20 Jun 2010

The Laws of Inexplicability. A Summary of Franz Kafka's "The Problem of Our Laws"



by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. My own notes are in brackets. The full text for the summarized section is provided at the end. May I very sincerely thank philosophyblog.com.au for making this text available online. May I also thank the sources for the images. Credits are given below the image and at the end of this entry.]



The Laws of Inexplicability
A Summary of
Franz Kafka's
"The Problem of Our Laws"



Notable ideas in this story:

We are ruled by laws. The laws are held and enforced by a noble class. But this class does not tell us explicitly what those laws are, nor is it clear to us why these noble people are the few to be in possession of the laws. However, we see that it is to our own benefit to tolerate this situation.


Ideas relative to Deleuze:

On the most fundamental level of our selfhood, we are internally split between the part of us that is sensing ourselves, and the part of us that is being sensed. It is as though we were subject to a law that governs our internal division. But this law is what is most a priori, most fundamental. It cannot even be cognized. We are ruled by an ungraspable implicit law which divides us into a) a unity of consciousness and b) a multiplicity of appearances in time. In order for us to exist in time, it is necessary that this law remain absolute and inexplicable.


Franz Kafka:
"The Problem of Our Laws"

Laws rule over us. But we do not know what exactly they are. Only the ruling class of nobles know these rules. [We need not think of lawyers and judges only. Consider also celebrities, and how their fashion choices become enforced upon the rest of us. We might be derided for not observing their codes of dress. The elites in academia use terms and concepts which the rest of us must adopt and employ in order to have a place in their discourse. Those of us who cannot afford to do the things that the wealthy do, or have their luxuries and status symbols, are somehow inferior and excluded from their privileges. But are not the changes in fashion, buzz-words, and status symbols seemingly arbitrary? It is as though on the highest levels they operate by rules which the elites could never reveal to the rest of us, because their power depends our following them rather than being immediately present to the changes like the nobles are. Now let's think mythically about the mystery of the unseen laws that govern us. Because the ruling class seems to produce or select its own inheritors, it appears as though these laws are ancient, perhaps even so ancient to blur into mythological times. We trust that the nobles enforce these rules judiciously. But without knowing them, we are deeply unsettled by the fact that we are ruled by an unseen power. Kafka writes:]

We are convinced that these ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know. (boldface mine, Deleuze's quotation)

These laws are mythically ancient. For countless years their proper interpretations have been worked out and perfected, and so much so, that we cannot doubt that they really are laws. So even though there might be some freedom to interpret these laws, there is not very much room for variation in their application. Thus one problem we might have with these laws cannot be discrepancies that might come about when they are applied in different ways. [We might consider for example how new fashions can be unexpected, but still somehow feel right, and seemingly have by their own the power to compel us to adopt them, as if the new styles by themselves have some sort of artistic power to attract us and to express their value to us all by themselves. So while we do not know the laws that the elites used to bring the trends into fashion, we might still get the sense that the laws were followed like they always have, since the new trends take-on those forces they always have had.]

[We have on the one hand considered how fashions seem to follow some guiding governance, even when they are completely unpredictable. Now let's look at them from another light, in terms of their seeming arbitrarity. We might see a popular musician take enormous risks with the fashions she chooses. In one sense, the clothes adorn the celebrity, but in another sense, they seem to stand apart from her, as if they were artworks all on their own. Consider these images of Lady Gaga, for example.




