Showing posts with label interpretation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label interpretation. Show all posts

17 May 2009

The Art of Aphoristic Interpretation in Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Prologue, 8




[The following is summary. The original text is reproduced below.]


Friedrich Nietzsche

On the Genealogy of Morals:
A Polemical Tract

Prologue

8



Nietzsche claims his text is written clearly, especially when compared to such earlier works as Thus Spoke Zarathustra. That text only becomes clear after one struggles with it. Before we can understand it clearly, we must be "deeply wounded by and profoundly delighted with every word in it." Another way that Nietzsche's lucid writing may be difficult is when it is written aphoristically. But aphorisms are impossible to understand only on the first read. They must be re-read over-and-over, and pondered at length. Only then can they be explicated by skillfully employing the art of interpretation. Nietzsche will demonstrate how this is done in the third book. There he will begin with an aphorism, and spend the rest of the book commenting on it. We see then, that reading itself as restructive interpretation is a compositional art form.
Of course, in order to practice this style of reading as art, one thing is above all essential, something that today has been thoroughly forgotten—and so it will require still more time before my writings are “readable”—something for which one almost needs to be a cow, at any rate not a “modern man”—rumination.

From the Ian Johnston Translation:

On the Genealogy of Morals
A Polemical Tract
Prologue

8


If this writing is incomprehensible to someone or other and hurts his ears, the blame for that, it strikes me, is not necessarily mine. The writing is sufficiently clear given the conditions I set out—that you have first read my earlier writings and have taken some trouble to do that, for, in fact, these works are not easily accessible. For example, so far as my Zarathustra is concerned, I don’t consider anyone knowledgeable about it who has not at some time or another been deeply wounded by and profoundly delighted with every word in it.* For only then can he enjoy the privilege of sharing with reverence in the halcyon element out of which that work was born, in its sunny clarity, distance, breadth, and certainty. In other cases the aphoristic form creates difficulties. These stem from the fact that nowadays people don’t take this form seriously enough. An aphorism, properly stamped and poured, has not yet been “deciphered” simply by being read. It’s much more the case that only now can one begin to explicate it, and that requires an art of interpretation. In the third essay of this book I have set out a model of what I call an “interpretation” for such a case.—In this essay an aphorism is presented, and the essay itself is a commentary on it. Of course, in order to practice this style of reading as art, one thing is above all essential, something that today has been thoroughly forgotten—and so it will require still more time before my writings are “readable”—something for which one almost needs to be a cow, at any rate not a “modern man”—rumination.

Sils-Maria, Oberengadin
July 1887



Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals. Transl. Ian Johnston. Copyright information can be found here.
Available online at:

25 Jan 2009

Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 1, §24 "Pleasure and Pain as Signs of the Future Reaction rather than Psychic Translations of the Past Stimulus"


by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary; my commentary is in brackets.]




Bergson, Time and Free Will

(Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience)


Chapter I, "The Intensity of Psychic States"

Part VIII: "Affective Sensations"


§24 "Pleasure and Pain as Signs of the Future Reaction rather than Psychic Translations of the Past Stimulus"


We normally think that pleasure and pain express what our bodies experience at that moment or what they had experienced just previously.


Bergson proposes another possibility. Perhaps pleasure and pain point to what is going to take place, "or what is tending to take place" (emphasis mine. 33c). Of course it could be that our species only evolved the capacity to keep notice of what occurs in the past and in the present. However, we should expect nature to endow us with traits that are actually useful. Responding just the past and the present is mostly useless, because they pass away so quickly.


Now consider that we have automatic (reflexive) and free movements. They are not rigorously distinct. Rather, there are varying levels between them.


[Say a bright light hits our eyes. Our reaction is to retract. If for some reason we needed to look that direction, we would have to enact a movement out of our own volition. So we have to counteract the automatic motion.


Perhaps our habit is to lie in bed rather than to awake promptly to the alarm. We have two ways to will ourselves against this automatic return to dormancy. We might either

1) make ourselves feel bad if we give-in to our reflexive return to sleep. Or

2) we could find reward in awaking. "Why it's great to wake up early!" we might have ourselves believe, and thereby feel pleasure for resisting our reactions.

So two ways we may enact volitional movements is by means of pleasure and pain. For, we need some powerful mediating force to counteract our automatic reflexes.]


When we have free movements, we introduce an "affective sensation" between the external action impressing upon us and our volitional reaction that soon follows. It could be that there are organisms which only have automatic reflexes, and never use their consciousness as an "intermediate agent" between stimulus and response. Most likely, argues Bergson, the purpose of pleasure and pain is to help us resist our automatic reactions. (33-34)


In order for pain and pleasure to serve as prevention against reflex movements, they must presuppose their arrival or continuation. In this sense, pleasure and pain are responding to future events that seem certain will occur. [This is conceivable, given that our bodies can be aware of their patterns of response. So when a stimulus is present, continuing, or expectable, we should be able to know also how we would normally respond, in an instinctive way.]


Pleasure and pain are sensations on a bodily level. They are responses to future events. So we may interpret them as signs for our future automatic movements. Thus our affective states correspond to

1) what has happened,

2) what is happening, and

3) what is about to happen.



[Next entry in this series.]





Images from the pages summarized above, in the English Translation [click on the image for an enlargement]:





Images from the pages summarized above, in the original French [click on the image for an enlargement]:








Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. F. L. Pogson, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001).

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog


French text from:

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888.

http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft