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by Corry Shores
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[Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, entry directory]
[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes. Material between brackets or between parentheses within brackets is my own and should not be trusted over the quotations, which themselves may contain typographical errors from their transcription. Please consult the original text in any case.]
Summary of
W. V. Quine
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
3
Interchangeability
Brief summary (collecting those below):
(3.1) (Recall that in this paper, Quine is addressing two dogmas of empiricism, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism (see section 0). We are now looking for a way ground analyticity. We found in section 1 that we cannot use the Kantian notion that it is based on meanings. We next looked at a formal grounding for it with a class of analytic statements where it can be formally defined as the denial rendering a self-contradiction, like “No unmarried man is married.” The problem was that there is another class of analytic sentences, like “No bachelor is married,” where its denial does not render an obvious self-contradiction. However, it is thought to be translatable into the first class by means of a synonymy of the terms “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” So we sought a way to ground this synonymy, so to ground all analytic statements of any kind. We found in section 2 that definitions will not suffice, because rather than establishing synonymies, they instead employ pre-existing ones. So) we are currently considering another way to ground synonymy, namely, “their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, salva veritate” (27). This can even work for vague terms, so long as that vagueness matches in each context. (3.2) Yet, this does not work for “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” For instance, we cannot substitute “unmarried man” in for “bachelor,” in the phrase “bachelor of arts” or in the sentence “‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.” One solution for these cases is to treat them as longer forms constituting one word and stipulating that they cannot be broken down and have their parts be substituted. The problem with this approach is that it presupposes a conception of word, but we will put that issue aside for the moment. (3.3) What we need to now determine is how sufficient interchangeability salva veritate is to define synonymy. It would be insufficient if there are cases of nonsynonymous words that still fulfill the requirements for interchangeability salva veritate (interchangeable in all contexts without change of truth value). Quine notes that the synonymy in question here does not mean that when interchanged it has identical mental associations or poetic qualities. For, in fact, we will never find such cases of synonymy anyway. More precisely, the kind of synonymy we have in mind is cognitive synonymy. It will be more fully explicated throughout the essay. It is the sort of synonymy that allows an analytic statement (like “All Bachelors are unmarried men”) to be converted into logical truths (like “Unmarried men are unmarried men”) by means substituting synonyms. If we assume what analyticity is (even though in fact we are trying to ground it), we can define the cognitive synonymy of “bachelor” and “unmarried man” with the statement: (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic. (Perhaps the idea here is that all cases of one are cases of the other, so nothing will be lost or gained by substituting them.) (3.4) We need still a definition of cognitive synonymy that does not presuppose analyticity, and we are currently considering as a possible candidate interchangeability salva veritate. To see that it works, recall first (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.” We next consider (4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.” This is self-evidently true (if it were false, it would be a contradiction, perhaps). Next, we suppose that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable salva veritate, and by making the substitutions, we obtain (5) “Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men.” If we say that this is true, then we are saying that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous, and thus that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic (perhaps because by means of an acceptable substitution, it can be rendered into the analytically true “All bachelors are bachelors” or “All unmarried men are unmarried men.” (3.5) Something that makes this proposal tricky is that it regards(4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors” as analytic on account of the use of “necessarily”. (Perhaps this is because when it is necessary, it is impossible to not be so. Thus it fulfills the formal criterion of analyticity as its denial being a contradiction.) This means that we are dangerously close to circularity. We want to define analyticity, but we assume it with our use of “necessarily.” So is this a straightforward case of circularity? (3.6) Quine claims that it is not entirely circular but can be thought more of as “a closed curve in space” (29). (3.7) We need to specify the parameters of a language before we can adequately see interchangeability salva veritate operating in it. Quine stipulates a language with atomic sentences composed of predicates and variables and with rules to build up complex sentences using truth functions (truth functional connectives maybe) and quantification (among other features). This language can handle descriptions, class names, and singular terms. This sort of a language will be “extensional” because in it, “any two predicates which agree extensionally (i.e., are true of the same objects) are interchangeable salva veritate” (29). (3.8) (Recall from section 1.6 the example of predicates, “creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney”. They might be alike in extension, but they are not alike in meaning. Quine now seems to say that these predicates are also not cases of cognitive synonymy. Thus we might gather that cognitive synonymy requires a similarity in meaning, which may not have been noted back in section 3.3 when he was first discussing it.) In an extensional language, we can interchange salva veritate ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ , because they extensionally refer to exactly the same class of entities. But we can do the same for ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’. Thus, interchangeability salva veritate in an extensional language does not give us cognitive synonymy, which we need for grounding analyticity. It only can tell us that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true. (3.9) But as we saw in section 1, we need to equate the cognitive synonymy between words like ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ with the analyticity of (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” and not merely with its truth, which is all that extensionality can accomplish. (3.10) So we see that “interchangeability salva veritate, if construed in relation to an extensional language, is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy” (30). And previously we saw that “If a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily’ [...], then interchangeability salva veritate in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance” (30) (3.11) So we cannot first formally establish cognitive synonymy to then secondly ground analyticity, like we set out to do. Supposing we could firstly ground analyticity, then we could define cognitive synonymy fairly easily, however: “Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the statement of identity formed by putting ‘=’ between them is analytic. Statements may be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional (the result of joining them by ‘if and only if’) is analytic” (31). Furthermore, “we can describe any two linguistic forms as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable (apart from occurrences within ‘words’) salva (no longer veritate but) analyticitate” (31). So let us return now to the problem of analyticity.
[Interchangeability Without Loss of Truth as Potential Ground for Synonymy]
[The Need to Define “Word”]
[Cognitive Synonymy as Fulfilling the Requirements for Interchangeability Salva veritate]
[Using “Necessarily” to Define Synonymy Indirectly in Terms of Analyticity]
[The Potential Circularity of Using “Necessarily” to Function for Analyticity]
[The Solution as Not Entirely Circular]
[Extensionality (in a Logically Formulated Language) as Interchangeability Salva veritate]
[Extensional Languages as Not Ensuring Cognitive Synonymy]
[Extensional Synonymy as Not Being Cognitive Synonymy and as Being Unable to Ground Analyticity]
[The Problems with Extensional Interchangeability Salva veritate and with “Necessarily”]
[Grounding Analyticity First as a Better Strategy]
Summary
[Interchangeability Without Loss of Truth as Potential Ground for Synonymy]
[(Recall that in this paper, Quine is addressing two dogmas of empiricism, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism (see section 0). We are now looking for a way ground analyticity. We found in section 1 that we cannot use the Kantian notion that it is based on meanings. We next looked at a formal grounding for it with a class of analytic statements where it can be formally defined as the denial rendering a self-contradiction, like “No unmarried man is married.” The problem was that there is another class of analytic sentences, like “No bachelor is married,” where its denial does not render an obvious self-contradiction. However, it is thought to be translatable into the first class by means of a synonymy of the terms “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” So we sought a way to ground this synonymy, so to ground all analytic statements of any kind. We found in section 2 that definitions will not suffice, because rather than establishing synonymies, they instead employ pre-existing ones. So) we are currently considering another way to ground synonymy, namely, “their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, salva veritate” (27). This can even work for vague terms, so long as that vagueness matches in each context.]
[ditto]
A natural suggestion, deserving close examination, is that the synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, salva veritate. Note that synonyms so conceived need not even be free from vagueness, as long as the vaguenesses match.
(27)
[The Need to Define “Word”]
[Yet, this does not work for “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” For instance, we cannot substitute “unmarried man” in for “bachelor,” in the phrase “bachelor of arts” or in the sentence “‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.” One solution for these cases is to treat them as longer forms constituting one word and stipulating that they cannot be broken down and have their parts be substituted. The problem with this approach is that it presupposes a conception of word, but we will put that issue aside for the moment.]
[ditto]
But it is not quite true that the synonyms ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are everywhere interchangeable salva veritate. Truths which become false under substitution of ‘unmarried man’ for ‘bachelor’ are easily constructed with help of ‘bachelor of arts’ or ‘bachelor’s buttons’. Also with help of quotation, thus:
‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.
