7 Apr 2009

We're Wild Inside: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.8, subsection 1





Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter VIII: Wildness and Wilderness

Subsection 1

We're Wild Inside


There is a difference between wildness and wilderness.
Wildness is a genetic state. Wilderness is a place we have dedicated to that wildness, both in ourselves and in other species. The home of our wildness is both etymologically and biologically wilderness. Although we define ourselves in terms of nationality, race, profession, and so on, it is evident that the context of our being in the past is wilderness -- to which, one might say, our genes look expectantly for those circumstances that are their optimal ambiance, a genetic expectation of our genome that is unfulfilled in the world we have created. (131b-c, emphasis mine)
We are currently developing technologies that will allow us some day to identify and perhaps eliminate deleterious genes from the human genome. We pursue this genetic research out of a drive for total health and perfect crops. However, "at a less conspicuous level this research is also defining the genetic basis and reality of the 'normal' or optimal human individual" (131d) [see Siep's article for further discussion.] Studies are showing that human traits we for long thought to be learned through culture and education are really inherited genetically.
At last we approach the hard truth: being human is heritable. (131d)
Even if we are born and raised in the wilderness, we still have all our human traits. So to what extent are we wild creatures?

Contemporary Western culture regards the wilderness as a beneficial realm of purification. It provides us "solace, naturalness, nearness to a kind of literary, spiritual esthetic, or to unspecified metaphysical forces, escape from urban stench, access to ruminative solitude, and locus of test, trial, and special visions." But all these valuations derive from prior traditions. Really we never left the wilderness.
True, wilderness is something we escape to, a departure into a kind of therapeutic land or sea, a release from our crowded and overbuilt environment, healing to those who sense the presence of the disease of tameness. We think of wilderness as a place, a vast uninhabited home of wild things. It is also another kind of place. It is that genetic aspect of ourselves that spatially occupies every body and every cell. To "go into" that wilderness is something we do constantly. We are immersed in it. Our consciousness and our culture buzz around it like tiny lights, not illuminating a great darkness but drawing energy that makes a self possible. (132c, emphasis mine)
To better grasp the nature of our wildness, we should contrast it with the concept of "domestication."
"Domestic" means a "breed" or "variety" created by the deliberate manipulation of a plant or animal population's reproduction by humans with a conscious objective. We ourselves are genetically wild rather than domesticated. (132c, emphasis mine)
We further distinguish "tame" from "domestic."
We are also tame, for almost any animal can be conditioned to accept the human environment, domestic or not. The tameness of captive wild animals is like our own tameness: it is conditioned to appropriate behavior in the household. Our tameness not our domestication, makes us at home in domesticated landscapes, in the sedentary life surrounded by household artifacts and the romance of the hearth and homestead, restraints in the interest of civic order that cloud the definition of "domestic." None of these affects the human genome and therefore it is wildness. (132-133, emphasis mine)
We are tamed. But that does not change our genes. They have retained their wild tendencies.

When we domesticate plants and animals through selective breeding, we also produce rapid genetic changes that exaggerates both selected traits and unintended ones as well. One gene might cause deleterious characteristics. Yet it might also be a part of a more complex web of interacting genes that function "like a safety net." For example, someone might have a gene bearing a recessive trait that makes him more prone to a certain disease. And yet he will be immune. For, other dominant genes protect him.

We have also selectively bred plants to bring out desired traits. Often this is done by pairing recessive genes. In doing so, the plant becomes less adaptable to its living conditions. We then need to compensate by taking extra care of the plant using artificial means. In other words, domesticating plants and animals weakens their genes and makes them more dependent on artificial human interventions.

