about how Geoffroy was supporting a paper that demonstrated a homology across two of Cuvier’s embranchments, which in Cuvier’s system, were incomparable (specifically between vertebrates and mollusks.) Cuvier showed the flaws in the paper’s argument. The argument was over three points, “the distinctness of species, the question of method, and the question of political control of the academy,” but we are here concerned with the first two. Cuvier won the first argument over the distinctness of species, by showing that the homologies cannot be found between mollusks and vertebrates in the way they are in the paper. (226-227) Also, under Cuvier’s teleological system, minor changes in the structure of one organ “would necessarily lead to reciprocal changes in the remainder of the organism,” meaning that there are not intermediaries between species.

Thus there is not a continuity of species for Cuvier and hence also not a transformation of species “as changes would have to cut across the dead zone of teleological imperfection surrounding a given species.” (227) However, “On Geoffroy's account, however, it was possible to see species as forming a continuity, since unity was defined by the connection of parts, rather than their particular instantiation in a teleological nexus.” [Thus a small variation in a part would not mean a drastic anatomical change, because functioning is not the basis for determining the anatomy.] The second part of the debate was about method, and it has two parts. Cuvier thought anatomy is a science that can only focus on the facts and their categorization. Geoffroy thought that after determining the facts, their scientific consequences must be assessed. Cuvier thought that there is a difficulty in formulating Geoffroy’s unity of composition. Cuvier thinks that homologies lead to absurdities, but teleology is consistent, also, some of Geoffrey's examples were mechanically impossible.

Cuvier argued that if homologies were to be understood as the identity of an organ across different species, we were led to absurdities, but if we rejected the idea that homologies were strict identities, then instead, we simply had a concept of analogy, such as that formulated by Aristotle, between different species. Following on from this criticism, Cuvier argued that many of the homologies proposed by Geoffroy were in fact mechanically impossible to perform on a given organism, such as the reversal of position of several key organs in fish compared to mammalian vertebrates. (227)

 

There is a transcendental at work in Geoffroy’s theory. There is a transcendental unity of organization expressed in different species.

Contrary to Cuvier's characterization of homologies as involving direct relations between actual creatures, homologies instead refer to the transcendental unity of composition. It is because particular structures in different organisms are an expression of this same transcendental unity of organization that the homology exists between them. (227)

Geoffroy does not think we can characterize the unity of composition on the basis of some particular structures of actual organisms, because it is a matter of a transcendental unity. So Geoffroy is concerned more with how the transcendental unity relates to empirical unity, and not how the parts of some actual creature’s body part relates to another one. This is why Deleuze finds resonances of Geoffroy’s ideas in his own work. “Thus, Cuvier's criticism fails to hit its mark, as Geoffroy's account does not deal with relations between actual terms but between the transcendental and the empirical. The identities directly between actual organs that Cuvier attributes to Geoffroy simply do not occur, and hence neither do Cuvier's supposed absurdities.” (228) Now we may distinguish Hegel’s from Cuvier's approaches. Both Hegel and Geoffroy have something like an archetypal animal [for Hegel, man, for Geoffroy, the transcendental unity of anatomical parts.] But unlike Hegel, Geoffroy does not propose that the archetype is an actual species. “Geoffroy's abstract animal instead could not be actualized without a radical alteration in kind.” (228) Also, Hegel’s approach has a hierarchy going from least to most differentiated. Yet, “Geoffroy's account does not prioritize any actual form of life; instead, all vertebrates relate to a transcendental unity of composition.” (228) Hegel’s approach is teleological, but Geoffroy’s is not, because the same anatomical part can have a different function in other animals. Thus Hegel’s approach is closer to Cuvier’s, with the exception of the four embranchments. (228)

Cuvier notes that certain homologies involved mechanically impossible transformations. Geoffroy’s solution was turning toward embryonic structures. “Certain structures that would later appear very dissimilar could be | discerned to develop from the same embryonic structures.” (228-229)

Because Geoffroy gives an embryogenetic account, he could trace the development of structures, which was not possible for prior anatomies. Also, in Cuvier’s approach, an aberration is considered a deviation from the plan of a species. Geoffroy’s approach could give a more positive description.

