Somers-Hall, (4.9), Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, ‘4.9 Learning and the Discord of the Faculties (188–97/237–47)’, summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall’s Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, Entry Directory]

 

[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos and other distracting mistakes. Somers-Hall is abbreviated SH and Difference and Repetition as DR.]

Summary of

Henry Somers-Hall

Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition:
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide

Part 1
A Guide to the Text

Chapter 4. Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference

 

4.9 Learning and the Discord of the Faculties (188–97/237–47)

 

 

Brief summary: 
For Deleuze, learning is not a matter of drawing inferences from propositions. Instead, it occurs when 1) we deal with the problematic situation in current states of affairs, then 2) gather together Idea fragments from a variety of sources to devise a ‘map’, so to speak, of the important relations in the situation, which is the Idea, and then 3) develop solutions which would change those states of affairs in ways which solve the problems. In an evolutionary sense, each bodily organ is itself like such a solution to certain problems, since for example the eye is the solution to the problem of light. Likewise, each faculty is a solution or Idea on its own. The reproductive imagination (or memory) for example could be the solution to the problem of intuitions (or perceptions) continually being lost due to the passage of time. Now, in those confusing moments while we are learning something very new, our faculties are working together discordantly, meaning that they each have their own object that is different from the other faculties’ objects. But this discordant relation of the faculties, since it is what allows us to learn, is a solution to the problem of Difference itself, which is what presents to us the many problematic situations that call for us to reconfigure our minds and workings in order to continually adapt to a complicated and changing world.

 

Summary

Previously we have been examining Deleuze’s notion of the Idea. We return now to two topics from chapter 3, namely, learning from section 3.10 and the relationship of the faculties from section 3.6. We will see that we need Ideas in Deleuze’s sense for learning, and we turn to Plato’s notion of the hypothesis. Recall again Plato’s divided line. [We also made use of the excellent diagram from the Thesis Eleven website. Many thanks!]

Of intelligible knowledge, there are two kinds: 1) mathematics and 2) knowledge of the forms. Mathematical fields like geometry use images, and they proceed deductively to a conclusion. But

The strength and the limitation of a deductive argument, however, is that its conclusion does not contain anything that is not implicitly assumed in its premises. The most it can do is simply make explicit what we have assumed at the outset. For this reason, it is essential to know that the premises of one’s argument are true, since it is from these that the argument gains its content, and validity.
(155)

[Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that geometry begins with hypotheses, which are uncertain, but philosophy tries to begin with certain premises by invoking Ideas or using clear and distinct concepts. And thus philosophy would be using a higher form of reasoning than geometry.] “Philosophy traditionally, according to Deleuze, has therefore attempted to show that we can convert hypotheses into categorical statements by arguing from premises that are absolutely certain, either by invoking the Ideas, or by, in Descartes’ case, positing certain concepts that are clear and distinct, and hence indubitable” (155). SH then says [I quote because I am not sure I follow the inference] “Now, as we have seen, Plato understands the Ideas by analogy with objects of empirical recollection, and Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas are fully transparent to consciousness. In both cases, therefore, we remain within the domain of consciousness and the proposition” (155).

In this procedure above, we move between two propositions directly [I suppose between premise to premise or from premises to conclusion]. Deleuze proposes a different procedure, called ‘vice-diction’, which “moves from a proposition to an Idea and then to a solution” (155). In the first stage, there is “the determination of the conditions of the problem” and in the second there is “the correlative genesis of cases of solution” (SH 156, qtg. DR 190/239). Deleuze offers two examples of learning, namely, learning to swim and learning a foreign language, which are favorite examples of Bergson. SH then quotes Bergson for the swimming example:

If we had never seen a man swim, we might say that swimming is an impossible thing, inasmuch as, to learn to swim, we must begin by holding ourselves up in the water and, consequently, already know how to swim. Reasoning, in fact, always nails us down to the solid ground. But if, quite simply, I throw myself into the water without fear, I may keep myself up well enough at first by merely struggling, and gradually adapt myself to the new environment: I shall thus have learnt to swim. So, in theory, there is a kind of absurdity in trying to know otherwise than by intelligence; but if the risk be frankly accepted, action will perhaps cut the knot that reasoning has tied and will not unloose. (Bergson 1998: 192)
(SH 156)

SH notes that we can contrast two kinds of learning here. There is the “propositional account” [learning by reasoning or intelligence, perhaps in Bergson’s terms]. But on this account, learning to swim would seem impossible or absurd, since learning to swim, that is, gaining knowledge of how to swim, already seems to presuppose that we had that knowledge in the first place. [SH then moves to Deleuze’s other sort of learning, which seems to be more dynamic, spontaneous, and interactive with the problematics involved with what is being learned. I do not follow this description very well. Let me quote it first.]

