by Corry Shores
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[Victor Goldschmidt, entry directory]
[Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien, entry directory]
[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]
Summary of
Victor Goldschmidt
Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps
Deuxième partie:
Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne
A
La Connaissance
Chapitre IV
L’interprétation des événements
1
L’interprétation a l’échelle cosmique
2.1.4.1.39
Providentialisme et causalité
Brief summary:
(2.1.4.1.39.1) Since we cannot know how events and our actions are leading finally to the greater good of the whole, we are left to wonder, what then is the good of consulting diviners to tell us about the future and about how we should behave now with respect to that foreseeable future? For, whatever it is that they tell us to do, it will still only result in the foreseen event. But that is precisely what their value is. They can guide us to do our part in bringing about that future. But why would we help a bad outcome for us to transpire? That is because there really are no bad outcomes from the perspective of divine providence. For, anything that seems bad for us is really good for the whole in the end, even though we cannot understand how or why. Thus diviners are agents of Destiny, and they help us become agents of Destiny too.
[Diviners and Divinees as Agents of Destiny]
Summary
2.1.4.1.39
Providentialisme et causalité
[Diviners and Divinees as Agents of Destiny]
(p.89-91: “ C’est la divination, précisément, qui « confirme tout …”)
[In sum: Since we cannot know how events and our actions are leading finally to the greater good of the whole, we are left to wonder, what then is the good of consulting diviners to tell us about the future and about how we should behave now with respect to that foreseeable future? For, whatever it is that they tell us to do, it will still only result in the foreseen event. But that is precisely what their value is. They can guide us to do our part in bringing about that future. But why would we help a bad outcome for us to transpire? That is because there really are no bad outcomes from the perspective of divine providence. For, anything that seems bad for us is really good for the whole in the end, even though we cannot understand how or why. Thus diviners are agents of Destiny, and they help us become agents of Destiny too.]
Divination is what confirms the idea of the providence of the gods who are watching over human affairs. But how in fact does divination reveal this divine benevolence? The problem here is [that it turns us away from anthropomorphic finalism (which we said in section 2.1.4.1.37.3 and section 2.1.4.1.37.5 was that all things in the world are designed for the gods and men and generally speaking for the good of all), for, if we have a prevision of what will happen to us (and how we will react, then if we act differently, we have contradicted the very assumptions underlying how the prevision was possible in the first place.) We might for example try to ward off bad futures using prayers or similar spiritualistic means. But were we to do so, it would be a matter of confatality, which means that we would have done them anyway by necessity. But if in fact any action we take to ward off a bad future is already presumed by the prophesy to take place as part of how events lead up to that bad future, then what service does a diviner render to us? For, our actions that we do out of concern about that future will still only lead to that same future. The answer here is that the diviner is an agent of destiny, [broadly speaking, and he helps us become agents of our particular destiny too, to make us aware that we must participate actively in how our divined future comes about, even if it is a bad future. (For, remember from section 2.1.4.1.37.5, there is no “bad” event that can happen from the perspective of the whole.)] Here Goldschmidt cites Cicero’s Natural Questions, Chapter 2, section 38, lines 3-4, but let us read some context too:
(3) “Either it’s going to happen or it’s not,” someone says. “If it’s going to happen, it will happen, even if you do not undertake vows. If it’s not going to happen, even if you do undertake vows, it will not happen.” Your dilemma is invalid, because you are ignoring the proviso that falls between those alternatives: this will happen, but only if vows are undertaken. (38.1) “But,” someone says, “fate must also cover this very point, that you either undertake vows or you do not.” Regard me as surrendering to you and conceding that the fact that vows will occur is also covered by fate: therefore they will occur. (2) It is fated that one man should be eloquent, but only if he learns to read; the same fate includes the point that he should learn to read: therefore he must be taught. This man will be wealthy, but only if he goes to sea; but in the sequence of fated events that promises him a large fortune, this too is necessarily included, that he should also go to sea: therefore he will go to sea. It is the same with expiations, I tell you: someone will escape the dangers if he expiates the divinely predicted threats; but it is also fated that he should expiate them; therefore he does expiate them. (3) Such arguments are commonly used against us to prove that nothing is left to our will, and that full rights over our actions are handed over <to fate>. When I am dealing with that topic, I shall explain how something is left to the individual’s decision, though fate remains intact. But for the present I have explained what is under discussion, how, if the course of fate is fixed, expiations and | placatory sacrifices can avert the dangers of prodigies: the reason being that they do not compete with fate, but they themselves are subject to fate’s law. (4) “So what use is a diviner to me?” you ask. “For it is necessary for me to perform the expiation in any case, even if he does not advise it.” He is of use because he is a servant of fate; in the same way, although we are indebted to fate for good health, we are also indebted to the doctor, because fate’s kindness reaches us through his hands.