On the one hand, celebrities are the victims as well as the benefactors of their risky style choices. Yet on the other hand, they seem somehow immune to the consequences, as if they stood above the laws that govern the trend-changes. In a way, we might think that these celebrities are impartial towards the fashion laws they express and indirectly enforce by setting a standard that many others adopt. So we in a way do not mistrust their intentions so much. It seems more to us like they are merely the channels through which the style trends flow. Also consider the hypocrisy of political leaders. They seem to think that the laws they set and enforce do not apply also to themselves. This might make us mistrust any one politician. But consider also how we might implicitly assume that those who make the laws by some account are somehow above those laws, as if they need to be taken out of the law system in order to obtain that privileged place where they may create and enforce those laws. We seem to tolerate then, not their hypocrisy, but rather the fact that there will always be a small number of people outside the laws, who from that external position can keep our ordered systems going. Think as well how there are voices in American political discourse who say the president can do whatever is necessary to save American lives, even if that means horrific torture, secret prisons, or wars across the globe. There is a tendency for those of us who follow the rules to also want someone who is above them, to protect us when the explicit laws by themselves are not enough to keep us safe. But we do so, because we assume that these leaders, even when breaking the explicit laws, follow some implicit lawfulness that is inexplicable, but still somehow just, for reasons we just cannot say, but know to exist. Hence] it is not really a disadvantage of the hidden laws that they are ruled by a select number of people, because they stand outside the laws, which makes them impartial to what they might be exactly, and hence they would not enforce laws that would be too hostile to us just for their own benefit. In fact, "that seems to be why the laws were entrusted exclusively into their hands. Of course, there is wisdom in that - who doubts the wisdom of the ancient laws? - but also hardship for us; probably that is unavoidable."

Yet, these laws are still unknown to us. So we merely presume that they exist.
There is a tradition that they exist and that they are a mystery confided to the nobility, but it is not and cannot be more than a mere tradition sanctioned by age, for the essence of a secret code is that it should remain a mystery. (emphasis mine, quoted by Deleuze)
[Now consider the many theories that might explain the changes in fashion or power. We might see how these theories account for the past. But there is still something nonetheless inexplicable in this process of creation involved in fashion changes or power shifts. So these theories really do not help us very much for doing more than try to give a coherent story to explain what already has happened. We might be led to think that the emergence of new trends or power structures is governed by chance or some other forces which are unpredictable, like the forces that drive artists to create new things. We might in other words wonder if there are no underlying laws in the first place.] Kafka writes:
Some of us among the people have attentively scrutinized the doings of the nobility since the earliest times and possess records made by our forefathers - records which we have conscientiously continued - and claim to recognize amid the countless number of facts certain main tendencies which permit of this or that historical formulation; but when in accordance with these scrupulously tested and logically ordered conclusions we seek to adjust ourselves somewhat for the present or the future, everything becomes uncertain, and our work seems only an intellectual game, for perhaps these laws that we are trying to unravel do not exist at all.
[Now also consider this viewpoint. We might think that celebrities choose their new fashions purely arbitrarily, and people see them as authorities, and so blindly follow them.] Kafka writes: "There is a small party who are actually of this opinion and who try to show that, if any law exists, it can only be this: The Law is whatever the nobles do." [People with this critical view reject the trends, and they think that it creates a problem for those who blindly follow them. For, the followers do not by themselves learn how to adjust to changes or create their own adaptations, but can only adopt from others:] "This party see everywhere only the arbitrary acts of the nobility, and reject the popular tradition, which according to them possesses only certain trifling and incidental advantages that do not offset its heavy drawbacks, for it gives the people a false, deceptive, and overconfident security in confronting coming events." But perhaps the laws or trends of the nobility seem arbitrary only because we do not know everything about them. If we could watch the changes unfold for many more centuries, we might have enough pieces to the puzzle to be able to know the laws explicitly. But as soon as the law becomes clear to everyone, then there would be no need for the nobility as its keepers. And because they derived their privileged position from being in sole exclusive possession of the laws, when they became known to all, the elites will lose their source of power. So the eventual revelation of the hidden laws will make the nobles irrelevant, and they will vanish.

But people who foresee the fall of the nobles do not do so because they hate them. In fact, they are more inclined to hate themselves for not having earned the right to possess the laws. [Some people cannot deal with this self-hatred, and to alleviate it, they become those people who think that the laws are purely arbitrary. Under this reasoning, no one is more worthy than another to be in possession of the laws, and hence they themselves are not less worthy or more self-contemptible. But then this also makes the noble class stand-out from the rest, as being the presumptuous ones. In a sense, it recognizes their power, and it perpetuates their position.

