16 Mar 2015

Marx & Engels (2) Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selections from Ch.2 ‘Proletarians and Communists’, summary


by Corry Shores

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Karl Marx & Frederick Engels


Manifesto of the Communist Party


Selections from
Ch.2
Proletarians and Communists


Summary



Very brief summary:

Capitalism is unjust, since it exploits workers. It reduces the freedoms and well-being of 9/10ths of the population. It should be replaced with a communist system where there is no private property and thus no basis for one class to subjugate another.

 

Brief Summary:
The communist movement has certain motivations and prescribed means to change society for the better, and they have rebuttals to capitalist critiques. In capitalism, the bourgeoisie exploit workers to advance their own private property, using as a basis for this purpose capital, that is, private property. Thus the cause and end of the exploitation is private property, and it should be done away with. In capitalism, most people work, but only a few benefit. Were private property to be abolished, we would have a classless society in which the production of one person benefits the entire society as a whole, who all share equally in those profits. To obtain this, first a violent revolution and despotic transitional State is necessary, bringing along with it economic turmoil. Then gradually out of this a more democratic and economically successful system will develop. There are a couple objections to such a communist system. 1) It does away with private property and thus the source of liberty. However, 1a) capitalism already does away with the private property of 9/10ths of the population, and 1b) certainly they are enslaved rather than free, being that they are toiling laborers earning very little of what they produce. So the freedom and private property in capitalism are not those of society at large but of a select wealthy few. Therefore capitalism cannot be justified in public policy. 2) Doing away with private property will eliminate the incentive that makes people work. However 2a) under capitalism, the people who toil the most gain nearly no private property as a result, so they are not motivated to work in order to obtain private property, and 2b) those who do profit are the capitalists who do none of the real labor. Thus the desire to acquire private property does not motivate them to work but rather to do nothing and let everyone else do the work.




Summary


The authors wonder what the relation is of communists to the proletariat (222b).


They state that the “Communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working-class parties” (222bc).


In fact, the Communists only have interests that the proletariat have (222bc).


[They also do not have any policies aimed at shaping the proletarian movement.] “They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement” (222bc).


There are just two things that distinguish the communists from the other working-class parties. 1) Even in national proletariat struggles, they emphasize the interests of the proletariat as a whole, regardless of nationality. 2) Throughout the development of the proletariat’s struggle with the bourgeoisie, at each stage the communists emphasize the proletariat movement on the whole (222c).


[The Communists practically speaking are highly advanced and resolute, pushing forward all the other working class parties; and theoretically speaking, they are well equipped to lead the proletarian movement. (222d)] “The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat | into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat” (222-223).


The communists do not draw their conclusions from the ideas of ‘would-be universal reformers’ (223a).


Rather, their ideas come from where we are in the history of class struggle. Doing away with private property is part of this progress. “They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of communism” (223ab).


For, “All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions” (223b).


For example, as a result of the French Revolution, feudal property was abolished in favor of bourgeois property (223b).


Similarly, Communism wants not necessarily to abolish all private property but merely bourgeois property. However, “modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few” (223bc).


[Since communists want the end of bourgeois property, and because bourgeois property is the last possible private property] “the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property” (223c).


Communists have been criticized for wanting to take away the right to acquire private property by means of one’s own labor, and these critics claim that this property is the basis for “all personal freedom, activity and independence” (223c).


Perhaps the critics are talking about the private property of the “petty artisan” and the “small peasant.” [But we have seen how the things they produce are taken from them by their employers and in return they are given but a fraction of the profit those productions earn.] But the capitalist system has already done away with this property.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.
(223d)


Or perhaps the critics mean that bourgeois private property is the fruit of one’s labor and the source of liberty (223d).


However, for the wage laborer it creates no private property. [The following part is not clear to me. Marx and Engels will say that it creates capital. But I am not entirely sure that he is saying that it creates capital for the laborer. If so, it is not clear how a low wage at subsistence level constitutes capital. If not, it is not clear to me how that point follows from the prior question asking if it creates property for the laborer, in which case it would seem to be: no.] It does create capital [for either the laborer or the capitalist], which is “that kind of property that exploits the laborer, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation” (223d). In fact, property in the form it now takes “is based on the | antagonism of capital and wage labour” (223-224). Since there are two sides in this struggle, the authors will look at both, starting with the capitalist side (224a).


[Capital is generated by many workers and circulated among them and among other capitalists. Thus,] “To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social status in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion” (224a).


[Private property is personal. But since capital is something produced and circulated among all members of society, and since it is a source of a class distinction that subjugates one social class to the other,] “Capital is therefore not only personal; it is a social power” (224ab).


[This personal capital might be somehow converted into public property, perhaps through tax revenue spent on publicly owned properties. So since capital begins as social property, when it] “is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character” (224b).


The authors now move from the side of the capitalist to the side of the wage-laborer (224b).


[The capitalist’s income normally goes beyond subsistence and is plenty to reinvest to make yet even greater income.] The average wage of the laborer is “minimum wage, i.e., that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer” (224bc). [The capitalist “appropriates” the profit from others’ labor. But] “What, therefore, the wage-labourer appropriates by means of his labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence” (224bc). [This bare wage could be considered personal property.] Communists do not want to do away with the bare minimum that keeps people alive. Instead, “All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it” (224c).


[Capital is generated by labor, and its accumulation is then perhaps what the authors are calling “accumulated labor”. In capitalism, laborers are put to work to make a profit so to increase the capitalists’ accumulated wealth. However, in communism, the laborer’s work is invested back not into the personal wealth of a few individuals but rather in the increased well-being of the worker.]

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.
(224cd)


[The accumulated wealth, that is, the “accumulated labor”, is something generated in the past. It is reinvested, making subtractions in the near future, especially in the lives of workers. I am not sure if those ideas will help us interpret the following sentences. Please read them to obtain a better interpretation.] “In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality” (224d).


