Stoic Logic and Semantics. "The Components of Expression and Meaning," Ch 5.5.2 of Luhtala, On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

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Anneli Luhtala

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

Chapter 5: The Stoics

5.5.2

The Components of Expression (Σημαινοντα, Semainonta)

and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα, Semainomena)

Previously we noted that the Stoics divided dialectic into two parts:

a) 'that which signifies'(σημαινοντα, semainonta), or 'vocal sounds' (φωναι, phonai). and

b) 'that which is signified' (σημαινόμενα, semainomena), or 'meaning' (again, σημαινόμενα, semainomena), or 'sayable' (λεκτά, lekta).

[Note that Mates translates semainon (σημαινον) as the 'significans,' which is equivalent to the sign, signal, sound, or Zeichen. The sound "Di - on" is the significans for Dion. The semainomenon (σημαινομενον) he calls the 'significate,' and it is equivalent to the connotation, intension, sense, thought/concept, Sinn, or lekton (λεκτον). The significate is what the Barbarian does not understand when he hears the sound "Di - on." And it is incorporeal. Finally he calls tygchanon (τυγχάνον) 'that which exists.' It is the same as the denotation, extension, meaning, external object, or Bedeutung. In our example, Dion himself is 'that which exists.']

The 'word' (λέξις, lexis) is the articulate form of the 'vocal sound' (φωνή, phone). (70b)

Luhtala will call "expression" the component of

σημαινοντα/φωναι/λέξις

(semainonta/phonai/lexis)

(that which signifies/vocal sounds/word).

And she will call "meaning" or "sayables" the component of

σημαινόμενα/λεκτά

(semainomena/lekta)

(that which is signified/sayable).

Aristotle merely distinguished two constituents of the proposition: ‘noun’/‘subject’ (ονομα, onoma) and ‘verb’/‘predicate’ (ρημα, rema). The Stoics however developed a much more detailed system. (71d)

True and false statements are made in the meaning component (σημαινόμενα, semainomena). (72c)

truth and falsehood do not pertain to individual words (φωναι, phonai) but to their combination. (72c)

Hence truth and falsity are part of incorporeal meaning. According to Diogenes Laertius,

Φωνή (Phone, 'voice') differs from λέξις (lexis, 'articulated sound'). Because, while the former may include mere noise, the latter is always articulate. Λέξις (Lexis, ‘articulate sound') again differs from λόγος (logos, ‘speech’ or ‘sentence’) because the latter always signifies something, whereas a λέξις (lexis, 'articulated sound'), as for example blituri, may be unintelligible, which a λόγος (logos, ‘speech’ or ‘sentence’) never is. And speaking/saying (λέγειν, legein) is different from uttering (προφέρεσθαι, propheresthai); for while vocal sounds (φωναι, phonai) are uttered, states of affairs (πράγματα, pragmata) are said, and sayables pertain to states of affairs. [Diog. Laert. VII, 56-57] (qt 72-73) [See another translation and discussion of Deleuze's distinction between the corporeal and incorporeal at this entry.]

Here we distinguish two types of speech acts associated with two kinds of linguistic items:

1) uttering (προφέρεσθαι, propheresthai) associated with vocal sounds (φωναι, phonai). These belong to the expression component; and

2) speaking (λέγειν, legein) associated with states of affairs (πράγματα, pragmata). As well, sayables (λεκτά, lekta) also pertain to states of affairs. These belong to the meaning component.

Diogenes of Babylon notes that both the articulate speech of discourse and raw vocal sounds come from the throat. He concludes that we do not construct meaning in our minds, but from deeper down in our bodies, in our hearts. (74a-c) Chrysippus makes the same argument. (74d)

Sayables could be uttered, but they need not be. Chrysippus says that they belong to the "preparation of utterance in the mind." (75bc)

But when sayables are actually spoken, they take the form of corporeal speech (λόγω, logo).

the rational impression (φαντασία, phantasia) comes first, then thought which is able to speak (διάνοια έκλαλητική, dianoia eklaletike) expresses its experience by means of speech (λόγω, logo). [Diog. Laert. VII, 49] (75c)

Stoics further made semantic distinctions in ontological terms. Phonetic vocal utterances belong to the corporeal sphere. Thinking and statement-making belong to the incorporeal sphere.

The voice (φωνή, phone) is corporeal, because it "has an effect." (75d) Diogenes Laertius writes:

For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect for whatever produces an effect is corporeal. Voice, as it proceeds form those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. [diog. Laert. VII, 55 = SVF, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 2.140 tr. R.H. Hicks; cf. Aet. Plac. IV 20, 2 = SVF 2.387 and Suda s.v. σωμα soma]. (qtd 75-76, emphasis mine)

For the Stoic's semantic ontology, there are three units:

a) the corporeal sound (for Mates: significans) ,

b) its 'signification' (significate), and

c) the referent (that which exists).

