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[The following is summary. My own notes are in brackets. The full text for the summarized section is provided at the end.]
Time and 'I':
Summary of "Refutation of Idealism" of the Transcendental Analytic in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
Immanuel Kant
The Critique of Pure Reason
I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
Part 2: Transcendental Logic
Division 1: Transcendental Analytic
Book II: Analytic of Principles
Chapter II: system of All Principles of Pure Understanding
Section III: Systematic Representation of All Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding
4. The Postulates of Empirical thought in General, Refutation of Idealism (added in the second edition)
.
Important Points in This Section:
- Our inner intuitions depend on perceptions of outer objects. This is because our inner intuitions are temporal. But to be temporal, they need to be temporally-determined, which means we need to designate one as following another. But to make this designation, we need to compare inner changes with some outer stasis. Hence our inner intuitions of ourselves depend on our outer perceptions of the substances that persist while their features alter.
Points Relative to Deleuze
[under ongoing revision]:
- Deleuze will show how the "I think" involves an internal disjunction between us as thinking subject and us as appearing object of cognition. To derive the "I am" from "I think", we need to appear to ourselves, which time, and thus also outer experience.
Refutation of Idealism
It might seem obvious that the objects around us exist. However, some argue that the existence of these spatial objects is uncertain, and perhaps even false or impossible. Kant calls this position "material idealism", and he will argue against. it. Descartes for example says that the existence of external objects is doubtful and indemonstrable, while yet for Descartes, the empirical assertion "I am" is indubitable. Kant calls Descartes' position "problematic idealism." Berkeley sees the existence of spatial objects as being false and impossible. This is dogmatic idealism. He thinks that space is something impossible; it is really just something we imagine. But this is because he regards space to be a property that things have. As a property, it is not a thing by itself, and thus is a 'non-entity.' Kant has already explained that space is an a priorirepresentation. It is inherent to the way we receive spatial objects, so it is objectively true. Descartes' problematic idealism only says that we are unable to prove the existence of external objects by using just our immediate experience [which can be considered illusory and thus doubtful]. Descartes will not admit any conclusion in this regard until sufficient proof is given [which would circumvent the doubts we might have regarding what our senses tell us]. For us to trust our senses, we need some proof that we are having actual experiences of things and not just imagining them. Now, Descartes does not doubt the existence of our inner experiences. So if we can show that our inner experiences are only possible only on account of our outer experiences, then we will have sufficiently proven the existence of the outer things we sense.
Theorem
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.
Proof
[Let's first recall Kant's previous discussion of the experiences we have of ourselves. When we appear to ourselves, we then are intuited internally. But all internal intuitions are experienced ashaving a place in the flow of time. This means that when we appear to ourselves, those self-appearings have their places in the flow of time. Kant writes:] "I am conscious of my existence as determine in time." [Each moment of time follows the prior one, and it does so necessarily. During each temporally-different self-appearance, there is one same self-consciousness that receives those appearances. So the mental acts in each time-instance belong-together, because they belong to the same self-consciousness. This one self-same self-consciousness that spans all the particular acts of consciousness can determine that one act follows another, because it was active in both cases. Thus it can determine the time-relation for these moments of consciousness, and also it can consider the substances that persist all while their properties alter throughout the temporally-different acts of consciousness. But in order for our consciousness to make these time-determinations of its own acts of consciousness, there needs to be something that it is conscious-of which also persists throughout these acts. So our own consciousness appears to us, rendering our existence as something that appears through the flow of time. Now consider if we are not conscious of any other thing that persists through the moments of our awareness. This would mean that we could not compare our inner appearings to something else that persists. Now, in order to determine that something changes, we can only do so if we place it in contrast to something that stays the same. When we observe a train roll past a mountain, we can say that there was a change of place, because the mountain persisted in its place, all while the train moved. But if we are in a craft that moves at a steady speed through the void of outer space, with no other object around us to observe, then we have no way to know that we are moving. Kant seems to suggest that something similar is required for us to determine that one moment of consciousness takes place at a different time than another. In addition to our inner intuitions of our existence (our self-appearings), we need also something that persists externally, against which to gauge the internal transitions and determine their temporal relations of succession. Now, when we have a sense-intuition, we also have the inner experience of it in the form of a representation. But because this representation is still internal, it is not enough. We need also the thing outside us in addition to our internal representation of it, if we want to temporally determine our inner self-appearances. So Kant writes:]
All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception . This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. [footnote a] Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. (B275; p.327b)
From footnote a, the editors write:
According to the revised preface (Bxxxix), this sentence is to be replaced by the following: "This persistent thing, however, cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, in relation to which their change, thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined." (p.327d)
[If we were unable to determine one moment of our consciousness as following some other one, then there would not be temporal relations between our acts of consciousness, and thus also we would not have a stream of consciousness that flows through the passing of time. But this also means that our consciousness-in-time needs also to be linked with external objects for it to have the temporality that makes it in-time:]
Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of the time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me. (B276; p.327bc).
Note 1.
We will now see how this refutes idealism. Kant explains that the idealist positions regard the only immediate experience to be inner experience. So, to know outer things, we need to infer them from our inner experiences. Yet, the idealists think, our inner representations of outer things might be false representations, perhaps products of our imagination. But if we were imagining them, we would be imagining them as being given through outer intuition. Yet, intuition is not imagination. And before we could possibly imagine ourselves having an outer intuition, we would need to have already experienced an outer intuition. Thus outer intuition would be the basis for any imagining of an inner intuition. So we need not wonder whether the idealists are right to assume that we have inner sense but no outer one, and instead merely an outer imagination.