We live in artificial structures that we designed and built for ourselves. But we also have selected certain plants to occupy our surroundings. We have chosen certain breeds of grasses and, grains. Even such 'weeds' as dandelions are "successional forms" of these chosen breeds. The human landscape seems durable. But this is an illusion. It is not in ecological equilibrium. Rather, it is an "ecological suppression caused by human and domestic animal pressures." (133bc) And yet, at the margins of the domesticated ecosystems are vegetation, microorganisms, insects, and animals that maintain their wildness. They do not need artificial support.
None is bound strictly to the mosaic of domestic plants and animals in order to survive in the way that domestic life forms are. (133c)
These domesticated landscapes cause us unease. We worry that such homogenization and artificiality threaten our well-being.
The radical implication is that we, like the other wild inhabitants, may actually be less healthy in the domesticated environments than in those wild landscapes to which our DNA remains tuned. (133d, emphasis mine)
We often find rural landscapes beautiful. This is probably because they "superficially resemble the savannas of our evolution." (133d)

But even these agrarian regions are not truly wild.
Our domesticated surroundings are human inventions -- the results of empirical technology over the past ten millennia and scientific technology during the past three hundred years. (134a)
But even though we have become accustomed to our domesticated surroundings, our human potential is better actualized in the wilderness where our wild genes belong, "where we are realized as mature individuals and communities of generous and peaceful character." (134b)

In fact, we cannot live without the wilderness.
Modern life conceals our inherent need for diverse, wild, natural communities, but it does not alter that need. (134b, emphasis mine)
So we become deprived of our essential need for wilderness. We see symptoms of that deprivation as the prevalence of psychic stress and social disorder. And we pretend that we do not need the wild. This is our "universal act of modern denial."

One mistaken belief about the human species is that we can survive even if our environment changes drastically. The dinosaurs could not. So they became extinct. But we are a "generalized" species that will outlast all the other ones that are too "specialized." (134c)

We delude ourselves in these ways. At the height of our self-deception is our belief that the human brain, "the magic means of our intelligence and mastery, is the instrument of our exception from the biology that has burdened and exterminated so many other species." (135cd)

But this very same human brain has "scarified" whatever new ecosystem it migrated into.
What was a good (and very highly specialized) brain for positioning a terrestrial primate in a Pleistocene niche is evidently maladapted for life in the throes of its own glut of people and barrenness of nature. (134d)
Thus we are not a generalized species: "human ontogeny -- the intricately structured, human life cycle -- is, like our central nervous systems, a delicately equilibrated biological complex." (134-135) We have for long thought ourselves to be universally adaptable to all environments. Really, we have adapted the environment to us, so to create ecological prosthetics that compensate for our genetic deficiencies. And doing so is not merely making the world more hospitable. Our alterations to the ecosystem now threaten to completely alter the ecological balance of the whole globe. The 21st century will probably bring us to the brinks of our adaptability. We will find that our bodies and minds can only adapt so much to a changing environment. But we will also learn that our culture is perfectly flexible to be able to adapt any which way it needs. What will guide these cultural changes will be the ways our cultural choices reward and punish us according to our "given natures." Our genome evolved as part of a very specific ecosystem, the African savanna. This genome kept us in its proper subsystem for three million years. It was only ten thousand years ago that culture really started to "evolve" away from our genome. During this agricultural revolution, we stopped being hunter-gathers and instead began the systematic husbandry of animals and plants. But although we domesticated many natural species, we spared ourselves from this genetic pruning. Homo sapiens has not evolved an "agrarian" genome. We are still hunters. We are still wild. So we can expect that if the modern form of our cultural heritage begins to threaten the species, we will return to a life more suitable to our genes.



Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

Our Womb is Wild: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.4, subsection 5




Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter IV: How the Mind Once Lived

Subsection 5

Our Womb is Wild


Contemporary culture imagines prehistoric societies as childlike. They worship a maternal earth goddess. But this belief results from "an eighteenth-century invention, a fantasy of urban disaffection." (63c) Yet no evidence suggests that our Pleistocene ancestors worshipped a female fecund earth deity. This was part of the later cultures that replaced the Pleistocene during the past ten thousand years. But before that humans venerated nature rather than human-like deities. And the animals they worshipped were wild.
These were not dogs, chickens, or milch cows but wild, free beings who owned the world as much as the hunters themselves, and in whose great beauty Homo sapienshad discovered a mirror of the best of human qualities. (64b, emphasis mine)
It was not until humans transitioned from hunter/gatherers to farmers that the imagery of fertile earth goddesses became important.


