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by Corry Shores
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[Clement of Alexandria, entry directory]
[Clement, Stromata, entry directory]
[The following is a partial summary of the English translation. Please trust the original sources over my summaries, as I do not know Greek. Paragraph divisions follow those of the print Greek text and sentence divisions follow those of the Greek online text, which is also the source from which the Greek quotations are copied. Bracketed commentary is my own and is based just on my close reading and not on any special knowledge of this text. Proofreading is incomplete, so I apologize for any distracting typos or other mistakes.]
Selective Summary of
Clement of Alexandria
[Clemens Alexandrinus]
Stromata
[The Miscellanies]
Book 8
Ch.9
On the Different Kinds of Causes
Brief summary:
The Stoic view on causation is that corporeal substances (bodies) are properly understood as causes, and incorporeal substances should not be understood as causes. When we say, ‘be a cause of’, we mean, ‘cause to be’, as in, causing something (whether corporeal or incorporeal) to arise or be produced. There are two important features of causation: {1} Corporeals cause incorporeals (namely, predicates) and not other corporeals. So, a corporeal a does not cause the existence of a corporeal b; rather, corporeal a causes the production of predicate P among corporeal b’s predicates. For example, the knife does not cause the flesh to exist; rather, it causes there to be produced among the flesh’s predicates the additional predicate of ‘being cut’. {2} Causality is always mutual and reciprocal. So, any time corporeal a causes the production of predicate P among corporeal b’s predicates, in the same stroke, corporeal b causes a property Q to become a predicate of corporeal a. In the knife example, just when the knife produces ‘being cut’ among the flesh’s predicates, the flesh causes there to arise the predicate ‘cutting’ among the knife’s predicates. The reason that causality is always mutual and reciprocal is because things have both causal properties and as well ‘aptitudes’ or ‘susceptibilities’ to having their predicates altered. For example, wood has an aptitude of ‘being burnable (by fire, etc.)’ and the fire has an aptitude of ‘being inflammatory (of wood, etc.). But fire and steel do not have these reciprocal aptitudes, which is why fire cannot cause the steel to ignite and the steel cannot cause the fire to spread. Now, in such mutual and reciprocal causation, the effects may be either the same or different. {2a} There is one example other than the knife and flesh where the predicates differ. The spleen causes a fever to gain the predicate ‘rising’ while the fever causes the spleen to obtain the predicate ‘enlarging’. {2b} And there are four examples of mutual and reciprocal causes having the same effects. Virtues cause one another to have the same predicate ‘inseparable from the others’, on account of their “inter-entailment.” The stones in an arch cause one another to have the same predicate ‘remaining together in this structure’, on account of their mutual support. A teacher and a student cause in one another the predicate ‘making progress’. And the merchant and the retailer cause there to be in one another the same predicate ‘making profit’. Now, the same cause can have variable and even opposite effects. One way that may happen is due to the intensity of the cause. For example, the same string will cause a deep sound when it has loose tension and a shrill sound when it has tight tension. Another way the same thing can have variable effects is due to the particular susceptibilities of the other thing. Here there are three examples. The same honey will be sweet for a healthy person and bitter to a person with a fever. The same wine can make one person enraged and another person merry. And the same sun can make wax melt while hardening clay. Also, cause precedes effect logically and chronologically. Thus a thing cannot be a cause of itself, and hence it is impossible for a thing to both be and become, that is to say, the same thing cannot be both what is causing the change and be the thing that undergoes that change, as the one must be separate from and precede the other. For example, a father cannot both be the one who is fathering a son while also being the son who is fathered.
Summary
[...]
3
[There are four views on causation: {1} Cause is a property of corporeal substance. {2} Cause is a property of incorporeal substance. {3} Corporeal substances themselves are properly understood as causes, and incorporeal substance is improperly understood as cause. (This is the Stoic view). {4} Incorporeal substances themselves are properly understood as causes, and corporeal substances are improperly understood as causes.]
3.1
Some, then, say that causes are properties of bodies; and others of incorporeal substances; others say that the body is properly speaking cause, and that what is incorporeal is so only catachrestically, and a quasi-cause.
(Wilson, 508)
8.9.26.1 Οἳ μὲν οὖν σωμάτων , οἳ δ ' ἀσωμάτων φασὶν εἶναι τὰ αἴτια· οἳ δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα κυρίως αἴτιόν φασι , τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον καταχρηστικῶς καὶ οἷον αἰτιωδῶς·
(96)
[We here note four views on causation. I do not concretely grasp all the distinctions at work here, but let us examine them first. We have corporeal substances (bodies) and we have incorporeal substances. Properties can be borne or not by substances. Actions may or may not be committed by or to substances. We need to understand what it would mean for a substance to have cause as a property. We can at least infer that when cause is a substance’s property, that the substance itself is not properly the cause. And also, given what is written here, it seems we can infer that a property is not an incorporeal substance. But how to understand cause as a property I am not sure. I will guess. We have a substance with properties, which can be described using a subject-predicate syntax. The object is red, round, etc. And we can add, ‘x is red, is round, ... and is causing y.’ We are not saying that the substance is causing y, but that it has a property which is its causal relation to another object. Of course there must be a better interpretation, but this is the one I will work with for now.] The first three of the views on causation are: {1} Cause is a property of a corporeal substance. {2} Cause is a property of an incorporeal substance. {3} Corporeal substances are properly understood as causes, and incorporeal substance is improperly understood as cause. (This seems to be the Stoic position, as has been noted by many scholars. It might mean the following. We first understand that interacting objects compose mixtures, and the sort of compositions determine properties that can be articulated as predicates (See Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics section 1.2 and section 1.3). But while the mixture itself is corporeal, those properties it takes on are incorporeal, insofar as they are something rational and sayable. Suppose we have a fire and an iron. The fire has a certain composition, corresponding to which is the sayable, incorporeal predicate, ‘is hot’. The iron has its own composition with its respective properties. When fire and iron come together, they make a new corporeal mixture. But we should note that their corporeal mixture corresponds to an incorporeal mixture of predicates, as well. It would be something like ‘heating’ (of the fire) mixing with the predicate ‘being heated’ (of the iron). In their incorporeal mixture, they would perhaps take the infinitive form, ‘to heat’. So we would say that there is the physical fact of their corporeal mixture and the event of their predicates’ incorporeal mixture. We need now to identify, what, under this third view, is the cause and what is being caused. Given what is written in later in this text, it would seem that we can say that under a mode of analysis of the corporeal and incorporeal mixtures into parts, that the corporeality of the fire, under a mixture with the corporeality of the iron, causes the iron to obtain the predicate ‘heating’. The fire does not cause the iron to have being as an iron, but it causes the iron’s predicate to come to be so.]
3.2
Others, again, reverse matters, saying that *incorporeal substances are properly causes, and bodies are so improperly; as, for example, that cutting, which is an action, is incorporeal, and is the cause | of cutting which is an action and incorporeal, and, in the case of bodies, of being cut,—as in the case of the sword and what is cut [by it].
(Wilson, 508-509. *Note, I changed here “corporeal substances” in the original to “incorporeal substances”. I do not know Greek, so probably I did that incorrectly. However, I did so anyway, because it seems inconsistent in its original form (why contrast corporeal substances with bodies? are they not the same?); and, it also appears to me that the original Greek term here is ἀσώματα and thus I assume ‘incorporeal’. See the Greek text below, and please correct me if I am wrong.)
ἄλλοι δ ' ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρέφουσι , τὰ μὲν ἀσώματα κυρίως αἴτια λέγοντες , καταχρηστικῶς δὲ τὰ σώματα , οἷον τὴν τομὴν ἐνέργειαν οὖσαν ἀσώματον εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ τέμνειν , ἐνεργείας οὔσης καὶ ἀσωμάτου , καὶ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι ὁμοίως τῇ τε μαχαίρᾳ καὶ τῷ τεμνομένῳ σώμασιν οὖσιν .
(96)
[The fourth view on causation is: {4} Incorporeal substances are properly understood as causes, and corporeal substances are improperly understood as causes. The example here is cutting, as an action, is incorporeal, and it is the cause of both the action of cutting and the predicate ‘being cut’ of a body. (It seems we need to distinguish the incorporeal cutting action, like the movement behind some act of cutting, and that cutting act itself. In the first case, perhaps, we simply have the movement of the knife, which is not yet a cutting movement, until it meets flesh. And the movement behind the motion causes it to make a cutting action when it passes through the thing it cuts. Or perhaps the idea is something like the following. The knife has an incorporeal predicate, ‘is cutting’. That predicate itself has causal power, thereby causing the knife to physically move through the flesh.)]