Deleuze’s rather abstract analysis of the process of learning to swim or learning a language is that we do so by ‘composing the singular points of one’s own body or one’s own language with those of another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems’ (DR 192/241). In order to escape the deductive sterility of the proposition, therefore, he claims that thinking needs to raise itself to the level of the Idea. The first stage of vice-diction is therefore that of finding other relevant cases that together specify the problem we are faced with, ‘fragments of ideal future or past events’ (DR 190/239). By ‘discovering the adjuncts’, Deleuze means this procedure of finding equivalent cases that emerge from the problem. As the Idea is an interpenetrative multiplicity, these elements must be combined to generate the Idea corresponding to the problem, just as the shades of light were passed through the convergent lens in Bergson’s example. Once we have the Idea of the problem, we can attempt to find those singular points of the Idea where it engenders solutions that are different from the present state of affairs. Deleuze gives the example of Lenin’s thought, which would involve the extraction from the present state of affairs of the Idea of the economic (abstract modes of production), and then the generation of a solution that involves a different | conjunction of singularities (just as selecting a different plane of a conic section will give us a different curve). Thus, we move from the present society to the problematic genetic principles that give rise to it, and then back to an alternative solution, or form of society. In a similar way, we do not look at the relations between parts of animals directly, as they may have different functional roles, but instead relate each to the others through the transcendental rules for their production. Thinking thus does not go from proposition to proposition. Rather, thinking becomes creative by tracing back propositions to the non-propositional field of problems that engender them.
(SH 157)

[Let us start with the examples. Deleuze discusses the swimming example in a Spinozistic context in his course lecture of 1981/03/17 and in his course lecture of 1981/03/31. The idea is that all bodies, our own and the body of water we swim in, are made up of smaller and smaller parts, ultimately of pure differential relations between vanishing terms (simplest bodies). But when we first encounter the wave, our field of differential relations and its differential relations are not at first compatible, in fact the wave’s internal relations decompose our own, and so we struggle in the water. But by learning how to modify our own workings to suit the workings of the wave, we learn to swim, and we also thereby constitute a larger composite body together. Perhaps this applies also to learning language. We must in a sense rearrange our own systems of associations and meanings in order to navigate in the other language. SH mentions the first stage of vice-diction as “finding other relevant cases that together specify the problem we are faced with, ‘fragments of ideal future or past events’ (DR 190/239)”. I am not sure what this is or how it would work in the examples. Perhaps the idea is that we need to try to direct our imagination into the future and try to figure what sorts of techniques might work were we to try them, and perhaps we might also look to similar past experiences. But I apologize that I do not know really what this sentence means. Either this or something new is what is called  ‘discovering the adjuncts’, which is when we find equivalent cases. The next sentence is then “As the Idea is an interpenetrative multiplicity, these elements must be combined to generate the Idea corresponding to the problem, just as the shades of light were passed through the convergent lens in Bergson’s example.” I am not sure what this means, but it seems one thing is that we generate an Idea that corresponds to the problem in the situation we encounter, and perhaps what is happening is we put together undetermined parts that we encounter in that situation and that we generate through finding equivalent cases. I am not sure how this works in our examples. Maybe when we first try to swim, we have these non-explicit intuitions or vague notions from memory and imagination which would somehow be applicable since they deal with a similar problematic. Perhaps we recall how oars worked when we learned how to row a boat, and we add other vague sorts of notions like observations of water-wheels, experiences while bathing, experimental thoughts about what might work- I have no idea really how this works. Then, maybe all these little undetermined Idea fragments converge as we begin successfully swimming. Or maybe the fragments converge before we successfully swim. Perhaps we have the Idea, like a light bulb going off, so to speak, then we begin successfully swimming. For, SH next says, “Once we have the Idea of the problem, we can attempt to find those singular points of the Idea where it engenders solutions that are different from the present state of affairs”. So maybe the fragments of the Idea converge as we try to adapt to the water, then we see special conceptual elements of the Idea which can generate solutions different from our current struggling not to drown. So maybe some of the singular points would be some notion about propulsion and another about staying afloat rather than sinking, and another about a mechanical rhythm of motion, and another about control of breathing. On the basis of these significant elements of the Idea, we might then figure one or another way to swim, like the different “strokes” one may use. I again am just guessing. The next sentence is: “Deleuze gives the example of Lenin’s thought, which would involve the extraction from the present state of affairs of the Idea of the economic (abstract modes of production), and then the generation of a solution that involves a different | conjunction of singularities (just as selecting a different plane of a conic section will give us a different curve).” So maybe what happened is that Lenin encountered a new sort of situation at the beginnings of the Soviet Union. There was the breakdown of the old system, as new political ideas were influencing the situation and calling for a fundamental rearrangement of social and economic relations. So maybe Lenin gathers Idea fragments somehow from the actual states of affairs and develops a sense of modes of production that could take place, and he figures out ones to actualize since they would work in that situation. Others were possible too, and they would have created a different structure to the society with its own special significant elements (like different shapes from the cone). The next sentence is: “Thus, we move from the present society to the problematic genetic principles that give rise to it, and then back to an alternative solution, or form of society”. So this seems to sum up the steps. First Lenin sees the instable current situation that resulted from demands for changes in economic relations and the breakdown of old relations, which leads him to think theoretically about the changes in modes of production and labor conditions leading up to this situation, which then lends to him devising a socialist society to successfully work with these new conditions. Then SH says, “In a similar way, we do not look at the relations between parts of animals directly, as they may have different functional roles, but instead relate each to the others through the transcendental rules for their production.” I am not sure I get this analogy. Perhaps the idea is that Lenin for example is not so concerned specifically and only with elements of the actual states of affairs, but he is concerned also with more basic relations that could be expressed in a variety of situations. Lastly SH writes, “Thinking thus does not go from proposition to proposition. Rather, thinking becomes creative by tracing back propositions to the non-propositional field of problems that engender them.” So Lenin for example did not reduce his current states of affairs to propositions from which he drew inferences, but rather on the basis of them he thought more deeply about the non-propositional problematic they are bound up in, and in this way he was able to create new social structures that solve the problems of that situation.]