[Now Kafka seems to suggest that people would not want to be without the nobility. Perhaps the majority of us implicitly understand that the inexplicability of the noble's laws, and of their reason for being the ones who possess them, are somehow essential for all of us on a very fundamental level. According to Deleuze's point about split internal selfhood, perhaps people want there to be an absolute inexplicable source of law, because the law that governs our internal split is also absolute and inexplicable. Then perhaps further, we see that if such a law is purely internal to us, then we could uncover it for ourselves. So we need it to lie outside us and to remain inexplicable. This requires that we have a limited class of people who we regard as having the right to those laws and also the right to keep them hidden from us. By these means, we come to think that the source of the law in general is something that will always be kept from our explicit knowledge, even though it is intimately and directly forced upon us. The law that governs our internal split would also then be founded on such an absolute law whose perpetual inexplicability has been guaranteed. This then guarantees that we will always be internally split. Because this internal split is what makes us who we are and is what allows us to exist in time, we demand that it remain inexplicable, and hence it must be grounded in an always external source that never explains itself and cannot itself be explained. As Kafka puts it:]

Actually one can express the problem only in a sort of paradox: Any party that would repudiate not only all belief in the law, but the nobility as well, would have the whole people behind it; yet no such party can come into existence, for nobody would dare to repudiate the nobility. We live on this razor's edge. A writer once summed the matter up in this way: The sole visible and indubitable law that is imposed upon us is the nobility, and must we ourselves deprive ourselves of that one law?



From the original text, provided at philosophyblog.com.au:

The problem of our laws

Our laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know. I am not thinking of possible discrepancies that may arise in the interpretation of the laws, or of the disadvantages involved when only a few and not the whole people are allowed to have a say in their interpretation. These disadvantages are perhaps of no great importance. For the laws are very ancient; their interpretation has been the work of centuries, and has itself doubtless acquired the status of law; and though there is still a possible freedom of interpretation left, it has now become very restricted. Moreover the nobles have obviously no cause to be influenced in their interpretation by personal interests inimical to us, for the laws were made to the advantage of the nobles from the very beginning, they themselves stand above the laws, and that seems to be why the laws were entrusted exclusively into their hands. Of course, there is wisdom in that -- who doubts the wisdom of the ancient laws? -- but also hardship for us; probably that is unavoidable.

The very existence of these laws, however, is at most a matter of presumption. There is a tradition that they exist and that they are a mystery confided to the nobility, but it is not and cannot be more than a mere tradition sanctioned by age, for the essence of a secret code is that it should remain a mystery. Some of us among the people have attentively scrutinized the doings of the nobility since the earliest times and possess records made by our forefathers -- records which we have conscientiously continued -- and claim to recognize amid the countless number of facts certain main tendencies which permit of this or that historical formulation; but when in accordance with these scrupulously tested and logically ordered conclusions we seek to adjust ourselves somewhat for the present or the future, everything becomes uncertain, and our work seems only an intellectual game, for perhaps these laws that we are trying to unravel do not exist at all. There is a small party who are actually of this opinion and who try to show that, if any law exists, it can only be this: The Law is whatever the nobles do. This party see everywhere only the arbitrary acts of the nobility, and reject the popular tradition, which according to them possesses only certain trifling and incidental advantages that do not offset its heavy drawbacks, for it gives the people a false, deceptive, and overconfident security in confronting coming events. This cannot be gainsaid, but the overwhelming majority of our people account for it by the fact that the tradition is far from complete and must be more fully inquired into, that the material available, prodigious as it looks, is still too meager, and that several centuries will have to pass before it becomes really adequate. This view, so comfortless as far as the present is concerned, is lightened only by the belief that a time will eventually come when the tradition and our research into it will jointly reach their conclusion, and as it were gain a breathing space, when everything will have become clear, the law will belong to the people, and the nobility will vanish. This is not maintained in any spirit of hatred against the nobility; not at all, and by no one. We are more inclined to hate ourselves, because we have not yet shown ourselves worthy of being entrusted with the laws. And that is the real reason why the party who believe that there is no law have remained so few -- although their doctrine is in certain ways so attractive, for it unequivocally recognizes the nobility and its right to go on existing.