4
[Cause has three senses to it. {1} Cause as ‘what the cause is’, (an agent or acting body of the causation, perhaps) as for example the sculptor (the ‘statuary’). {2} Cause as ‘of what it is the cause of becoming’ (a cause produces a change in something, like the brass becoming a statue). And {3} ‘to what it is the cause, as, for example, the material’, like the brass, which becomes a statue. So the sculptor causes the brass to become a statue, and the knife causes the flesh to be cut. Since becoming (being produced) and being cut are actions, the cause causes an incorporeal. Note that cause is understood as bringing something (action, property, etc.) into being, and not simply as an affection.]
4.1
The cause of things is predicated in a threefold manner. One, What the cause is, as the statuary; a second, Of what it is the cause of becoming, a statue; and a third, To what it is the cause, as, for example, the material: for he is the cause to the brass of becoming a statue.
(Wilson, 509)
Τὸ "7 τινῶν ἐστιν αἴτιον "7 λέγεται τριχῶς , τὸ μὲν ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον , οἷον ὁ ἀνδριαντοποιός , τὸ δὲ οὗ ἐστιν αἴτιον , < οἷον > τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀνδριάντα , τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐστιν αἴτιον , ὥσπερ τῇ ὕλῃ· τῷ χαλκῷ γὰρ 8.9.26.3 αἴτιός ἐστι τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀνδριάντα .
(96)
[Cause has three senses to it. {1} Cause as ‘what the cause is’. The example is the sculptor (statuary). (So perhaps ‘what the cause is’ is the agent of the causation, but I am not sure.) {2} Cause as ‘of what it is the cause of becoming’. The example here is a statue. (What is important here is that cause is understood as causing a becoming, a change of state or of identity or form, perhaps.) And {3} ‘to what it is the cause, as, for example, the material’. In our illustration, this would be the brass, which becomes a statue. (So here it seems to be a substrate material that changes its form or identity through a becoming, caused by the cause.)]
4.2
Hence becoming, and being cut – that of which the cause is a cause – since they are activities, are incorporeal.
(Long & Sedley, 333)
The being produced, and the being cut, which are causes to what they belong, being actions, are incorporeal.
(Wilson, 509)
τὸ γίνεσθαι οὖν καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι , τὰ οὗ ἐστιν αἴτιον , ἐνέργειαι οὖσαι ἀσώματοί εἰσιν .
(96)
[I am not sure, but this seems to mean the following. Becoming and being cut are what the causes cause. Since they are actions, they are incorporeal.]
5
[Causes cause predicates, sayables (λεκτά, lecta), or propositions. Here are some examples. Predicate : ‘is cut’, with the substantival form (case) of that predicate: ‘being cut’; proposition: ‘a ship is built’, with the case being ‘a ship’s being built’. A case is incorporeal, although it corresponds to some corporeal thing. Thus when we say ‘house’, what goes through our lips is the incorporeal case for the thing itself and not the actual house.
5.1
It can be said, to make the same point, that causes are causes of predicates, or, as some say, of sayables [lekta] – for Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates ‘sayables’. Or else, and preferably, that some are causes of predicates, for example of ‘is cut’, | whose case [i.e. substantival form] is ‘being cut’, but others of propositions, for example of ‘a ship is built’, whose case this time is ‘a ship’s being built’.
(Long & Sedley, 333-334. The final clause on Aristotle is omitted. See the Wilson and Luhtala translations below.)
According to which principle, causes belong to the class of predicates (κατηγορηματων), or, as others say, of dicta (λεκτων) (for Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates dicta); or rather, some causes will be assigned to the class of predicates, as that which is cut, whose case is to be cut; and some to that of axioms,—as, for example, that of a ship being made, whose case again is, that a ship is constructing. Now Aristotle denominates the name of such things as a house, a ship, burning, cutting, an appellative.
(Wilson, 509)
Aristotle thinks that causes are causes of appellations (προσηγορία), i.e. of items of the following sort: ‘a house’, ‘a ship’, ‘a burning’, ‘a cut’.
(Luhtala, 131)
8.9.26.4 Εἰς ὃν λόγον κατηγορημάτων ἤ , ὥς τινες , λεκτῶν ( λεκτὰ γὰρ τὰ κατηγορήματα καλοῦσιν Κλεάνθης καὶ Ἀρχέδημος ) < αἴτια > τὰ αἴτια· ἤ , ὅπερ καὶ μᾶλλον , τὰ μὲν κατηγορημάτω ν αἴτια λεχθήσεται , οἷον τοῦ "7 τέμνεται "7, οὗ πτῶσις τὸ τέμνεσθαι , τὰ δ ' ἀξιωμάτων , ὡς τοῦ "7 ναῦς | γίνεται "7, οὗ πάλιν ἡ πτῶσίς ἐστι τὸ ναῦν γίνεσθαι· Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ προσηγοριῶν , οἷον τῶν τοιούτων , οἰκίας , νεώς , καύσεως , τομῆς .