Such counterinstances can, however, perhaps be set aside by treating the phrases ‘bachelor of arts’ and ‘bachelor’s buttons’ and the quotation ‘ ‘bachelor’ ‘ each as a single indivisible word and then stipulating that the interchangeability salva veritate which is to be the touchstone of synonymy is not supposed to apply to fragmentary oc-|currences inside of a word. This account of synonymy, supposing it acceptable on other counts, has indeed the drawback of appealing to a prior conception of “word” which can be counted on to present difficulties of formulation in its turn. Nevertheless some progress might be claimed in having reduced the problem of synonymy to a problem of wordhood. Let us pursue this line a bit, taking “word” for granted.
(27-28)
[Cognitive Synonymy as Fulfilling the Requirements for Interchangeability Salva veritate]
[What we need to now determine is how sufficient interchangeability salva veritate is to define synonymy. It would be insufficient if there are cases of nonsynonymous words that still fulfill the requirements for interchangeability salva veritate (interchangeable in all contexts without change of truth value). Quine notes that the synonymy in question here does not mean that when interchanged it has identical mental associations or poetic qualities. For, in fact, we will never find such cases of synonymy anyway. More precisely, the kind of synonymy we have in mind is cognitive synonymy. It will be more fully explicated throughout the essay. It is the sort of synonymy that allows an analytic statement (like “All Bachelors are unmarried men”) to be converted into logical truths (like “Unmarried men are unmarried men”) by means substituting synonyms. If we assume what analyticity is (even though in fact we are trying to ground it), we can define the cognitive synonymy of “bachelor” and “unmarried man” with the statement: (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic. (Perhaps the idea here is that all cases of one are cases of the other, so nothing will be lost or gained by substituting them.)]
[ditto]
The question remains whether interchangeability salva veritate (apart from occurrences within words) is a strong enough condition for synonymy, or whether, on the contrary, some nonsynonymous expressions might be thus interchangeable. Now let us be clear that we are not concerned here with synonymy in the sense of complete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality; indeed no two expressions are synonymous in such a sense. We are concerned only with what may be called cognitive synonymy. Just what this is cannot be said without successfully finishing the present study; but we know something about it from the need which arose for it in connection with analyticity in Section I. The sort of synonymy needed there was merely such that any analytic statement could be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. Turning the tables and assuming analyticity, indeed, we could explain cognitive synonymy of terms as follows (keeping to the familiar example): to say that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous is to say no more nor less than that the statement:
(3) All and only bachelors are unmarried men
is analytic.4
(28)
4. This is cognitive synonymy in a primary, broad sense. Carnap (Meaning and Necessity, pp. 56ff.) and Lewis (Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [La Salle, Ill., 1946], pp. 83ff.) have suggested how, once this notion is at hand, a narrower sense of cognitive synonymy which is preferable for some purposes can in turn be derived. But this special ramification of concept-building lies aside from the present purposes and must not be confused with the broad sort of cognitive synonymy here concerned.
(28)
[Using “Necessarily” to Define Synonymy Indirectly in Terms of Analyticity]
[We need still a definition of cognitive synonymy that does not presuppose analyticity, and we are currently considering as a possible candidate interchangeability salva veritate. To see that it works, recall first (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.” We next consider (4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.” This is self-evidently true (if it were false, it would be a contradiction, perhaps). Next, we suppose that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable salva veritate, and by making the substitutions, we obtain (5) “Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men.” If we say that this is true, then we are saying that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous, and thus that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic (perhaps because by means of an acceptable substitution, it can be rendered into the analytically true “All bachelors are bachelors” or “All unmarried men are unmarried men.”]
[ditto]
What we need is an account of cognitive synonymy not presupposing analyticity – if we are to explain analyticity conversely with help of cognitive synonymy as undertaken in Section I. And indeed such an independent account of cognitive synonymy is at present up for consideration, viz., interchangeability salva veritate everywhere except within words. The question before us, to resume the thread at last, is whether such interchangeability is a sufficient condition for | cognitive synonymy. We can quickly assure ourselves that it is, by examples of the following sort. The statement:
(4) Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors
is evidently true, even supposing ‘necessarily’ so narrowly construed as to be truly applicable only to analytic statements. Then, if ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable salva veritate, the result
(5) Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men
of putting ‘unmarried man’ for an occurrence of ‘bachelor’ in (4) must, like (4), be true. But to say that (5) is true is to say that (3) is analytic, and hence that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried men’ are cognitively synonymous.