So here we are “moving from one empirical state to another via an Idea” (157). We can also learn just by investigating Ideas themselves. First we note that Deleuze’s notions of problems and solutions do not apply just to matters of knowledge. We return to this point later. We for now might think of how evolution is solving problems through the ‘differenciation’ of organs. For example, the eyes are the solution to the problem of light. Each faculty also can be seen as a solution to problems, [as for example the faculty of speech is a solution to the problem of phonetic combinations:]

We can see that each of the faculties themselves is a solution to a problem [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]:

Take, for example, the linguistic multiplicity, regarded as a virtual system of reciprocal connections between ‘phonemes’ which is incarnated in the actual terms and relations of diverse languages: such a multiplicity renders possible speech as a faculty as well as the transcendent object of that speech, that ‘metalanguage’ which cannot be spoken in the empirical usage of a given language, but must be spoken and can be spoken only in the poetic usage of speech coextensive with virtuality. (DR 193/242–3)

In this case, the faculty of speech is rendered possible by the virtual multiplicity, which gives the rules for actual speech production. If we relate the structure of speech to the Idea, we can see that it contains each of its moments. The phonemes are undetermined, but able to enter into determinable relations. These relations describe the expressiveness of the language. In turn, an individual speech act corresponds to the integration | of this field of expressions. There is a reciprocity here, however, since the multiplicity is constituted in terms of the differential relations between phonemes because it is related to the field of a given language (‘each dialectical problem is duplicated by a symbolic field in which it is expressed’ [DR 179/227]). So the constitution of the faculty of speech (the solution) in turn determines the virtual multiplicity (problem) relative to it. ‘The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior, or transcendent exercise’ (DR 143/180). In this sense, each of the faculties is an Idea as well as a relation to an Idea.
(157-158)

[I do not follow the next paragraph very well. Let me quote it first.]

We have already seen that each faculty communicates violence to the others, to the extent that they communicate in terms of objects that differ in kind. Thus, the object of sensation differed in kind from the object of memory, but yet was able to enter into a relationship with it. What is it that allows these faculties to communicate? Well, once we recognise that each of the faculties has its own transcendent object, because their objects are ‘express[ed] technically in the domain of solutions to which they give rise’ (DR 179/227), it becomes simple to explain how they can communicate with one another, yet still be distinct. On an empirical level, each faculty is distinct, as each has its own set of objects (both transcendent and empirical). While each of the faculties contains a difference between empirical and transcendental exercises, this is only the first degree of difference. The ‘second degree’ of difference is where each of these faculties is in turn the solution to the problem of pure difference [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]:

This harmonious Discord seemed to us to correspond to that Difference which by itself articulates or draws together. There is thus a point at which thinking, speaking, imagining, feeling, etc., are one and the same thing, but that thing affirms only the divergence of the faculties in their transcendent exercise. (DR 193–4/243)

Each faculty is therefore the expression of an Idea, Difference itself being the Idea of an Idea. In this way, each of the faculties is both the same as, and different from, the others (what Deleuze calls para-sense as opposed to common sense, because it escapes the structure of representation). While all of the faculties relate to Ideas, it is still the case that thought is in some sense superior to the other faculties. If we take speech, then we can see that it is constituted in terms of phonemes. The elements that constitute thought, however, are Ideas themselves. Thought is thus the Idea of Ideas, and relates the other faculties. Thus, ‘while the | opposition between thought and all forms of common sense remains stronger than ever, Ideas must be called “differentials” of thought, or the “Unconscious” of pure thought’ (DR 194/244).