Actually one can express the problem only in a sort of paradox: Any party that would repudiate not only all belief in the law, but the nobility as well, would have the whole people behind it; yet no such party can come into existence, for nobody would dare to repudiate the nobility. We live on this razor's edge. A writer once summed the matter up in this way: The sole visible and indubitable law that is imposed upon us is the nobility, and must we ourselves deprive ourselves of that one law?

***

Translation by Willa and Edwin Muir from The complete short stories of Franz Kafka, edited by Nathum N Glazer (1971).

The problem of our laws was written between 1917 and 1924. It was first published (postumously) in Beim Bau der Chinesischen Mauer (1931; pp 29-32), a collection edited by Max Brod and Hans Joachim Schoeps.





Kafka Text from:


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13 Jun 2010

Self-Sensing Ourself: Summary 1st part of: 'General Remark Concerning the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology' in Kant's 1st Critique


by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. My own notes are in brackets. The full text for the summarized section is provided at the end.]



Self-Sensing Ourself:
Summary of the first part of: "General Remark Concerning the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology" in the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason


Important Points in This Section:

- All our acts of consciousness involve the unity of our self-consciousness. So implied in all our conscious acts is the "I think". And further implied in this proposition is our existence as a thinking being, the "I am". But it is not there just in the pure thinking of our unified self-consciousness. We are not saying that all thinking beings exist. Rather we are determinately specifying that it is I who exists. Hence we are not dealing with the universals of pure thinking, but rather with the determinations of our sense-intuitions. So the "I am" is implied in the "I think," but only insofar as the "I think" involves a cognition that relates us as self-appearance (an empirical passive object fractured across time) to us as unified consciousness (an a priori active subject undivided and atemporal).



Points Relative to Deleuze
[under ongoing revision]:

- Deleuze will make use Kant's critique of Descartes' cogito argument. It implies that there is an internal disjunction at the structural core of our selfhood. This disjunction is possible by means of the empty form of time, which allows us to appear to ourselves through our inner intuitions. Time, then, arises on account of an inner otherness that we directly perceive, cognize, and determine to be our own, even while it stands as other to us. We contract to our selfhood something that is fundamentally different from us (as it is an object while we are subject). By being both split and self-contracted, we on the one hand fragment into a flow of changes of ourself through time, all while maintaining an intensely unstable coherence all throughout.


Immanuel Kant
The Critique of Pure Reason
I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
Part 2: Transcendental Logic
Division 2: Transcendental Dialectic
Book II: The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason
Chapter II: The Paralogisms of Pure Reason (as in the second edition)
"Refutation of Mendelssohn's Proof of the Persistence of the Soul"
"General Remark Concerning the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology"
.

We will first touch upon some concepts Kant makes earlier in the book. The first concerns the nature of universal a priori propositions, which he distinguishes from empirical a posteriori propositions. It seems that for Kant, a priori propositions must be universal:
Now such universal cognition, which at the same time have the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience; hence one calls them a priori cognition: whereas that which is merely borrowed from experience is, as it is put, cognized only a posteriori, or empirically. (A2; p.127bc)
Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yet perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori. (B4; p.137cd)

Paralogisms of Pure Reason

"I think" is a proposition that expresses the unity of our consciousness. This proposition also implies our own existence. In a sense, it says "I exist thinking". But it does not say that all thinking beings exist. It merely says that I exist. So it is not a universal judgment, and hence the inference of our existence from the I think must involve our experience of ourselves. [This seems to be because the inference "I exist thinking" involves a determination: we are determining that the being doing the thinking is ourself. If we instead were saying that all beings who think also exist, then we are not determining any particular being, but rather speaking of all or any of them. However, when it is I who thinks, we are dealing then with determinate content. This also means we are cognizing ourselves, because we are relating ourselves to our unity of consciousness. Such a cognition requires that we also have intuitive content. All our inner intuitions occur during some temporal place. So we are only able to determine ourselves as an existing thinking being by means of time.]