So Kant has proven that outer experiences are immediate, because they are prerequisite for the temporally-determined consciousness that has both inner and outer experiences.
[Now also recall (again from Kant's previous discussion) how our existence, our 'I am,' is the being of our a priori unity of self-consciousness. Each act of consciousness belongs with the rest, because all belong to one consciousness that is the same for each. This is not a cognition of ourselves, because cognitions require also determinate intuitive content. But because we can still be self-conscious without self-cognition, our unified a priori self-consciousness can also be considered in a way our 'I think'. When we cognize ourselves, we relate our inner intuitions of ourselves to this 'I think', as belonging to it. But this 'I think' is not the awareness that it is thinking (again see the above-linked previous discussion). The 'I think' (transcendental unity of self-consciousness) can only either be conscious of itself, or its appearings, but never of its own action of relating the two. This is important for when we compare Kant's and Descartes' 'I think'. Because for Descartes, there is more than just the unity of self-consciousness in the 'I think'. There is also a more explicit self-awareness that one is thinking. What Kant points-out is that for us to have Descartes' sort of 'I think', we need to first appear to ourselves so that we realize that we are thinking. Otherwise we would not be aware that we are thinking. So we might say that for Kant, Descartes' 'I think' is more than just simple a priori unity of consciousness. Perhaps it could be rendered 'I think me'. But to think ourselves, as we said, requires that we appear to ourselves temporally, which also requires we have outer experiences, and thus Descartes' cogito necessitates outer experiences. Kant writes:]
Of course, the representation I am , which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thinking, is that which immediately includes the existence of a subject in itself, but not yet any cognition of it, thus not empirical cognition, i.e., experience; for to that there belongs, besides the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case inner intuition, i.e., time, in regard to which the subject must be determined, for which outer objects are absolutely requisite, so that inner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer experience. (B277; p.328a)
Note 2:
Kant will now show that our actual experiences demonstrate the point he made above (that inner experience depends on outer experience, because we need outer experience to determine the temporality of inner experience). Consider that any time we perceive one thing as following another, (and in that way determine the time-relations of those moments), we need to make use of changes in outer relations. Kant's example is the sun's motion in relation to the things on earth. We might also think of clock-hands, whose change of location relative to the dial indicates time-changes. Now let's also consider our concept of substance. Something persists while its features change, and that persisting thing we consider substance. But the only thing we know-of that persists in this manner is matter. Yet what makes something persist is that it spans different moments of consciousness. For us to be aware of this spanning, there must be a unity to our temporally-different acts of consciousness. Thus the persistence of matter is grounded nonetheless on the a priori unity of consciousness. And likewise, as we have noted, the a prioriunity of consciousness, along with the persistence of substance, are together needed for the temporality involved in our inner self-intuitions. Now, there is a self-consciousness implied in the representation "I" of "I think". But this self-consciousness is not self-cognition, and hence does not involve our self-intuitions. It is merely an "intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject" (B278; p.328c). Therefore, the "I" alone is not yet correlated with an intuition, and hence is not yet related to something persistent, and thus furthermore the "I" alone does not already include the time-determinations necessary to say that it is a self that would persist through a manifold of temporally-different acts of consciousness.
Note 3:
Just because every inner experience is possible only on account of outer experience, that does not mean that the intuitive representation we have of outer things must also imply their existence. We can also imagine outer things as well. To distinguish imagined from actual outer things, we need to examine its determinations and judge it according to our criteria for what makes an actual experience.
From the text of the Meiklejohn translation:
REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
Idealism -- I mean material* idealism -- is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, I am. The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property of things in themselves; for in that case it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental æsthetic. Problematical idealism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a decisive judgement before
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sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.
* In opposition to formal or critical idealism -- the theory of Kant -- which denies to us a knowledge of things as things in themselves, and maintains that we can know only phænomena. -- Tr.
THEOREM.
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own
existence proves the existence of external objects in space.
PROOF.
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing without me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things external to me. Now, consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time. Hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the condition of determination in time. That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me.
Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism bas reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is properly
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immediate,* that only by virtue of it -- not, indeed, the consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the determination of our existence in time, that is, internal experience -- is possible. It is true, that the representation I am, which is the expression of the consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts, is that which immediately includes the existence of a subject. But in this representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject, and therefore also no empirical knowledge, that is, experience. For experience contains, in addition to the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case it must be internal intuition, that is, time, in relation to which the subject must be determined. But the existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose, so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only mediately and through external experience.
* The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is, in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, by the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The question as to the possibility of it would stand thus: "Have we an internal sense, but no external sense, and is our belief in external perception a mere delusion?" But it is evident that, in order merely to fancy to ourselves anything as external, that is, to present it to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense, and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every act of imagination. For merely to imagine also an external sense, would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be determined by the imagination.
Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance. Its truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a determination of time only by means of a change in external relations (motion) to the permanent in space (for example, we become aware of the sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation to the objects of this earth). But this is not all. We find that we possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a substance as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence is not itself derived from external experience, but is an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time, consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the existence of external things. In the representation "I," the consciousness of myself is not an intuition,
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but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that this I has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the internal sense -- in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.
Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external things involves the existence of these things, for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of external objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only through external experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary must be discovered from its particular determinations and by comparing these with the criteria of all real experience.
Summary based on:
Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Eds. & Transls. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Full text taken from:
Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Transl. J.M.D Meiklejohn.
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