[The first idea is that the faculties work discordantly, because their objects are different in kind, but they still must try to communicate despite these differences. We next seem to be building from the point we just made, which is that the faculties are solutions to problems. To this it seems we expand it to say that the faculties’ objects are also Ideas (or maybe this means something else: “each of the faculties has its own transcendent object, because their objects are ‘express[ed] technically in the domain of solutions to which they give rise’”). The next sentence I do not understand: “On an empirical level, each faculty is distinct, as each has its own set of objects (both transcendent and empirical)”. I am not sure what the “on the empirical level” means. So on the empirical level, the understanding and the imagination have their own sets of objects. Then to this we add that each faculty, on the empirical level, also has both transcendent and empirical objects. I am not sure what we would say about the faculties on the transcendental level. Perhaps first we can say this. On the empirical level they have different objects, since for example the concept of a triangle is different in kind from intuitions of triangles or of whatever else. But on the transcendental level they all have the same object, namely a problematic they are all dealing with in their own way and working together to try to solve. Then, regardless of the level, they have both a transcendental and an empirical object. The empirical object would perhaps be the specific object they have of its own kind, and the transcendental object would be the Idea each has of its own kind, which is like its own way to solve the problem. I am just making huge guesses. The next sentence is: “While each of the faculties contains a difference between empirical and transcendental exercises, this is only the first degree of difference”. So we need to distinguish empirical from transcendental exercises, but I do not know how to clearly make that distinction. Perhaps it has to do with whether their objects are empirical or transcendental. I will guess here. Maybe the idea is that insofar as the faculty is dealing with their own sort of solution, they are dealing with the empirical object, and insofar as they are dealing with the problem, they are dealing with the transcendental object. So maybe in a certain situation, our understanding is dealing with trying to find the right concept, and in that sense it’s transcendental object is the problem itself regarded in conceptual terms, and maybe it supplies the notion of triangle, which is a proposed solution and is also its empirical object. Insofar as it is dealing with that problem, its exercise is transcendental and insofar as it is dealing with the solution its exercise is empirical. Again I am just making very huge and most certainly incorrect guesses. We then note that there is a difference between these two exercises, which is the “first degree of difference”. The next sentence is: “The ‘second degree’ of difference is where each of these faculties is in turn the solution to the problem of pure difference [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]: This harmonious Discord seemed to us to correspond to that Difference which by itself articulates or draws together. There is thus a point at which thinking, speaking, imagining, feeling, etc., are one and the same thing, but that thing affirms only the divergence of the faculties in their transcendental exercise. (DR 193–4/243)”. I again cannot give an interpretation that I am confident in. But it seems perhaps we can say the following. If we look at a situation where our faculties are working together discordantly, we see they are dealing with a specific problem, which involves the twin exercises (empirical and transcendental) of each faculty that we mentioned above. But why would they need to work together discordantly in the first place? Perhaps this discordant exercise is itself the solution to the problem of dealing with fundamental difference in our world, which lie at the basis of all problematics that our faculties contend with. So the discordant exercise “evolved” you might say as a means for us to be able to learn how to deal with all the very complicated and challenging situations we encounter in the world, just like how the eye specifically evolved to deal with the problem of light. If the faculties only worked concordantly and only communicated the same objects, they would not be equipped with the flexibility needed to deal with our complicated and changing world. The first degree of difference is that between the transcendent and empirical exercises of the faculties, while the second degree of difference is perhaps the more basic difference that the discordantly related faculties are contending with. (Or perhaps it is another difference, like the difference between each faculty or their object, I am not sure). The next sentence is: “Each faculty is therefore the expression of an Idea, Difference itself being the Idea of an Idea”. Maybe the point here is that each faculty is a solution or an Idea, and difference, which is the problem or Idea to which each faculty is dealing, is the Idea of each facultative Idea. Then, “In this way, each of the faculties is both the same as, and different from, the others (what Deleuze calls para-sense as opposed to common sense, because it escapes the structure of representation)”. So each faculty is fundamentally a solution of its own kind, so they are different and they operate discordantly, but since they all are solutions to the same problem/Idea of Difference, they are all the same in this other sense. The final sentences seem fairly straightforward. Since the faculty of thinking deals with Ideas, it has a special place among the faculties, which also deal with Ideas but perhaps in a less explicit way. Those final sentences might be making another point, but I am not sure.]

Citations from:

Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.

Or if otherwise noted:

DR:
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994/London: Continuum, 2004.

Bergson, Henri (1998), Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Image credits:

Thesis Eleven.
<https://thesiseleven.wordpress.com/philosophy/platos-republic/simile-of-the-divided-line/ >

<https://osopher.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/plato-divided-line.gif?w=504&h=360>.

 

 

 

The Identity of Difference. Citations from Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, on the topic of split self-hood

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Literature, Poetry, and Drama Entry Directory]

[Other entries in the 'Time is Out of Joint' series.]

[The following are citations from Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory. They are meant as preparation for a look at his Remarks on Oedipus and on Antigone, which we will examine later. My notes outside the citations are given in brackets.]

The Identity of Difference
Citations from Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, on the topic of split self-hood

From On the Law of Freedom:

[The following might help elaborate Deleuze's notion of the anarchy of the Kantian faculties, seen especially in sublime experiences.]

There is a natural state of the imagination which has in common the lawlessness with that anarchy of representations organized by the intellect, to be sure, yet which, with respect to the law by which, with respect to the law by which it is organized, need to be distinguished from intellect.

By this natural state of imagination, by this lawlessness, I mean a moral one; by this law, [I mean] the law of freedom. There, the imagination is considered in and of itself, here in conjunction with the faculty of desire.
In that anarchy of representations where the imagination is considered theoretically, a unity of the manifold, an ordering of perceptions was indeed possible yet accidental. [33b; V,211]

From Judgment and Being:

[This material discusses how expressions of identity, such as 'I am I', theoretically take both I's as subjects, but when executed in our lives, self-identifications involve us considering ourselves on the one hand as subject but then on the other hand as object.]