Geoffroy therefore took up Serres' theory of arrests of development, which held that deformity was caused when the development of a particular organism was arrested at a lower form of organization, forcing this form of organization to perpetuate within the organism. This can be combined with the fact that the unity of composition, as it was not understood teleologically, was able to give a positive account even of deformations that reduced the effectiveness of the organ in question. The science of aberrations, known as "teratology," in fact plays an important role in the formulation of the theory of evolution and will be central to the evaluation of the limitations of Hegel's account. (229)

 

 

 

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb5 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Hegel, Cuvier, and Comparative Anatomy’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 5: Hegel, Cuvier, and Comparative Anatomy

Brief Summary:

Cuvier, like Hegel, thinks that animals should not be classified in terms of differences of degree. Unlike Hegel, he uses a non-unified system, one with four branches. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Cuvier’s system is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes.

Summary

Previously we saw for Hegel, the organism is made up of the organic relation between the organism and its organs, and it is best exhibited in humans, which have the greatest differentiation that is still unified.

 

Now we turn to Hegel’s treatment of Cuvier to see how types of organisms’ structures are determined in different ways according to the organism’s needs. Cuvier was a highly influential 19th century French anatomist. He worked toward the “formation of the orthodox view of anatomy”.  (221) He helped turn anatomy into its own natural science.

At the root of this transformation was the intuition that by comparing the anatomy of animals from different species, it would be possible to build up a taxonomical system that classified animals according to rational determinations, rather than simply placed them in groups arbitrarily. (221)

His system of classification has two central principles: [1] the four embranchements and [2] the functional account of the organism’s structure.

The four embranchements:

For Cuvier, Hegel’s systems of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction as features of the organism were inadequate for a system of classification. Instead, Cuvier proposes four embranchements of animals, which are are four fundamentally distinct provinces. They are “defined according to fundamental differences in the structure of the nervous system.” (222) [1] vertebrates [2] articulates, [3] the mollusks, and [4] the radial embranchements. Because the differences across these branches is so extreme, we cannot compare them. Unlike Hegel, Cuvier does not think we can find a central plan, like humans, to characterize all organisms’ structures. But Hegel and Cuvier share the view that species should not be defined in terms of difference in degree.

According to Cuvier, “there are certain general laws that are logically prior to the actual existence of the organism that govern its structure.” (222) These laws are derived from the purposive nature of organisms.

The conditions of existence define a harmony in the functioning of the organism as a whole, which leads to the hypothesis that the nature and distribution of the parts of the organism can be discovered simply by reasoning from their place in the functional unity of the organism. (222)

Hegel also expressed this view in the Philosophy of Nature.

This is a teleological account similar to Hegel’s. Cuvier’s method was highly effective, “particularly in the field of paleontology, where Cuvier was able to prove the possibility of extinction by reconstructing now extinct species from fossilized remains.” (222) He could also conclude anatomical features on the basis of animals’ level of activity. “Thus birds, which are very active, of necessity had to be completely surrounded by air, as well as have air inside them, in the form of hollow bones.” (222) For Cuvier, like Hegel, there is a purposive nature of organs and nature herself.

As Cuvier goes on to write, "it is in this dependence of the functions and the aid which they reciprocally lend one another that are founded the laws which determine the relations of their organs and which possess a necessity equal to that of metaphysical or mathematical laws." We can see from this that Cuvier was further in agreement with Hegel that the kind of purposive account proposed by Kant need not be understood as a purely regulative form of understanding, but in fact told us something fundamental about the nature of the world as such. (223)

 

But there are important differences between Hegel’s and Cuvier’s accounts. For Cuvier, we can understand the organism’s structure on the basis of its functional needs, but only for more developed animal life forms. Also, there can be structural features that have no function [as circumstances have changed and the creature no longer needed that organ.] Also there are purely accidental mutations in nature that have no function. Yet

In spite of these differences, it is still the case that Hegel's account is teleological and | functionalist and that where he departs from Curvier, it is in order to claim either that a given feature is contingent and therefore inexplicable or else is governed by teleology operating at a different level. (223-224)

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb4 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Hegel’s Account of the Structure of the Organism’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 4: Hegel’s Account of the Structure of the Organism

Very Brief Summary:

For Hegel, the organism is made up of the organic relation between the organism and its organs, and it is best exhibited in humans, which have the greatest differentiation that is still unified.