The corporeal sound and its signification belong to the domain of dialectic. The referent or "the object in the external world" is what activates our impressions. It belongs to the Stoic's physical theory. Sextus Empiricus describes these distinctions:

The Stoics defended the first opinion (according to which true and false is a question of the signification), saying that three things are linked together, 'the signification', 'the signifier', and 'the name-bearer'. The signifier is an utterance, for instance 'Dion'; the signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal – the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false. [Adv. math. VIII, 11-13, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 195] (qt 76bc)

Luhtala explains that the authentic Stoic sources to not make such clear-cut distinctions. For example, the word "Dion" by itself cannot be true or false. Only a proposition like "Dion walks" can have that property. (77a-b)

Luhtala, Anneli. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 2000.

Sound, Speech, and Statement in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book VII, §57, and in Deleuze's Logic of Sense (Logique du Sens)

by Corry Shores
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Diogenes Laertius

Lives of Eminent Philosophers

(Βίοι καὶ γνῶμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων)

Book VII

§57

Language's elements are the alphabet's 24 letters.

The term "letter" has three meanings:

1) the spoken letter's particular sound, and

2) the written letter's symbol or character,

3) the letter's name; for example, 'alpha' for α.

Now, there is a difference between voice and speech.

1) the voice might just be mere noises from the mouth. But,

2) speech must always be articulate.

And, there is a further difference between speech and a sentence (or statement):

1) a sentence or statement always signifies something, and is never unintelligible. However,

2) a spoken word need not always signify something. For example blituri (βλίτυρι) is unintelligible, yet still it is a spoken word.

And to frame a sentence is more than mere utterance, for while vocal sounds are uttered, things are meant, that is, are matters of discourse. (text page 167a)

In Logic of Sense (Loqique du Sens), Deleuze distinguishes bodily non-sense expressions and surface articulations.

To render language possible thus signifies assuring that sounds are not confused with the sonorous qualities of things, with the sound effects of bodies, or with their actions and passions. What renders language possible is that which separates sounds from bodies and organizes them into propositions, freeing them for the expressive function. It is always a mouth which speaks; but the sound is no longer the noise of a body which eats – a pure orality – in order to become the manifestation of a subject expressing itself. One speaks always of bodies and their mixtures, but sounds have ceased being qualities attached to these bodies in order that they may enter into a new relation with them, that of denotation, and that they may express this power of speaking and of being spoken. Denotation and manifestation do not found language, they are only made possible with it. They presuppose the expression. The expression is founded on the event, as an entity of the expressible or the expressed. What renders language possible is the event is confused neither with the proposition which expresses it, nor with the state of affairs denoted by the proposition. And in truth, without the event all of this would be only noise – and an indistinct noise." (Logic of Sense 208-209)

Rendre le langage possible signifie ceci : faire que les sons ne se confondent pas avec les qualités sonores des choses, avec le bruitage des corps, avec leurs actions et passions. Ce qui rend le langage possible, c’est ce qui sépare les sons des corps et les organize en propositions, les rend libres pour la fonction expressive. C’est toujours une bouche qui parle ; mais le son a cessé d’être le bruit d’un corps qui mange, pure oralité, pour devenir la manifestation d’un sujet qui s’exprime. C’est toujours des corps et de leurs mélanges qu’on parle, mais les sons ont cessé d’être des qualités attenant à ces corps pour entrer avec eux dans un nouveau rapport, celui de la désignation, et exprimer ce pouvoir de parler et d’être parlé. Or la désignation et la manifestation ne fondent pas le langage, elles ne sont rendues possibles qu’avec lui. Elles supposent l’expression. L’expression se fonde sur l’événement comme entité de l’exprimable ou de l’exprimé. Ce qui rend le langage possible, c’est l’événement, en tant qu’il ne se confond ni avec la proposition qui l’exprime, ni avec l’état de celui qui la prononce, ni avec l’état de choses désigné par la proposition. Et. en vérité, tout cela ne serait qui bruit sans l’événement, et bruit indistinct. (Loqique du Sens 212-213)

Images from the Diogenes text [click image for an enlargement]:

From:

Deleuze, Gilles. Logic of Sense. Transl. Mark Lester. London:Columbia University Press, 1990, reprinted by Continuum, 2001.

Deleuze, Gilles. Logique du Sens. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969.

Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Vol 2. Transl. R.D. Hicks. London: William Heinemann, 1925.

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/livesandopinions00diogiala