Judgment. in the highest and strictest sense, is the original separation of object and subject which are most deeply united in intellectual intuition, that separation through which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation. In the concept of separation, there lies already the concept of the reciprocity of object and subject and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which object and subject form the parts. “I am I” is the most fitting example for this concept of arche-separation as theoretical separation, for in the practical arche-separation it [the “I”] opposes the non-I, not itself. [37b, V,216, boldface mine]

[Being is not the same as identity. Our own personal being is not to be found in an identical relation between ourself as subject and as object. From a Deleuzean point of view, perhaps, our personal being instead is to be found in our internal difference, taken in one sense as the internal split between ourselves as self-thought (subject) and us as self-felt (object). We might further distinguish this from something more like a Merleau-Pontyian perspective. Instead of us being both subject and object, or being something pre-subjective and pre-objective, we rather are constituted (at least in part) by the differences communicated between our subjective and objective sides.]

Being--Yet this Being must not be confused with identity. If I say: I am I, the subject (“I”) and the object | (“I”) are not united in such a way that no separation could be performed without violating the essence of what is to be separated; on the contrary, the I is only possible by means of this separation of the I from the I. [37-38; V,216-217] How can I say: “I”! without self-consciousness? Yet how is self-consciousness possible? In opposing myself to myself, separating myself from myself, yet in recognizing myself as the same in the opposed regardless of this separation. Yet to what extent as the same? I can, I must ask in this manner; for in another respect it [the “I”] is opposed to itself. Hence identity is not a union of object and subject which simply occurred, hence identity is not = to absolute Being. [38a, V,217, boldface mine]

From Reflection:

[The following sentence might be interesting to compare to Deleuze's idea of intensity intensifying as it falls to zero. However, the quote would then be taken out of context and serve only as a poetic formulation.]

One can fall upward just as well as downward. [45d; IV,233]

From The Ground for "Empedocles":

[Deleuze will look at how Hölderlin says Sophocles' Oedipus brings the character to a pure state of interiority.]

The tragic odes begin in the highest fire; the pure spirit, the pure inwardness has transcendent its border, it has not sufficiently moderated those connections of life which are necessary and which, as it is, already strive for contact, and which are excessively inclined to do so due to the wholly inward mood, [that is] consciousness, reflection, or physical sensuousness; and thus, through the excess of inwardness, there has originated a discord which the tragic ode figures forth right at the outset in order to depict the pure. [p.50ab; IV,149]

[To elaborate on Deleuze's notion of disorganization, especially in terms of the anarchy of the Kantian faculties and the disorder of the Body without Organs, we might compare it with Hölderlin's distinction between organic and aorgic. Here we quote also from the editor's commentary]

Precisely because he expresses the deepest inwardness, the tragic poet denies altogether his individuality, his subjectivity, and thus also the object present to him; he conveys them into a foreign personality, into a foreign objectivity [52c; IV, 151]

The more organic, artistic man is the blossom of nature, the more aorgic [ft.3] nature, when it is sensed purely, by the purely organized, purely and uniquely form man, affords him the feeling of perfection. However, this life exists only in sentiment and not for knowledge. If it is to be known, then it must be present itself by separating itself in the excess of inwardness where the opposed principles interchange so that the organic, which surrendered itself too much to nature, and which forgot its essence and consciousness, transcends into the extreme of autonomous activity and art and reflection, where nature, at least in its effects on reflective man, transcends into the extreme of the aorgic, the incomprehensible, the non-sensuous, the unlimited, until through the progression of the opposed reciprocal effects the two originally unity [principles] meet again as in the beginning, only that nature has become more organic through the forming, cultivating man, through the formgiving drives and forces as such, whereas man has become more aorgic, universal, infinite. [53b.c; IV,152-153].

[From footnote 3, to the word 'aorgic']

The translation of Hölderlin's distinction between organisch and aorgisch and the translation of aorgisch as “organic” requires some explanation. Hölderlin’s distinction must be understood in the context of Swabian Pietism and the energetically inspired concept of nature of German Romanticism. Unlike Schelling’s distinction between organisch and anorganisch, Hölderlin’s “organic” implies not a natural organism or the like, but designates the organized, reflected principle of the spirit and of art. Similarly, the term aorgisch, subsequently translated as “aorgic,” does not refer to the merely lifeless but designates, in the course of this translation, the unreflexive, unrepresented, disorganizing manifestation of nature. [p.168a.b]

Hölderlin, Friedrich. Essays and Letters on Theory. Thomas Pfau, trans & ed. Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1988.

Deleuze's Kant: Bodily Intensity, Sublime Catastrophe

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Corry Shores, Entry Directory]
[Deleuze, Entry Directory]

[Other entries in this Rhythm of Sensation series]

[The following is taken from my master's thesis, The Rhythm of Sensation on the Surface of Sense: Communication in Deleuze as NonSensed and Intense, pages 41-46. Completed, defended, and archived June 2008. I present this material here as reference for later work on Kant, Deleuze, and common sense.]

