.jpeg)
by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]
[Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, entry directory]
[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes.]
Summary of
W. V. Quine
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
0.
[introductory material]
Brief summary (collecting those below):
(0.1)
[Quine claims that modern empiricism is largely under the influence of two main beliefs (“dogmas”). Quine will show that both lack foundation. {1} This first one is that truths are distinctly either: {1a} synthetic, meaning that they they are grounded in fact, or they are {1b} analytic, meaning that they grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact. {2} The second belief is reductionism, namely, that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a formulation that is constructed using rules of logic and whose terms refer to immediate experience. Were we to abandon these dogmas, there would be two effects: {A} the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science would blur; and {B} we would shift to pragmatism.]
[The Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Analytic/Synthetic; Reductionism). Results of Abandoning Them.]
Summary
[The Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Analytic/Synthetic; Reductionism). Results of Abandoning Them.]
[Quine claims that modern empiricism is largely under the influence of two main beliefs (“dogmas”). Quine will show that both lack foundation. {1} This first one is that truths are distinctly either: {1a} synthetic, meaning that they they are grounded in fact, or they are {1b} analytic, meaning that they grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact. {2} The second belief is reductionism, namely, that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a formulation that is constructed using rules of logic and whose terms refer to immediate experience. Were we to abandon these dogmas, there would be two effects: {A} the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science would blur; and {B} we would shift to pragmatism.]
[ditto]
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism.
(20)
Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” The Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.
.
.
