Showing posts with label number. Show all posts
Showing posts with label number. Show all posts

5 Jun 2019

Heyting (2.2.1) Intuitionism: An Introduction. Section 2.2.1, “[Real Number-Generators:] Definition; Relation of Coexistence”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. I am not a mathematician, so please consult the original text instead of trusting my summarizations, which are possibly mistaken and probably inelegantly articulated. Bracketed comments and subsection divisions are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes.]

 

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Arend Heyting

 

Intuitionism: An Introduction

 

2.

Arithmetic

 

2.2

“Real Number Generators”

 

2.2.1

Definition; Relation of Coexistence

 

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(2.2.1.1) We will examine the theory of real numbers in intuitionistic mathematics by beginning with Cantor’s theory. (2.2.1.2) A Cauchy sequence is one with a series of rational numbers that progressively tend toward an ultimate value, with the gap between successive numbers narrowing upon that ultimate value. Formally:

‘A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k), such that |an+pan| < 1/k for every natural number p.’

(16)

(2.2.1.3) We can devise an example using a sequence, namely the decimal series of π, and make a stipulation regarding some part of it, even though we may not even know if such a part of it does in fact exist. [This perhaps shows us an instance where we cannot effectively determine n(k).] (2.2.1.4) We call a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers a “real number-generator,” or just simply a “number-generator,” if that leads to no confusion. (2.2.1.5) “Two number-generators a ≡ {an} and b ≡ {bn} are identical, if an = bn for every n. We express this relation by ab.” [This perhaps means that if each nth term in both series is equal to the other, then the number-generators are identical.] (2.2.1.6) The second definition is: “The number-generators a ≡ {an} and b ≡ {bn} coincide, if for every k we can find n = n(k) such that |an+pb n+p| < 1/k for every p. This relation is denoted by a = b.” [This perhaps is to say that although the terms of the two sequences may not be identically the same, they still converge upon the same value.] (2.2.1.7) There is a theorem about coinciding number-generators, namely, that they are reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. (2.2.1.8) Heyting remarks: “Given any number-generator a ≡ {an}, a number  generator b ≡ {bn} can be found such that a = b and that the sequence {bn} converges as rapidly as we wish. For instance, in order that |bn+pbn| < 1/n for every n and p, it suffices to take bk = an(k) for every k.” [Perhaps the idea is that for every number-generator, we can find another coinciding one, with the identical one being one option.] (2.2.1.9) We can abbreviate a number generator v = {vn} as just v, and vn (without curly brackets) would be the nth component in the sequence v. (2.2.1.10) We will define real numbers in chapter 3, after dealing with set theory, which is requisite.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

2.2.1.1

[Introducing the Topic]

 

2.2.1.2

[Cauchy Sequences Defined]

 

2.2.1.3

[An Example]

 

2.2.1.4

[Definition 1a: The Real Number-Generator]

 

2.2.1.5

[Definition 1b: The Identity of Number Generators]

 

2.2.1.6

[Definition 2: The Coincidence of Number-Generators]

 

2.2.1.7

[A Theorem on Coinciding Number-Generators: Reflexivity, Symmetry, Transitivity]

 

2.2.1.8

[Remark: Finding Coinciding Number-Generators]

 

2.2.1.9

[Abbreviation for Number Generators]

 

2.2.1.10

[Postponing Real Numbers Until After Set Theory]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.2.1.1

[Introducing the Topic]

 

[We will examine the theory of real numbers in intuitionistic mathematics by beginning with Cantor’s theory.]

 

[ditto]

INT. Yes, but at the next station, that of real numbers, we enter a totally different landscape. As in the classical mathematics, so in intuitionism different equivalent theories of real numbers are possible [L. E. J. Brouwer 1919A, p. 3; A. Heyting 1935]. I shall briefly expound Cantor’s theory, which has some advantages for our purpose.

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BROUWER, L. E. J.

1919A. Begründung der mengenlehre unabhängig vom logischen satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten. Zweiter Teil. Verhandelingen Akad. Amsterdam 12, N° 7.

(123)

HEYTING, A.

1935. Intuitionistische wiskunde. Mathematica B (Leiden) 4, p. 72–82, 123–136; 5, p. 62–80, 105–112; 7, p. 129-141.

(128)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.2

[Cauchy Sequences Defined]

 

[A Cauchy sequence is one with a series of rational numbers that progressively tend toward an ultimate value, with the gap between successive numbers narrowing upon that ultimate value. Formally:

‘A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k), such that |an+pan| < 1/k for every natural number p.’

(16)]

 

[(It gets technical, and I will need to build from more basic ideas that we have addressed previously. Let me first give the quotation, and we will break it down as best as I can, but you are advised to consult a real mathematician here.

Let us suppose that the theory of rationals, including their order relations, has been developed. A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k), such that |an+pan| < 1/k for every natural number p. This must be so understood, that, given k, we are able to determine effectively n(k).

(16)

And we begin with the first line:

Let us suppose that the theory of rationals, including their order relations, has been developed.

So we are assuming that we have an idea of rational numbers (which are ones that can be expressed as an integer over an integer. See Wildberger, Math Foundations 13, 01.30.] And we also have an idea of their ordering, which may be the idea of sequence that we get next.

A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k), such that |an+pan| < 1/k for every natural number p.

First we need to understand what a “sequence {an}” is. I am not entirely certain, but it would seem to be, at this early stage, a series of increasing rational numbers. (It may be something like the series Wildberger calculates in Math Foundations 92, 12.25.) Such sequences can have any sort of series on increasing integers, but we will talk about a particular kind, called Cauchy sequences. We discussed them already in Wildberger, Math Foundations 111, sections 111.1-111.8, and I will try to convert that as best as I can to what is given here. The basic nature of the Cauchy sequence is that it is an increasing series of rational numbers, but as you go down along the sequence, they tend toward a certain value progressively and interchangingly. So the first one will be very high for instance from the ultimate value, then next will be very low (but still closer), soon one will be a little high, the next a little low. And presumably they converge upon a value. Wildberger, in Math Foundations 111.6, shows this gradual, interchanging convergence of the values with this diagram:

The green line is the value that the series of rationals are tending toward. The idea was that no matter how small an interval you choose, you will be able to find a place in the sequence after which the gaps between successive values (the space above and below the green line) will be less than that arbitrarily small interval. This implies that it is always moving toward some specific value (the green line). So let us go very slowly here through the definition.

A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k ...

The new concept here is the natural number k. But as we will see, it will function ultimately as the arbitrarily small value that we mentioned above. We obtain it by dividing k by one, as we learn soon enough. So the idea is that no matter how large you make k (and ultimately, no matter how small an interval you choose), the sequence will continue by narrowing between that gap, starting from some place within the sequence. Let us continue:

A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k),

I am not entirely certain, but it seem that this n is like the N in Wildberger’s diagram:

It signifies the nth item in the sequence. Maybe n = n(k) is like a function saying that to the k value there corresponds a place along the sequence that fulfills the stipulations to come. But I am not sure. Yet, if that were the case, then the formula would make sense for me. To continue:

A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k), such that |an+pan| < 1/k for every natural number p.

Let us first notice the 1/k. This we said was like the arbitrarily small number. We also now have p. It will serve the function of saying that no matter where you go after that nth term in sequence, the differences between any two successors will be less than that arbitrarily small value. Let us break that down:

|an+pan|

In the first place, we are finding an absolute value. It is like the gap or distance between two successive values. Suppose p is 1. That means we are dealing with the n value and its successor. The gap between them will be less than the arbitrary value.

|an+pan| < 1/k

Now, since in a Cauchy sequence the gap narrows, that means any gap further down the sequence will have to be smaller than that first one and thus smaller than the arbitrarily small value. So no matter how large the p (that is, no matter how far along the series you choose to go after that point), the gap between successive values will fit within the arbitrarily small interval.)]