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

6 Apr 2009

Stoic Logic and Semantics in Ch 5.5 "Stoic Logic" of Luhtala, On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic


[This entry was remade at: http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2017/02/luhtala-55-on-origin-of-syntactical.html.]

by Corry Shores 
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Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Chapter 5: The Stoics

5.5 Stoic Logic


The Stoics applied the term 'logic' to rhetoric and dialectic. (64c) Rhetoric deals with continuous speech. Dialectic is argumentation by question and answer. Zeno compared dialectic to a clenched fist and rhetoric to a hand outspread, "illustrating the compactness and brevity of dialectical discourse as opposed to rhetorical." This distinction came to characterize two kinds of speech, logos and oratio. Perhaps the woodcut below follows this simile. [Image credit below.]



The Stoics also applied the term logic to other fields, namely, formal logic, theory of knowledge, semantics, phonetics, stylistics. All these disciplines have logos ('reason,' 'speech') as their subject matter. Hence Stoics associated rationality with speech. Logos
at once directs the universe and accounts for the action of the rational man as an integral part of its rational structure. According to the rational order of the universe, there is a parallelism between cosmic events and human action in that both are manifestations of a causal relation of cause and effect. (65c)
Humans are the only rational creatures. We can use language, which is based on "internal speech" and on our comprehension of logical sequences. (65d)
A wise person has 'right reason.'
he is able to make statements which are demonstrably true about some actual events that are taking place. The fact that Stoic logic is primarily concerned with states of affairs involving particulars marks an important distinction from Aristotelian logic which deals with relations between terms and mainly with universal terms. (66a, emphasis mine)
The early Stoics were keen to diminish the importance of universals, claiming that they are merely figments of our imagination. (66b)
Universals have no place in Stoic ontology: "they were called not-somethings." Chrysippean logic uses individuals and definite pronouns rather than universals. (66bc)

Truth was a matter both of epistemology and formal logic.
truth is discovered by means of correct statements about real world events which are based on what are known as 'rational impressions.' (67a, emphasis mine)



Luhtala, Anneli. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 2000.

Image from:

The Soul of the Cosmos: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.4, subsection 4


Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter IV: How the Mind Once Lived

Subsection 4

The Soul of the Cosmos


Our ancestors hunted. The "act of killing and facing one's own death" raised "intense emotional and philosophical problems." (61b)
It is right to kill and be killed in this "game" of the hunt so long as we understand the transformation of life and death as a natural consequence of the gifting cosmos where one receives and gives and in the final hour finally passes the gift on. When that clarity is lost the hunt becomes monstrous, along with the rest of nature, and we remove the killing to a butcher's abattoir. (61b)
Their practices of gathering and hunting structured their broader view.
Gathering and hunting are the economic basis of an intricate cosmology in which epiphany and numinous presence are embodied and mediated by wild animals, plants, mountains, and springs. (61b)
Hunter's had their own way of conceiving the cosmos. Stanner called it "the dreaming." The universe is a moral system made-up of three components: marvels, species diversity, and institutions.
Marvels refer to that presence of the unexpected that one always encounters sooner or later in nature, particularly when the terrain reflects something about the mind that implies a common structure. (61c, emphasis mine)
We understand the world around us metaphorically. So our natural taxonomies provide us conceptual tools. And our morality is built on these systems. This is the element of 'species diversity' in the hunter's cosmogony.