(96-97)
[So when causes cause incorporeal actions, they are causing predicates or sayables (lekta). And Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates ‘sayables’. Some causes cause such predicates as ‘is cut’, and the substantive form (the case) of ‘is cut’ is ‘being cut’. Other causes cause propositions, like ‘a ship is built’. The substantive form (the case) of ‘a ship is built’ is ‘a ship’s being built’. Aristotle says that causes cause common nouns / appellations, like ‘a ship’ and ‘a burning’.]
5.2
Case is agreed to be incorporeal; and hence the famous sophism is solved as follows: ‘What you say passes through your mouth.’ This is true. ‘But you say: A house. Therefore a house passes through your mouth.’ This is false. For what we say is not the house, which is a body, but the case, which is incorporeal and which a house bears.
(Long & Sedley, 198)
But the case is allowed to be incorporeal. Therefore that sophism is solved thus: What you say passes through your mouth. Which is true. You name a house. Therefore a house passes through your mouth. Which is false. For we do not speak the house, which is a body, but the case, in which the house is, which is incorporeal.
(Wilson, 509)
8.9.26.5 ἡ πτῶσις δὲ ἀσώματος εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται· διὸ καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ἐκεῖνο οὕτως λύεται· "7 ὃ λέγεις , διέρχεταί σου διὰ τοῦ στόματος "7, ὅπερ ἀληθές , "7 οἰκίαν δὲ λέγεις , οἰκία ἄρα διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται "7, ὅπερ ψεῦδος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν οἰκίαν λέγομεν σῶμα οὖσαν , ἀλλὰ τὴν πτῶσιν ἀσώματον οὖσαν , ἧς οἰκία τυγχάνει .
(97)
[For this idea we will need to form a concept of case (πτῶσις), but I admit I find it to be a tricky notion. First recall from Luhtala’s On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic section 5.5.2.1 the distinction between σημαίνοντα (expression, that which signifies), which includes vocal sounds and words, and σημαινόμενα (meaning, sayables, that which is signified). Now recall from section 5.5.2.4 that in the Stoic analysis of expression (σημαίνοντα), ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’; and in the Stoic analysis of meaning (σημαινόμενα), these terms correspond with case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα), respectively. And recall finally from section 5.5.4.4 that the Stoic notion of the subject is understood both linguistically as case πτῶσις (a noun that is joined to the predicate) and as the individual, physical subject in the world involved in the action (as either agent or patient) and in the state of affairs that we conceive it to be bound up with. I will guess the idea in these Clement passages is the following. For the Stoic Chrysippus, a word like ‘house’ has both an incorporeal sense to it, as its case, but it also has a corporeality to it, namely, the subject it represents. Perhaps the Stoics conceptually blur the distinction between the linguistic and physical sides of the subject, such that the idea that the thing itself moves through the lips is less absurd. A house moves through the lips, because what constitutes a house is its sense, which is loaded into the sounds moving through the mouth; so since its sense moves through the lips, it itself moves through the lips. Luhtala discusses this “sophism” in section 5.5.3.10. At any rate, Clement seems to be denying this Stoic notion and saying that the case is simply incorporeal, so only the incorporeal goes through the lips and not the corporeal thing itself.]
[...]
10
[The cause bears a relation to its causal action, and it bears a relation to the object it has a causal effect upon. When a cause relates to a causal action and to an affected object in this way, it is properly called a cause. There is a mutual aptitude involved. The fire has the aptitude to cause burning in certain substances, like wood (but not steel), while the wood (but not steel) has the aptitude to be set aflame by fire.]
10.1
Every cause, apprehended by the mind as a cause, is occupied with something, and is conceived in relation to something; that is, some effect, as the sword for cutting; and to some object, as possessing an aptitude, as the fire to the wood. For it will not burn steel.
(Wilson, 511)
Πᾶν αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον < διπλῇ > διανοίᾳ ληπτὸν τυγχάνει , ἐπεὶ τινὸς καὶ πρός τινι νοεῖται , τινὸς μέν , τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος , καθάπερ ἡ μάχαιρα τοῦ τέμνειν , πρός τινι δέ , καθάπερ τῷ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντι , 8.9.29.2 καθάπερ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ξύλῳ· τὸν ἀδάμαντα γὰρ οὐ καύσει .