Let us suppose that the theory of rationals, including their order relations, has been developed. A sequence {an} of rational numbers is called a Cauchy sequence, if for every natural number k we can find a natural number n = n(k), such that |an+pan| < 1/k for every natural number p. This must be so understood, that, given k, we are able to determine effectively n(k).

(16)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.3

[An Example]

 

[We can devise an example using a sequence, namely the decimal series of π, and make a stipulation regarding some part of it, even though we may not even know if such a part of it does in fact exist. [This perhaps shows us an instance where we cannot effectively determine n(k).]]

 

[(I do not comprehend this example, so please consult the quotation below. I am guessing wildly that the example is to illustrate the previous sentence, “This must be so understood, that, given k, we are able to determine effectively n(k),” by showing a case where the corresponding n term cannot be found, at least currently. Sorry, please see for yourself.)]

Example. The sequence a ≡ {2n} is a Cauchy sequence. Let the sequence b ≡ {bn} be defined as follows : If the nth digit after the decimal point in the decimal expansion of π is the 9 of the first sequence 0123456789 in this expansion, bn = 1, in every other case bn = 2n. b differs from a in at most one term, so b is classically a Cauchy sequence, but as long as we do not know whether a sequence 0123456789 occurs in π, we are not able to find n such that |bn+pbn| < 1/2 for every p; we have no right to assert that b is a Cauchy sequence in our sense.

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[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.4

[Definition 1a: The Real Number-Generator]

 

[We call a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers a “real number-generator,” or just simply a “number-generator,” if that leads to no confusion.]

 

[ditto]

Definition  1. A Cauchy sequence of rational numbers is a real number-generator. Where no confusion is possible, we shall speak briefly of a number-generator.

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[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.5

[Definition 1b: The Identity of Number Generators]

 

[“Two number-generators a ≡ {an} and b ≡ {bn} are identical, if an = bn for every n. We express this relation by ab.” [This perhaps means that if each nth term in both series is equal to the other, then the number-generators are identical.]]

 

[I am not certain, but the next idea I am supposing is the following. We will now define the identity between number generators. We will say if each nth term in each series (so the first item in the first sequence, along with the first item in the other, then the second item in the first sequence, along with the second item in the other, etc.) are the same for both sequences, then they are identical, which we write as using ≡: “]

Two number-generators a ≡ {an} and b ≡ {bn} are identical, if an = bn for every n. We express this relation by ab. The following notion of coincidence is more important.

(16)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.6

[Definition 2: The Coincidence of Number-Generators]

 

[The second definition is: “The number-generators a ≡ {an} and b ≡ {bn} coincide, if for every k we can find n = n(k) such that |an+pb n+p| < 1/k for every p. This relation is denoted by a = b.” [This perhaps is to say that although the terms of the two sequences may not be identically the same, they still converge upon the same value.]]

 

[I do not understand the following definition for the coincidence of number-generators, but I wonder, guessingly, if it is the following. In the identity of generators, each nth term needed to be equal for each sequence. But perhaps now we will have two sequences that may not have the same series of terms, but still converge upon the same value. Yet it is probably something else. There also seems to be the idea that, after a certain point, their corresponding nth terms will always fall within a gap smaller than any arbitrarily given one. So maybe the idea is that eventually the pairings will coincide even if they did not begin that way. I am guessing wildly.)]

Definition 2. The number-generators a ≡ {an} and b ≡ {bn} coincide, if for every k we can find n = n(k) such that |an+pb n+p| < 1/k for every p. This relation is denoted by a = b.

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[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.7

[A Theorem on Coinciding Number-Generators: Reflexivity, Symmetry, Transitivity]

 

[There is a theorem about coinciding number-generators, namely, that they are reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive.]