(28-29)
[The Potential Circularity of Using “Necessarily” to Function for Analyticity]
[Something that makes this proposal tricky is that it regards(4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors” as analytic on account of the use of “necessarily”. (Perhaps this is because when it is necessary, it is impossible to not be so. Thus it fulfills the formal criterion of analyticity as its denial being a contradiction.) This means that we are dangerously close to circularity. We want to define analyticity, but we assume it with our use of “necessarily.” So is this a straightforward case of circularity?]
[ditto]
Let us see what there is about the above argument that gives it its air of hocus-pocus. The condition of interchangeability salva veritate varies in its force with variations in the richness of the language at hand. The above argument supposes we are working with a language rich enough to contain the adverb ‘necessarily’, this adverb being so construed as to yield truth when and only when applied to an analytic statement. But can we condone a language which contains such an adverb? Does the adverb really make sense? To suppose that it does is to suppose that we have already made satisfactory sense of ‘analytic’. Then what are we so hard at work on right now?
(29)
[The Solution as Not Entirely Circular]
[Quine claims that it is not entirely circular but can be thought more of as “a closed curve in space” (29).]
[ditto]
Our argument is not flatly circular, but something like it. It has the form, figuratively speaking, of a closed curve in space.
(29)
[Extensionality (in a Logically Formulated Language) as Interchangeability Salva veritate]
[We need to specify the parameters of a language before we can adequately see interchangeability salva veritate operating in it. Quine stipulates a language with atomic sentences composed of predicates and variables and with rules to build up complex sentences using truth functions (truth functional connectives maybe) and quantification (among other features). This language can handle descriptions, class names, and singular terms. This sort of a language will be “extensional” because in it, “any two predicates which agree extensionally (i.e., are true of the same objects) are interchangeable salva veritate” (29).]
[ditto]
Interchangeability salva veritate is meaningless until relativized to a language whose extent is specified in relevant respects. Suppose now we consider a language containing just the following materials. There is an indefinitely large stock of one- and many-place predicates, mostly having to do with extralogical subject matter. The rest of the language is logical. The atomic sentences consist each of a predicate followed by one or more variables; and the complex sentences are built up of atomic ones by truth functions and quantification. In effect such a language enjoys the benefits also of descriptions and class names and indeed singular terms generally, these being contextually definable in known ways.5 Such a language can be adequate to classical mathematics and indeed to scientific discourse generally, except | in so far as the latter involves debatable devices such as modal adverbs and contrary-to-fact conditionals. Now a language of this type is extensional, in this sense: any two predicates which agree extensionally (i.e., are true of the same objects) are interchangeable salva veritate.
(29-30)
5. See, e.g., my Mathematical Logic (New York, 1940; Cambridge, Mass., 1947), sec. 24, 26, 27; or Methods of Logic (New York, 1950), sec. 37ff.
(29)
[Extensional Languages as Not Ensuring Cognitive Synonymy]
[(Recall from section 1.6 the example of predicates, “creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney”. They might be alike in extension, but they are not alike in meaning. Quine now seems to say that these predicates are also not cases of cognitive synonymy. Thus we might gather that cognitive synonymy requires a similarity in meaning, which may not have been noted back in section 3.3 when he was first discussing it.) In an extensional language, we can interchange salva veritate ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ , because they extensionally refer to exactly the same class of entities. But we can do the same for ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’. Thus, interchangeability salva veritate in an extensional language does not give us cognitive synonymy, which we need for grounding analyticity. It only can tell us that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true.]
[ditto]
In an extensional language, therefore, interchangeability salva veritate is no assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired type. That ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable salva veritate in an extensional language assures us of no more than that (3) is true. There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ rests on meaning rather than merely on accidental matters of fact, as does extensional agreement of ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’.
(30)
[Extensional Synonymy as Not Being Cognitive Synonymy and as Being Unable to Ground Analyticity]
[But as we saw in section 1, we need to equate the cognitive synonymy between words like ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ with the analyticity of (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” and not merely with its truth, which is all that extensionality can accomplish.]
