Shores. Jc Beall’s Current and Potential Impact on the Continental Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics (Author Manuscript)

by Corry Shores

 

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[Corry Shores, entry directory]

 

In accordance with the archiving and open access policies of Springer Nature, I am making a PDF of the Author Manuscript (AM) available here on my personal website.

This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5

To access the final published version, please reach the publisher using that link or contact the author at corryshores@gmail.com or through Research Gate.

 

 

Corry Shores

Jc Beall’s Current and Potential Impact on the Continental Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics

 

PDF LINK

 

 

 

 

Shores, Corry. “Jc Beall’s Current and Potential Impact on the Continental Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics.” Asian Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2023): 1–12. doi:10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5

 

Research Gate link:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370444805_Jc_Beall%27s_current_and_potential_impact_on_the_continental_philosophy_of_non-classical_logics_in_the_Asian_Journal_of_Philosophy

Shores. The Primacy of Falsity: Deviant Origins in Deleuze

by Corry Shores

 

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In accordance with the distribution provisions of Tijdschrift voor Filosofie: Louvain Journal of Philosophy, I am making a PDF of the published article available on my personal website.

 

 

Corry Shores

The Primacy of Falsity:

Deviant Origins in Deleuze

PDF LINK

 

 

 

 

Shores, Corry. “The Primacy of Falsity: Deviant Origins in Deleuze.” Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 81 (2019): 81–130.

"Every Typewriter is a Character." Clifford Duffy's "as a construct"

 

by Corry Shores

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[Literature, Poetry, Drama, entry directory]

[Clifford Duffy Entry Directory]

 

 

 

Clifford Duffy

“as a construct”

[link]

 

Clifford Duffy wrote another incredible poem recently on his Recall to Poetry site. Here is a screenshot of an especially striking part of it.

 

(From Duffy)

 

As always, Duffy’s use of electronic typography and html coding give the poem sonic variations impossible with print, especially considering how the browser window sizing and scrolling affects the layout in his particular well-crafted way. The timing of each word, the speed, tone, and pacing of its delivery, all under high variation. Note for instance when we transition through the crossed out ‘she’, the sudden dips in tone and volume, or the gliding carriage return effect of the blank underlines in the ‘rising’ section, giving silence an affective sound. Duffy created a new artform many years ago and continues innovating it to this day, and he stands as one of the best and most original poets I have ever read.

 

 

 

 

Duffy, Clifford. “as a construct”. Recall to Poetry:

https://recalltopoetry.blogspot.com/2021/11/as-construct.html#more

 

.

Breeur (3.0) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.3.0, “Introduction”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

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[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased here.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Roland Breeur

[Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page]

 

Lies – Imposture – Stupidity

 

Part 2

Imposture

 

Ch.3

The Imposter

 

3.0

“Introduction”

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brief summary (collecting those below):

(3.0.1) The common conception of an impostor is that they are “someone who invents a story that is not their own. He or she is trying to pretend to be someone else” (54). Yet, Breeur notes that imposture is a little more complex than this, because it also involves the impostor’s ability “to blur the lines that normally allow us to establish the difference between the true and the false” (54). (3.0.2) Jean-Bertrand Pontalis defines the impostor as someone who “usurps an identity,” inventing for themself a story that is not their own but that they adhere to their identity, thereby effectively posing themselves as someone they are not (54). Breeur gives a couple examples. {1} “James Macpherson imposes himself as the one who discovered the Gaelic Iliad written by Ossian, whereas he himself was its author” (54). {2} Brigido Lara was a Mexican art forger. He forged “an unprecedented number of pre-Columbian artworks the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia” (54). In 1974, he was arrested for stealing many of them. To defend himself, he confessed that “these objects were all fakes and that he had made them” (54). Yet later he was hired by the “Museum of | Anthropology in Xalapa – as an expert in forgery, his work would consist in sorting through the national collections to keep only the real ones” (54). (Here the imposture both “worked” in its deceptive capacity and later it proved beneficial in working to prevent deception. (3.0.3) Han Van Meegeren is another famous forger. He made fake Vermeers that both experts and the press were convinced were authentic. It was only a good while later that Meegeren’s deception was exposed. “So, it worked” (55). (3.0.4) But sometimes attempts at imposture do not work: “Dimitri II, a false descendant of Ivan The Terrible who was proclaimed tsar on June 20, 1606, was unmasked and murdered a few months later. His body was butchered and his ashes sent back with cannons to Poland, his country of origin” (55). Normally when we catch impostors, the punishment is often severe: “As a rule, the recall, or the revenge, of reality is inexorable” (55). Why is this? Breeur doubts that it is because we cherish the truth so much. Rather, “As Deleuze once said, everyone knows very well that, in fact, we rarely seek the truth – our interests and also our stupidity keep us from the truth even more inveterately than do our mistakes” (55). Breeur says we punish caught impostors not for deceiving us, but for getting caught, for failing to deceive us. In fact, we would even celebrate impostors who were able to carry their deception to their death, only to be discovered afterward: “If we punish counterfeiters, it would be because they missed their objective, i.e. because they had failed. Had they been successful – though this evokes the paradoxical idea of a successful impostor, which may seem to be an oxymoron, there are those who are not unmasked until after their death, or those we do not dare to unmask, and therefore those who can, in a sense, be considered successes – we would have honored them” (55). This is because we are fascinated with and admire their ability to neutralize reality and make appearing coincide with being, which is a feat normally only accomplished by our dreams. (Perhaps, we admire them for overcoming reality with the power of appearances.) “I think that what fascinates us is the idea that their deception or deceit had the power to neutralize reality. Thus, and this is the central element of the idea which I would like to pursue, we admire or are ensorcelled by those who deceive us less for the content of what they make us believe than for the very fact of having deceived us, i.e. less for the exceptional life which they claim to have lived and more for the mediocrity of the one which they were able to eclipse. The life of a successful impostor is one in which being and appearing coincide at a point that is only achieved in the realm of dreams. Hence, the imposture fascinates, in as much as it looks like a dream made real” (55). The success of impostors also serves another purpose, namely, to “to deceive and convince themselves. […] We are the spectators who confirm and reinforce them in their game of concealment or dissimulation”  (55).

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

3.0.1

[Imposture and Blurring the Lines Between True and False]

 

3.0.2

[The Impostor as One Who Lives an Alternate Identity]

 

3.0.3

[Van Meegeren’s Vermeer Forgeries]

 

3.0.4

[Our Love of the Impostor’s Overcoming and Neutralizing of Reality by Making Appearing Coincide with Being, as with Dreams]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

3.0.1

[Imposture and Blurring the Lines Between True and False]

 

[The common conception of an impostor is that they are “someone who invents a story that is not their own. He or she is trying to pretend to be someone else” (54). Yet, Breeur notes that imposture is a little more complex than this, because it also involves the impostor’s ability “to blur the lines that normally allow us to establish the difference between the true and the false” (54).]

