Luhtala (5.5.4.4) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Πτῶσις (‘Case’)”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.4

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

 

5.5.4.4

Πτῶσις (‘Case’)

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

While the Stoic notion of case is not clear from our sources, we can see that it has something to do with the notion of subject, understood both linguistically and physically. As we can infer from Diogenes Laertius’ account of the Stoic predicate, we see that the subject is understood both linguistically as case πτῶσις [a noun that is joined to the predicate] and as the individual, physical subject in the world involved in the action [as either agent or patient] and in the state of affairs that we conceive it to be bound up with. This unity of the conception of subject indicates a unity in Stoic philosophy between their linguistic theory and their ontology.

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.4.4.1

[How the Stoics understood case (πτῶσις) is uncertain. Luhtala will “defend the origin of the notion of case as a subject notion in the linguistic theory” (102).]

 

Scholars have had difficulties coming to a clear understanding of the Stoic notion of case (πτῶσις). In fact, “The obscurity of the notion of case has even led scholars to deny the existence of the linguistic subject notion in Stoic logic” (101) [I am not sure what is meant by ‘linguistic subject notion’. Perhaps it is the nominative, or maybe it is other cases that indicate the agent of the action. Please consult the text to see.] Luhtala notes a number of views taken by other scholars, and writes, “I will defend the origin of the notion of case as a subject notion in the linguistic theory, viewing it specifically against the background of the Peripatetic use of the term πτῶσις (‘case’)” (102).

 

 

5.5.4.4.2

[Plutarch’s account of Stoic case, where the proposition is divided into case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα), is not entirely true to the Stoic’s notion.]

 

Most scholars depend on “a passage in Plutarch according to which the Stoic proposition consists of case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα) (Quaest. Plat. 1009C)” (102). But Plutarch’s approach, where he analyzes “the Stoic proposition into two members of equal weight in a manner reminiscent of Platonic and Aristotelian traditions” is not the most authentically Stoic way (102).

 

 

5.5.4.4.3

[Diogenes Laertius does not define the Stoic subject, but he discusses the predicate, from which we can infer things about the non-predicate (the subject). A predicate is a state of affairs that is said of something, with that something taking a nominative case.]

 

Luhtala will first examine the notion of subject in Stoic grammar or logic, as described by Diogenes Laertius. In fact he does not define the subject, but we will examine what he says about the predicate to infer things about the subject. Diogenes Laertius writes:

The predicate [κατηγόρημα] is what is said of something; the predicate is a defective sayable [λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς] which has to be joined to a nominative case [ὀρθῇ πτώσει] in order to yield a judgement [ἀξιώματος]; the predicate is a state affairs [πρᾶγμα] which is a construction about one or more subjects. (Diog. Laert. VII,64 see n.143)

(102. Note, I inserted Greek words on the basis of the Greek text and what Luhtala writes, but I may have done so incorrectly.)

[The original passage might be:

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἀγορευόμενον ἢ πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλόδωρόν φασιν, ἢ λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν.

[Perseus]

And another translation:

A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. [Perseus]

And another:

A predicate is what is asserted of something, or a state of affairs attachable to something or some things, as Apollodorus says, or an incomplete sayable attachable to a nominative case for generating a proposition.

(Long & Sedley 1987: 197)

]

 

 

5.5.4.4.4

[In Diogenes Laertius’ account of the Stoic predicate, we see that he regards the predicate as taking a nominative case, and also that the predicate says something about something in the world, like an individual subject.]

 

In the second definition (above) for the predicate [“the predicate is a defective sayable (λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς) which has to be joined to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement (ἀξιώματος)”] sees the predicate as joinable to a linguistic item, the nominative case (ὀρθῇ πτώσει). So we see that we need a nominative case for a predicate to form a complete judgment, and that suggests the view, held by Plutarch, that the Stoic subject is case (103). But the other definitions do not employ strictly linguistic concepts. In the first definition [“The predicate (κατηγόρημα) is what is said of something”], the ‘something’ “is likely to refer to an entity in the physical world, i.e. to a body about which something is said” (103). The “subjects” or “somethings” in the third definition probably refer individuals like Cato, Socrates, etc. “They are viewed as agents and patients involved in action and undergoing of action, of which we construe a state of affairs (πρᾶγμα) in our mind” (103).

 

 

5.5.4.4.5

[The Stoic subject has two senses: {1} it is the linguistic case that is joined to the linguistic predicate, and {2} it is the physical thing in the world involved in the action and conceived state of affairs.]

 

On the basis of this definition, Luhtala argues that the subject for the Stoics is both {a} the linguistic case that joins with the predicate and as well {b} the physical body that enacts or undergoes an action and that is the thing we conceive as involving some state of affairs. [I do not follow her next point; see below.]

On the basis of Diogenes’ report I conclude that the Stoic notion of ‘subject’ has a twofold nature. On the one hand, it is a linguistic item, a case (πτῶσις), which is joined to another linguistic item, the predicate, to form a proposition. Both constituents are items of the component of meaning. On the other hand, the subject is a physical body involved in action (and undergoing of action) of which we construe a state of affairs (πρᾶγμα) in our mind. The subject notion in the propositions, which contain one of the impersonal predicates, seems to have been handled purely linguistically, in terms of the opposition between direct and oblique cases rather than in terms of participants in states of affairs.

(103)

 

 

5.5.4.4.6

[The Stoic notion of the subject as both what joins to the linguistic predicate and as the thing in the world involved in action and a state of affairs shows a unity in Stoic philosophy, here between their linguistic theory and ontology.]

 

We thus see the unity of ontology and linguistics in Stoic philosophy, because the subject has both a grammatical and ontological sense.

The twofold nature of the subject notion appears to be another indication of the unity of Stoic philosophy: its description resorts to both ontological and linguistic theories.

(103)

 

 

 

 

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

 

[Note, for Quaest. Plat. I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Plutarch’s Quaestiones Platonicae.]

 

 

Texts I cite:

 

Long, (A.) & Sedley (D.). 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

 

 

 

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