(Seneca 2010: 181-182)
And next from Epictetus, Discourses, Book 2, ch.10, part:
CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, you are a man and this is one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated from domestic animals (προβάτων). Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient (serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connexion of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise (profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this.
(Epictetus 1890, copied from Perseus)
Thus, we should consult diviners, but not with our desires in mind but only to aid in the unfolding of destiny. For as we see in Epictetus, Discourses, Book 2, Chapter 7, “How We Ought to Use Divination” (part):
What then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see: let us sacrifice on the occasion.—Yes, master, as fortune chooses. —When he has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play upon us.
What then should we do? We ought to come (to divination) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the man whom he meets which of two roads leads (to his journey's end), without any desire for that which leads to the right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any road except the road which leads (to his end).
(Epictetus 1890, copied from Perseus)
So there is a danger in interpreting the finalism of providence in terms of our personal preferences, (namely I think, the danger of going against G0d’s wisdom for the greater good of the whole.) This again refers us back to bare causality (but I am not sure what is meant by that. It perhaps means that we cannot know the finalities of things, but we can work with the causes, as for example the ways our behaviors serve as causes of events leading to those finalities.)]
39. C’est la divination, précisément, qui « confirme tout [89|90] à fait l’idée que la providence des dieux veille sur les affaires humaines »1. Mais en quoi, exactement, ce don de prévision manifeste-t-il la bienveillance divine ? – Sans doute peut-on répondre : « Il est faux que la connaissance des événements futurs ne nous importe en rien, car nous serons davantage sur nos gardes, si nous l’avons »2. Mais de cette réponse, il convient d’écarter toute idée de finalisme anthropocentrique. Ce serait contredire la prévision aussi bien que la providence, que de croire que, connaissant l’avenir, on pourrait le changer. Si la prédiction annonce simplement « des dangers qui nous menacent » alors, sans doute, prières, vœux, sacrifices pourront « détourner » ces dangers. Mais de telles « mesures de précautions »3 rentrent elles-mêmes dans le destin et « sont comprises sous sa loi » à titre de confatalia. Nécessairement donc, nous les eussions prises. « En ce cas, quel service un haruspice me rend-il ? Je suis de toute façon obligé de faire ces expiations, même s’il ne me les conseille pas. – Le service qu’il te rend, c’est d’être l’agent du destin4. » Donc, même dans le cas d’un danger conjuré, le finalisme de la prédiction est résorbé dans la causalité du destin. Il en est ainsi, à plus forte raison, quand l’avenir annoncé dépasse la probabilité d’un danger. Il semble même que l’utilité véritable de la divination consiste à nous faire connaître ce qui sera, sans plus ; que le bon usage de la divination se borne à nous rendre nous-mêmes « agents du destin » ; que les « mesures de précaution » tendent précisément à nous faire coopérer à ce quiarrivera5. Aussi faut-il « aller vers les devins sans désir et sans répugnance, comme le voyageur demande au passant qu’il rencontre laquelle des deux routes conduit au but, ne désirant pas davantage que ce soit celle de droite plutôt que celle de gauche. Il ne veut pas, en effet, passer par telle de ces routes, mais par celle qui [90|91] conduit »1. – Devant le danger d’interpréter le finalisme de la providence selon nos préférences passionnelles, nous sommes renvoyés, ici encore, à la causalité nue.
(89-91)
1, Cic., de nat. deor., II, LXV, 162.
2. Cic., de diu., I, XXXVIII, 83: « Neque nostra nihil interest scire ea quae euentura sunt ; erinius enim cautiores, si sciemus ».
3 Cf. note précèd.
4. Sénèque, Quest. Nat., II, XXXVIII, 3-4.
5. P. ex. Epictète, .Diss., II, X, 5 : « Si l’homme de bien pouvait prévoir l’avenir, il coopérerait lui-même à la maladie, à la mort; à la mutilation, parce qu’il aurait conscience qu’en vertu de l’ordre universel, cette tâche lui est assignée. »
(90)
1. Epict., Diss., II, VII, 10.
(91)
From:
Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.
Otherwise:
Epictetus. 1890. The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments. English translation by George Long. London: George Bell and Sons.
Copied from Perseus:
http://data.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng1
Seneca. 2010. Natural Questions. English translation by Harry M. Hine. Chicago: University of Chicago.
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