Institutions
are what humans create most successfully, based on stories of origins, as analogies to the structures that bind the species into marvels of affinity. These are the keys to reality, revealing how things are, what is known, and how to behave. (61-62)
Tales give commentary on society's underlying principles, and provides models for morality. Some tribes of Australian aborigines have developed some of the most complex and sophisticated metaphysical systems, despite their stone-age technologies.
This cosmogony -- how the universe became a moral system -- is nothing like an Athenian skeptical philosophy but is a continual, visionary, intuitive, poetic understanding, an ahistoric abiding. There is no quarrel with life. Their metaphysic assents to what men have to be because of the way their life is cast. (62b)
Civilized societies feel superior to nature. But the cosmography of certain tribal cultures expresses humility toward the natural world. The animals know more than we do. And all the world around us is besouled.



Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.



A Wilderness of Chance: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.4, subsection 3




Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter IV: How the Mind Once Lived

Subsection 3

A Wilderness of Chance


Shepard now examines the complex mental processes involved in primitive foraging. The result of their interpenetration with the nonhuman world are such human accomplishments as toolmaking, intellectual sophistication, philosophy, and tradition. As Lévi Strauss writes: "in a world where diversity exceeds our mental capacity nothing is impossible in our capacity to become human." (57b)

On the one hand, civilized thought aims to simplify complexity rather than to clarify it. We unify, seek continuities, variabilities, and relativities rather than conceptualize new schemas. But this is precisely what primitive cultures attain.
the "civilized mind" attempts to simplify and level the world whereas the "savage mind" is not afraid to become enmeshed in its complexity. (57bc)
Rituals transcend the difference between real and imaginary. And yet, the way that primitive people conceptualize their world is nonetheless coherent and sophisticated. It is a "science of the concrete." And the world is seen as made-up of discontinuities. Lévi Strauss writes:
The manner in which primitive peoples conceptualize their world is not merely coherent but the very one demanded where objects are discontinuous and complex. (qt 59c, emphasis mine)
They treated plants and animals as "elements of a message."

For many prehistoric foragers, animals were the "principle actors in cosmology."
The human task was to discover social themes coded in nature and cataloged as taxonomy, told as stories and danced to the rhythms of animal-skin drums. (58a)
To hunt and gather, we need memory, which is directly related to brain size.
Memory becomes more important the bigger and more dangerous the game, the more helpless and far-traveled the gatherers. (58a)
Humans are naturally the prey to large animals, or at least we are their inferiors in the natural order of the wild. But we developed hunting abilities. Giant animals became our prey, and not the other way around. To hunt the great beasts, we needed to cooperate in a well-timed way. And this required planning. Primitive cultures must initiate and carry-on lengthy dialogues about how they will conduct the hunt. They continue the discussion throughout. And afterward their conversation reviews and assesses the events.
When tracking, the !Kung San note birdcalls and signs and discuss the spoor. Tracks tell the species, age, sex, speed, and physical condition of the animal and whether it was accompanied by other animals, what it was feeding on, and when it passed. Since tracks change over time, the !Kung San develop "their discriminating power to the highest degree," estimating how far ahead the animals are. The hunters read the dung and watch for bits of the foliage dropped from the animals' lips while eating. They appraise the size of a herd, whether it has been seeking shade, resting, or halting to feed. The stalking of a wounded animal opens new and repeated discussions and decisions. (58c-d)
At night, the hunters enter the wilderness of spirit.
During overnight stops the hunters observe specific taboos in a ritually heightened state. Access to the spirits by hunters -- ancestral, demonic, plant or animal -- is not unusual and can be undertaken in prayer, supplication, dream, trance, visionary disembodiment, and ecstatic flight to the other world. This spiritual state leads to a deeper insight into the meaning of the hunt, the chancy character of the game that may lead to a loss of the hunter's life, and the ethical implications of taking other lives. (58-59, emphasis mine)
Hunters are humble. They learn the fragility and spiritual value of all creature's lives.