 

[ditto]

The impostor is commonly described as someone who invents a story that is not their own. He or she is trying to pretend to be someone else. However, this attempt is very complex. Among other things, it only works to the extent that the impostor is able to blur the lines that normally allow us to establish the difference between the true and the false. That is what this chapter is all about.

(54)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.0.2

[The Impostor as One Who Lives an Alternate Identity]

 

[Jean-Bertrand Pontalis defines the impostor as someone who “usurps an identity,” inventing for themself a story that is not their own but that they adhere to their identity, thereby effectively posing themselves as someone they are not (54). Breeur gives a couple examples. {1} “James Macpherson imposes himself as the one who discovered the Gaelic Iliad written by Ossian, whereas he himself was its author” (54). {2} Brigido Lara was a Mexican art forger. He forged “an unprecedented number of pre-Columbian artworks the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia” (54). In 1974, he was arrested for stealing many of them. To defend himself, he confessed that “these objects were all fakes and that he had made them” (54). Yet later he was hired by the “Museum of | Anthropology in Xalapa – as an expert in forgery, his work would consist in sorting through the national collections to keep only the real ones” (54). (Here the imposture both “worked” in its deceptive capacity and later it proved beneficial in working to prevent deception.]

 

[ditto]

So, what is an impostor? Jean-Bertrand Pontalis gives the following definition: “The impostor [is] the one who usurps an identity, [who] invents for himself to the point of adhering to it a story that is not his own [and who] poses as someone else, and it works.”⁵⁹ Thus, James Macpherson imposes himself as the one who discovered the Gaelic Iliad written by Ossian, whereas he himself was its author. Or Brigido Lara, arrested in 1974 by the Mexican police for “stealing” an unprecedented number of pre-Columbian artworks the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, who was forced, in order to defend himself, to admit that these objects were all fakes and that he had made them. Afterwards, he was hired at the Museum of | Anthropology in Xalapa – as an expert in forgery, his work would consist in sorting through the national collections to keep only the real ones. “It works,” in the sense that even a kind of reminder of reality is beneficial.

(54-55)

59. Pontalis quoted in Andree Bauduin, Psychanalyse de l’imposture (Paris: PUF, 2007), p. II.

(54)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.0.3

[Van Meegeren’s Vermeer Forgeries]

 

[Han Van Meegeren is another famous forger. He made fake Vermeers that both experts and the press were convinced were authentic. It was only a good while later that Meegeren’s deception was exposed. “So, it worked” (55).]

 

[ditto]

Or let us take the exquisite example of the famous forger Han Van Meegeren, born in 1889, who put one over on the critics by making a dozen false Vermeers. The most eminent experts of that time, as well as the press, almost unanimously considered them to be masterpieces of the Delft master. It was not until the end of World War II, when the police seized Goering’s private collection and the painter was convicted of treason for selling a Vermeer to the Nazi Marshal, that the deception was exposed. So, it worked.⁶⁰

(55)

60. See Luigi Guarneri, La double vie de Vermeer, Trans. Marguerite Pozzoli (Aries: Actes Sud, 2007).

(55)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.0.4

[Our Love of the Impostor’s Overcoming and Neutralizing of Reality by Making Appearing Coincide with Being, as with Dreams]

 

[But sometimes attempts at imposture do not work: “Dimitri II, a false descendant of Ivan The Terrible who was proclaimed tsar on June 20, 1606, was unmasked and murdered a few months later. His body was butchered and his ashes sent back with cannons to Poland, his country of origin” (55). Normally when we catch impostors, the punishment is often severe: “As a rule, the recall, or the revenge, of reality is inexorable” (55). Why is this? Breeur doubts that it is because we cherish the truth so much. Rather, “As Deleuze once said, everyone knows very well that, in fact, we rarely seek the truth – our interests and also our stupidity keep us from the truth even more inveterately than do our mistakes” (55). Breeur says we punish caught impostors not for deceiving us, but for getting caught, for failing to deceive us. In fact, we would even celebrate impostors who were able to carry their deception to their death, only to be discovered afterward: “If we punish counterfeiters, it would be because they missed their objective, i.e. because they had failed. Had they been successful – though this evokes the paradoxical idea of a successful impostor, which may seem to be an oxymoron, there are those who are not unmasked until after their death, or those we do not dare to unmask, and therefore those who can, in a sense, be considered successes – we would have honored them” (55). This is because we are fascinated with and admire their ability to neutralize reality and make appearing coincide with being, which is a feat normally only accomplished by our dreams. (Perhaps, we admire them for overcoming reality with the power of appearances.) “I think that what fascinates us is the idea that their deception or deceit had the power to neutralize reality. Thus, and this is the central element of the idea which I would like to pursue, we admire or are ensorcelled by those who deceive us less for the content of what they make us believe than for the very fact of having deceived us, i.e. less for the exceptional life which they claim to have lived and more for the mediocrity of the one which they were able to eclipse. The life of a successful impostor is one in which being and appearing coincide at a point that is only achieved in the realm of dreams. Hence, the imposture fascinates, in as much as it looks like a dream made real” (55). The success of impostors also serves another purpose, namely, to “to deceive and convince themselves. […] We are the spectators who confirm and reinforce them in their game of concealment or dissimulation”  (55).]

 

[ditto]

But does it always work? Of course not. Dimitri II, a false descendant of Ivan The Terrible who was proclaimed tsar on June 20, 1606, was unmasked and murdered a few months later. His body was butchered and his ashes sent back with cannons to Poland, his country of origin. As a rule, the recall, or the revenge, of reality is inexorable. Why? It would be too easy to say that, out of love for the truth, we do not like to be fooled. As Deleuze once said, everyone knows very well that, in fact, we rarely seek the truth – our interests and also our stupidity keep us from the truth even more inveterately than do our mistakes.⁶¹ If we punish counterfeiters, it would be because they missed their objective, i.e. because they had failed. Had they been successful – though this evokes the paradoxical idea of a successful impostor, which may seem to be an oxymoron, there are those who are not unmasked until after their death, or those we do not dare to unmask, and therefore those who can, in a sense, be considered successes – we would have honored them. As a consequence, I do not think that in the fascination we feel for imposters of whatever stripe | we express above all an admiration for someone who seemed capable of giving what is false the appearances of the truth. Rather, I think that what fascinates us is the idea that their deception or deceit had the power to neutralize reality. Thus, and this is the central element of the idea which I would like to pursue, we admire or are ensorcelled by those who deceive us less for the content of what they make us believe than for the very fact of having deceived us, i.e. less for the exceptional life which they claim to have lived and more for the mediocrity of the one which they were able to eclipse. The life of a successful impostor is one in which being and appearing coincide at a point that is only achieved in the realm of dreams. Hence, the imposture fascinates, in as much as it looks like a dream made real. Also, it has an internal purpose: Accomplished counterfeiters (and they are rare, the majority being limited to the category of crooks who stop or are blocked halfway) seek less to deceive us than to deceive and convince themselves. We are the spectators who confirm and reinforce them in their game of concealment or dissimulation.