Brief Summary:

For Hegel, we cannot understand the organism as a mechanically related set of indifferent material parts, because it maintains a characteristic unity and acts spontaneously. Instead the organism is structured on the integration of unity and multiplicity, identity and difference, part and whole, one and many; for, it is organ and organism, with the two mutually dependent on each other [each organ is reciprocally determinate with the others, but also the organism and its organs are reciprocally determining]. The best model for the structure of the organism would be one with the greatest differentiation that is still unified. Plants can be divided and the parts regenerate new plants, so they were not organs so much. Animals go up a scale of differentiation, with humans at the top, because they also have the greatest sense of how each individual is an organ in a social body.

Summary

Previously we saw how Hegel’s dialectic of nature is not temporal and thus not compatible with evolutionary theory.

We now see how much Hegel’s theory of the organism is antievolutionary. In the previous chapter we saw how for Hegel, the concept of the universal depends on that of the individual, and vice versa. We will see Hegel in his account of the structure of the organism turning to Aristotle and Kant.

We might regard the organism’s basic building blocks as its constituting matter. “Such an understanding of the organism will allow us to see the organism purely in mechanical terms as the mutual interactions of its parts.” (217) But this explanation “suffers from the limitation that it appears to ignore two central features of the organism: that it is unified and that it is organized.” (217) [But the mechanistic/atomic model will not explain its autonomous self-organization, its spontaneity, etc.]

As these features appear to be essential determinations of the organism, if we are to give an account of them, we need to present an alternative explanatory framework that allows us to explain the structure of the organism. Hegel claims that Aristotle's basic determination of the organism, "that it must be conceived as acting purposively, has in modern times been almost forgotten till Kant, in his own way, revived this concept in his doctrine of inner teleology, in which the living being is to be treated as its own end" (PN, § 360, Rem.). [217]

For Kant, “nature as something commensurate with the understanding implies our seeing nature as created by an understanding.” (218a) [Our understanding sees things in terms of their purposes. Nature for Kant is commensurate with the natural world. Thus things in nature should be seen in terms of their purposes, like grass is there for the cow to eat.]

Kant's argument is therefore that seeing nature a s something commensurate with the understanding implies our seeing nature as created by an understanding. With this move, we open up a whole new category of descriptive concepts that can be applied to nature. If nature is seen as the creation of an understanding, we can view creatures in categories applied to other forms of intelligent creation, such as one would apply to the human creation of art or tools, where the final goal of the object enters into our understanding of the object itself. Thus, according to Kant, if we are to see nature as being commensurate with the understanding, we must see it as purposive. (218)

This presupposition that nature is purposes is not something we learn through empirical investigations but is rather the grounds for our investigation of nature; it is a transcendental principle. It is because we use the category of purposiveness when studying nature that we see it as being more than an “agglomeration of mechanical interactions.” (218)

According to Kant, something is a natural purpose if it is both cause and effect of itself, and it is so in two senses of this. [1] The thing as natural purpose is a member of a species and thus reproduces itself through the species’ perpetuation.  [2] The thing as natural purpose is an individual, and “it reproduces itself through the incorporation of raw matter into its structure and d1rough its self-preservation.” (218) And there are two requirements for the thing to be considered a purposive unity. [a] The parts must depend on their relation to the whole; for, the whole defines their relations to one another, and [b] “the whole must be determined by the reciprocal relations of the parts.” (218) So because the parts, the organs, exists for the sake of the others and the whole, we consider them as instruments [thus purposively]. Hegel takes up Kant’s four features. “The two Kantian notions of self-causation, as an individual | and as a species, form the two determining principles of the structure of the organism for Hegel. These two principles are treated separately by Hegel, although they operate simultaneously.” (218-219)

So we notice the similarities: “The organism consists in a set of parts which reciprocally determine one another in relation to a whole. Furthermore, this whole is simply a product of d1e interaction of the parts.” (219) Now, the particles of matter can exist independently, so the parts of the organism, as reciprocally determining, cannot be seen as mere particles of matter; rather, they are processes.