[So clearly personal property is a means of enslaving people, since its investments exploit labor and perhaps also somehow limit current freedoms on the basis of past investment sacrifices having consequences in the present. Communism is accused of wanting to abolish private property and thus freedom. In fact, they want to abolish capital property and do away only with the ‘freedom’ of one class to exploit another.] “And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly | so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at” (224-225).


In a capitalist system, “freedom” is “free trade, free selling and buying” (225a).


Certainly in the context of history, all people now, the wealthy especially, have more freedom to buy and sell than they did in the Middle Ages. However, given the freedom for all society that would result in abolishing private property, we are now much less free than we could be, compared to the future that communists propose (225b).


The bourgeoisie are upset that communists want to do away with private property. But they themselves have already done away with it for the nine-tenths of the population whom they deprive of it.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.
(225b)

[[We might wonder at this point how well these arguments would stand up now in societies where workers make enough to accumulate modest amounts of private property.]]


[Thus this criticism of communism only emphasizes the good that it can do.] “In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend” (225c).


Capitalists convert the proletariat’s labor into capital, that is, to profit from the labor or from rent, which is a “social power capable of being monopolized.” This is also a way that individual property [taken from the production of the workers] is converted into bourgeois property [the accumulated wealth of the capitalists]. Capitalists think that if you do away with this system, “individuality vanishes” (225c) [perhaps because they think that one’s power as an individual vanishes. Perhaps this power is really the individual power to subjugate other individuals, but I am not sure what the authors mean here by “individuality” and how capitalists think it is tied to capital.]


[Since the only “individuals” whose freedom their system aims to protect are the select wealthy,] “You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible” (225d).


Under communism, everyone benefits from everyone else’s productions. Thus “Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations” (225d).


There is another criticism capitalists make of communism. They say that working for personal profit is what motivates people to work in the first place. That motivation is lacking when people work for society’s benefit. Thus, “It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property, all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us” (225d).


[However, as we have seen, the proletariat never acquire any property anyway. They only work for subsistence. Also, those who get rich do none of the labor. So they are not motivated to work on the basis of accumulated property. Rather, they are motivated to exploit workers for this purpose.] “According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labour when there is no longer any capital” (226a).


[This summary skips pages 226b-230a]


The authors end their rebuttals to bourgeois arguments against communism (230ab).


So the aim is the revolution by the working class. The first step in this “is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy” (230b). [[We notice here the aim is democracy and not totalitarian regimes.]]


In order to achieve this, property must be taken from the bourgeoisie and given to the state.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.
(230b)


To make this transition will require despotic means and a period of economic turmoil.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.
(230bc)


The steps taken will differ according to the needs of each nation (230c).


However, in advanced societies, the steps will generally be the following [which is all quotation]:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production | owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c, &c.
(230-231)

[[Note above step 2’s similarity to Thomas Picketty’s new book Capital in the 21st Century: “The right solution is a progressive annual tax on capital” (572). However, here in this manifesto, it is not clear to me how after abolishing private property in the first step a taxation could be put in place in the second step.]]


Political power “is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another.” Thus, “When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character” (231bc). This revolution, if successful will “have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class” (231c).


This will instate a single class of all society in which, unlike in capitalism, the free development of one individual benefits all other in the society. “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (231c).

 





Works Cited


Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. Martin Milligan. pp.203-243. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988 [1844].


Available online: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm



15 Mar 2015

Marx & Engels (1) Manifesto of the Communist Party, Ch.1 ‘Bourgeois and Proletarians’, summary, b


by Corry Shores

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

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[Economics Entry Directory]
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[The following is summary. All underlining, boldface, and bracketed commentary are my own.]


[The following also has not been sufficiently proofread, so please ignore the typos.]




Karl Marx & Frederick Engels


Manifesto of the Communist Party


Ch.1
Bourgeois and Proletarians


Summary



Very brief summary:

The progress of history is a chain of revolutions where an oppressed class overcomes its oppressor and instates itself as the ruling class. Currently capitalists, the bourgeoisie or middle-class, have taken this position of power. But they do not deserve to keep it, since they exploit the masses and reduce their existence to unacceptably low levels. Also, the development of industry is creating a working class that is more homogenized, on account of increasingly mechanizing the labor, and thus this unity and solidarity of the laborers will eventually result in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. They will do away with the bourgeoisie’s source of power by ending private property. But by doing so, they will eliminate the means that any one class can oppress another, thereby ending the history of class conflicts.

 

Brief Summary:
History can be understood as a sequence of class struggles in which revolutions instate new class divisions along with their own new class struggles. The most recent revolution was the change from feudal classes to the current bourgeoisie/proletariat [capitalist/worker] class structure, resulting from the rise of capitalism, modern industry, and global trade. The system works by exploiting laborers. They are paid as little as possible, worked as hard and long as possible, and the rise of the division of labor in the factory along with the increasing use of machinery has reduced labor from a rewarding human activity to a form of mechanized slavery. But since all jobs are becoming more and more mechanical, the importance of specialized skill is reduced, which puts all workers more on par with each other. This then creates the conditions for their solidarity, which is enhanced by technological developments in communications and transportation. Also, the bourgeoisie, besides the immorality and injustice of exploiting labor, have proven themselves unfit to rule, since they have overseen only the decrease in the quality of life of the majority of the population to bare subsistence and slave-like labor. They came to power as a part of a larger historical pattern of revolution. The conditions lending to their power are also what will make that power crumble. So not only should they fall, they inevitably will fall.



Summary


Marx & Engels offer a view of human history as being the ongoing story of the political, social, and economic struggles between hierarchized classes.

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
(209b)


This struggle holds between such classes as “Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman” or in other words, more generally between  “oppressor and oppressed” (209). These warring classes have “carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes” (209bc).


These clashing classes can be discerned in all epochs of history.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.
(209c)


Modern bourgeois society arose out of the prior feudal class system. Although their rise saw the end of feudal classes, it “has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones” (210a).