(55-56)

61. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: PUF, I962), p. 108.

(55)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

Breeur, Roland. Lies – Imposture – Stupidity. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.

The book can be purchased here.

 

Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page.

.

 

 

.

Breeur (2.6) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.6, “Duchenne: Smile!”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Roland Breeur, entry directory]

[Breeur, Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, entry directory]

 

[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased here.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Roland Breeur

[Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page]

 

Lies – Imposture – Stupidity

 

Part 1

Lies and Stupidity

 

Ch.2

Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity

 

2.6

“Duchenne: Smile!”

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brief summary (collecting those below):

(2.6.1) David Livingstone Smith provides an evolutionary account for self-deception. He begins by noting that it is “difficult to suppress the non-verbal signs that convey our inmost thoughts and feelings” (49). (Yet, it is to our advantage not to let other people always know our true thoughts, feelings, and intentions.) So we developed ways “to move through the world without broadcasting our inmost thoughts and feelings on every occasion,” which for Smith is lying (49). Yet, even with our best efforts to do so, often “our bodies betray and seem to sabotage our conscious mind’s efforts to deceive or conceal” (49). However, if we truly believe our own lies, or if we were made unaware that we were dissimulating, then we would not have contrary inner feelings that might inadvertently  indicate otherwise. Hence human self-deception: “We learned to lie without knowing doing so” (50). (2.6.2) Guillaume Duchenne “discovered the facial distinction between a true and a false smile. The true one involves more than just lip retraction: A real smile produces contractions around the eyes, causing wrinkles and narrowing the eyes” (50). Smith uses this term for a fake smile however. Yet the idea remains that there are two kinds of smiles: “The phony smile is the artificial one of ‘airplane personnel,’ smiles produced for cameras, for ‘public consumption’ (de Waal), etc., while the true smile is the direct expression of our deeper self, it ‘arises from a specific inner state, as sincere | reflections of enjoyment, happiness, or affection.’ True smiles are therefore ‘harder to feign’” (50-51). (2.6.3) Breeur notes some complications with this supposed clear-cut distinction between a fake and genuine smile. The smiles of airplane personnel are “not meant as an expression of one’s inmost thoughts and feelings, hence there is nothing deceptive about it,” so they are not simply false and deceptive (51). “Likewise, any variant of conventional social expressions of politeness are not necessarily, inherently, or irreducibly false or insincere” (51). In contrast to this sort of a polite, service smile, Breeur designates the “real false smile,” which “is not the phony one, but the imitation of the true one” (51). (While the service smile is made with both parties knowing it is done as a service to the other), the real false smile is “the smile of the imposter, i.e. someone that in a context of social smiles intends to convince the other that his or her smile is genuine and sincere, is true and not fake” (51). Also, the real false smile is, of course, not meant to express a feeling that the imposter genuinely has but rather to evoke a feeling in the receiver, which is “precisely what actors do. An imposter [...] is an actor off stage” (51). The imposter is so good at this sort of deception that they “can deliberately, fully, self-consciously neutralize the work of a lie detector” (51). For the lie to be effective, the liar needs this sort of “Absolute and total self-control” (51). Breeur notes that this sort of self-control is “what trained spies achieve when they | are submitted to lie detectors. They betray nothing because they are real fakes” rather than the “phony fakes” with service smiles (51-52). (2.6.4) (Recall from section 1.3.5 that Augustine defines lying as having one thought in your head while expressing another thought instead, with the intention to deceive. In this way, the liar has a double heart and holds a double thought. Lying is an act of duplicity in which “You dissimulate what is true, and you simulate what is untrue” (19). (Augustine: “dissimulation is pretending not to be what one actually is, whereas simulation is pretending to be what one actually is not.”)) Breeur notes that often the “the problem of imposture is seen as a variant of lying, i.e. a tendency to combine forms of dissimulation and simulation” (52). (So, perhaps, it is not that we see imposture as a subcategory or subtheme of the topic lying.) Rather, “it is the other way around” (52). (Perhaps, lying is one of the tools the imposture uses in their overall deceptive, misleading behavior in which they craft a fake identity for themselves.) “As we saw, a liar is an actor. His or her play is not part of a deliberate tendency to lie. But his or her lying is integrated into a general strategy to seduce, to impose a mise-en-scene and to play a certain role, to incarnate a fake identity, to imitate a ‘real’ smile” (52).

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.6.1

[Self-Deception About Our Deception]

 

2.6.2

[Fake Smiles]

 

2.6.3

[The Real False Smile of the Self-Controlled Imposter]

 

2.6.4

[Imposture and Lying]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.6.1

[Self-Deception About Our Deception]

 

[David Livingstone Smith provides an evolutionary account for self-deception. He begins by noting that it is “difficult to suppress the non-verbal signs that convey our inmost thoughts and feelings” (49). (Yet, it is to our advantage not to let other people always know our true thoughts, feelings, and intentions.) So we developed ways “to move through the world without broadcasting our inmost thoughts and feelings on every occasion,” which for Smith is lying (49). Yet, even with our best efforts to do so, often “our bodies betray and seem to sabotage our conscious mind’s efforts to deceive or conceal” (49). However, if we truly believe our own lies, or if we were made unaware that we were dissimulating, then we would not have contrary inner feelings that might inadvertently  indicate otherwise. Hence human self-deception: “We learned to lie without knowing doing so” (50).]

 

[ditto]

In his captivating book on the motives for lying, David Livingstone Smith gives an evolutionary account of deception.⁵¹ His claim is that deception and the unconscious are coextensive. Starting from the idea that it is difficult to suppress the non-verbal signs that convey our inmost thoughts and feelings, he suggests that nature moved human beings to develop systems to lie, i.e. to move through the world without broadcasting our inmost thoughts and feelings on every occasion. Even so, it often occurs that our bodies betray and seem to sabotage our conscious mind’s efforts to deceive or conceal; | indeed, we would lie far more effectively if only we could operate ignorant of our dissimulations or if we could make ourselves believe that we were not dissimulating. This is how Smith explains the evolutionary origin of self-deception: It “helps us to ensnare others more efficiently.” Deception often makes us “anxious, hesitant, nervous etc. The greater the risk, the more self-conscious we become”;⁵² hence the need of a strategy to neutralize our painful knowledge of our deception in order to avoid “betray[ing] our dishonesty accidentally” (blushing, perspire, etc.). We learned to lie without knowing doing so.

(49-50)

51. See his Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious Mind (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004).