The organism consists in a set of parts which reciprocally determine one another in relation to a whole. Furthermore, this whole is simply a product of the interaction of the parts. It should be clear from this understanding of the organism that while the organism may be fully physical, the basic elements of the organism, its parts, cannot simply be equated with matter, since particles of matter are at least apparently capable of existing independently of one another. Instead, the constitutive parts of the organism are processes. "It is said that after five, ten, or twenty years the organism no longer contains its former substance, everything material has been consumed, and only the substantial form persists" (PN, § 356, Add.). [219]

 

So notice the double status of organism parts. [1] they are processes, but [2] their being processual does not mean they lack structure. Hegel follows an idea of Aristotle [I don’t know what that idea is; Somers-Hall says:]

Hegel acknowledges a central point of Aristotle's account when he writes that "in so far as d1e animal's members are simply moments of its form, and are perpetually negating their independence, and withdrawing into a unity which is the reality of the Notion, the animal is an existent Idea. If a finger is cut off, a process of chemical decomposition sets in, and it is no longer a finger" (PN, § 350, Add.) . [219]

And Hegel we have seen is also following Kant. We now need to distinguish two kinds of organic life, plant and animal.

[1] Plant life:

If we separate some part of a plant, that part can grow itself into a new plant. So the parts are not subordinate to the whole, and thus the parts are all individuals and not really organic parts [that are reciprocally determining, thus] plant life does not perfectly embody the Notion.

For Hegel, plant life is not a perfect embodiment of the Notion. Hegel argues that this is because it is possible to separate a part of the plant from the whole and for this part of the plant itself to develop into a complete organism. Thus, the parts of a plant cannot be considered to be truly subordinated to the whole. The plant "unfolds its parts; but since these its members are essentially the whole subject, there is no further differentiation of the plant: the leaves, root, stem are themselves only individuals" (PN, § 337, Add.). "Each plant is therefore only an infinite number of subjects; and the togetherness whereby it appears as one subject is only superficial" (PN, § 377, Add.). [219]

So we will be concerned with animals and not plants, and we will see how “this purposive explanation of the organism expresses itself in the determinate structure of the organism.” (219). There are two stages of this.

First Hegel sets out the basic determinations of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction as they occur in all organisms. Second, he attempts to show how differences in the | determinacy of these moments can be explained through the particularities of the needs of the organism and the extent to which the organism recognizes itself as a moment of the concrete universal of species.” (219-220)

 

So for Hegel, the organisms basic structure is found in the the interrelation of three of its functions: sensibility, irritability, and reproduction.  On account of these functions, the organism is both unified and differentiated. The self-feeling of the animal is its source of integrity. And sensation affects a small part of the body but these sensations relate to the unified organism as a whole, so sensation combines moments of unity with moments of difference. [220]

When something touches my skin, while the contact is limited to a particular area of my body, I still characterize it as I who have been touched. This functional role for sensibility, irritability, and reproduction in turn gives rise to certain structures within the organism. These moments give rise to the nervous, circulatory, and digestive systems. The distinction between these different systems differentiates the animal from d1e plant, since the animal is differentiated according to a function that is subordinated to the structure of the organism as a whole. Each system is therefore made up of elements that can only exist in relation to the system as a whole. In turn, we discover that each system maintains some of the functional roles of other systems, thus preventing the abstract separation of any one system from the unity of the organism as a whole. The differentiation of the organism into parts plays the role of allowing the organism to move beyond plant life, but it also admits of a series of gradations, from the simplest animals to the most differentiated. [220]

The perfect animal is the human organism.

