Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 1, §18 "The Same Definition of Intensity Applies to Superficial Efforts, Deep-Seated Feelings and ..."

by Corry Shores
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Bergson, Time and Free Will

(Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience)

Chapter I, "The Intensity of Psychic States"

Part VI: " Attention and Tension"

§18 "The Same Definition of Intensity Applies to Superficial Efforts, Deep-Seated Feelings and States Intermediate between the Two"

We saw that the purely psychic state of joy is in the first place made up of thousands of constituent states, each qualitatively different. Moreover, we noted that what seems to be an increase in joy is really a progress through different emotions, each qualitatively different from the rest.

Similarly, we saw that one small muscle effort, such as pulling a trigger, is really made up of many qualitatively different peripheral muscle efforts as well, such as throat contractions. In addition, any one muscle undergoes a progress through a series of qualitatively different sensations, such as exertion, fatigue, and pain.

Hence we define the intensity of a superficial bodily effort the same way that we define deep-seated psychic feelings. For, in both cases there is a qualitatively complex sensation that proceeds through a series of qualitatively different phases. (26c)

Yet, our consciousness is accustomed to thinking in terms of space, so qualitative differences will be misconceived as having different sizes. As well, our minds tend to translate a variety of thoughts into a single word. So even though each qualitatively different part or phase is entirely unique to itself, we tend to classify them under the same headings. (26c)

Similarly, we simplify our conceptions of physical sensations by localizing precise points where our muscle efforts seem to center-around. This misleads us to believe that there is only one sensation limited to one spot that increases without changing into some other sensation. (28d)

Now consider when we focus our attention on something. Both our minds and our bodies are activated. Likewise for when we have a violent emotion such as anger, which is inspired by some idea and consumes our whole bodies. Because attention and violent have both a mental and physical component, they are examples of states intermediate between purely psychic states and purely physical ones. Bergson will proceed to show that they too are qualitatively extensive rather than quantitatively intensive. (27a.b)

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Images from the pages summarized above, in the English Translation [click on the image for an enlargement]:

Images from the pages summarized above, in the original French [click on the image for an enlargement]:

Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. F. L. Pogson, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001).

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog

French text from:

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888.

http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft