by Corry Shores
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[Victor Goldschmidt, entry directory]
[Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien, entry directory]
[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]
Summary of
Victor Goldschmidt
Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps
Deuxième partie:
Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne
A
La Connaissance
Chapitre IV
L’interprétation des événements
1
L’interprétation a l’échelle cosmique
2.1.4.1.38
Interprétation par les causes
Brief summary:
(2.1.4.1.38.1) When we understand why things happen, namely, for the greater good, then even troubling events become bearable. And with regard to how sometimes bad people obtain good things, we should realize that they paid some moral price for it that we should be glad we are not paying. (2.1.4.1.38.2) We can generalize this notion that whatever happens to us happens for the greater good of the whole to now further say that the same goes for animals and even all inanimate things. For the Stoics, the moral problem is how to actualize this general, natural law, and doing so is what is meant by the precept: “co-operate with Destiny.” (2.1.4.1.38.3) We will next turn to another way that providence refers us back to causality.
[Providence and Theodicy]
[Cooperating with Destiny by Actualizing the Greater Good of the Whole as the Stoic Moral Problem]
[Transition to the Next Section on Causality]
Summary
2.1.4.1.38
Providentialisme et causalité
[Providence and Theodicy]
(p.88-89: “38 Comprendre le pourquoi des choses peut …”)
[In sum: When we understand why things happen, namely, for the greater good, then even troubling events become bearable. And with regard to how sometimes bad people obtain good things, we should realize that they paid some moral price for it that we should be glad we are not paying.]
To simply understand the causal why of things (see section 2.1.4.1.37.6) can be enough to interpret them in a divination-like way] and thereby to take away from them their shocking and unbearable elements. We often witness how good things can happen to bad people and how bad things can happen to good people. This has raised the problems in philosophy of divine justice and theodicy. For, if bad people obtain good things, we should realize that they had to “sell their soul” [my words] so to speak to obtain them. They had to lose integrity for example. Thus these ill-gotten gains come at a moral price. Here is one Epictetus passage that Goldschmidt cites:
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 3, Ch.17 “On Providence”, here part:
WHEN you make any charge against Providence, consider, and you will learn that the thing has happened according to reason.—Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage.— In what?—In money.—Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, in being modest: for you will not find it to be so; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because Philostorgus was fortunate: Would you choose to lie with Sura? May it never happen, he replied, that this day should come? Why then are you vexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells; or how can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means as you abominate; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better things to the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be rich?—He admitted this—Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the better thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an ad- vantage over the inferior in that in which he is superior; and you will never be vexed.
(Epictetus 1890, copied from Perseus)
And here is a similar text that is not cited, but quite useful here I find.
Epictetus, Enchiridion, Ch.25:
Has any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being saluted, or in being invited to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to rejoice that he has obtained them: but if bad, be not grieved because you have not obtained them; and remember that you cannot, if you do not the same things in order to obtain what is not in our own power, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. For how can a man obtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a man's doors as that other man does, when he does not attend him when he goes abroad, as the other man does; when he does not praise (flatter) him as another does? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do not part with the price, in return for which those things are sold, and if you wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of lettuces? An obolus1 perhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and receives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not obtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive less than he who has got the lettuces; for as he has the lettuces, so you have the obolus which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter also you have not been invited to a man's feast, for you did not give to the host the price at which the supper is sold; but he sells it for praise (flattery), he sells it for personal attention. Give then the price, if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you wish both not to give the price and to obtain the things, you are insatiable and silly. Have you nothing then in place of the supper? You have indeed, you have the not flattering of him, whom you did not choose to flatter; you have the not enduring of the man when he enters the room.
1. The sixth part of a drachma.
(Epictetus 1890, copied from Perseus)
[Here is the Goldschmidt quotation:]
38 Comprendre le pourquoi des choses peut, en effet, suffire à les interpréter et, par là, à leur enlever ce qu’elles peuvent avoir de choquant et d’insupportable. On sait que le spectacle de la répartition injuste des biens et des maux entre les bons et les méchants avait amené la spéculation | philosophique, dès ses débuts, au problème de la justice divine et de la théodicée1. Epictète résout ce problème par un simple recours à la causalité ; il est naturel que chacun obtienne ce qu’il poursuit et qu’il reçoive « le prix de ce qu’il vend »: le philosophe, la sagesse, et le méchant, la prospérité2. Ici, comme dans certains textes de Marc-Aurèle3, nous sommes très près de l’explication spinoziste des affections.