(49)

52. Smith, Why We Lie, p. 75.

(50)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.6.2

[Fake Smiles]

 

[Guillaume Duchenne “discovered the facial distinction between a true and a false smile. The true one involves more than just lip retraction: A real smile produces contractions around the eyes, causing wrinkles and narrowing the eyes” (50). Smith uses this term for a fake smile however. Yet the idea remains that there are two kinds of smiles: “The phony smile is the artificial one of ‘airplane personnel,’ smiles produced for cameras, for ‘public consumption’ (de Waal), etc., while the true smile is the direct expression of our deeper self, it ‘arises from a specific inner state, as sincere | reflections of enjoyment, happiness, or affection.’ True smiles are therefore ‘harder to feign’” (50-51).]

 

[ditto]

This claim, however, is built on a rather simplistic model of expression. As do many other scientists today who are interested in the bodily expression of emotion, Smith refers to the classic case of the so-called “Duchenne smile.”⁵³ Guillaume Duchenne was a French neurologist who in his book The Mechanisms of Human Facial Expressions discovered the facial distinction between a true and a false smile. The true one involves more than just lip retraction: A real smile produces contractions around the eyes, causing wrinkles and narrowing the eyes. Funnily enough (or very symptomatically), Smith and Frans de Waal differ in the attribution of the term “Duchenne smile”: For Smith it refers to the phony smile⁵⁴ while for de Waal it refers to the true smile.⁵⁵ But both converge in the determination of the nature of the distinction. The phony smile is the artificial one of “airplane personnel,” smiles produced for cameras, for “public consumption’’ (de Waal), etc., while the true smile is the direct expression of our deeper self, it “arises from a specific inner state, as sincere | reflections of enjoyment, happiness, or affection.” True smiles are therefore “harder to feign.”⁵⁶

(50-51)

53. See also Frans de Waal, Mama ‘s Last Hug: Animal Emotions and What They Teach Us about Ourselves (London: Granta, 2019), pp. 66-68.

54. “The false, mouth-only ‘have a nice day’ kind of smile was named the ‘Duchenne smile’ in honor of its discoverer” (Smith, Why We Lie, p. 72).

55. “Only the so-called Duchenne smile is a sincere expression of joy and positive feeling” (de Waal, Mama’s Last Hug, p. 66).

(50)

56. de Waal, Mama’s Last Hug, p. 67.

(51)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.6.3

[The Real False Smile of the Self-Controlled Imposter]

 

[Breeur notes some complications with this supposed clear-cut distinction between a fake and genuine smile. The smiles of airplane personnel are “not meant as an expression of one’s inmost thoughts and feelings, hence there is nothing deceptive about it,” so they are not simply false and deceptive (51). “Likewise, any variant of conventional social expressions of politeness are not necessarily, inherently, or irreducibly false or insincere” (51). In contrast to this sort of a polite, service smile, Breeur designates the “real false smile,” which “is not the phony one, but the imitation of the true one” (51). (While the service smile is made with both parties knowing it is done as a service to the other), the real false smile is “the smile of the imposter, i.e. someone that in a context of social smiles intends to convince the other that his or her smile is genuine and sincere, is true and not fake” (51). Also, the real false smile is, of course, not meant to express a feeling that the imposter genuinely has but rather to evoke a feeling in the receiver, which is “precisely what actors do. An imposter [...] is an actor off stage” (51). The imposter is so good at this sort of deception that they “can deliberately, fully, self-consciously neutralize the work of a lie detector” (51). For the lie to be effective, the liar needs this sort of “Absolute and total self-control” (51). Breeur notes that this sort of self-control is “what trained spies achieve when they | are submitted to lie detectors. They betray nothing because they are real fakes” rather than the “phony fakes” with service smiles (51-52).]

 

There are more than a few problems with these accounts. For starters, one would be justified in one’s skepticism regarding such simplistic models of “facial expression.” I would also like to know what kind of scientific evidence corroborates the claim that “our faces most of the time mirror true feelings.”⁵⁷ But the more relevant issue is that I do not believe that the distinction between the public consumption smile and the genuine personal smile maps so neatly onto that of false and true respectively. The public smiles of “airplane personnel,” for example, are not simply false. Likewise, any variant of conventional social expressions of politeness are not necessarily, inherently, or irreducibly false or insincere. In the example of airplane personnel, a frequent flyer who frequently feels betrayed by the “phony” smiles of airplane personnel might very well be paranoiac. The key is that the airplane personnel smile is not meant as an expression of one’s inmost thoughts and feelings, hence there is nothing deceptive about it, unless one believes in the possible existence of a society based only on true smiles. What is false is not the socially adaptive face expression, the mask called persona: A real false smile is not the phony one, but the imitation of the true one. The latter is the smile of the imposter, i.e. someone that in a context of social smiles intends to convince the other that his or her smile is genuine and sincere, is true and not fake. The domain of the fake smile is that of evocation instead of expression. Evoking a feeling is precisely what actors do. An imposter, as we will see immediately, is an actor off stage. An imposter is someone who can deliberately, fully, self-consciously neutralize the work of a lie detector. This is the core of the effective lie: Absolute and total self-control. This is what Eichmann achieved during his trial. This is what trained spies achieve when they | are submitted to lie detectors.⁵⁸ They betray nothing because they are real fakes. Not phony fakes with an “airplane personnel smile”.

(51-52)

57. de Waal, Mama’s Last Hug, p. 67.

(51)

58. Cf. Bettina Stangneth, Lügen lessen (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2017).

(52)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.6.4

[Imposture and Lying]

 

[(Recall from section 1.3.5 that Augustine defines lying as having one thought in your head while expressing another thought instead, with the intention to deceive. In this way, the liar has a double heart and holds a double thought. Lying is an act of duplicity in which “You dissimulate what is true, and you simulate what is untrue” (19). (Augustine: “dissimulation is pretending not to be what one actually is, whereas simulation is pretending to be what one actually is not.”)) Breeur notes that often the “the problem of imposture is seen as a variant of lying, i.e. a tendency to combine forms of dissimulation and simulation” (52). (So, perhaps, it is not that we see imposture as a subcategory or subtheme of the topic lying.) Rather, “it is the other way around” (52). (Perhaps, lying is one of the tools the imposture uses in their overall deceptive, misleading behavior in which they craft a fake identity for themselves.) “As we saw, a liar is an actor. His or her play is not part of a deliberate tendency to lie. But his or her lying is integrated into a general strategy to seduce, to impose a mise-en-scene and to play a certain role, to incarnate a fake identity, to imitate a ‘real’ smile” (52).]

 

[ditto]

Very often the problem of imposture is seen as a variant of lying, i.e. a tendency to combine forms of dissimulation and simulation. But it is the other way around. As we saw, a liar is an actor. His or her play is not part of a deliberate tendency to lie. But his or her lying is integrated into a general strategy to seduce, to impose a mise-en-scene and to play a certain role, to incarnate a fake identity, to imitate a “real” smile.

(52)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

Breeur, Roland. Lies – Imposture – Stupidity. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.

The book can be purchased here.

 

Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page.

.

 

 

.