Summary of the first part of:
"General Remark Concerning the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology"

Echoing what we said above, Kant writes:

The proposition "I think," or "I exist thinking," is an empirical proposition. But such a proposition is grounded on empirical intuition, consequently also on the object thought, as an appearance; and thus it seems as if, according to our theory, the whole, even in thinking, is completely transformed into appearance, and in such a way our consciousness itself, as mere illusion, would in fact come down to nothing. (B428; p.456bc)

Thinking can be distinguished from cognition. Thinking does not by itself involve intuitions, such as our self-appearings. Rather, thinking alone is "merely the logical function and hence the sheer spontaneity of combining the manifold of a merely possible intuition" (B428; p.456bc). [So when we normally use the term 'thinking,' we often use it to mean that we are thinking about something in particular. But Kant has us consider just one aspect of this process. When we think, we put together mental contents. Now, when we have sensations, our minds receive representations. But when we think, we need not first be responding to our sense impressions. This is why thought is considered spontaneous. From A51/B75; p.193c: "If we call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for brining forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding." So pure thinking is merely the capacity (and perhaps tendency) of our consciousness to initiate cognition unprovoked.] Because, then, the thinking involved in the "I think" does not yet think the particular determinate I who is ourself, the pure thinking does not alone by itself present the subject, the "I" of "I am". Previously Kant explained that the "I" of the pure self-consciousness of the "I think" is not some determinate, particular "I", but any subject whatsoever. He writes of the "wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x." (A436/B404; p.414b) Until we cognize ourselves by means of intuition, we are not even yet the particular I in the statement "I exist", but rather, if you will, any-subject-whatever, or the subject = x. In order, then, for us to obtain the I of I am, we need to determine that I as being the I who is doing the thinking. And to obtain this determinate content, we need inner intuitions of ourselves, which are self-appearings. Kant, then, writes that the pure thinking of the "I think" in no way presents
the subject of consciousness as appearance, merely because it takes no account at all of the kind of intuitions, whether it is sensible or intellectual. In this way I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself, but rather I think myself only as I do every object in general from whose kind of intuition I abstract. If here I represent myself as subject of a thought or even as ground of thinking, then these ways of representing do not signify the categories of substance or cause, for these categories are those functions of thinking (of judging) applied to our sensible intuition, which would obviously be demanded if I wanted to cognize myself. But now I want to become conscious of myself only as thinking; I put to one side how my proper self is given in intuition, and then it could be a mere appearance that I think, but not insofar as I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the being itself, about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me for thinking. (B429; p.456c.d)
But the proposition "I think," insofar as it says only that I exist thinking, is not a merely logical function, but rather determines the subject (which is then at the same time an object) in regard to existence, and this cannot take place without inner sense, whose intuition always makes available the object not as thing in itself but merely as appearance. Thus in this proposition there is already no longer merely spontaneity of thinking, but also receptivity of intuition, i.e., the thinking of my self applied to the empirical intuition of the very same subject. (B429; p.457a, emphasis mine)

From the text of the Meiklejohn translation [see in particular p.252 for the "General Remark"]:

R-245-

Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality
or Permanence* of the Soul.



* There is no philosophical term in our language which can express, without saying too much or too little, the meaning of Beharrlichkeit. Permanence will be sufficient, if taken in an absolute, instead of the commonly received relative sense. -- Tr.