The human is the most differentiated organism. The three functions of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction are both determined and related to the organism’s unity. Also, advanced species have a sense not only of their own organic parts, but they understand themselves as playing an organic role in the species, like how parents care for their young. There is a unity of process from parent to child, and it is mirrored in the organisms objective structure, for example, the mammal’s breasts which give milk from mother to child. Hegel thinks that humans are the perfect animal and they should be regarded as the model to understand less differentiated animals (this seems to go against his immanent understanding of dialectic and instead think in terms of genus and species.) (220-221) For example, insects have complex motor systems but internally not much differentiation, as “digestive and circulatory systems are completely undifferentiated from one another." (221) As we go down the chain to simpler organisms, internal differentiation becomes less. The least differentiated animals are very close to plants, and if we cut them into pieces, the organism will not die. (221) But we need more than a taxonomical account, because that only tells us the degrees of difference of animals’ structures, but we also need to take into account the particular forms of differentiation too. So Hegel turns to Cuvier.

 

 

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb3 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Hegel and Evolution.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 3: Hegel and Evolution

Brief Summary:

Hegel’s ideas on the dialectical movement in nature might suggest a compatibility with evolutionary theory, even though Hegel’s thinking precedes Darwin. However, evolution as a theory precedes Hegel. For Hegel, the dialectical movement in nature is not to be seen as something unfolding in time. So Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not easily seen as compatible with evolutionary theory.

Summary

Previously we saw how for Hegel, the organism expresses the identity of difference and identity in the movements of nature, because it is a multiplicity of organs that make a unified organism.

Now we turn to Hegel on the topic of evolution. The idea of the transformation of species goes back to Lamarck especially, whose work predates Hegel and Darwin. We will now examine the relation between evolution and Hegel’s thinking. (214)

We saw that Hegel’s genetic account of the categories solves problems in Kant’s and Aristotle’s systems. Each category emerges from prior ones, and some commentators have described this as an evolutionary motion. Harris thinks Hegel’s dialectic is preeminently evolutionary, because it exhibits two essential features of evolution: “process, in the form of the movement between finite forms, and direction, in the form of necessary dialectical transformations.” (215) Evolution is thus a progression that is is both immanent and purposive. So Spencer merely gives an evolutionary taxonomy of creatures, but he does not give an account of the evolutionary movement itself, “it cannot explain why the taxonomical structures take the forms that they do.” (215)

We saw how Kant derives his categories by tracing their relationships to empirical logic. Hegel found this to be an arbitrary way to determine the categories. Hegel proposes instead his his genetic account which shows “how the categories could be seen as developing immanently from one another.” (215) But this is merely a logical understanding of development. Philosophy of Nature in a similar way tries to “derive categories that govern the fundamental structure of nature.” (215) But the development of the stages is not temporal, it happens just in the “ ‘inner Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature’. (PN, § 249).” (215) So whatever development we find in nature will “necessarily fall outside of tl1e Notion.” (215)

That is, Hegel's developmental account cannot be taken to he an evolutionary account as precisely those parts of the account that carry explanatory weight in Hegel's system, the development of the Notion, form the structure of nature itself and are not developed temporally within nature. (215)

 

So Hegel does not discuss a Darwinian sort of evolution. However, he does discuss two other explanations for how species are generated: emanation and evolution, which are both serial progressions. (216a)

[1] Evolution:

Evolution starts from ‘the imperfect and formless.’ First there was just water and aquatic life forms. There then evolves plants, polyps, mulluscs, then fishes. The fishes then evolve into land animals, and out of the land animals humans evolve.

[2] Emanation:

Here instead of less perfect beings giving rise to more advanced ones, we begin with the most perfect being who creates a lesser one, who creates a lesser in turn, all the way down to negative being, or matter, and the extreme of evil.
Note how both these explanations describe a quantitative variation between species, being either increasing or decreasing perfection. [But this means there is one type of thing, perfect being, under quantitative and not qualitative variation.]