Before and after the hunt, primitive people tell stories and conduct ritual ceremonies. This enhances the hunt's spiritual dimension. The hunters will hunt animals. To do so, they spiritually become animals.
Animal masks in rites give palpable expression to transitional states. On the body of a person the animal mask joins that which is otherwise separate -- not only representing human change but conceptualizing shared qualities -- so that unity in difference and difference in unity can be conceived as a pervasive truth. And some animals, by their shape or habit, such as foxes and frogs, are also boundary creatures who already signify the threshold world of human passages. In dance and song, bodies, painted and adorned, move to deep rhythms that bind the world and bring the human into mimetic participation with other beings and the truth of the multiplicity of all domains. (59bc)
José Ortega y Gasset describes human hunting. We enter inside the natural system.
Wind, light, temperature, ground-contour, minerals, vegetation, all play a part; they are not simply there, as they are for the tourist or the botanist, but rather they function, they act. (qt 59d)
And we learn about death from the animal we kill. So "we must seek his company" in the "subtle rite of the hunt." Gasset argues that hunters are our true fathers: "we realize our true heredity in the hunt." (60a)

Power is structured much differently in primitive cultures. It is less hierarchical and more fluid. What binds them socially are
the array of natural species about them. Animals and plants are regarded as centers, metaphors, and mentors of the different traits, skills, and roles of people. Insofar as they model diversity and the polythetic cosmos, the animals provide analogs to the multiplicity of stages and forms: the are interlocutors of change that is brought ceremonially into human consciousness. (60bc)
The forager's world is just as rich. It is full of "signs of a gifting cosmos, a realm of numerous alternatives and generous subsistence, not so much to be controlled by humans as to be understood and affirmed and joined." (60c) Hence forager's and hunters affirm chance.
The original chancy game of prey and predator, of eating or being eaten, takes on a more significant meaning in a gifting world where chance is still an element: the only question is when the gift will pass on. (60c, emphasis mine)
Recall Bateson's notion of metarandom variables. We are only limited parts of cybernetic ecosystems. So we can never understand the whole of its workings. There are always variables that vary other variables. We can never predict everything. So we must affirm chance. Or as Shepard writes:
Hunter/gatherers know nature well enough to appreciate how little they know of its complexity. They are engaged in a humble play of adventitious risk, which is hypostasized in gambling, a major leisure-time activity. Gambling is, after all, miniaturizing the game, depicting in the bodies of beasts, lounging or in repose, the ravishing mystery and fun of being a counterplayer, of moving and being moved in the excitement of the chase, the stillness of its sacred aftermath, and the joy of retelling. The great game of chance is elaborated in foragers' myths rich in the strangeness of life with its unexpected boons and encounters, its unanticipated penalties and rewards, not as arbitrary features of supernatural visits but as infinitely complex affiliations. (60-61, emphasis mine)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

In Space of Night Runs Dark Internal: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.4, subsection 2



Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter IV: How the Mind Once Lived

Subsection 2

In Space of Night Runs Dark Internal


We previously discussed how our evolutionary ancestors developed their human cognitive capacities. From the thick darkened forests, they emerged upon the savanna's open field. Where in forests it was impractical, now we could hunt. And we did so by means of abstractions from time and space. A far-away animal sound meant game in that direction. Tracks of grass-stalks popping back up meant prey had crossed minutes ago. In a way, we became detectives. Our minds developed capacities for logical inferences to help us track game. If footprints are fresh, then game is near.

By this point in our evolution, our minds became fully human. They were capable of various complex forms of cognition: pantomime, mimicked reference, and conveying the ideas for animals by imitation, for example. Around this time we probably developed capacities for sign language that used conventional signals. And just as we would read each other's signs, we began reading the stars and clouds for signs of things to come.
The afterthought was twin to the forethought: from narration of the past, to the articulated plan, to the formulated strategy of the hunt to be. (55a)
And by these capacities our minds performed logic for hunting. Shepard quotes W.E.H. Stanner as saying
If one wants to see a really brilliant demonstration of deductive thought, one has only to see a blackfellow tracking a wounded kangaroo, and persuade him to say why he interprets given signs in a certain way. (35, emphasis mine)
Lévi-Strauss showed that the "savage mind" was neither childish nor stupid. Its metaphysics is different. The world for primitive thinking is timeless. Present events and past are of little distinction.