1. Sublime Intensity

We may trace Deleuze’s notion of intensity to his commentary on the role of intensive magnitudes in Kant’s sublime and the resulting violence and discord of the faculties. When our faculties function normally in sensation, the object we encounter is given to us with extensive magnitudes: it extends in time and space. Yet for Kant, the phenomenal object is not something that merely bears extensive magnitudes, it itself is a magnitude: “we might think of a walking stick as having a magnitude of [one meter]... in contrast, Kant thinks of the walking stick as being a magnitude.”[1] Objects appear to us with temporal and spatial features; thus, to be a phenomenal object is to be a magnitude (eine Größe sein), and we may estimate how great (wie groß) the extent of the magnitude (Größe) is.[2] When we confront an object, we do not grasp its extensive dimensions all at once; for, no matter how small the object, a passage of time is required to scan its full spatial extent.[3] It is not until we take all the extensive parts together that we comprehend the object, to take it as a whole; but this is done through a succession of apprehensions of the parts which are then retroactively synthesized into a whole. The imagination does this by reproducing the representations of the previously apprehended parts and then uniting them all into a synthetic representation of the entire object. The understanding then proceeds to recognize the object by identifying it with its proper concept. This harmonious cooperation of the faculties recognizing a shared object is our “common sense.”[4]

Unlike the magnitudes of these recognized objects whose extensive features we apprehend successively, intensive magnitudes are apprehended instantaneously and entirely, and their magnitude is a matter of their degree of influence on our senses. For example, the full moon’s diameter may appear to be only somewhat less than the sun. However, emanating from this same approximate extent of space is a vast difference of intensity: the moonlight’s glimmer is pale in comparison to the sun’s shine, which is “about 200,000 illuminations of the moon,” so bright as to burn the retinas of our eyes.[5] Yet, even though upon reflection we may compare their intensities according to standard moon-units of brightness, we do not perceive the intensity as having such a quantity, but instead only as being an unextended magnitude of greatness.

When experiencing the mathematical sublime, we confront something formless whose extensive magnitude is absolutely great (schlecthin groß).[6] As such, there can be no end to the succession of apprehensions; and, our imagination, which dually reproduces passing appearances while representing those still appearing, encounters the limit of the amount of representations it may reproduce and synthesize into one object. Yet still, we desire the pleasure that results when our faculties fulfill their purpose of comprehension, and thus we add to the violence that the imagination already experiences from its being pushed past its limits, by pressuring the faculties to comprehend the absolutely great object. However, on account of its endless magnitude, the absolutely great object cannot be represented by comprehending its extensive parts. The best the imagination can do is represent the “subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious even in their contrast.”[7] That is to say, our faculties cannot represent the object, but rather only their own failed coordinated efforts to do so. This “negative” representation is then correlated with reason’s idea of the absolute whole, and thereby the violence is resolved, and our pain from the sublime experience is replaced by the pleasure of satisfying our purpose as rational creatures.[8]

In these cases when no extensive magnitude is sensed, only intensive magnitudes are experienced; however, Kant still subordinates intensity to extensity. Magnitude is homogeneous, because it is made up of numerically diverse identical parts.[9] By comprehending the parts of an extensive magnitude into a whole, and then by comparing that whole with another magnitude, we measure the extensities of objects. Intensity, however, is not given in its parts, so its quantity is represented only by artificially imposing an extensive-like measure upon its magnitude, as if it extended in a homogeneously quantified dimension. We will find that for Deleuze, intensity is likewise a quantity, yet not a homogenous one; and he detects an implicit evaluation of a chaotic heterogeneous rhythm in Kant’s sublime experiences.

2. Bodily Catastrophe

As we described previously, in Kant’s experience of the sublime we encounter something whose magnitude exceeds our capacities to comprehend it. Normally we apprehend objects part-by-part in their chain of succession, eventually comprehending them together, which, Deleuze explains, we accomplish by selecting an apprehension to function as a standard unit of measure. This unit should be in proportional “harmony” with what it measures, although it varies for each instance, because, he says, “apprehending successive parts implies... something like a lived evaluation of a unit of measure. But in following the nature of objects there is no constant unit of measure,” (Appréhender des parties successives ça implique… déjà comme une espèce d’évaluation vécue d’une unité de mesure. Or suivant la nature des objets il n’y a pas d’unité de mesure constante).^[10]

For example, when seeing a tree, we might apprehend the parts by looking first to the top, then move our eyes bit-by-bit towards the bottom, thereby assessing that the tree has a height of ten people. But when seeing the mountain behind the tree, we look-it up to the top and assess it as ten trees tall. So the unit of measure varies according to the circumstance, but in each case, it must be in due proportion and harmony with the object it measures. What must be involved in these acts of comprehension, Deleuze suggests, is an aesthetic comprehension of the unit of measure, based on an evaluation of the “rhythm” of the succession of apprehensions, as though they had a rate which could be quantified by juxtaposing a homogeneous part to the whole flow, like a beat with a particular tempo.