Although earlier epochs, as we noted, had a “complicated arrangement” of social classes,

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.
(210a)


The bourgeoisie originated from the [merchant middle-class] burghers who were previously serfs in the Middle Ages (210b).


World exploration and colonization enriched and empowered the rising bourgeoisie (210b).


The guild system of feudal times was preplaced by the manufacturing system, to meet new market demands. “The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop” (210c).


But even the manufacturing system could not keep up with demand, and so steam powered industry arose. “The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry; the place of the industrial middle class by industrial millionaires, the leaders of the whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois” (210cd).


As the world markets expanded, so too did domestic industry and infrastructure (210-211).


The modern bourgeoisie is the result of a series of revolutions [and therefore may itself fall victim to yet another revolution undoing its order].

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.
(211a)


And, each small advance in the bourgeoisie’s rise to power “was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class” (211a):

An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the medieval commune: here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany); there taxable “third estate” of the monarchy (as in France); afterwards, in the period of manufacturing proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, cornerstone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.
(211b)


Thus as we see from the political upheaval it brought about, “The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part” (211bc).


This is seen especially in how it has “has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations” and “pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors’; and it has “drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation” (211d). [We notice here the violent rhetoric. If the bourgeoisie has committed such violent acts, it is only fitting that the communists should use in a similar way, metaphorically or otherwise, violence to change their order. As we will see in the next lines, their order is unjust and cruel:]

[The bourgeoisie] has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, | veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
(211-212)

[So while the feudal lords at least veiled their exploitation behind religious or political values, the bourgeoisie merely reduces human life to exploitative profit-making labor without any sugar-coating to conceal its injustice and immorality.]


Where previously certain occupations like doctor, lawyer, priest, scientist, and poet were held with “reverent awe” [and valued for their contributions to society’s well-being, functioning, knowledge, and culture], they are now viewed no more than as “paid wage laborers” [whose productive worth is quantifiable only in terms of currency value] (212a).


It has also reduced family life and relations to “mere monetary relations” [perhaps because people relate to each other only in terms of paying for one another]. (212ab)


Bourgeoisie has also demonstrated what humans are capable of when they are industrious. “It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades” (211b).


In the bourgeoisie epoch [on account of the forces of capitalism,] new methods and modes of production replace older ones [if they prove to generate more profit. As a result, the normally stable and secure structures of life and relations among people are made unstable and fluid, which is perhaps unsettling in a psychological and existential way.]

Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
(212c)


The capitalist need for more sources of and markets for production has caused the bourgeoisie to occupy all corners of the world (212d).


World trade and production has minimized the importance of national boundaries. Goods are imported and exported everywhere, making all parts of the world interconnected and interdependent. This even holds in “intellectual production” as for example cultural products. “National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature” (213a-b). [This could also pave the way for a world socialism.]


The spread of the bourgeoisie’s influence has caused many other nations, no matter how developed, to enter into this capitalist system. “It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image” (213c).


The bourgeoisie have moved populations and productivity into the towns. This has prevented many people from residing in the “idiocy of rural life,” but it has also made country depend on towns and lesser-developed nations dependent on more developed ones (213d).


The bourgeoisie has not only centralized populations into towns, but it as well has centralized property and the means of production into only a few hands. As a result, political power has been concentrated and centralized as well.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with | the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs-tariff.
(213-214)


The amount of productive potential that was realized by the bourgeoisie surpasses anything that was previously accomplished or even dreamed of.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground — what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?
(214b)


In sum, the bourgeoisie has overturned the feudal system, which had to be done away with given how production and trade were developing (214c).


Then into the place of the feudal structures “stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted in it, and the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class” (214d).


But this great system of production and trade is also unpredictable and dangerous. It “is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells” (214d). There have been crises that were caused by over-production, where

there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them.
(215a)

They solve these crises in three ways: 1) by destroying the excessive productive forces, 2) by conquering new markets, and 3) by further exploiting older ones. “That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented” (215cd).


Since it was these capitalist productive systems that overturned the feudal system, “The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself” (215d).


[These machines of production, which are in a sense no entirely within the control of the bourgeoisie, can also be appropriated by the working class and used against the bourgeoisie.]

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons — the modern working class — the proletarians.
(215d)


[Normally we think of the power of wealth of the bourgeoisie increasing as corresponding to the decrease of wealth and power of the proletariat. However, perhaps because these seem capitalist tools can be appropriated by the proletariat, who is already operating them, perhaps their potential power increases as well. Or perhaps the meaning of the following passage is more generally that the workers advance in training and abilities with increased sophistication of the industry.] The proletariat develops at pace with capital and the bourgeoisie. Laborers are dependent on this industry and are vulnerable to its fluxuations. (216a)


Because of the division of labor, factory work is less rewarding then it was back when workmen were more attached to their productions. Their work becomes machine-like. [Also, perhaps because the crappiest jobs produce only the least valuable goods, the worse the work, the lower the pay.] And the pay is as low as possible, and it gets lower with the repulsiveness of the work. Workers also must keep at pace with the machines.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labour, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by the increase of the work exacted in a given time or by increased speed of machinery, etc.
(216b)


The modern factory is like a slave operation run by a despot. [It is thus unjust and deserving of change. But also, since workers are ‘organized like soldiers’, there is the basis for them to fight against the system like soldiers.]

Modern Industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.
(216c-d)


Mechanization and the division of labor have made physical strength and skill less necessary in factory work. This has made men and woman equally viable as workers, and since woman and children can be paid less, they are often preferred (216-217).


And even though the laborer earns a wage, it is instantly lost back to other parts of the bourgeoisie.

No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far, at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.
(217a)


The lower middle-class, including “the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants” do not really remain middle class but instead “sink gradually into the proletariat”. This is because their capital is not great enough to compete with larger industries and also because their specialized skills become less valuable when new methods of production make them obsolete (217b).