(88-89)
1. Cf. La religion de Platon, pp. 75 sqq.
2. Epictète, Diss., III, XVII; III, IX, 3-4 ; IV, VII, 36-39.
3. « Quand tu te heurtes à l’impudence de quelqu’un, demande-toi aussitôt : Se peut-il qu’il n’y ait pas d’impudents en ce monde ? – Cela ne se peut. Ne demande donc pas l’impossible. Tu as là devant toi un de ces impudents dont l’existence est nécessaire dans le monde... Quand tu reproches à un homme sa déloyauté ou son ingratitude, fais un retour sur toi-même. C’est évidemmen-ta faute, si tu as cru que cet homme, ayant ces dispositions, tiendrait sa pat role, ou encore si, en lui rendant service, tu n’entendais pas le lui rendre et en rester là, si tu n’as pas fait en sorte de retirer aussitôt de ton action même tout son fruit. » (M.-Aurèle, IX, 42, 1, 10-11). – «Celui qui n’admet pas que le méchant commette de fautes ressemble à celui qui n’admettrait pas que le figuier produise son suc dans les figues, que les marmots piaillent, que le cheval hennisse et autres nécessités de cet ordre » (XII, 16, 2). Cf. déjà Chrysippe ap. Aul.-Gell., VII, I (« Est enim genere ipso quasi fatale et consequens, ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non uacent »).
(89)
[Cooperating with Destiny by Actualizing the Greater Good of the Whole as the Stoic Moral Problem]
(p.89: “ Cette explication par les causes peut être généralisée …”)
[In sum: We can generalize this notion that whatever happens to us happens for the greater good of the whole to now further say that the same goes for animals and even all inanimate things. For the Stoics, the moral problem is how to actualize this general, natural law, and doing so is what is meant by the precept: “co-operate with Destiny.”]
[As we saw above in section 2.1.4.1.38.1, we can see that whatever happens to a person is part of a grander sort of divine providential goodness and justice that we cannot often discern.] We can also generalize this principle to all things in the world. The following is from Marcus-Aurelius, Meditations, Book 8, line 46:
46. Nothing can befall a man which is not a natural incident of mankind; nor to an ox, nor to a vine, nor to a stone, which is not a natural incident to these species. If, then, that alone can befall any thing, which is usual, and naturally incident to it, what cause is there for indignation? The presiding nature of the whole hath brought nothing upon you, which you cannot bear?
(Marcus Aurelius 2014: 103)
This notion of natural cause and necessity is a lot like the modern conception of natural law. It is especially so given how the singularity of the event seems to dissolve in the universality of the law. We return to this point later. For now, we observe that for the Stoics, the whole of the moral problem is a matter of the actualization, here and now, of this natural law, and this is what it means for us, as the precept goes, to co-operate with Destiny.
Cette explication par les causes peut être généralisée. « A aucun homme, il ne peut rien arriver qui ne soit un accident humain... Si donc il arrive à chaque être ce qui est conforme à ses habitudes et à sa nature, pourquoi te fâcherais-tu ? La nature universelle n’a rien pu t’apporter qui te soit insupportable4. » Cette explication par la cause naturelle, par la nécessité5, se rapproche beaucoup de la conception moderne de la loi naturelle. Elle s’en rapproche surtout en ce que la singularité de l’événement semble dissoute (plutôt qu’ « expliquée ») dans l’universalité de la loi. Nous reviendrons plus loin sur ce point. Disons, pour l’instant, que tout le problème moral, pour le stoïcisme, consiste à actualiser, hic et nunc, cette loi, et c’est là ce que signifie le précepte nous enjoignant de coopérer avec le Destin.
(89)
4. M.-Aurèle, VIII, 46.
5. Epict., Diss., IV, X, II; II, V, 27.
(89)
[Transition to the Next Section on Causality]
(p.89: “Nous avons considéré, jusqu’ici, l’explication …”)
[In sum: We turn now to another way that providence refers us back to causality.]
So far we have considered the explanation of the facts that occur. As well, there is an interpretation for that facts that will occur in the future. We are now going to see yet again that the idea of providence refers us back to the idea of causality.
Nous avons considéré, jusqu’ici, l’explication des faits qui se produisent. Il y a une interprétation également pour les faits qui se produiront. Nous allons voir que, là encore, l’idée de providence nous renvoie à celle de causalité.
(89)
From:
Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.
Otherwise:
Epictetus. 1890. The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments. English translation by George Long. London: George Bell and Sons.
Copied from Perseus:
http://data.perseus.org/texts/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0557.tlg001.perseus-eng1
Marcus Aurelius. 2014. Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Translated by Hutcheson, Francis and Moor, James. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Text copied from:
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