(98)
[A cause relates both to the effect its action has, like the sword related to cutting (or maybe the sword’s cutting motion in relation to the cutting that it makes in something), and to some object it has an effect on, like the wood being acted upon by fire. It should be noted that this causal relation is reciprocal. The fire’s effect of burning can only relate to wood and not to steel. So the wood has an aptitude of ‘being burnable (by fire, etc.)’ and the fire has an aptitude of ‘inflammatory (of wood, etc.)’]
10.2
The cause belongs to the things which have relation to something. For it is conceived in its relation to another thing. So that we apply our minds to the two, that we may conceive the cause as a cause.
(Wilson, 511)
τὸ αἴτιον τῶν "7 πρός τι "7 · κατὰ γὰρ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον νοεῖται σχέσιν , ὥστε δυεῖν ἐπιβάλλομεν , ἵνα τὸ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον νοήσωμεν .
(98)
[I am not certain, but perhaps it is saying that the cause is located in the thing that is relating causally to these other things, that is, to the causal action and to the affected or caused object.]
11
[A cause must precede its effect. The effect is a ‘becoming’ (a coming to be, a production) while the cause is a ‘being’. Something cannot both be the cause and be the effect at the same time. Thus something cannot both be (be one thing) and become (become something else) at the same time. Now, in order for something to be a cause of itself, it would need to precede itself. That is logically impossible, so nothing can be a cause of itself.]
11.1
The same relation holds with the creator, and maker, and father.
(Wilson, 511)
8.9.29.3 Ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ ποιητοῦ λόγος καὶ πατρός .
(99)
[This relation of cause to causal action and to affected object is like that of a creator (to its creative acts and created things), of a maker (to their constructive acts and constructed things), and a father (to his son).]
11.2
A thing is not the cause of itself. Nor is one his own father. For so the first would become the second. Now the cause acts and affects. That which is produced by the cause is acted on and is affected.
(Wilson, 511)
οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό τι ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιον οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ τις πατήρ , ἐπεὶ τὸ πρῶτον γενήσεται δεύτερον· τό γε μὴν αἴτιον ἐνεργεῖ καὶ διατίθησι , 8.9.29.4 τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου γενόμενον πάσχει καὶ διατίθεται .
(99)
[There is a logical and chronological order to cause and effect. Cause has priority. This means that one cannot cause oneself, because one must precede oneself to cause oneself, which is impossible. The cause is the acting party. It acts upon what it produces and affects.]
11.3
But the same thing taken by itself cannot both act and be affected, nor can one be son and father.
(Wilson, 511)
οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ λαμβανόμενον ἐνεργεῖν ἅμα καὶ διατίθεσθαι , 8. 9.29. 5 οὐδὲ υἱὸς εἶναι καὶ πατήρ .
(99)
[One thing cannot both be the acting party and the affected party, when causality is involved; for example, a person cannot both be a father who creates a son and at the same time be that son who was fathered.]
11.4
And otherwise the cause precedes in being what is done by it, as the sword, the cutting.
(Wilson, 511)
καὶ ἄλλως τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ὑπ ' αὐτοῦ γινομένου προχρονεῖ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν , ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα τῆς τομῆς .
(99)
[The cause must precede its causal action, like how the sword must precede its cutting action.]
11.5
And the same thing cannot precede at the same instant as to matter, as it is a cause, and at the same time, also, be after and posterior as the effect of a cause.
(Wilson 511)
οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ προχρονεῖν τῇ ὕλῃ , καθὸ αἴτιόν ἐστιν , ἅμα καὶ ὑστερεῖν καὶ ὑστεροχρονεῖν , καθὸ τῆς αἰτίας 8.9.29.6 ἐστὶν ἔργον .
(99)
[The next idea might be the following. We said that the cause relates both to its causal action and to the affected object. We then said that the cause must precede the causal action. Now perhaps we are saying that the cause must precede the affected thing, but I am not sure. With this notion of matter (ὕλῃ), perhaps he is saying the following. The unformed brass preceded its form as a statue. The brass was also understood as a cause (see section 4.1). The effect then is the form as a statue. The idea might be that the material cannot both cause the statue-form while at the same have that statue form.]
11.6
Now being differs from becoming, as the cause from the effect, the father from the son.
(Wilson, 511)
διαφέρει τε τὸ εἶναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι· οὕτως καὶ αἴτιον μὲν τοῦ γινομένου , πατὴρ δὲ υἱοῦ .