Breeur (2.5) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.5, “Reduction to Simplicity”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Roland Breeur, entry directory]

[Breeur, Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, entry directory]

 

[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased here.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Roland Breeur

[Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page]

 

Lies – Imposture – Stupidity

 

Part 1

Lies and Stupidity

 

Ch.2

Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity

 

2.5

“Reduction to Simplicity”

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brief summary (collecting those below):

(2.5.1) (Recall from section 2.4 how industries, in the face of a preponderance of scientific findings that threaten their profits, might fund their own counter-research efforts. The purpose is to fabricate a “scientifically legitimized” opposing view, so to hinder adverse public policy and public opinion.) In response to industry’s clouding of scientific debate, one response is to insist on the better, more factual truth. But this would only work if the industry-funded scientists were simply lying. Instead, their efforts to cloud the debate only create “a context in which truth ceases to be of value” (46). (Perhaps the idea is the following. When both sides are given equal weight in the public discourse, all while only one is based in a genuine effort to conduct unbiased scientific research, then both true and false statements, or both good and bad scientific research, is regarded equivalently. As such, the true and good knowledge is lowered to the level of an alternative opinion or view or interpretation of the data, rather than being something with special merit.) This, then, involves the “reduction to stupidity” (see section 2.2.5, and summary at section 2.3.1) (where discourse is “reduced to hot air” on account of people holding on to inferior views,) which prevents the superior ones from promulgating and having persuasive effect. (2.5.2) This strategy often involves efforts to fight the bad, false and misleading industry funded research by replacing it with good, true research. Breeur calls this “stupidity as disproportion.” Yet, the reason so many people disbelieve good science (as for example the overwhelming scientific evidence for human-caused climate change) has to do with what they are willing to believe. Many people simply do not want to believe the truth. For instance, they may fall victim to confirmation bias: “i.e. people’s tendency to believe and value above all facts and information that confirm their cherished premises and presuppositions – or, negatively put, people’s unwillingness to accept facts and evidence that contradict their cherished premises and presuppositions” (46). (2.5.3) There are a number of cognitive phenomena that might explain why people tend toward such irrational thinking: “In the case of the backfire effect, a person will not only refuse to accept the evidence challenging his or her beliefs, they will even feel strengthened in their beliefs by evidence to the contrary, ‘doubling down’’ on their cherished beliefs. In the case of the Dunning-Kruger effect, also known as the ‘too stupid to know they’re stupid’ effect, people referred to as ‘low-ability subjects’ fail to recognize their own intellectual deficiencies” (47). (2.5.4 Some (including Lee McIntyre) use such cognitive phenomena to explain post-truth phenomena. What is puzzling is that the tendency to believe truth rather than these falsehoods should increase our survival chances. So (from an evolutionary standpoint) it is unclear why these cognitive biases are so prevalent. It is also found that conservatives tend to exhibit the “negativity bias,” as they “seem more inclined to believe threatening falsehoods than liberals” (47). McIntyre speculates that this may be explained by the fact that conservatives tend to have larger amygdalae. (2.5.5) Breeur notes that even McIntye’s thinking has its own biases. For instance, it is “politically polarized vis-a-vis the Democratic left versus the Republican right” (48). Also, “McIntyre’s reference to this mysterious amygdala – which is part of the so-called ‘limbic system’’ – is as perplexing as that of Descartes’s references to the pineal gland” (48). On the one hand, McIntyre aims to be scientifically rigorous in order to unearth the causes for why we are unwilling to accept inconvenient yet scientifically verified truths; while on the other hand, the scientific research he uses, although ingenious and inventive, nonetheless finds just trivial, banal truths. There is a striking discrepancy between these two factors (which demonstrates the futility of McIntyre’s approach). Yet, “It is on the basis of such banalities that a whole discourse has been created, which from the Olympian altitude of its ‘objective facts’ and ‘experimental evidence’ valiantly commits itself to fight against the impostors in power” (48). (2.5.6) Because this scientific response is so “full of clichés or simplifications,” it can be perplexing and in the end prove futile, weak, and stupid in the face of the “proliferation of alternative facts” (49). The problem with this approach is that it does not realize that not all truths have the same values, as some prove to be too simplistic or banal to have any real weight or effect. “This is the reduction to simplicity: Regardless of their truth status, the value of truth claims can be (if they are not often) so simplistic, so banal, so trivial, etc., that it is difficult to understand how anyone could believe in their efficacy. The anthropological and metaphysical models at the core of many theories and programs are so simplistic and vain that one cannot see how they could be invoked to fight against the indifference to truth that permeates contemporary society” (49).

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.5.1

[The Failure to Combat Industry Misinformation Campaigns by Insisting on Better Science]

 

2.5.2

[Confirmation Bias]

 

2.5.3

[Some Cognitive Phenomena Involved in Science Denial]

 

2.5.4

[The Negativity Bias of Conservatives]

 

2.5.5

[The Banality of Science Insistence]

 

2.5.6

[Reduction to Simplicity]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.5.1

[The Failure to Combat Industry Misinformation Campaigns by Insisting on Better Science]

 

[(Recall from section 2.4 how industries, in the face of a preponderance of scientific findings that threaten their profits, might fund their own counter-research efforts. The purpose is to fabricate a “scientifically legitimized” opposing view, so to hinder adverse public policy and public opinion.) In response to industry’s clouding of scientific debate, one response is to insist on the better, more factual truth. But this would only work if the industry-funded scientists were simply lying. Instead, their efforts to cloud the debate only create “a context in which truth ceases to be of value” (46). (Perhaps the idea is the following. When both sides are given equal weight in the public discourse, all while only one is based in a genuine effort to conduct unbiased scientific research, then both true and false statements, or both good and bad scientific research, is regarded equivalently. As such, the true and good knowledge is lowered to the level of an alternative opinion or view or interpretation of the data, rather than being something with special merit.) This, then, involves the “reduction to stupidity” (see section 2.2.5, and summary at section 2.3.1) (where discourse is “reduced to hot air” on account of people holding on to inferior views,) which prevents the superior ones from promulgating and having persuasive effect.]

 

[ditto. (Recall the “reduction to stupidity” from section 2.2.5. Breeur was discussing how one’s insistence on their opinions is an instance of stupidity, because they persist with their faulty views even when confronted by superior ones. It would be better to have flexibility and drop bad judgements in favor of more informed and considered ones, and then to espouse the better ones instead. This would facilitate the flow and prosperity of truth, which involves development, refinement, adaptation, and so forth. When instead that flow is blocked because some people insist on keeping their faulty opinions in the face of other people’s better ones, this depletes those superior ones of their power to flow, promulgate, and have influence on other people’s minds. In that way, the better views are “reduced to hot air” so to speak, and overall it reduces the general discourse to inferior judgments. This reduction of the truth-flow power of evolving judgments is the “reduction to stupidity”.]