 

[ditto (For the meanings of these terms, see for instance Graham Priest’s Introduction to Non-Classical Logic sections 21.8.2 and 21.8.3, or section 9.2.6.)]

Theorem. The relation of coincidence between number-generators is reflexive, symmetrical and transitive. The easy proof is well-known.

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[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.8

[Remark: Finding Coinciding Number-Generators]

 

[Heyting remarks: “Given any number-generator a ≡ {an}, a number  generator b ≡ {bn} can be found such that a = b and that the sequence {bn} converges as rapidly as we wish. For instance, in order that |bn+pbn| < 1/n for every n and p, it suffices to take bk = an(k) for every k.” [Perhaps the idea is that for every number-generator, we can find another coinciding one, with the identical one being one option.]]

 

[(I do not get the next point, but I will guess it is the following. For any number-generator, we can find another one that coincides with the first, with one possibility being an identical one. See the quotation please.)]

Remark. Given any number-generator a ≡ {an}, a number | generator b ≡ {bn} can be found such that a = b and that the sequence {bn} converges as rapidly as we wish. For instance, in order that |bn+pbn| < 1/n for every n and p, it suffices to take bk = an(k) for every k.

(16-17)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.9

[Abbreviation for Number Generators]

 

[We can abbreviate a number generator v = {vn} as just v, and vn (without curly brackets) would be the nth component in the sequence v.]

 

[ditto]

If, in the following, a number-generator is denoted by one letter, v say, it will be silently understood that it can also be denoted by {vn}, so that vn is the nth component of the sequence v.

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[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2.1.10

[Postponing Real Numbers Until After Set Theory]

 

[We will define real numbers in chapter 3, after dealing with set theory, which is requisite.]

 

[ditto]

As the notion of a real number presupposes the fundamental notions of set theory, I postpone the definition of a real number (as a set of coincident number-generators) till chapter III.

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[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

Heyting, Arend. Intuitionism. An Introduction. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1956.

 

.

30 Dec 2009

Objective Divisibility §32. Ch.2.Duration as Immediate Datum. Bergsonism. Deleuze

[The following summarizes parts of Deleuze's Bergsonism. My commentary is in brackets. Paragraph subheadings are my own.]



Gilles Deleuze

Le bergsonisme
Bergsonism

Ch.2
La Durée comme donné immédiate
Duration as Immediate Datum


[For Bergson, duration changes in kind when we divide it. This is because it is thoroughly heterogeneous. But duration does not extend like space does. So we do not have half a duration when we split it. Rather, we have wholly different durations. There are never any self-same phases throughout a duration. It is continuously heterogeneous. (Consider seeing this entry. It discusses Riemann's influence on Bergson's notion of continuous multiplicity.]


§32 Objective Divisibility

[Duration is subjective. But we are also conscious of objective things in the world around us. And these extend in homogeneous space, unlike duration. Hence,] objective things (objects) are divisible, and when we divide them, they do not change in kind. Hence objectivity is what divides by differences in degree. [Deleuze cites Matter and Memory p.273. (Reference to be added later). Bergson writes here: "As long as we are dealing with space, we may carry the division as far as we please; we change in no way, thereby, the nature of what is divided. This is because space, by definition, is outside us; it is because a part of space appears to us to subsist even when we cease to be concerned with it; so that, even when we leave it undivided, we know that it can wait, and that a new effort of our imagination may decompose it when we choose. As, moreover, it never ceases to be space, it always implies juxtaposition and consequently possible division. Abstract space is, indeed, at bottom, no thing but the mental diagram of infinite divisibility. But with duration it is quite otherwise" (Bergson 273c.d).]