(99)
[From what is written next, ‘becoming’ might be understood as ‘coming to be’, but I am not sure. We distinguish being and becoming like how we previously distinguished cause and effect and father and son.]
11.7
For the same thing cannot both be and become at the same instant; and consequently it is not the cause of itself.
(Wilson, 511)
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι ἅμα καὶ γίνεσθαι . οὐθὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιον .
(99)
[Perhaps the meaning is that if something is coming to be, it does not yet have being, thus it cannot be the cause of itself. Suppose now that by ‘becoming’ we are to understand ‘come into a new state of being’. Perhaps the idea would then be that something cannot both be in that state and be in a process of taking on that state. Now, cause must precede effect. Since a thing cannot both be itself and become itself, that is, since its being cannot precede its becoming, a thing cannot be the cause of itself. But I am not sure really of the meaning here.]
12
[Corporeals cannot cause other corporeals to come into being. However, corporeals can cause predicates belonging other bodies to come into being. All causal relations are mutual and reciprocal, because the interacting bodies always cause a change in one another’s predicates, rather than being a unilateral movement where only one body is unchanged while the other changes. Those predicates will either be the same or different. There are two examples of the predicates differing. A knife causes the predicate ‘be cut’ to come to be among the flesh’s predicates. In the same stroke, the flesh causes there to arise the predicate ‘cutting’ among the knife’s predicates. The spleen causes a fever to gain the predicate ‘rising’ while the fever causes the spleen to obtain the predicate ‘enlarging’. And there are four examples of the mutual and reciprocal causes having the same effects. Virtues cause one another to have the predicate ‘inseparable from the others’. The stones in an arch cause one another to have the predicate ‘remaining together in this structure’. A teacher and a student cause in one another the predicate ‘making progress’. And the merchant and the retailer cause there to be the predicate ‘making profit’ in one another.]
12.1
Causes are not of each other, but there are causes to each other.
(Long & Sedley, 334)
Things are not causes of one another, but causes to each other.
(Wilson, 511)
8.9.30.1 Ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ αἴτια , ἀλλήλοις δὲ αἴτια .
(99)
[One thing cannot be the cause of another thing. However, one thing may be a cause to another thing. Here I am guessing that cause is a matter of causing to be. So, for one thing to be a cause of another thing means that the one thing causes the other thing to come to be. As we will see, for one thing to be the cause to another thing is to cause some predicate in the other thing to come to be.]
12.2
For the splenetic affection preceding is not the cause of fever, but of the occurrence of fever; and the fever which precedes is not the cause of spleen, but of the affection increasing.
(Wilson, 511)
For the pre-existing condition of the spleen is the cause, not of fever, but of the fever’s coming about; and the pre-existing fever is the cause, not of the spleen, but of its condition’s being intensified.
(Long & Sedley, 334)
ἡ γὰρ σπληνικὴ διάθεσις προϋποκειμένη οὐ πυρετοῦ αἴτιος , ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸν πυρετόν· καὶ ὁ πυρετὸς προϋποκείμενος οὐ σπληνός , ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὔξε 8.9.30.2 σθαι τὴν διάθεσιν .
(99)
[First comment: I do not have sufficient knowledge of ancient (or even modern) medicine to interpret this medical condition properly. But let us at least look at a case study in Hippocrates, Epidemics 1:
Herophon had acute fever [...] Fifth day. Deafness early in the day; general exacerbation; spleen swollen [...]