How to react against these forms of strategic and structural castings of doubt and confusion? There is a tendency, shared by McIntyre, to focus and remain fixated on the problem of truth. Indeed, what these fake experts do is create fake information – that is, they lie. But on such a socially extended and structurally implemented level, the reclaiming of truth seems | at best misguided, for these fake experts actually do not lie – they merely create a context in which truth ceases to be of value. Hence the reduction to stupidity.

(45-46)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.5.2

[Confirmation Bias]

 

[This strategy often involves efforts to fight the bad, false and misleading industry funded research by replacing it with good, true research. Breeur calls this “stupidity as disproportion.” Yet, the reason so many people disbelieve good science (as for example the overwhelming scientific evidence for human-caused climate change) has to do with what they are willing to believe. Many people simply do not want to believe the truth. For instance, they may fall victim to confirmation bias: “i.e. people’s tendency to believe and value above all facts and information that confirm their cherished premises and presuppositions – or, negatively put, people’s unwillingness to accept facts and evidence that contradict their cherished premises and presuppositions” (46).]

 

[ditto]

As a reaction to this reduction, however, a new form of stupidity emerges in the form of the aforementioned misguided and inappropriate emphasis on truth. This is what happens when media outlets stress the importance of “fact checking” in a domain where, as a matter of fact, facts do not matter. What McIntyre does is a bit different. He endeavors to fight bad research with good research, i.e. to replace the false with the true. In this process is generated a new form of stupidity which could be termed stupidity as disproportion. By way of a beginning, consider the following urgent question: Why are so many people blind to the truth? Why, for example, do so many people go around denying climate change? Why do they refuse to listen to reason? Why do they reject out of hand the wise, well-intentioned, and edifying sermons of the scientists? Here, McIntyre appeals to the study of psychological mechanisms as they have recently been investigated by cognitive and behavioral psychologists. The basic idea is simple: The explanation is that many people do not want the truth. One can circumvent this essentially tautological formulation with reference to the notion of “confirmation bias,” i.e. people’s tendency to believe and value above all facts and information that confirm their cherished premises and presuppositions – or, negatively put, people’s unwillingness to accept facts and evidence that contradict their cherished premises and presuppositions.

(46)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.5.3

[Some Cognitive Phenomena Involved in Science Denial]

 

[There are a number of cognitive phenomena that might explain why people tend toward such irrational thinking: “In the case of the backfire effect, a person will not only refuse to accept the evidence challenging his or her beliefs, they will even feel strengthened in their beliefs by evidence to the contrary, ‘doubling down’’ on their cherished beliefs. In the case of the Dunning-Kruger effect, also known as the ‘too stupid to know they’re stupid’ effect, people referred to as ‘low-ability subjects’ fail to recognize their own intellectual deficiencies” (47).]

 

[ditto]

Intellectuals, for instance, claim truth in the name of reason and science in their fight against all forms of “beliefs” nourished by emotions or feelings (i.e. the subjective), and they call upon science (in McIntyre’s case, upon cognitive psychology) to understand the mechanisms of the brain that explain tendencies towards “irrationality.” McIntyre himself, in an effort to understand the current electorate’s lack of rationality, refers to a number of tests carried out by psychologists that |reveal myriad “fascinating cognitive biases” from the “backfire effect” to the “Dunning-Kruger effect.” In the case of the backfire effect, a person will not only refuse to accept the evidence challenging his or her beliefs, they will even feel strengthened in their beliefs by evidence to the contrary, “doubling down’’ on their cherished beliefs. In the case of the Dunning-Kruger effect, also known as the “too stupid to know they’re stupid” effect, people referred to as “low-ability subjects” fail to recognize their own intellectual deficiencies.⁴⁶

(46-47)

46. McIntyre, Post-Truth, pp. 48-51.

(47)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.5.4

[The Negativity Bias of Conservatives]

 

[Some (including Lee McIntyre) use such cognitive phenomena to explain post-truth phenomena. What is puzzling is that the tendency to believe truth rather than these falsehoods should increase our survival chances. So (from an evolutionary standpoint) it is unclear why these cognitive biases are so prevalent. It is also found that conservatives tend to exhibit the “negativity bias,” as they “seem more inclined to believe threatening falsehoods than liberals” (47). McIntyre speculates that this may be explained by the fact that conservatives tend to have larger amygdalae.]

 

[ditto]

These mechanisms and effects have led McIntyre (among others) to attempt to connect them with, or use them to explain, the post-truth phenomenon. Basically, the hope is to find some answer for the consternating fact that we (rational animals) cannot see that “believing the truth increase[s] our chances for survival. “What are the mental constraints that rob our brain of the ability to think clearly? That is, why are people irrational? McIntyre does not offer any answers; he simply concludes, on a dour note of resignation, that, “for whatever reason, we must recognize that a plethora of cognitive biases are just part of the way our brains are wired.”⁴⁷ Rather than try to “solve” the “mystery” of irrationality, McIntyre explores its vicissitudes, though always with reference to the science of the brain. Some cognitive biases, McIntyre teaches us, function differently depending on our political beliefs. With reference to the work of anthropologist Daniel Fessler, who investigated what may be referred to as “negativity bias,”⁴⁸ in order to demonstrate why conservatives seem more inclined to believe threatening falsehoods than liberals, McIntyre contends that this phenomenon is explicable when one considers the “experimental evidence” which indicates | that the “fear-based amygdala tends to be larger in conservatives than in liberals.”⁴⁹

(47-48)

47. McIntyre, Post-Truth, pp. 48-51.

48. McIntyre, Post-Truth, p. 57.

(47)

49. McIntyre, Post-Truth, p. 58. Research on the so-called “partisan brain” is clearly in vogue at the moment. See, for example, the research conducted by Andrea Pereira and Jay Van Bavel (“The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief,” Trends in Cognitive Science 22.3 (2018), 213-224), or Jordan B. Peterson’s (et alii) recent papers (to quote one of them: Shona Tritt, Michael Inzlicht, & Jordan Peterson, “Preliminary Support for a Generalized Arousal Model of Political Conservatism”, PloS one. 8. e83333.10.1371/journal.pone.0083333.)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.5.5

[The Banality of Science Insistence]

 

[Breeur notes that even McIntye’s thinking has its own biases. For instance, it is “politically polarized vis-a-vis the Democratic left versus the Republican right” (48). Also, “McIntyre’s reference to this mysterious amygdala – which is part of the so-called ‘limbic system’’ – is as perplexing as that of Descartes’s references to the pineal gland” (48). On the one hand, McIntyre aims to be scientifically rigorous in order to unearth the causes for why we are unwilling to accept inconvenient yet scientifically verified truths; while on the other hand, the scientific research he uses, although ingenious and inventive, nonetheless finds just trivial, banal truths. There is a striking discrepancy between these two factors (which demonstrates the futility of McIntyre’s approach). Yet, “It is on the basis of such banalities that a whole discourse has been created, which from the Olympian altitude of its ‘objective facts’ and ‘experimental evidence’ valiantly commits itself to fight against the impostors in power” (48).]