“The proletariat goes through various stages of development” (217c). At first it fights against the “instruments of production;”

They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.
(217cd)


[At this stage, for some reason, it seems that the workers are not organized against the bourgeoisie but rather somehow the bourgeoisie unites the workers against the bourgeoisie’s former rivals, the wealthy aristocrats from the prior monarchies.]

At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight | their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeois. Thus, the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.
(217-218)


But as the industry develops, labor becomes less specialized. It also puts all the workers on a more equal level and gives them a greater sense of solidarity. They form unions and may at times riot together (218b).

The victories of proletariat are slight. But with each one, their union grows stronger. New developments in communications and transportation also help them strengthen relations among them (218c-d).


Although the union of workers is at times weakened by their own infighting, it nonetheless “ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier,” and it has been able to influence legislation in its favor (218-219).


The bourgeoisie is involved in its own battles: 1) with the former aristocracy, 2) with those parts of the bourgeoisie itself that are antagonistic to the progress of industry, and 3) sometimes with the bourgeoisie of other nations. In all these cases, the bourgeoisie [somehow] brings the proletariat into the fight. By doing so, they educate the proletariat in certain political matters that the proletariat can then somehow use against the bourgeoisie.

In all these battles, it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.
(219b)


As we noted above, members of the bourgeoisie slip into the proletariat. [Somehow] “These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress” (219c).


Progress is moving toward the dissolution of the ruling class. Some of its members, seeing that the future lie in the working class, are converting over to this other side. This is even seen among bourgeois intellectuals who understand the tide of this historical movement and also convert.

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the progress of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.
(219d)


Since times are changing and the worker is the one who keeps up with them, the proletariat is in a special position to help bring about the future that is already set in motion.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.
(219d)


The lower middle classes who fight the bourgeoisie only to hold onto their middle class status are not revolutionary but are rather conservative, since they do not want to change the class system (220a). In fact, they are reactionary, since the tide has already begun turning.


There are also those who are social scum, the ‘dangerous class’. They could join the revolution, but their life is so bad they are more apt to be bribed into service by the bourgeoisie [perhaps to stir trouble among the revolutionaries] (220b).


The proletariat are in a state where the system is of no use to them [and thus they have every reason to change it.]

In the condition of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industry labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.
(220bc)


[In previous revolutions, a portion of the society subjugates other portions. The proletariat, for some reason, if it wants control of “the productive forces of society,” it must do away with such a subjugating structure by getting rid of individual property. For, were no one group to have more property than another, then no group can subjugate another.]

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.
(220cd)


Previous revolutions have been conducted by or for some minority. The proletariat revolution, however, will be an act of nearly all of society.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The | proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.
(220-221)


[Although eventually all proletariat of the world must unite,] the proletariat’s revolts must begin on the national level, [perhaps on account of the immediacies of their class conflicts.] (221a)


The authors have depicted how there has been a veiled civil war between bourgeoisie and proletariat that develops to open revolution (21b).


In prior class conflicts, the oppressed classes were able to improve their situation. The condition of the proletariat, however, continues to decline [on account of the problems of mechanized labor that continue to worsen with its development]. Thus the bourgeoisie cannot be trusted to govern, since they are unable to keep the lives of the masses at a certain basic condition.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of the feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the process of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.
(221b-d)


The bourgeoisie’s power comes from capital, which is obtained and grown through wage-labor. Modern industry unites wage-laborers [as we saw above]. Thus modern industry’s development is bringing about the overturn of the class division that has been fostering and benefiting from this very same industrial development.

The essential conditions for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance | of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by the revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.
(221-222)

 

 

 



Works Cited


Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. Martin Milligan. pp.203-243. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988 [1844].


Available online: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm



 

Marx & Engels. Communist Manifesto. Entry Directory


by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All underlining, boldface, and bracketed commentary are my own.]




Karl Marx & Frederick Engels


Manifesto of the Communist Party


Preamble


Ch.1: Bourgeois and Proletarians


Ch.2: Proletarians and Communists
[Selections]


Ch.3: Socialist and Communist Literature


Ch.4: Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties
[Selection]





Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. Martin Milligan. pp.203-243. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988 [1844].


Available online: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm

Marx & Engels (intro) Manifesto of the Communist Party, Preamble, summary


by Corry Shores

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[The following is summary. All underlining, boldface, and bracketed commentary are my own.]




Karl Marx & Frederick Engels


Manifesto of the Communist Party


Preamble


Summary



Brief Summary:
Communism at this time of 1844 is a political ideology that is seen in a negative light and as a threat. This testifies to its influence and importance. But it also presents the need to correct the record and to give it a fair account. That is the purpose of this manifesto, which is meant for the audience of all of Europe.



Summary


In Europe [at this time, 1844], communism was a political idea already with some influence, yet it was often considered in a negative light (208).


In fact, ‘communism’ is often used as a political insult or accusation (208).


There are two results of this:


1) The fact that it is such a strong accusation means that “Communism is already acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power” (208), and


2) Since the negativity of this accusation is based on hearsay and misunderstanding, “Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself” (208).


The following is the effort to accomplish this task. It is translated into many major European languages [so to broaden the spread of its ideas] (209).





Works Cited


Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. Martin Milligan. pp.203-243. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988 [1844].


Available online: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm



8 Mar 2015

Somers-Hall, (0.6), Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, ‘0.6 Incongruent Counterparts (13–14/15, 23–7/26–31)’, summary


by
Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own.]



Henry Somers-Hall


Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide


Part 1
A Guide to the Text

 

 

0 Introduction: Repetition and Difference

0.6 Incongruent Counterparts (13–14/15, 23–7/26–31)


Summary



Very Brief Summary:

We may distinguish many things by means of the parts’ relative positions to one another. However, a simple glove for example could fit on a left or a right hand, even though when both of the pair are worn together it can only be a left or a right handed glove. Its own conceptual distinctions, which are based on the relative positions of its parts, are not enough to distinguish its right or left handedness. Thus there are reiterations of things in our world – these incongruent counterparts – that are repetitions whose instantiations do not collapse into one another on account of their being conceptually indistinguishable.