Such accounts, according to Hegel, favor identity over difference, as they operate according to only one principle or type. The idea of qualitative divisions in the natural world is therefore key to Hegel's account, and he argues that we should "reject such nebulous, at bottom, sensuous ideas, as in particular the so called origination . . . of the more highly developed animal organisms from the lower" (PN, § 249 Rem.). (216)

 

So Hegel does not see there being a dialectical understanding of evolution. However, we might still wonder if Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is compatible with evolutionary theory.

Hegel writes that "it is a completely empty thought to represent species as developing successively, one after the other, in time. Chronological difference has no interest for thought" (PN, § 249, Add.). (216)

So if we are looking for compatibility between Hegel and evolution, we need to think that ‘no interest for thought’ here refers to dialectical thought and not thought in general. Somers-Hall in fact thinks that “Hegel's account of the structure of the organism entails an antievolutionary account of species”. (217) He explains:

This approach has three advantages. First, it takes us away from Hegel's somewhat cursory remarks on evolutionary theory to some of his more substantive discussions. Second, it allows us to look in more detail at Hegel's relationship to contemporaries on this issue. And third, it allows us to relate Hegel's account to Deleuze's, through an analysis of the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate of the 1820s and 30s in French anatomy. (217)

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb2 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘The Philosophy of Nature.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Responses to Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 2: The Philosophy of Nature

Brief Summary:

For Hegel, the Idea is The One Totality and it is self-determining reason. This totality is nature, but it becomes other to itself as externality and multiplicity. Nature is rational. The movement in nature involves the identity of difference and identity. So while there are multiplicities of bodies, they form whole systems. In physics bodies form indifferent relations to one another. In chemistry chemicals combine and transform, but their processes are not self-perpetuation. They are however in organic life. Here we have unity and difference in the form of the unity of the organism being constituted through the differences of its organs, and its processes are self-perpetuated.

Summary

For Hegel, the idea is self-determining reason.

More than this, through the recognition that the Idea relates to itself, much as the moments of infinity did in the doctrine of being, we come to realize that the Idea itself is "the One Totality" (EL, §242). That is, it forms a self-referential whole. (212)

The totality is nature, but it is an immediacy, which makes it a one-sided determination of nature. The Idea as totality then becomes other to itself as multiplicity or externality.

We can note, however, that Hegel argues that while this idea of a unified totality is already nature, as a strict unity, it represents an immediacy and is therefore a one-sided determination of nature. In order to counteract this one-sidedness, the Idea "resolves to release out of itself into freedom the moment of its particularity or of the initial determining and otherness, [that is,] the immediate Idea as its reflexion, or itself as nature" (EL, § 244). In order to thus become determinate, the Idea therefore becomes the other of itself as immediate unity. Nature is thus first presented as multiplicity, or pure externality. (212)

Even thought the Idea becomes other to itself, nature is not governed by reason; rather, it become reason that is expressed otherwise than as self-determining idea. So [1] nature is immanently rational, it is a moment of reason and not a creation of it. [2] Yet reason is not in the form of reason in nature.

however, reason is not present in the form of reason in nature . In fact, it is other than itself. Because of this, we will encounter in nature moments of contingency, where there is an incommensurability between the particular forms of nature and their rational Notion. (213)

Nature is a system of stages. The movement between states is governed by reason, which is the movement of the inner Idea of nature. The Idea’s governing principle is the unity of identity and difference. The moment of difference is what first predominates in nature. Nature we said is externality in its opposition to the pure idea. This externality we find described in Philosophy of Nature, where it is discussed in terms of matter. Because matter is infinitely divisible, this implies the parts’ indifference to each other, which would be their externality. But externality is one side of the Idea and unity is the other, so matter contains the idea of unity. So while the planets seem indifferent to one another, in fact they form one system of “bodies in reciprocal relations to one another”. (213)

The Philosophy of Nature describes an immanent movement with there “arising of more and more explicitly unified systems of diverse parts, culminating in the animal organism.” (213) Space, as externality, is the first moment. It gives rise to time and matter. The physics of matter gives us a universal system that allows us to relate all material bodies to one another. but because it is universal, it is too abstract to capture the particularity of the world. (213)  This makes the determinate content become isolated and detached from one another, lacking any necessary connection. So in physics, bodies enter into relations of movement, but in chemistry, different bodies can enter into transformative relations, and this will mean that chemistry does more to develop the moment of unity in difference. For example, acids and bases combine to form salts, which are chemicals with properties different to both acids and bases. [Different salts can mix in water. But chemistry does not completely tell us about the identity of difference and identity.]