[ditto. (Perhaps the idea is the following, but I am not sure. For a sentence to be true, it need not be analytically true. To be analytically true, the sentence either has to either be one whose denial presents a self-contradiction, or be a sentence that can be rendered as such by substituting cognitively synonymous terms. In an extensional language, we can use substitutions and reference to extensions to demonstrate that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ can be interchanged without loss of logical truth and that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true. However, we have not established that (3) is analytic. I am not certain why. By substitution, we can render it “All and only unmarried men are unmarried men.” Perhaps we should consider a sentence like “Creatures with a heart are ones that (thereby) pump their blood through their circulatory system.” that experience stress when the heartrate goes above a certain threshold.” If we substitute “creatures with a kidney”, that might still be a true sentence, but we might not get an analytically true statement, (“Creatures with a kidney are ones that (thereby) pump their blood through their circulatory system.”) And maybe this will be because there is nothing about the kidney itself that directly suggests blood pumping, although the heart rather does, and also although the kidney is normally needed when pumping blood. If so, Quine’s notion of analyticity might be built on a notion of cognitive synonymy where the synonymous terms are ones that directly implicated, such that from the one we can directly derive the other, and not just indirectly by checking their extensions. As Quine noted before, the sameness of extensions can be for accidental reasons. This suggests possibly he still has intensional meaning in mind for cognitive synonymy, but we will have to see.]
For most purposes extensional agreement is the nearest approximation to synonymy we need care about. But the fact remains that extensional agreement falls far short of cognitive synonymy of the type required for explaining analyticity in the manner of Section I. The type of cognitive synonymy required there is such as to equate the synonymy of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ with the analyticity of (3), not merely with the truth of (3).
(30)
[The Problems with Extensional Interchangeability Salva veritate and with “Necessarily”]
[So we see that “interchangeability salva veritate, if construed in relation to an extensional language, is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy” (30). And previously we saw that “If a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily’ [...], then interchangeability salva veritate in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance” (30) ]
[ditto]
So we must recognize that interchangeability salva veritate, if construed in relation to an extensional language, is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense needed for deriving analyticity in the manner of Section I. If a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily’ in the sense lately noted, or other particles to the same effect, then interchangeability salva veritate in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance.
(30)
[Grounding Analyticity First as a Better Strategy]
[So we cannot first formally establish cognitive synonymy to then secondly ground analyticity, like we set out to do. Supposing we could firstly ground analyticity, then we could define cognitive synonymy fairly easily, however: “Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the statement of identity formed by putting ‘=’ between them is analytic. Statements may be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional (the result of joining them by ‘if and only if’) is analytic” (31). Furthermore, “we can describe any two linguistic forms as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable (apart from occurrences within ‘words’) salva (no longer veritate but) analyticitate” (31). So let us return now to the problem of analyticity.]
[ditto]
The effort to explain cognitive synonymy first, for the sake of deriving analyticity from it afterward as in Section I, is perhaps the wrong approach. Instead we might try explaining analyticity somehow without appeal to cognitive synonymy. Afterward we could doubtless derive cognitive synonymy from analyticity satisfactorily enough if desired. We have seen that cognitive synonymy of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ can be explained as analyticity of (3). The same explanation works for any pair of one-place predicates, of course, and it can be extended in obvious fashion to many-place predicates. Other | syntactical categories can also be accommodated in fairly parallel fashion. Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the statement of identity formed by putting ‘=’ between them is analytic. Statements may be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional (the result of joining them by ‘if and only if’) is analytic.6 If we care to lump all categories into a single formulation, at the expense of assuming again the notion of “word” which was appealed to early in this section, we can describe any two linguistic forms as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable (apart from occurrences within “words”) salva (no longer veritate but) analyticitate. Certain technical questions arise, indeed, over cases of ambiguity or homonymy; let us not pause for them, however, for we are already digressing. Let us rather tum our backs on the problem of synonymy and address ourselves anew to that of analyticity.
(30-31)
6. The ‘if and only if’ itself is intended in the truth functional sense. See Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 14.
(31)
Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” The Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.
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