(Hippocrates, Epidemics 1, Case 3, p.191; Greek text on 190)
Let us just suppose, then, that there is a medical condition having at least these two symptoms: an enlarged spleen and a fever (or we might say, an enlargement of the spleen and a rise in body temperature to the level of a fever). And let us also suppose that these two symptoms can have some sort of a causal relation to one another.] [Second comment: The wording is tricky in this one, because it does not clarify which are objects and which are causal actions. The main difficulty I have is that it is not clear to me if ‘fever’ is a corporeal substance or a property of some substance. And perhaps it might even be an activity. Let us suppose it is an entity somehow, because I think were it a property, it would need to be worded differently, like ‘having fever’. But I am not sure how to think of it as a body itself, in its relation to the spleen. At any rate, suppose we have these two corporeal entities, the spleen and the fever. The spleen has a certain condition. And we state that this condition is preexisting. That condition of the spleen does not cause the fever, but it instead causes the fever’s coming about. So perhaps the idea is that the fever was already there but in such a small amount that it went unnoticed or at least was physiologically unproblematic. Then the condition of the spleen causes the fever to rise. Now, you might say that it is silly to think that the fever would be there in a negligible state and only under certain circumstances increase to a medically problematic level. But, the next line explicitly states that the fever is also preexisting. So we assume the fever was already there, and the spleen’s condition causes the fever to ‘come about’ or, since it is preexisting, let us say, come into such a state that it is noticeable. Next: the fever does not cause the spleen itself (the fever does not cause the spleen to have come into being; for, as we said, it preexisted this circumstance); rather, the fever causes the spleen’s condition to intensify. The idea here could then be that the enlargement of the spleen does not cause the fever to exist in the first place but rather for it to increase in intensity. And, the fever does not cause the spleen to exist, but rather causes it to swell. (Suppose we used different terminology. We have the spleen, and its variable property is its size. That size might increase to the point where we would say that the spleen is enlarged. And we have the whole body with the variable property of temperature. That temperature might increase to a point where we would say that the body has a fever. We would then say that the enlarged spleen does not cause the body – as something with heat – to come into being. But the enlarged spleen can cause the body’s property of ‘being fever-temperatured’ to come to be. And the body, with its fever-temperature, does not cause the spleen to come to be. Rather, the body, with its fever-temperature, causes the spleen’s property of ‘being enlargement-sized’ to come into being.) There are two important observations to make here: {1} A corporeal a does not cause the existence of a corporeal b; rather, corporeal a causes the production of predicate P in corporeal b. So causality does not transpire from one body into another body (directly and simply) but from one body upon another (onto its “surface” as Deleuze might say. Were it a causal influence to the substance itself, we would say that the cause went into that substance. But a thing’s accidental, variable properties are not essential to it. So we might think of them as being superficial to the substance. Hence the cause has its effect not into the other substance but rather upon its surface of incorporeal predicates). And {2} any time corporeal a causes the production of predicate P in corporeal b, in the same stroke, corporeal b causes a property Q to become a predicate of corporeal a. So causality is always reciprocal. These two features of causality become more evident in the other examples below.]
12.3
In the same way, the virtues are causes to each other of not being separated, owing to their inter-entailment, and the stones in the vault are causes to each other of the predicate ‘remaining’, but they are not causes of each other. And the teacher and the pupil are causes to each other of the predicate ‘making progress’ .
(Long & Sedley, 334)
Thus also the virtues are causes to each other, because on account of their mutual correspondence they cannot be separated. And the stones in the arch are causes of its continuing in this category, but are not the causes of one another. And the teacher and the learner are to one another causes of progressing as respects the predicate.
(Wilson, 512)
οὕτως καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἀλλήλαις αἴτιαι τοῦ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντακολουθίαν , καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς ψαλίδος λίθοι ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν αἴτιοι τοῦ μένειν κατηγορήματος , ἀλλήλων δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἴτιοι , καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος δὲ καὶ ὁ μανθάνων ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν 8.9.30.3 αἴτιοι τοῦ προκόπτειν κατηγορήματος .
(99)
[The next example is that virtues do not cause each other but rather they cause one another to be not separated, and this is on account of their ‘inter-entailment’. Perhaps the idea might be something like the following. A courageous person would also be honest, because telling the truth often takes courage. Now, courage does not cause honesty to come to be (a person’s courage does not cause one to also have honesty), and honesty does not cause courage. Rather, we assume that one person already has courage and honesty (or, if they come to acquire courage, they thereby also acquire honesty). So one virtue does not cause the other. However, since each implies or requires the other, that means each one causes the other to have the relational predicate of being inseparable with it. Or: both cause the other to be in a relation with one other. The next example involves the stones in an archway. No stone causes another stone to exist. However, each stone in its mixture with the others in their relation of mutual support causes one another (and thus all) to have the property of remaining stable. The teacher does not cause one to be a student, and a student does not cause one to be a teacher. However, the one causes the other (and thus both) to make progress in education.]
12.4
Things are said to be causes to each other sometimes of the same effects, as the merchant and the retailer are causes to each other of making a profit; but sometimes of different effects, as in the case of the knife and the flesh; for the knife is the cause to the flesh of being cut, while the flesh is the cause to the knife of cutting.
(Long & Sedley, 334)
And mutual and reciprocal causes are predicated, some of the same things, as the merchant and the retailer are causes of gain; and sometimes one of one thing and others of another, as the sword and the flesh; for the one is the cause to the flesh of being cut, and the flesh to the sword of cutting.