While salts are neutral , by combining certain salts, mediated by another substance such as water, we can, in special circumstances, get them to exchange their respective salts. In the chemical sphere, we therefore have a concrete unity between the different elements. Salts and acids, for instance, appear to be inherently relational. While this is the case, chemical interactions do not give us the complete idea of the identity of identity and difference that we are looking for, however. (214)

Various chemicals can be separated and unified. These processes repeat, making them conceivable as part of one greater unified process. If the produces of these chemical processes spontaneously renewed the processes of combination and separation, then they would be life. So it is in the organism where Hegel locates the unity of difference in nature. An organism is a whole but it is made of separate organ parts. And unlike bare chemical processes, it can perpetuate its own processes rather than have them perpetuated by means of external intervention. Because it is about organs and organisms, it refers to the problem of the one and the many. (214)


Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb1 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Introduction.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 8: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 1: Introduction

Brief Summary:

We will compare Deleuze’s and Hegel’s theories on the structure of the organism to see if [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic provides enough precision for characterizing the world.

Summary

In the previous chapter we saw that Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack that Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another. Deleuze has a concept of difference as integrated singularities, and Hegel a philosophy of integrated oppositions. Hegel’s philosophy can be subsumed into and critiqued by Deleuze’s philosophy, but no the other way around. However, Hegel could say that on the basis of logic there is no such thing as Deleuze’s concept of difference. So we now turn to applications of their theories with respect to the structure of organisms.

“In order to provide a more definite appraisal of the merits of Hegel and Deleuze's logics, we need to look at how these logics describe actual features of the world.” (211) For Hegel, “the animal organism will embody the good infinite, consisting of parts that cannot exist except in a teleological relation to the whole. A similar relationship will be formed between the individual organism and the species”. (211) For Deleuze, the organism expresses the Idea, and species is a ‘transcendental illusion’. “The focus of this chapter will be the question of evolution, or more particularly, the compatibility of Hegel's conception of the organism with evolutionary theory”. (211) Somers-Hall will argue that Hegel does not think evolution is possible; and instead we look “at whether Hegel's concept of the organism necessarily precludes an understanding of the transformation of species.” (211) Somers-Hall will also examine the debate between Cuvier and Saint-Hilaire.

The final aim will be to see whether Deleuze's three charges are valid: that Hegel only presents a false movement, that Hegel's logic problematically revolves around a single center, and that the dialectic does not provide the necessary precision in its characterization of the world. (212)

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch7 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Force, Difference, and Opposition.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Force, Difference, and Opposition

Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack than Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another.

Brief Summary:

If Hegel wanted to critique Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, he would show how Deleuze’s virtual and actual as contraries dialectically sublate, which collapses the basic distinction of Deleuze’s ontology. However, because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not contraries, such a Hegelian critique would not hold. From a Deleuzean perspective, Hegel’s dialectic could be viewed as a false movement, with Deleuze’s genesis of difference being the real movement. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist.

Summary

In the previous chapter we compared Deleuze’s and Hegel’s interpretation of differential calculus, and we saw from it that Deleuze conceives there being a subrepresentational unconditioned and Hegel an infinite representational unconditioned. In this chapter we pit their theories against one another to see which one is better able to critique the other and defend against the other’s critique.

For example, Hegel might critique Deleuze’s actual and virtual by showing that the forces involved in each are dialectically inherent to one another, thus collapsing the ontological distinction on which Deleuze bases his transcendental empiricism.

More specifically, Deleuze opposes virtual and actual, and difference in itself from negativity. From the Hegelian perspective, this means Deleuze is using spatializing thinking of finite thought. If Deleuze had used infinite thought, he would have seen that the opposed terms dialectically converge, and thus this fundamental distinction in Deleuze’s philosophy does not hold.