 

Brief summary:

For there to be repetition, you need a number of instances of something, but they cannot all be one and the same, as you would have one thing never ceasing to be itself rather than repeating. But if there are no conceptually discernible differences between the instances, they would collapse into one another. However, if there are conceptual differences, then they are not reiterations but rather new things altogether each time. So to have repetition, it would seem we need a series of things which are not conceptually distinguishable (and thus do not collapse into one thing) but are also truly unique from one another (so that there is reiteration and not continuation). Deleuze offers examples of such cases. Here we look at Kant’s incongruent counterparts. If we imagine that the first thing invented was a plain and very simple glove, we would not know if it were left or right handed. For, you could flip it over and it could fit the opposite hand. But (assume that) God would only make a glove for either a left or a right hand. It must inherently be one or the other. [It is left handed on account of there being not the relative spatial relations of each part of the glove to the other parts, but rather that the glove takes up some absolute position in space, which perhaps is a place belonging either to a left or a right hand]. So because many things are different (like being left and right hand gloves) without any spatial relations to determine which is which, these incongruent counterparts are examples of repetitions without conceptual distinctions.

 


Summary


Previously we looked at examples of ‘natural blockages’ in atomism. Now we see ‘natural blockage’ in the case of Kant’s incongruent counterparts, Kant’s argument for which “is first introduced into a debate between Newton (and Clarke) and Leibniz on the nature of space” (16). Newton and Leibniz debated whether space was absolute or if it was relative to the objects it contains. Newton thinks we have both types and that we can distinguish them. Absolute space for him does not need anything external to it to be what it is, and it is “always similar and immovable” (SH 17, quoting Newton 1934: Defs., Scholium II). Relative space, however, is “some moveable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces.” Our senses determine it by means of its position in relation to bodies. It is also “commonly” thought to be an immovable space, as in the cases of “a subterraneous, an aerial, or celestial space, determined by its position in respect of the Earth” (SH 17, quoting Newton 1934: Defs., Scholium II).  Newton defines a frame of reference by inertia, “that is, by the fact that all objects within a frame of reference are moving at constant velocity” (SH 17). [The move to the next point is not clear to me. Maybe SH’s point is that if everything is determined within one frame of reference, then all things are spatially related in an absolutely consistent way, and thus it is very difficult to distinguish this relative space to absolute space.]  “On this basis, it is very difficult to even differentiate between a relative and an absolute frame of reference” (17). Nonetheless, Newton still argues that these relative spatial relations are only possible on the basis of an absolute frame of reference that is “logically prior to the existence of objects themselves. Absolute space is therefore essentially a metaphysical posit within Newton’s physics, which grounds the possibility of relations between objects” (17). [The reason why relative spatial relations depend on an absolute space is not given here.]

Leibniz does not think that space is absolute. Rather, it is “a secondary, derivative concept that emerges from the relations which exist between objects” (17). Leibniz gives three reasons why the notion of absolute space is problematic. 1) [Something needs to be either a substance or a property, but absolute space is neither]. It is not a substance, [because substances have causal powers, but] substance is causally inert. Yet, [properties do not precede the objects they are properties of, however] absolute space “precedes objects rather than depending on them” (18). 2) Leibniz holds that every event needs a reason or cause. [This could be his principle of sufficient reason. Now consider relative space. We can use physics to say why one thing is where it is on account of some physical cause. However,] “If space is independent of the things within it, it becomes inexplicable why the universe is where it is and not, for instance, three feet to the left of its current position” (18). 3) [Recall Leibniz’ identity of indiscernibles. Two things which cannot be distinguished are in fact really just one thing after all. But,] “if there is no way to distinguish one point of space from any other, then we can say that each point in space is identical to every other one, and so, as they are identical, space is just one point” (18).


So instead of the Newtonian view that there exists both absolute and relative space, Leibniz argues that space is relative in the same way time is. That is to say, space is “an order of co-existences as time is an order of successions” (SH 18, quoting Leibniz and Clark 2000, p.15). Leibniz does not think the concept of space tells us anything about the particular way things exist. So when we perceive objects in space, we do not perceive their absolute locations but rather just their spatial relations.  [Perhaps Leibniz means something like the following. When we perceive things in space, we do not perceive their absolute locations in some universal all encompassing space, as if we somehow stood outside our spatial context and could see all things exactly in their absolute places. On this basis of our spatial perception, perhaps, we would conclude that space itself is not absolute.]


[Since relative relations are conceptual and not physical determinations of things,] for Leibniz,

space is a distorted view of what are really conceptual determinations of objects. Space in this sense is therefore secondary to the ‘order of things’, and exists only in so far as it allows us to see the relations which obtain between these entities. Space emerges because the intellectual nature of the universe is only perceived confusedly by the finite subject. On this view, therefore, conceptual determinations precede space, which is in no way a real feature of the world, rendering Newton’s absolute theory of space false. (18)

This also means for Leibniz that monads lack spatial properties [in the absolute sense] but they do have spatial properties as “well-founded phenomena,” which are [somehow] “analogous with what are in reality conceptual properties” (SH 18). [Now recall the problem we have addressed in the recent sections. According to Leibniz’ law of the identity of indiscernibles, two things sharing the same (conceptual) properties are really identical (and thus perhaps not really two things in the first place). But repetition somehow involves one thing being repeated (under a certain view of repetition). However, that means that if all things are conceptually distinguishable, then repetition is impossible, as we only have a plurality of distinct things and not the reiteration of some one thing. Thus] SH says that the main point we take from Leibniz is that for him

all of the properties which we encounter in space can be understood purely in conceptual terms. If that is the case, then because each object will be conceptually distinct for every other, repetition is impossible.
(SH 18)