Yet, as sublime experiences demonstrate, the rhythm cannot be assessed by an equal, steady, and consistent comparison of homogeneous differences; rather, this rhythm is continually heterogeneous and uneven. However, merely for the purpose of comprehending our experiences, we evaluate an approximate regularity in the flow of temporally and spatially determined apprehensions, as Deleuze says, “we plunge into them in a sort of exploration,” (on s’enfonce comme dans une espèce d’exploration).^[11] Which is to say, that the proportions in our apprehensions are continually changing, as though we were looking upon our reflection in a carnival mirror from different angles at a time. Objects, then, are originally given to us as deformations, because they appear at varying scales, distances, and angles.

This inconsistency of proportion is one reason that Deleuze discovers a heterogeneous rhythm in Kant’s notion of perception. We should look first at the metaphorical implications of the term rhythm. We normally measure temporal rhythm by consistent ratios: the clock ticks were one per second. Kant’s aesthetic comprehension of a unit of measure is analogous, but considered more in terms of spatial extent (‘ten trees per mountain’) rather than temporal extension (‘one tick per second’). However, there is also a sort of temporal rhythm to the apprehensions, because if, for instance, our eyes are moving more rapidly, then the smaller apprehensions might be arriving faster. As well, there is a temporal rhythm to our comprehensions, because if we were standing far from the tree, we would comprehend its size quicker than if we were standing underneath it; because, from this more awkward angle, we would have greater difficulty comparing the disproportionate top with what lies near us at the bottom. Thus, it would require more apprehensions per comprehension.

But even in these exceptional examples, the difficulties we have in making aesthetic comprehensions is not a complete disaster to our perception, because we can adjust to the abnormalities after some time. Our exploratory “plunge” into the rhythmically irregular apprehensions results in our emerging with a sort of map or representative depiction of the objects and their correct spatiotemporal relativities to each other, despite them having been given without these universal regularities.

Yet, these evenly-proportional ratios between the measuring apprehension and the comprehension are not what Deleuze means by rhythm, which for him is chaos and catastrophe. He illustrates these notions with the powerful example of Kant’s sublime experiences. As we noted before, in these instances we perceive something with an absolute magnitude, which means that it goes beyond any possible measuring unit. For this reason, when perceiving it, there is no end to the succession of apprehensions; so, there is never a whole that can be measured with finite units. When we try to find one, the whole increases, and we continue to make larger-and-larger units, none being adequate: “each time I find one it is destroyed. So I am pushed as if by a wind at my back to choose bigger and bigger units of measure, and none is adequate” (Chaque fois que j’en trouve une, elle est détruite. Alors je suis poussé comme par un vent dans le dos à choisir des unités de mesure de plus en plus grandes, et aucune n’est adéquate).^[12] This is the first catastrophe: we become disoriented and dizzy, because without possessing a common universal measure, we do not have any stable point of orientation in our perception of the world around us. It is as though the whole world were appearing in a waving carnival mirror. We may then only distinguish “completely heterogeneous parts,” and as we come to have new apprehensions, we forget the prior ones, which pushes us “into going ever further and losing more and more,” enhancing our dizziness. This is the second catastrophe, in which we are no longer able to synthesize our apprehensions.^[13] For example, our eyes might move upwards from the mountain to the expanse of the starry night sky; and when trying to measure its extent, we continually discover that between each star are more fainter ones, and between those even more. We uncover galaxies in what we previously thought were but single points of light, so that it becomes impossible to assess the night sky’s extent, on account of its infinite depth: even its tiniest parts conceal cosmic expanses that are far beyond our comprehension.

As Deleuze explains, “beneath measures and their units, there are rhythms which give me, in each case, the aesthetic comprehension of the unit of measure. Beneath the measure there is the rhythm. But this is the catastrophe,” (Sous les mesures et leurs unités, il y a des rythmes qui me donnent, dans chaque cas, la compréhension esthétique de l’unité de mesure. Sous la mesure, il y a le rythme. Or la catastrophe est là).^[14] That is to say, we comprehend objects in the chaos of sensation by first aesthetically apprehending a unit to measure them. However, what determines the size of the measuring unit are the proportions and rates of our perceptions, which are not regular enough to be simplified into consistent numerical divisions; for, our sensations are given to us in a way that has both regularity and irregularity. Hence, spatiotemporal extents appear in unpredictable and varying ways, which nonetheless seem manageable. We continually try to find the proper units of measure, even though the irregularities of perception make it impossible for our measurements to be precise. This strange mixture of order and its opposite, which is inherent to all out sensations, is what Deleuze calls chaos. (Perhaps we might venture to say that Deleuze seems to think that for Kant, perceptions are given to us already with spatial and temporal features; however, the way these spatial and temporal features are given to us is without spatiotemporal regularity. Yet, we must artificially establish some regularity for the purpose of comprehension. So, the inherent irregularity of their way of being given to us, then, might be the rhythm of sensation in this Kantian context).