 

[ditto]

One may wonder to what kind of cognitive bias this kind of philosophical thinking, which encourages us to exercise our “critical” minds, has succumbed.⁵⁰ First and foremost, McIntyre’s entire discourse (symptomatic of virtually all debates in the United States) is politically polarized vis-a-vis the Democratic left versus the Republican right. Second, for a philosopher claiming the almost absolute value of “facts validated by science,” McIntyre’s reference to this mysterious amygdala – which is part of the so-called “limbic system’’ – is as perplexing as that of Descartes’s references to the pineal gland. To my mind, the most disconcerting aspect of McIntyre’s discourse is the disproportion that appears between the proclaimed aims and ambitions of his reflections (namely, our inability or unwillingness to accept inconvenient truths) and the kind of explanations supposed to explain this anomalous irrationality (namely, scientific explanations, and specifically explanations for which the ingenuity or inventiveness of the “experiments” seems· to mask the banality, even the triviality, of the truths investigated). It is on the basis of such banalities that a whole discourse has been created, which from the Olympian altitude of its “objective facts” and “experimental evidence” valiantly commits itself to fight against the impostors in power.

(48)

50. Cf. Ibidem, p.57.

(48)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.5.6

[Reduction to Simplicity]

 

[Because this scientific response is so “full of clichés or simplifications,” it can be perplexing and in the end prove futile, weak, and stupid in the face of the “proliferation of alternative facts” (49). The problem with this approach is that it does not realize that not all truths have the same values, as some prove to be too simplistic or banal to have any real weight or effect. “This is the reduction to simplicity: Regardless of their truth status, the value of truth claims can be (if they are not often) so simplistic, so banal, so trivial, etc., that it is difficult to understand how anyone could believe in their efficacy. The anthropological and metaphysical models at the core of many theories and programs are so simplistic and vain that one cannot see how they could be invoked to fight against the indifference to truth that permeates contemporary society” (49).]

 

[ditto]

The potential “eugenic” implications notwithstanding vis-a-vis McIntyre’s emphasis on neurology and the amygdalae of conservatives, there is an imbalance between the urgency and the complexity of the problems identified |and the response provided. This response – shared by the well-meaning academic majority of “defenders of the Enlightenment” – is full of clichés or simplifications that would leave any more or less assiduous reader perplexed, so that, whether or not there is scientific validity in the experiments adduced by McIntyre, the posturing in opposition to the proliferation of alternative facts is futile, weak – in a word, stupid. This position is predicated on the belief that truth is a value powerful enough to eradicate the false and the fake, but this position betrays a misconception, for truth is not a value “in itself”; rather, “value” is a criterion to which “truth’’ must be submitted. This is the reduction to simplicity: Regardless of their truth status, the value of truth claims can be (if they are not often) so simplistic, so banal, so trivial, etc., that it is difficult to understand how anyone could believe in their efficacy. The anthropological and metaphysical models at the core of many theories and programs are so simplistic and vain that one cannot see how they could be invoked to fight against the indifference to truth that permeates contemporary society.

(48-49)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

Breeur, Roland. Lies – Imposture – Stupidity. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.

The book can be purchased here.

 

Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page.

.

 

 

.

Breeur (2.4) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.4, “Strategic Stupidity”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Roland Breeur, entry directory]

[Breeur, Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, entry directory]

 

[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased here.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Roland Breeur

[Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page]

 

Lies – Imposture – Stupidity

 

Part 1

Lies and Stupidity

 

Ch.2

Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity

 

2.4

“Strategic Stupidity”

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brief summary (collecting those below):

(2.4.1) There are recent efforts to promulgate falsehoods under the guise of an appeal to reason and science, and thus certain “contemporary defenses of Enlightenment values” seem to play a role “in the proliferation of stupidity.” One example is found in the climate change “debate.” In fact, scientifically speaking, there is little left to debate regarding the rising temperatures and the role human activity has played in that increase. Nonetheless, the news media (perhaps on account of a financial interest in creating controversy) present the discussion as if “there are still scientific debates being had and to be had,” which of course is “fake news.” Yet, often these same people who argue that the science of climate change is not yet settled also “claim that the post-truth era is the result of (comparatively recent) intellectual movements which are predicated on questioning the value/validity of science, objectivity, and the like.” (They furthermore seem to assume that before the post-truth era, human culture and politics were guided by scientific factual knowledge rather than by emotion and personal belief, and they seem to be unaware that past election campaigns were not based on “the dissemination of scientifically validated facts” (43).) (2.4.2) Studies have shown how corporate interests have contaminated the science in public discourse on such matters as climate change, immigration, abortion, and nationalism: “Scientifically validated facts are frequently denied on non-scientific grounds, and more often than not such denials are motivated by ideological and/or economic interests. Scientific evidence is deliberately refuted and challenged by “experts” subsidized by companies in order to produce fake research and to generate general confusion via the media” (44). The benefactors are a political class that gains by ignoring the problems. Because the media are the ones disseminating this misinformation, they become “a tool used to call into question whatever truths are deemed inconvenient (and unprofitable), the result being nothing more than fraud” (44). (2.4.3) For example, in 1953, tobacco companies met and decided that rather than “fighting among themselves, trying to find out which brand is less harmful” they would instead unite to fight the science that demonstrates how tobacco is unhealthy. They formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) to “convince the public that there was no evidence that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that previous studies claiming otherwise had been challenged by ‘numerous scientists’” (45). (2.4.4) The TIRC’s efforts were successful, and it operated in fact for four decades (1953-1998). It succeeded by {1} funding its own experts, {2} feeding those paid, biased findings/opinions to the media so that they feel compelled to present the issue as having two opposing, scientifically legitimized sides, {3} promoting the tobacco industry’s side of the “debate” through lobbying and public relations, and {4} exploiting the confusion that resulted in the public’s mind. This same strategy has been applied for many other issues, including global warming, the ozone layer, and acid rain. The overall goal is to convince the public that existing scientific findings have come into question by other findings and so to no longer regard them as scientifically verified facts.

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.4.1

[Science and Political Naivety]

 

2.4.2

[Corporate Contamination of Science]

 

2.4.4

[The Success of the Tobacco Industry’s Misinformation Campaign]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.4.1

[Science and Political Naivety]

 

[There are recent efforts to promulgate falsehoods under the guise of an appeal to reason and science, and thus certain “contemporary defenses of Enlightenment values” seem to play a role “in the proliferation of stupidity.” One example is found in the climate change “debate.” In fact, scientifically speaking, there is little left to debate regarding the rising temperatures and the role human activity has played in that increase. Nonetheless, the news media (perhaps on account of a financial interest in creating controversy) present the discussion as if “there are still scientific debates being had and to be had,” which of course is “fake news.” Yet, often these same people who argue that the science of climate change is not yet settled also “claim that the post-truth era is the result of (comparatively recent) intellectual movements which are predicated on questioning the value/validity of science, objectivity, and the like.” (They furthermore seem to assume that before the post-truth era, human culture and politics were guided by scientific factual knowledge rather than by emotion and personal belief, and they seem to be unaware that past election campaigns were not based on “the dissemination of scientifically validated facts” (43).)]

