by Corry Shores
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[Eugène Dupréel, entry directory]
[Dupréel, La consistance et la probabilité constructive, entry directory]
[The following is summary and not translation. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, so typos are present, including in the quotations. Please consult the original text to be sure about the contents. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not especially good with French.]
Summary of
Eugène Dupréel
La consistance et la probabilité constructive
Part 1
“La consistance”
1.5
Hiérarchie des êtres selon la consistance
Brief summary:
(1.5.1) Regarding the fate of something, we must remember that a thing can only influence and be influenced by things of the same sort. So sensible, material things can only touch and be touched by other spatial objects. The same goes for abstract entities. Numbers can only interrelate with other numbers, pure ideas with other pure ideas, propositions with other propositions, and judgments with other judgments. (1.5.2) There are three main types of beings: {1} sensible or perceptible beings (which are also spatial and material), {2} notions, which are those things that depend on a subject to know or express them, like sensations, feelings, thoughts, reveries, and so on, and {3} values, which are dynamic beings, because they lead one to commit deliberative actions.
[Inter-Affectivity as Type-Limited]
[The Three Types of Beings: Sensible Things, Notions, and Values]
Summary
[Inter-Affectivity as Type-Limited]
(p.12: “La consistance d’un être étant sa capacité ...”)
[Regarding the fate of something, we must remember that a thing can only influence and be influenced by things of the same sort. So sensible, material things can only touch and be touched by other spatial objects. The same goes for abstract entities. Numbers can only interrelate with other numbers, pure ideas with other pure ideas, propositions with other propositions, and judgments with other judgments.]
[So (as we noted in section 1.2.2), the consistency of a being is its capacity to endure throughout a series of its vicissitudes. With that being the case, we should note when discussing the being’s destiny that we should attend to just those sorts of vicissitudes that have some influence on its destiny. For example, an object that is simply material cannot be directly altered by things that are insensible. Rather, it can only touch and be touched by other spatial beings. Similarly, a pure idea like a number or a logical proposition can only enter into a direct relationship with other beings that are equally abstract. (Note how this rings with Spinoza’s parallelism.) A judgment can only be proven or disproven by another judgment, and a number can only be substituted by another number. And the living, thinking subject is merely the necessary intermediary for bringing these abstract entities into contact.]
La consistance d’un être étant sa capacité de durer à travers la succession de ses vicissitudes, il convient de ne porter l’attention, dans l’examen de son destin, que sur les sortes de vicissitudes capables de les atteindre. Ainsi un objet tout matériel ne peut être directement altéré par quelque chose qui n’a rien de sensible, seul peut le toucher quelqu’autre être spatial et c’est seulement sur cet être de même sorte qu’il peut porter sa résistance ; réciproquement, une idée pure telle qu’un nombre ou une proposition logique, ne peut entrer en rapports directs qu’avec d’autres êtres également « abstraits ». Un jugement ne peut être confirmé ou infirmé que par un autre jugement, un nombre admis ou nié que par la substitution d’un autre nombre. Le sujet vivant et pensant qui se prononce sur ces rapports n’est qu’un intermédiaire nécessaire, ce n’est pas de sa nature propre que dépend la relation retenue.
(12)
[The Three Types of Beings: Sensible Things, Notions, and Values]
(p.13: “En conséquence dans la recherche de la hiérarchie des êtres ...”)
[There are three main types of beings: {1} sensible or perceptible beings (which are also spatial and material), {2} notions, which are those things that depend on a subject to know or express them, like sensations, feelings, thoughts, reveries, and so on, and {3} values, which are dynamic beings, because they lead one to commit deliberative actions.]
[So when seeking the hierarchy of beings according to their degree of consistency, we need to sort them according to their natures. We take for granted that in order to characterize consistency, we need only deal with the following three kinds of beings: {1} sensible or perceptible beings, {2} notions, and {3} values. (It is fairly straightforward what a sensible thing is, so we need not further explain it.) A notion is anything that comes to be only by means of a subject that knows and expresses it, and it can be for example a sensation, a feeling, a thought, a reverie, etc. Values are those beings that we may call dynamic, because a value is what leads to a deliberated action.]
En conséquence dans la recherche de la hiérarchie des êtres selon le degré de consistance il y a lieu de la dresser selon leurs natures respectives. On tiendra pour accordé qu’il suffit de caractériser la consistance au sein de ces trois espèces d’êtres que sont les choses sensibles ou perceptibles, les notions et les valeurs. Sous le nom de notions seront réunis tous les êtres qui ne se posent que dans leur rapport avec un sujet en condition de les connaître et de les exprimer, sensations, sentiments, pensées, rêveries etc. Quant aux valeurs ce sont ces êtres qu’on peut appeler dynamiques car une valeur est cela qui entraîne un acte délibéré.
(13)
Dupréel, Eugène. (1961). La consistance et la probabilité constructive. (Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques 55, no.2). Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique.
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