(Wilson, 512)
λέγεται δὲ ἀλλήλοις αἴτια ποτὲ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν , ὡς ὁ ἔμπορος καὶ ὁ κάπηλος ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν αἴτιοι τοῦ κερδαίνειν , ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου , καθάπερ ἡ μάχαιρα καὶ ἡ σάρξ· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τῇ σαρκὶ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι , ἡ σὰρξ δὲ τῇ μαχαίρᾳ τοῦ τέμνειν .
(99)
[(First recall the examples from above. Fever causes spleen enlargement and spleen causes fever increase. These are different effects. Virtues cause inseparability in each other. These are the same effects. Teacher and student cause progress in one another. These are also the same effects. Now) Clement says that we can classify mutual and reciprocal causes by whether the effects are the same or not. (The example here is like teacher and student.) For example, the merchant and the retailer cause ‘making profit’ in one another. Or, the effects might be different, as with the knife and flesh. The knife causes there to arise among the flesh’s predicates ‘being cut’, while the flesh causes there to arise among the knife’s predicates ‘cutting’.]
[...]
16
[The same thing can have variable, even opposite effects. On way that may happen is due to the intensity of the cause. For example, a loose string will cause a deep sound and a tight string will cause a high sound. Another way the same thing can have variable effects is due to the particular susceptibilities of the other thing. Here there are three examples. The same honey will be sweet for the healthy person and bitter to the ill person. The same wine can make one person enraged and another person merry. And the same sun can make wax melt while hardening clay.]
16.1
And the same thing becomes the cause of contrary effects; sometimes through the magnitude of the cause and its power, and sometimes in consequence of the susceptibility of that on which it acts.
(Wilson, 513)
8.9.32.1 Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν ἐναντίων αἴτιον γίνεται , ποτὲ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τὴν δύναμιν , ποτὲ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα 8.9.32.2 τοῦ πάσχοντος .
(100)
[One cause can have different effects, depending on the level of intensity of the cause or depending on what susceptibilities the other object has.]
16.2
According to the nature of the force, the same string, according to its tension or relaxation, gives a shrill or deep sound.
(Wilson, 513)
παρὰ μὲν τὴν ποιὰν δύναμιν· ἡ αὐτὴ χορδὴ παρὰ τὴν ἐπίτασιν ἢ τὴν ἄνεσιν ὀξὺν ἢ βαρὺν ἀποδίδωσι τὸν φθόγγον .
(100)
[We begin with the first case of variable effects, namely, that difference in the level of power in the cause can have different effects. The example here is that a string will give high or a low sound depending on how tight or loose its tension is.]
16.3
And honey is sweet to those who are well, and bitter to those who are in fever, according to the state of susceptibility of those who are affected. And one and the same wine inclines some to rage, and others to merriment. And the same sun melts wax and hardens clay.
(Wilson, 513)
8.9.32.3 παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῶν πασχόντων· τὸ μέλι γλυκάζει μὲν τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας , πικράζει δὲ τοὺς πυρέσσοντας , καὶ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀργήν , τοὺς δὲ εἰς διάχυσιν ἄγει , καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἥλιος τήκει μὲν τὸν κηρόν , ξηραίνει δὲ τὸν πηλόν .
(100)
[The next examples are for the second case, namely, that the variance in effect is due to the susceptibilities of the other thing. If a person is well, they are susceptible to finding honey to be sweet. But if they have a fever, the honey will taste bitter. The same wine drunk by two people could make the one angry and the other joyful, depending on their susceptibility. And the sun can simultaneously cause a piece of wax to melt and a clump of clay to harden.]
[...]
Clement of Alexandria. (1909). Stromata, in Clemens Alexandrinus, dritter band. Leipzig : J.C. Hinrichs.
Pdf available at:
https://archive.org/details/clemensalexandri17clemuoft
Greek text copied from:
http://khazarzar.skeptik.net/pgm/PG_Migne/Clement%20of%20Alexandria_PG%2008-09/Stromata.pdf
Clement of Alexandria. (1869). The Miscellanies; or, Stromata, in The Writings of Clement of Alexandria, vol.2. Translated by William Wilson. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
PDF available at:
https://archive.org/details/writingsofclemen02clem
English text copied from:
Hippocrates. 1957. Epidemics. In Hippocrates, vol.1. English translation by W.H.S. Jones. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University.
PDF available at:
Long, Anthony A. and David N. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol.1: Translations of the Principle Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.
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