 

[ditto. Note, regarding the observation that “those who propagate the idea that the science is not yet in on climate change are often those who at the same time rail against post-truth era attacks on Enlightenment values,” I wonder if Ben Shapiro would be such a case. (Here and Here).]

In a related vein, it is worth asking if contemporary defenses of Enlightenment values, i.e. reason and science, do not have | a role to play in the proliferation of stupidity. Consider, for instance, certain strategic and cynical appeals to science. As the story goes, in recent decades, scientific methods and results have been reduced in the same manner as facts were reduced to opinions. By extension, science has been used to support both truths and falsehoods. For a present-day example, consider the status of climate change. Although there is no scientific debate concerning the fact that global temperatures are rising because of human actions, the media has propagated the idea that there are still scientific debates being had and to be had. This, sensu stricto, is fake news. This is a fake controversy produced by fake researchers with ideological and/or economic motivations who are “cashing in’’ on the zeitgeist. Yet, those who propagate the idea that the science is not yet in on climate change are often those who at the same time rail against post-truth era attacks on Enlightenment values. Often, these are the people who claim that the post-truth era is the result of (comparatively recent) intellectual movements which are predicated on questioning the value/validity of science, objectivity, and the like. This is the context of science-denial, post-truth and neo-enlightenment. It is clear that in debates concerning “fighting post-truth,” the aspect of ambiguity or the duplicity of meaning proper to facts that we explored in the first chapter, is most of the time ignored. Not in the least because authors, in their analysis, neglect the impact of fake news on the factual dimensions that make up the social and historical fabric in favor of scientific truths. This offers these authors the arrogance to claim that the Post-Truth era is the result of intellectual movements that questioned the value of objective and scientific truths. These doubts, as we will see, would have created circumstances in which objective facts, are henceforth considered to be less important for shaping public opinion than emotions and personal beliefs. As if it has ever been different. And as if in the past all election campaigns were based solely on the dissemination of scientifically validated facts.

(42-43)

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2.4.2

[Corporate Contamination of Science]

 

[Studies have shown how corporate interests have contaminated the science in public discourse on such matters as climate change, immigration, abortion, and nationalism: “Scientifically validated facts are frequently denied on non-scientific grounds, and more often than not such denials are motivated by ideological and/or economic interests. Scientific evidence is deliberately refuted and challenged by “experts” subsidized by companies in order to produce fake research and to generate general confusion via the media” (44). The benefactors are a political class that gains by ignoring the problems. Because the media are the ones disseminating this misinformation, they become “a tool used to call into question whatever truths are deemed inconvenient (and unprofitable), the result being nothing more than fraud” (44).]

 

[ditto]

But let’s first summarize the strategic production of doubt by corporate-funded lobbying in domains that were keen to influence political positions on climate change, immigration, abortion, nationalism, etc. In his recent book on the post-truth era, Lee McIntyre offers a clear image of such cynical strategies, using the fascinating and at the same time distressing analyses of Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway and of Ari Rabin-Havt.⁴² Scientifically validated facts are frequently denied on non-scientific grounds, and more often than not such denials are motivated by ideological and/or economic interests. Scientific evidence is deliberately refuted and challenged by “experts” subsidized by companies in order to produce fake research and to generate general confusion via the media. This confusion naturally benefits a political class which, thanks to the doubt manufactured, can deploy a program “ignoring” the problems and facts for which their opponents were trying to find government-wide solutions. Thus, the media becomes a tool used to call into question whatever truths are deemed inconvenient (and unprofitable), the result being nothing more than fraud.

(44)

42. See Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), and Rabin-Havt, Lies, Incorporated: The World of Post- Truth Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 2016).

(44)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.4.3

[The Disinformation Campaign of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC)]

 

[For example, in 1953, tobacco companies met and decided that rather than “fighting among themselves, trying to find out which brand is less harmful” they would instead unite to fight the science that demonstrates how tobacco is unhealthy. They formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) to “convince the public that there was no evidence that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that previous studies claiming otherwise had been challenged by ‘numerous scientists’” (45). ]

 

[ditto]

For a historical example, we can follow McIntyre back to 1953 – specifically, to the Plaza Hotel in New York. It was there and then that the heads of the major tobacco companies met to determine the best strategy to deal with a disturbing article that had just been published linking cigarette tar and cancer. John Hill, a leading figure in public relations at the time, proposed a global plan for tobacco companies to stop fighting among themselves, trying to find out which brand is less harmful, and to adopt a united front to fight the cigarette science. This plan would be supported with additional “research’’ to combat the “bad” science. Thus, the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) was created. Its mission was | mainly to convince the public that there was no evidence that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that previous studies claiming otherwise had been challenged by “numerous scientists.”⁴³

(44-45)

43 Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2018), p. 22 sq.

(45)

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2.4.4

[The Success of the Tobacco Industry’s Misinformation Campaign]

 

[The TIRC’s efforts were successful, and it operated in fact for four decades (1953-1998). It succeeded by {1} funding its own experts, {2} feeding those paid, biased findings/opinions to the media so that they feel compelled to present the issue as having two opposing, scientifically legitimized sides, {3} promoting the tobacco industry’s side of the “debate” through lobbying and public relations, and {4} exploiting the confusion that resulted in the public’s mind. This same strategy has been applied for many other issues, including global warming, the ozone layer, and acid rain. The overall goal is to convince the public that existing scientific findings have come into question by other findings and so to no longer regard them as scientifically verified facts.]

 

[ditto]

Guess what: It worked! The immediate effect was the creation of confusion – no doubt its purpose. And this program was in operation for four decades, all the way up until 1998. The TIRC strategy can be summarized as follows: “Find and fund your own experts, use this to suggest to the media that there are two sides to the story, push your side through public relations and governmental lobbying, and capitalize on the resulting public confusion to question whatever scientific result you wish to dispute.”⁴⁴ Given its effectiveness, this strategy has been adopted by others in other cases; it is this strategy that has been widely implemented in other scientific “disputes” and “controversies” such as those related to holes in the ozone layer, acid rain, and global warming, among others.⁴⁵ The goal in these cases is not even to establish alternative facts – to make the public believe that the facts already validated and widely accepted have been the subject of new research and have been widely questioned.

(45)

44. McIntyre, Post-Truth, pp. 24-25.

45. It is therefore not surprising to see that the “experts” of the Heartland Institute, responsible for casting doubt on the results of scientific research related to global warming, were financed by Philip Morris among others.

(45)

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Bibliography:

Breeur, Roland. Lies – Imposture – Stupidity. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.

The book can be purchased here.

 

Breeur’s academia.edu page and researchgate page.

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