http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2017/08/luhtala-562-on-origin-of-syntactical.html
]
by Corry Shores[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]
[Central Entry Directory]
[Stoics, Stoic Logic, Stoic Semantics, Entry Directory]
[Luhtala's On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, Entry Directory]
Aetius associates the active with the following qualities (boldface mine)
According to Aristotle, contiguity is essential to causation: “physical events are transmitted either through direct contact of bodies or by the πνευμα (pneuma, breath)” (127b). Also, we may describe action in terms of movement, either of other bodies locomotion, or of the πνευμα/pneuma’s tensional motion [intensity]. (Simpl. In. Ar. cat. 306,14; 302,1)
There is a linguistic sense to the principles of action/passion. Luhtala quotes Lapidge (On Stoic Cosmology) as saying that acting and being acted-upon are logically distinguishable aspects of a single body, no matter its qualitative form.
Action involves causation. Hence there needs to be two bodies for an action. Luhtala relates this to ancient grammatical principles. Active constructions are transitive. The verb’s action is directed towards a recipient. (127d)
For Zeno, a cause is something that accounts for the effect. It is: “that because of which.” What it causes is an attribute (συμβεβηκός, symbebekos). The cause is a body. The caused is a predicate (κατηγόρημα, kategorema). You cannot have a cause without thereby also having the effect. So a cause is the reason something happens. For example, on account of prudence, being prudent occurs. Because of a soul’s existence, being alive occurs. It is impossible for someone with a soul to be dead, or someone with prudence to be imprudent.
Chrysippus likewise considers a cause ‘that because of which.’ It is both an existing thing (ον, on) and a body (σωμα, soma). However, what it causes is neither an existent nor a body. And, the cause is ‘because.’ But the caused is ‘why?’ Chrysippus gives this account when explaining statements of cause. (Stobaeus. Ecl. 1.1.38,14-139,4 = SVF 1.89 and 2.336, transl Long/Sedley 1987: 333, cited in Luhtala 128b.c)
So the cause is a body. But the effect is an incorporeal (ασώματα, asomata), a predicate (κατηγόρημα, kategorema), or an accident (συμβεβηκός, symbebekos). All these are meaning components (σημαινόμενα, semainomena) A cause is purely physical, for it is an existent and a body. This distinction between bodies and incorporeal predicates is like the Stoic ontological distinction made between existing bodies (οντα, onta) and subsistent incorporeal sayables (λεκτά, lekta).
Early in this distinction’s development, the difference was described as being between noun/verb cognate pairings, for example, moderation/to be moderate. We saw before how in Stoic ethics, to possess prudence means one is being prudent. However, when the terms are not cognates, they use the appropriate substitute, like soul and to live. We see that they differentiate common nouns and verbs in such a way that the nouns represent entities with an active nature, and the verbs represent predicates that cannot bear an active force. But really Zeno’s notion of causation does not square with Stoic linguistic theory.
Sextus Empiricus writes how two bodies are involved in action.
According to Clemens, a causal relation is between a noun and a predicate, and not between nouns, as Aristotle holds (Clemens. Misc. VIII,9,30.1-3 = SVF 2.349, transl. Long/Sedley 1987: 334, cited in Luhtala 131b.d)
Sextus Empiricus also indicates that Stoic causation was considered largely in semantic terms. He explains that causation involves two bodies along with some incorporeal event happening to these bodies. The sun’s heat causes the wax melting, or its being melted. (Sext.Emp. Pyrr. Hyp. III,14)
Mignucci says that the predicate (κατηγόρημα, kategorema) refers to cause’s modification on the effect (see Adv. math. IX,211). And according to Diogenes Laertius, “the predicate is state of affairs construed around one or more subjects” (Diog. Laert. VII, 64).
According to Frede
No comments:
Post a Comment