This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul -- it being granted that it is a simple being -- cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition; he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or disappearance.* He endeavoured to prove in his Phædo, that the soul cannot be annihilated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist. Inasmuch as, be said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no multiplicity), between the moment in which it is, and the moment in which it is not, no time can be discovered -- which is impossible. But this philosopher did not consider that, granting the soul to possess this simple nature, which contains no parts external to each other and consequently no extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this degree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series of smaller degrees. It follows, therefore, that this supposed substance -- this thing, the permanence of which is not assured in any other way, may, if not by decomposition, by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently by elanguescence, if I may employ this expression), be changed into nothing. For consciousness itself has always a degree, which may be lessened.* Consequently the faculty of being

-246-

conscious may be diminished; and so with all other faculties. The permanence of the soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense, remains undemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in life is evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to itself, at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere conceptions, its permanence beyond life.*

* Verschwinden.

* Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a representation. For a certain degree of consciousness, which may not, however, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met with in many dim representations. For without any consciousness at all, we should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we connect; as we really can do with many conceptions, such as those of right and justice, and those of the musician, who strikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music. But a representation is clear, in which our consciousness is sufficient for the consciousness of the difference of this representation from others. If we are only conscious that there is a difference, but are not conscious of the difference -- that is, what the difference is -- the representation must be termed obscure. There is, consequently, an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire disappearance.

* There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought -- of which they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life -- after this life bas ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the introduction of counter -- possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several substances; and conversely, of the coalition of several into one simple substance. For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it does not necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance. Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul -- even that of consciousness -- as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it; and we can believe that, as in this case every. thing that is real in the soul, and has a degree -- consequently its entire existence -- has been halved, a particular substance would arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has been divided, formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it; and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the former substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple substances, which appear under the form of matter, might (not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other, but by an unknown influence, of which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance), by means of such a dynamical division of the parent -- souls, as intensive quantities, produce other souls, while the former repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from allowing any value to such chimeras; and the principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of the categories -- that of substance, for example -- is possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority of the faculty of thought -- without any intuition, whereby an object is given -- a self -- subsistent being, merely because the unity of apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite being, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to hinder the materialist, with as complete an independence of experience, to employ the principle of the rationalist in a directly opposite manner -- still preserving the formal unity required by his opponent?

-247-

If, now, we take the above propositions -- as they must be accepted as valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology -- in synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation, with the proposition: "All thinking beings are, as such, substances," backwards through the series, till the circle is completed; we come at last to their existence, of which, in this system of rational psychology, substances are held to be conscious, independently of external things; nay, it is asserted that, in relation to the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance, they can of themselves determine external things. It follows that Idealism -- at least problematical Idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system. And, if the existence of outward things is not held to be requisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in time, the existence of these outward things at all, is a gratuitous assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof.

But if we proceed analytically -- the "I think" as a proposition containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being the principle -- and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its content, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence in time and space without the aid of anything external; the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of a thinking being, but with a reality, and the properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the mode in which this reality is cogitated, after everything empirical had been abstracted; as is shown in the following table:

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Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition, whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also as a predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined, whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not. But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception -- the simple Ego in the representation to which all connection and separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself important; even although it presents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real that is at the same time simple; for points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in the first proposition as given, for it does not mean, "Every thinking being exists" (for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity), but only, "I exist thinking"; the proposition is quite empirical, and contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation to my representations in time. But as I require for this purpose something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal intuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple self -- consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence apart from external objects.

And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity of consciousness -- which we cognize only for the reason that it is indispensable to the possibility of experience -- to pass the bounds of experience (our existence in this life); and to extend our cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical -- but in relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly undetermined -- proposition, "I think"?