Space for them is not homogeneous. Distances are not scaled uniformly.
The lines linking points are not mathematically perceived like the typographic lines in a book; it is a world without tense or causality in language, a world where change is not a measured becoming but a new areness; it is a journey, not a passage through, but a revised at-ness. (55d)
Primitive space is an event world that is signified by sound and "created from interiors rather than surfaces, returning the hearer always to the organic paradigm, life, the body as the source of sound." (55-56)

Space is not geometrical or mathematical. It is dynamic. Primitive minds understand spatial relations in terms of the way their activities correspond with others' activities.

Many Native American cultures have running traditions. The run had "magical ends" and "mystical purposes." One sort was "trance running." Another type is night walking. Here the walker steps through the dark, never looking to the ground. This allows them to develop peripheral night vision. And,
if peripheral information feeds directly into the unconscious, as some believe, we may enhance access to our unconscious by such nocturnal skills as nightwalking. The rational, objective world which occupies most of us each day, usually overrides the nonrational and unconscious world -- which, when neglected, intrudes, disrupts, and overturns our logical mind. (56d)
However, the forager's world did not have such inner conflicts. Their brain's rational and nonrational functions were balanced and acknowledged.
They could see in the dark as well as discern the dark underside of human consciousness. (57)

Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

Becoming of Age: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.3, subsection 5


Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter III: How We Once Lived

Subsection 5

Becoming of Age


The adolescent body sexually matures while emotional changes prepare the individual for adult community life. Human neoteny slows down some aspects of our body's and personality's development. This causes immature traits to remain with us throughout the rest of our lives.

The adolescent discovers the symbol.
Symbolic thinking comes with adolescence. Among primal peoples, plants and animals prepare the individual for the skills of metaphoric allusion to physical things in order to conceptualize abstractions. Totemism strictly speaking, is the social role of the individual by analogy to a natural series. Myths and spiritual and cosmological concepts are communicated by allusion to a familiar natural world. (44a-b)
Adolescent peer groups can be unnatural.
"Hanging out" together of age-stratified youths may be one of the most destructive characteristics of our present culture. Without a childhood that has grounded them in the natural world, often without adults anticipating and properly monitoring and celebrating their transition into adulthood and understanding their idealism and need for spiritual experiences, youth often find themselves alone in this modern world. (44bc)
Sometimes adolescents must grow themselves up in gangs, surrounding them "in a milieu of violence and power rather than in spiritual communion." (44c)

In our modern societies, adolescents might suffer from loneliness and lack of true communication. But tribal societies tend not to have anxieties about self-identity. Anthropologists think this is because they have group identity and hence little problems with self-consciousness. Others think the problem is our failure to identify with nature. But adolescence is a time when the individual sharpens the distinctions between self and other so to clarify one's own identity. However, the danger is that the self becomes isolated. Pleistocene humans solved this problem by keeping the individualizing self within a network of interdependent social relations.


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.


We Creatures of Trees: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.3, subsection 4





Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter III: How We Once Lived

Subsection 4

We Creatures of Trees


Primitive cultures often use certain biological markers to indicate when the child is ready to take on adult roles and responsibilities. For example, when a child loses his milk teeth, that means he is ready to accompany adults to help forage for food.
The boy learns the rudiments of the hunter/tracker skills and the girl the intricacies of the digging stick and the subtleties of plant distribution. (42c)
Yet they are just at play. And they learn "a vast store of cultural information" by listing to hunting stories. And their playful explorations teach them how to identify countless plants and animals.