[SH now moves on to Kant.] In his Concerning the Ultimate Foundation for the Differentiation of Regions in Space, Kant tries to show that Newton’s view of [absolute] space is correct. [The paragraphs of Kant under discussion do not present his idea very readily. Kant will make the point that if only one hand is created, we cannot determine whether it is a left or a right hand merely by means of the relations of its parts, that is to say, merely by means of the spatial relativities of the individual parts like the fingers, palm, back-hand, and thumb. However, this is not so obvious, given that there is clearly a distinguishable front and back side of the hand (palm and back-hand), and the left hand is the one which, when looking at the palm side, the thumb is to the left of the fingers. This example is also sometimes explained using the idea of a glove, whose front and back side are not always distinguishable like the human hand is. It would be a glove which could fit perfectly on one hand, and if flipped around, can fit perfectly on the other hand. See for example Catherine Wilson’s Stanford Encyclopedia article, “Leibniz’s Influence on Kant,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-leibniz/ . So consider if the first thing ever created were a glove symmetrical in this way. You could flip it over and it would turn from a right to a left hand glove. Hence the relative positions of its parts are not enough to determine a left from a right hand glove. Kant’s point might be that what would make that determination is a distinction in absolute space, with the left one being in one place and the right one being in another. Those absolute positions would then somehow determine its left or right handedness. I can only guess that this would be that the gloves somehow correspond to the absolute positions for the left and right hand on which they are worn. This absolute spatial determination would be internal to each glove, since its absolute location is a distinction internal to the object and not a matter of external relations of one to another. But this is not clear to me. Try to find your interpretation for this quoted Kant passage. According to SH, the main idea we take from this is that the conceptual determination of the glove in terms of the relation of its parts is insufficient for knowing whether it is a left or a right hand glove. The following first gives a block quote of Kant, and following after its citation is SH’s commentary.]

Let it be imagined that the first created thing were a human hand, then it must necessarily be either a right hand or a left hand. In order to produce one a different action of the creative cause is necessary from that, by means of which its counterpart could be produced.

If one accepts the concept of modern, in particular, German philosophers, that space only consists of the external relations of the parts of matter, which exist alongside one another, then all real space would be, in the example used, that which this hand takes up. However, since there is no difference in the relations of the parts to each other, whether right hand or left, the hand would be completely indeterminate with respect to such a quality, that is, it would fit on either side of the human body. But this is impossible. (Kant 1968: 42–3)

Kant’s point is that the conceptual determination of the hand, in this case, a set of relations between parts, is not sufficient to determine whether the hand is a left hand or a right hand. In both cases, the relations are identical, and so, conceptually, the hands are also identical. The fact that hands are left or right handed therefore means that there must be an ‘internal difference’ that is not a conceptual determination.
(SH 19, block quoting above Kant 1968: 42–3).


[SH’s next example is not entirely clear to me. I will take a guess at what he means with it. We are to consider a triangle being on a two-dimensional plane. In order to know if it is congruent with another triangle, which in this case is a mirror image of the first, we need a third dimension to flip it over, since rotating it two-dimensionally will only give us the triangle upside down. So if we stay in two dimensions and rotate it, we are only dealing with a relative concept of space, as the triangle’s parts retain their relations among one another, but the congruency between one triangle and its mirror image is not determinable on the basis of this presentation of the triangle that is limited to spatial relations. What is needed is the third dimension of space which allows us to flip the triangle over so to overlay its mirror image beside it. For some reason, this is a matter of absolute space, perhaps because the third dimension enables us to fix the locations in a way we are unable using just two dimensions. Thus (on the basis of some reasoning still not presented entirely by me here), it is not enough to only use relative space and its limited use of conceptual relations to determine whether or not a triangle can be congruent with its mirror image. Please read SH’s paragraph below to better understand how it is that this example demonstrates Kant’s argument for absolute space (internal differences) rather than relative space (external relations of parts).]

We can make this point clearer by noting that the property of handedness is intimately related to the nature of the space in which the object is placed. If, instead of a hand, we took the example of a triangle on a two-dimensional plane, it should be clear that it cannot be rotated so as to cover its mirror image. If we consider the same triangle in a three-dimensional space, however, we could ‘flip the triangle over’, thus making it congruous with its mirror image. The dimensionality of space therefore determines whether the counterparts are congruous or incongruent, meaning that handedness is a property of space, and not purely of conceptual relations. For this reason, Kant rejected his earlier Leibnizian interpretation of space in favour of a Newtonian conception. (SH 19)


Kant’s incongruence of counterparts “lays the groundwork” for Kant’s notion that space is an a priori intuition because it shows how “space cannot be understood in conceptual terms. Space is an intuition, or a mode of sensibility, by which we apprehend the world. In the transcendental aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes two claims about intuition: that it is a priori, and that it is non-conceptual” (20). Deleuze regards Kant’s notion that the structures of space and time are different in kind from our conceptual understanding as one of Kant’s greatest philosophical innovations. We will later see in the second chapter  something analogous in Deleuze’s thinking. (20)


Citations from:

Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.


Or if otherwise noted:


Kant, Immanuel (1968), ‘Concerning the Ultimate Foundation for the Differentiation of Regions in Space’, in G. B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford (trans. and ed.), Selected Pre-Critical Writings, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

 

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm and Clarke, Samuel (2000), Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.


Newton, Sir Isaac (1934), Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, trans. Felix Cajori, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

6 Mar 2015

Somers-Hall, (0.5), Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, ‘0.5 Extension and Comprehension (11–16/13–18)’, summary


by
Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own.]



Henry Somers-Hall


Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide


Part 1
A Guide to the Text

 

 

0 Introduction: Repetition and Difference

0.5 Extension and Comprehension (11–16/13–18)


Summary



Very Brief Summary:

True repetition is not the reiteration of something self-same. Representation, then, is not repetition, since it is a matter of genericized reiterations. So whatever is repeating is not doing so in terms of conceptual representation. Such instances would need to be distinguishable in reality but not conceptually. An example is an atom. All atoms have the same conceptual determinations, but differ non-conceptually in terms of spatio-temporal determinations.