There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing more than a discipline, which sets impassable

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limits to speculative reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism. It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves -- which, although applicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from a higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of experience and life.
From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance -- which always presupposes a given intuition -- cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self -- consciousness -- the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of time has its basis, cannot determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, if the latter is impossible, the former, as an attempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so.*

* The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary being Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained -- because in this case the major premiss, "Everything, which thinks, exists," must precede -- but the two propositions are identical. The proposition, "I think," expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that perception* (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of perception by means of the categories in relation to time; and existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that has been given, only, however, to thought in general -- but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists, and is designated as such in the proposition, "I think." For it must be remarked that, when I call the proposition, "I think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation; on the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. But without some empirical representation, which presents to the mind material for thought, the mental act, "I think," would not take place; and the empirical is only the condition of the application or employment of the pure intellectual faculty.

* See p. 244. -- Tr.

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Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience -- a cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of thought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, this can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our proposition must be proved apodeictically; or, if this is unsuccessful, the sources of this inability must be sought for, and, if these are discovered to exist in the natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must submit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims to dogmatic assertion.

But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it has never been able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The

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proofs which have been current among men, preserve their value undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power, by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason. For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province -- the arrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement of nature; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own existence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world, in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing unsuited to its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly conformed to its destination in life -- we shall find that man, who alone is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal that seems to be excepted from it. For his natural gifts -- not merely as regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them, but especially the moral law in him -- str&ch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all advantageous consequences -- even the shadowy gift of posthumous fame -- above everything; and he is conscious of an inward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in this world -- without regard to mere sublunary interests -- the citizen of a better. This mighty, irresistible proof -- accompanied by an ever -- increasing knowledge of the conformability to a purpose in everything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless immensity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith -- remains to humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves bas failed to establish the necessity of an existence after death.
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the conception -- in every respect undetermined -- of a thinking being in general. I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience, at the same time making abstraction of all actual experience; and infer therefrom that I can be conscious

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of myself apart from experience and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self; and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination of cognition.
The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking; because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of the word, although occupying itself with an object of experience -- only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution of this task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed heterogeneity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the objects of the external senses; inasmuch as the formal condition of the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space also. But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ internally, but only in so far as the one appears externally to the other -- consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous; this difficulty disappears. There then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the question -- how a community of substances is possible; a question which lies out of the region of psychology, and which the reader, after what in our analytic has been said of primitive forces and faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human cognition.

GENERAL REMARK
On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.

The proposition, "I think," or, "I exist thinking," is an empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is merely a phenomenon; and in this way our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts upon nothing.

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Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it does not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon -- for this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to myself; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mode of intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of representation are not related to the categories of substance or of cause; for these are functions of thought applicable only to our sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking; in what mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon -- although not in so far as I am a thinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to me any property of this being as material for thought.

But the proposition, "I think," in so far as it declares, "I exist thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It determines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in relation to existence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a thing in itself, but always as a phenomenon. In this proposition there is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of thought; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now, in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, and so forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an object in itself by means of the representation I, but also for the purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that is, of cognizing itself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal empirical intuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but phenomenal data, which do not assist the object of pure consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate existence, but are useful only as contributions to experience.

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But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience, but in certain firmly -- established a priori laws of the use of pure reason -- laws relating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves as legislating a priori in relation to our own existence and as determining this existence; we should, on this supposition, find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of empirical intuition. We should also become aware that in the consciousness of our existence there was an a priori content, which would serve to determine our own existence -- an existence only sensuously determinable -- relatively, however, to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible world.

But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual -- but by what predicates? By none other than those which are given in sensuous intuition. Thus I should find myself in the same position in rational psychology which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to give significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of experience. I should be justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to their practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience -- in conformity with their analogical significance when employed theoretically -- to freedom and its subject.* At the same time, I should understand by them merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity with which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of being explained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of substance and cause, although they originate from a very different principle. We have made these observations for the purpose of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the sequel.

* The Ego. -- Tr.


Summary based on:
Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Eds. & Transls. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Full text taken from:
Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Transl. J.M.D Meiklejohn.
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