But for Deleuze, the actual and the virtual are not opposed terms but are rather two tendencies of the real. Thus they do not succumb to a Hegelian critique which would try to sublate them.

The difference between Hegel’s and Deleuze’s treatment of the problem of the one and the many further clarifies their different concepts of difference. For Hegel, we encounter the problem of the one and the many when we do not use infinite thought to dialectically integrate them. For Deleuze we encounter the problem of the one and the many when we do not regard the many as a heterogeneous multiplicity of intrinsically related parts, like the colors making up white light or the phase portrait showing all the incompossible developments of a system. According to Deleuze, Hegel’s reliance on representation prevents him from seeing this other sort of difference which does not fit into Hegel’s system.

What we find is that Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack than Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another. Both Hegel and Deleuze have a non-spatialized sense of difference. Hegel’s is an integration of contraries, but Deleuze’s is an integration of singularities. A Hegelian critique of Deleuze’s virtual would not hold because it is not a contrary to the actual. So Deleuze’s philosophy cannot be subsumed into and critiqued by Hegel’s. However, within Deleuze’s philosophy we might say that Hegel’s dialectic is a false movement. But Hegel could respond that on logical grounds there is no such difference as the kind in Deleuze’s philosophy. So we now turn to organisms to test the applicability of their theories of difference.

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch7.Sb6 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Conclusion.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Force, Difference, and Opposition

Subdivision 6: Conclusion

Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack than Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another.

Brief Summary:

Both Hegel and Deleuze have a non-spatialized sense of difference. Hegel’s is an integration of contraries, but Deleuze’s is an integration of singularities. A Hegelian critique of Deleuze’s virtual would not hold because it is not a contrary to the actual. So Deleuze’s philosophy cannot be subsumed into and critiqued by Hegel’s. However, within Deleuze’s philosophy we might say that Hegel’s dialectic is a false movement. But Hegel could respond that on logical grounds there is no such difference as the kind in Deleuze’s philosophy. So we now turn to organisms to test the applicability of their theories of difference.

Summary

Both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s concept of difference “moves beyond that provided by empirical, spatial intuition.” (209) Deleuze’s difference makes it so that Hegel’s criticism of the notion of essence does not apply to Deleuze’s virtual (we examined Hegel’s criticism in terms of the dialectic of the inverted world.) (209-210) [The contrary of essence is normally accident. The contrary to accident is not essence but multiplicity, and this is the closest we have to what essence is (as what remains the same despite variation). Hegel would identify accident and essence. I am not sure if this is what Somers-Hall is saying here (maybe it is just simply difference not as contrary but as singularity):]

As Deleuze writes, somewhat polemically, "no doubt, if one insists, the word 'essence' might be preserved, but only on condition of saying that the essence is precisely the accident, the event, the sense; not simply the contrary of what is ordinarily called the essence but the contrary of the contrary: multiplicity is no more appearance than essence, no more multiple than one" (DR, 191). That is, Deleuze's contrary of the contrary involves neither term, rather than, for Hegel, both terms in an identity of identity and difference. In showing that Hegel is unable to think this concept of difference, I hope to have demonstrated the novelty of Deleuze's philosophy, which provides a viable alternative to Hegel. (210)

But note an asymmetry in their concepts of difference. We can within Deleuze’s philosophy understand Hegel’s philosophy of negation as false movement, but Deleuze’s philosophy of difference cannot be placed into Hegel’s system and thus cannot be evaluated. Yet “This fact does not on purely logical grounds entail a rejection of Hegelian dialectic, however, since the Hegelian can simply deny the actual existence of Deleuzian difference.” (210) But the question is, which philosophy best applies to the world?

The ultimate test must therefore be the extent to which any logical theory captures the nature of the world, not simply by ranging over all phenomena, but also by capturing their singularity, or used in the term's loosest possible sense, their essence. (210)

In the next chapter we test their theories with regard to the structure of the organism.

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.