For Deleuze, this heterogeneous rhythm is what disorganizes our faculties, although this relation between the rhythm of sensation and the discord of the faculties calls for clarification. The internal conflict in sublime experiences is found primarily between the faculties of imagination, understanding, and reason, all of which strive together to obtain knowledge, which is our purpose as rational beings. Reason is the faculty that forces us to “unite the immensity of the sensible world into a whole,” (rien d’autre que la raison ne nous force à réunir en un tout l’immensité du monde sensible).^[15] The understanding provides us with concepts; the imagination synthesizes apprehensions into representations. When the understanding’s concept matches the imagination’s representation, the object is recognized.

Discord comes about in sublime experiences when this matching procedure is thwarted: the apprehensions are too numerous to synthesize, so the imagination never produces a complete representation that might correspond to a concept. Despite this impossibility of accord, reason violently pushes them to the limits of their capacities, which causes us to suffer pain.

If it is on account of the irregular rhythm of sensation that the imagination is unable comprehend the apprehensions, then we can see how rhythm is responsible for the disorganization of the faculties. We might also say metaphorically that they are out of synchrony, because when they recognize an object, they come together at the same moment, and then may together at once move-on to the next task. However, when they are in discord, the understanding might run through numerous possible concepts all while the imagination has synthesized only a few partial representations. Hence, we may consider the discord of the faculties both as a disruption of harmony and synchrony, the latter metaphor being important for regarding disorder in terms of rhythm.

Because we are continually thwarted from comprehending and recognizing the object in sublime experiences, Kant claims that we sense the object as formless.^[16] Deleuze adds that the object is also deformed (difforme), on account of the interesting way that he modifies Kant’s doctrine of the faculties.^[17] Deleuze's transformative renewal of this theory is central to his anti-phenomenological account of perception; so, he defends it with strong words, writing that Kant’s doctrine of the faculties is “an entirely necessary component of the system of philosophy.”^[18] We noted that in phenomenology, chaos becomes a factor in perception when our expectations are disappointed, because we have two conflicting possible syntheses; this conflict, then, temporarily suspends the unification of the sense data. Yet, object constitution happens on the level of the passive association of the constituent appearances of the objects, on the basis of kinship relations that refer to each other.^[19] Disappointment only occurs when we were wrong in our unifications. Phenomenology could not possibly mix chaos and order on this level, because the “agency” of the unification is found within the features of the appearances themselves: the tree’s leaves already bear such similar features as to not require a precise analysis of each one in order to determine that they are the foliage of one tree. According to Husserl, we associatively identify objects through connections of homogeneity, and distinguish them with relations of heterogeneity.^[20] If phenomenology took into consideration the chaotic rhythm of sensation that Deleuze describes (perhaps by giving a phenomenological analysis of sublime experiences), it would encounter the difficulty of explaining an associative synthesis of the heterogeneous.

Deleuze, however, is not interested in giving an account of passive synthesis. Rather, he wants to show that there is a sort of sensation that has nothing to do with synthesis and identification. And, the fact that it is chaotic presents no problem for Deleuze’s theory, because raw sensations do not require any sort of organizational procedure.

Hence Deleuze's interest in the faculties: by claiming that “phenomena” come about through a tension between 1) our tendency to find order where it is suggested, and 2) the inherent irregularities thwarting these efforts, Deleuze can account for experiences which we are more compelled to call sensations, on account of their engaging our empirical faculties to the maximum degree.

---

[1] Daniel Sutherland, “Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics and the Greek Mathematical Tradition,” (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 2, April, 2004), p, 158.

[2] Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt, 1957), B81; Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt, 1956), B203.

[3] Kritik der Reinen Vernunft B202-204.

[4] Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, Transl. Mark Lester (London: Columbia University Press, 1990, reprinted by Continuum, 2001), p.89. Logique de sens, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969), p.95-96.

[5] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transls. & Eds. Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B221.

[6] Immanuel Kant, Der Kritik der Urteilskraft, B81.

[7] Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Transls. & Eds. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.142.

[8] Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.143.

[9] Sutherland, “Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics,” p.168.

[10] Gilles Deleuze, “Cours Vincennes: synthesis and time - 28/03/1978,” webdeleuze.com.

[11] Gilles Deleuze, “Cours Vincennes: synthesis and time - 28/03/1978,” webdeleuze.com.

[12] Gilles Deleuze, “Cours Vincennes: synthesis and time - 28/03/1978,” webdeleuze.com.

[13] Gilles Deleuze, “Cours Vincennes: synthesis and time - 28/03/1978,” webdeleuze.com.

[14] Gilles Deleuze, “Cours Vincennes: synthesis and time - 28/03/1978,” webdeleuze.com.

[15] Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, Transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam, (London: The Athlone Press, 1984,) p.51. La philosophie critique de Kant : doctrines des facultés, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, originally 1963,) p.74.

[16] “das Erhabene ist dagegen auch an einem formlosen Gegenstande zu finden,” Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft¸ B76.

[17] Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, p.50. La philosophie critique de Kant, p.73.

[18] Gilles Deleuze, Différence et répétition, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p.143. Difference & Repetition, Transl. Paul Patton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.186.

[19] Husserl, Edmund, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Ed. Rudolf Bernet, Transl. Anthony J. Steinbock, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), p. 175.

[20] Husserl, p.175.

[Labels continuation entry]