Children also are naturally in touch with the ecosystem.
Children at age six are typically anthropomorphic: they perceive other forms of animal life as motivated and feeling like themselves, which is the basis of kinship with the natural world. This feeling extends to plants as well. (42c)
Like other primates, we love trees. Hence they are perhaps the most important plants for our childhood.
They are on the one hand like great, protective, benign adults whose whispering and lightly percussive tremolo is like the humming of a kindly aunt or uncle. On the other hand trees structure space as though it were a labyrinthine underworld, where hiding is like survival itself. (42-43)
As well, dense forests have their "gothic side and smell of danger."

Before our species migrated to the savannas, we were creatures of the trees. "Its roots go much deeper into our past, as though the forest were part of our brain." (43c)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

Songs Sung Wild: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.3, subsection 3





Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter III: How We Once Lived

Subsection 3

Songs Sung Wild


Previously we saw how sights shape the child's sense of place, even for abstract, non-physical, and cosmic places. Hearing does this as well.
The Voice of life is made up of calls, drums, songs, musical instruments, moving wind and water; they tell us of the livingness of the world in a surprisingly coherent milieu. Vision discovers parts but sound links them. (40c)
Some consider all sound as music.
Nature is like a tuning fork: its space, time, and seasons are marked by an auditory pulse with its variations in echo and penetration, layers of the daily cycles of frog, bird, and insect calls. One sings in duets with the birds, cicadas, and waterfalls. (41a)
There is a culture on the Malay peninsula who stress their similarities to all parts of nature. They as well regard music as fundamental to life. (41b-c)

We lost our sense of nature's musical time from the last thousand years of living as slaves to the mechanical clock used to "create and control a schedule of workship and work."(41d) Bells chime a time abstracted from nature's cyclical repetitions. But once drums beat a rhythm synchronized with nature's cycles.


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.


Our Eyes of Child: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.3, subsection 2



Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter III: How We Once Lived

Subsection 2

Our Eyes of Child


Our evolution was a gradual adaptation to wild life on the African savanna.
Our bodies are niche-fixed, defined by the characteristic features of our ecology in the strict sense of the word -- that is, the energy and symbiotic patterns and demographics of our genus, Homo, as they have existed for perhaps two million years. (38c)
Our genome was shaped by our environment. And our culture is guided by our genome.
Because of our evolutionary past and the extraordinary way life has shaped our mind and bodies, we are required by the genome to proceed along a path of roles, perceptions, performances, understanding, and needs, none of which is specifically detailed by the genome but must be presented by culture. Mentally and emotionally, children, juveniles, and adolescents move through a world that is structured around them following a time-layered sequence of mother and other caregivers, nature, and cosmos. (39a)
Childhood is humanity's most crucial experience. Children obtain social bonds. They explore the non-human world, learning its names and identifications. The child learns speech, but "nature is the child's tangible basis upon which symbolic meanings will be posited." Many of our metaphorical meanings we use through adulthood are based on our naming and recognizing plants and animals during childhood.
The ability to read the landscape or the environment, later in life, grows from establishing natural things as its anatomy, keys to the wholeness and well-being of the habitat. (39d)
Children undergo bodily changes such as tooth eruptions, growth spurts, or personality changes. All the while, culture responds appropriately in a way "that is analogous to the optimal environmental conditions necessary for a butterfly to emerge from a chrysalis." (40b)

Consider how some of us obtain our wisdom teeth in adulthood. Normally we teethe in childhood. But the human species exhibits many traits in adulthood that are proper to child development.
This is called "neoteny," and it bound-up with the way we relate to our environment.
Neoteny, the immaturity factor, is intimately associated early in life with a topographic intuition -- that is, place in consciousness as an aspect of one's own body and physiognomy. Early correlation in human subconsciousness between body and earth, as the child and then the youth explores and wanders through his or her home range, is basic to future visualizing of nonphysical reality and cosmological "places." (40b)



Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

Shepard, Entry Directory, Coming Home to the Pleistocene


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Paul Shepard