 

Brief summary:

We might normally think of something repeating as being a reiteration of the same thing. In this sense, we are thinking of repetition in terms of generality, since the thing being repeated is understood as something general that is reiterated in a number of particularities. Yet, Deleuze is formulating a concept of repetition which is not based on generality. Representation is also often understood in terms of generality, and thus representation is not for Deleuze a sort of repetition. There are two processes involving representation that Deleuze addresses: representational memory (which represents objects no longer present) and recognition (which compares present objects with internal representations). These representations often take a structure which makes them only representative of certain objects and not others. This structure can be understood as having a comprehension and extension. The comprehension is the conceptual description which delineates the essential attributes of the thing. The extension are the variety (or singularity) of things that the representation includes.  [“the comprehension of the idea triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two rigid Angles, &c.” and “the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different sorts of triangles” (Arnauld 1850: 49).] The more we add to the comprehension, the more restrictive it gets, and thus more comprehension results in less extension, and vice versa. At the extreme where the extension is one thing, that means the comprehension has expanded to the infinite. Deleuze then addresses a problem this raises when we take into consideration Leibniz’ identity of indiscernables: “if two things share the same properties, they are in fact identical” (15). This implies that two objects cannot share the same properties, as they would really be one identical thing. But if repetition is understood as the reiteration of the same, then this sort of repetition would be impossible. However, if we have a reiteration of things which cannot be conceptually distinguished, then we would have a repetition without them collapsing into one self-same thing. But in order to have Deleuze’s sort of repetition, we need on the one hand to have things which are reiterations but on the other hand not be reiterations of things which conceptually collapse into one another. To progress to such examples, we need first to note the concept of blockages. All things within a generalized concept are the same and thus they all collapse into one another. All mammals if not further specified are conceptually indistinguishable. In order to distinguish some of those mammals from others, we need to stop the application of the term in certain cases, or to put it another way, we need to instate ‘blockages’, which are conceptual determinations. This allows us to have ‘horses’ and ‘cows’ be repetitions of the concept of ‘mammal’. We can further divide horses using other artificially instated blockages. But what we want are natural blockages where the differences are inherent to the things while also they cannot collapse conceptually into one self-same thing.  One case would be things which are conceptually indistinguishable (with that concept having an extension of 1) but differ only in spatial temporal determinations (which cannot be part of the conceptual determination). Atoms for example are like this. Another example of this is using the same word in many cases. They have the same conceptual determination but different contextual variations.

 


Summary


The Introduction to DR is about how real repetition is opposed to generality. First we saw how this is so with regard to natural law. Then we saw it with respect to moral law [here and here]. Now in this section we learn how they are opposed in terms of representation. Deleuze is critical of two processes, representational memory and recognition. In both of them, the representation of objects plays a central role. We need the representation of objects when we remember them, because they are in the past and are no longer presented. And when we recognize something, we need to “compare our internal representation of the object with the object itself” (14). We wonder, how do we structure these representations? (14) We often do so by defining the representation so that it corresponds only to those objects (or that object) it means to represent.

We normally see objects as composed of substances and properties, and we describe these objects using the parallel conceptual terms of subjects and predicates. Depending on how many predicates we ascribe to a subject, we can determine which objects fall under that concept. For example, we can restrict the application of a concept by stipulating that it only applies to objects which have a certain property. So the concept of an animal applies to only those entities with the property of animality. By adding further predicates, we can narrow down the group of entities which fall under the concept. Thus the concept of a rational animal covers a subset of both of the groups to which those predicates are attributed. It therefore circumscribes a smaller collection of entities (traditionally taken to be mankind).
(14)

We now turn to the ‘comprehension’ and ‘extension’ of the concept. These terms were defined in Arnauld’s then standard logic text the Port Royal Logic. The comprehension of the concept includes all its essential distinguishing features.

I call the COMPREHENSION of an idea, those attributes which it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it without destroying it; as the comprehension of the idea triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two rigid Angles, &c.
(15, see Arnauld citation below)

The extension are the things [and subcategories] that are included as instances of that concept.

I call the EXTENSION of an idea those subjects to which that idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general term, which, in relation to them, is called superior, as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different sorts of triangles. (Arnauld 1850: 49)
(SH 15, quoting: Arnauld, Antoine (1850), Logic or the Art of Thinking, being the Port Royal Logic, trans. Thomas Spencer Baynes, Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox.)

[Now, think of a very general concept, like ‘thing’. It refers to a great many objects, since it is so vague. Its comprehension is small but its extension is great. Instead think “living whales”. It refers to a far smaller number of items. So its comprehension is large but its extension is small.] “Now, it should be obvious that the extension and the comprehension of a concept are inversely proportional. That is, the more we specify a concept, the fewer objects will be subsumed by it” (15). This means that if the extension is 1, then the comprehension is infinite, since “the extension and the comprehension of a concept are inversely proportional” (15). [This part is not entirely clear to me. What does it mean for the comprehension to be infinite? Does it mean that it has an infinity of essential distinguishing traits? Why would it be infinite? Would it be infinite because any one particular thing must be distinguished from an infinity of other things and thus have an infinity of determining / particularizing traits? Would not many of them be accidental? Also, why is it if we decrease the extension and thereby increase the comprehension does the comprehension become infinite when the extension is 1, and not instead it just become a very large finite number? So why is it that for a concept with an extension of 1 and another concept with an extension of 2 that their difference in comprehension be on the scale of the infinite rather than the finite?] Now note Leibniz’ identity of indiscernables: “if two things share the same properties, they are in fact identical” (15). [Regarding extension and comprehension, if two things have no differences in their comprehensions, then they must have the same extension. The important concept here is that we begin by distinguishing two things, but in the end we conclude there never were two things but instead only one. But for repetition in the classic sense of reiteration of the same, then we cannot have repetition of the same, since there would only be one object continuing as itself rather than an another instantiation of it. The next move in Somers-Hall’s explanation is not clear to me, but it seems he is saying that, on this basis, in order to have repetition, we need to be able to distinguish each object conceptually (comprehensionally), but we might have reason to doubt that this is really possible. I will quote these passages for your interpretation:]

the more we specify a concept, the fewer objects will be subsumed by it. If we are to remember a particular event, or recognise a particular object, then the extension of that concept must be 1, i.e. it must only refer to the particular experience or object under consideration. But this implies, as extension and comprehension are inversely proportional, that the comprehension of the concept must be infinite. Deleuze refers to the idea that every object can be uniquely specified by a concept as a ‘vulgarized Leibnizianism’ (DR 11/13). By this, he means that it implies something like a principle of identity of indiscernibles (that if two things share the same properties, they are in fact identical). If it were impossible for two different objects to have the same properties, then repetition itself would be impossible. So the question is, is it possible to distinguish each object from every other conceptually?
(15)


[Note how we define concepts we arbitrary set cut-offs for what items will be included under it and which will not, and we set those cut-offs by means of setting limitations in the generalities of the concept.] When we limit an extension, we do so by setting up ‘blocks’ in our conceptual determination.

When we define a species, for instance, we attribute a set of properties to a thing. For instance, we might define a horse by the properties of being a mammal, having hoofs, being a herbivore, etc. In this case, we don’t want to develop a concept that defines an individual, since we want a concept that allows us to talk about a group of individuals at the same time (horses). Rather than carrying on until we have specified a particular horse, we introduce what Deleuze calls an ‘artificial blockage’ (DR 12/14) by stopping this process of determination. Depending on where we introduce the artificial blockage, we will get more or less general concepts. Thus, by | adding more determinations to the concept of mammal (and thereby increasing its comprehension), it will apply to a more and more specific class of mammals (its extension will decrease).
(16)

[Somers-Hall seems to be saying in the following that we cannot have repetition among the items of a concept, because everything within it is the same thing. For there to be repetition, you need conceptual difference. In order to make this difference, you need additional conceptualization, another concept, which can specify that thing more. So within mammals you cannot have repetition, since there is only one concept and thus only one extension (one general class, even though we may place many things into that class. We do not distinguish those things from one another conceptually, so we just have one thing, ‘mammal’). In order to get something new, we need to add blockages to obtain for example horse. Then we might say that we have a repetition of mammal in the horse. Please interpret the Somers-Hall text for yourself:]

Here we can relate repetition to difference, since purely in terms of these concepts of ‘horse’ or ‘mammal’, repetition is grounded in a difference which falls outside of the concept in question (DR 13/15). That is, in so far as we are only talking about the concept, ‘horse’, repetition is possible, as all particular horses are horses in exactly the same way. The difference between them is not in the concept, ‘horse’, but in another concept (perhaps they are different colours or sizes, or are used in different roles). Repetition is therefore difference without, or outside of, the concept.
(16)

[The next part is also a little unclear to me. In the above he says that the distinctions are found in external concepts, but now he says that by specifying further we bring the difference within the concept. Perhaps he is saying that when we create a blockage, we create an internal difference within ‘mammal’ for example, thereby creating two or more concepts external to one another, like ‘horse’ and ‘sheep’. Then he says that the internal differentiation is an artificial rather than a natural blockage. This seems to mean that we can explicate the difference between the objects conceptually, because we have conceptually made that distinction in the first place. The horse we say has different properties than the sheep. Now we need to think of ‘natural’ blockages which create a difference that is not conceptualizable.]

In this case, we could have carried on specifying the concept further and by doing so brought the difference within the concept, hence it being an artificial blockage; but the question is, are there natural blockages, that is, cases where it is impossible for us to capture the difference between two objects conceptually?
(16)


Deleuze offers three examples of these natural blockages: atomism, (psychic) repression, and Kant’s incongruent counterparts (16). Since Deleuze deals at greater length with the topic of repression in the second chapter, Somers-Hall will focus now on atomism and incongruent counterparts.


SH warns us that Deleuze’s account of atomism is “rather obscure” (16). [The basic reasoning that SH gives seems to be the following. We divide up the world into parts of parts of parts and so on until we arrive at fundamental parts. Now, what distinguishes one thing from another? Well, it has different parts, different constitution. But what if something has no parts? It will not have any distinguishing traits conceptually speaking. It will only be distinguishable from other atomic parts on the basis of temporal and spatial differences, which are not conceptual in the same way that constitutional differences are conceptual. Thus here we have natural blockages which say this atom is not that atom, but we have no conceptual way to distinguish them.]

He [Deleuze] suggests [the following up to citation is block quotation]:

Let us suppose that a concept, taken at a particular moment when its comprehension is finite, is forcibly assigned a place in space and time – that is, an existence corresponding normally to the extension = 1. We would say, then, that a genus or species passes into existence hic et nunc [here and now] without any augmentation of comprehension. (DR 12/14)

Rather than a species just being a convenient grouping, it would now be something that had a definitive existence, with each of the objects falling under the concept being absolutely identical. Deleuze is thinking of something like an atom here. Atoms are identical to one another (conceptually indistinguishable) in spite of the fact that they are separate individuals. While in the case of a species, we could add further determinations if we wished to distinguish particular members of a species, there simply are no further conceptual distinctions that can be made between | different atoms. In this case, each atom is a repetition of the one before precisely because they differ, but still fall under the same concept.
(SH 16-17)

We also have natural blockages in case of word usage. We use the same word many times each [presumably] denoting the same concept and thus being conceptually indistinguishable, while in fact [on account of non-conceptualizable contextual variations] each instance of the word is unique and distinguishable non-conceptually. (17)

While we might question whether atoms really are identical with one another, Deleuze claims that the case is much more decisive in the case of words, where we can repeat the same word. This is because each particular instance of the word is conceptually indistinguishable from each other. In this situation, we cannot specify each instance conceptually, and so the ‘vulgarized Leibnizianism’ of complete conceptual determination breaks down.
(17)

 




Citations from:

Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.