Numbers are the model for those things that can divide without changing their nature. Like numbers, objects are numerically divisible into units. Hence an object is a "numerical multiplicity / multiplicité numérique" (41d/34d). In a sense, such numerically divisible things already have the division implied within them. So Deleuze writes: "number has only differences in degree, or that its differences, whether realized or not, are always actual in it / le nombre n'a que des différences de degré, ou que ses différences, réalisées ou non, sont toujours actuelles en lui" (41d/34-35).

Something that does not extend also does not have parts and cannot be divided into parts. So what about the basic numerical units? If they are unities, then can they be divisible? If not, then they would have different degrees of difference within them. Rather, perhaps they might be like heterogeneities which change kind if they are divided. Consider for example when we add two units together. We regard each of these units as indivisible wholes that are combined with each other. So are such units indivisible? But later, we might divide that doubled unit by four. By doing so, we divide each of the previous wholes into halves. So in this way, the unity of the unit is provisional. Bergson says it obtains its unity in the mental act that regards it as such, for the temporary purpose of addition. But then for the purpose of division, the mind then regards the unit as divisible. Bergson writes in Time and Free Will §54, [underlined are the parts that Deleuze quotes]:

by looking more closely into the matter, we shall see that all unity is the unity of a simple act of the mind, and that, as this is an act of unification, there must be some multiplicity for it to unify. No doubt, at the moment at which I think each of these units separately, I look upon it as indivisible, since I am determined to think of its unity alone. But as soon as I put it aside in order to pass to the next, I objectify it, and by that very deed I make it a thing, that is to say, a multiplicity. To convince oneself of this, it is enough to notice that the units by means of which arithmetic forms numbers are provisional units, which can be subdivided without limit, and that each of them is the sum of fractional quantities as small and as numerous as we like to imagine. How could we divide the unit, if it were here that ultimate unity which characterizes a simple act of the mind? How could we split it up into fractions whilst affirming its unity, if we did not regard it implicitly as an extended object, one in intuition but multiple in space? You will never get out of an idea which you have formed anything which you have not put into it; and if the unity by means of which you make up your number is the unity of an act and not of an object, no effort of analysis will bring out of it anything but unity pure and simple. No doubt, when you equate the number 3 to the sum of 1 +1 + 1, nothing prevents you from regarding the units which compose it as indivisible: but the reason is that you do not choose to make use of the multiplicity which is enclosed within each of these units. Indeed, it is probable that the number 3 first assumes to our mind this simpler shape, because we think rather of the way in which we have obtained it than of the use which we might make of it. But we soon perceive that, while all multiplication implies the possibility of treating any number whatever as a provisional unit which can be added to itself, inversely the units in their turn are true numbers which are as big as we like, but are regarded as provisionally indivisible for the purpose of compounding them with one another. Now, the very admission that it is possible to divide the unit into as many parts as we like, shows that we regard it as extended. (Bergson Time and Free Will 80d.82b)



Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. F. L. Pogson, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001).

Available online at: http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog



Deleuze, Gilles. Bergsonism. Transl. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1991.Deleuze, Gilles.

Deleuze, Gilles. Le bergsonisme. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.





5 Jun 2009

Bateson, Natural Analog and Digital Computation, in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity

by Corry Shores
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Gregory Bateson

Mind and Nature:

A Necessary Unity

Ch. II

Every Schoolboy Knows

9. Number is Different from Quantity



Numbers are the product of counting. Quantities are the product of measurement. This must mean that numbers can conceivably be accurate because there is a discontinuity between each integer and the next. Between two and three, there is a jump. In the case of quantity, there is no such jump; and because jump is missing in the world of quantity, it is impossible for any quantity to be exact. You can have exactly three tomatoes. You can never have exactly three gallons of water. Always quantity is approximate.

Even when number and quantity are clearly discriminated, there is another concept that must be recognized and distinguished from both number and quantity. For this other concept, there is a sub-set of patterns whose members are the products of counting. Indeed, it is the smaller, and therefore commoner, numbers that are often not counted but recognized as patterns at a single glance. Card players do not stop to count the pips in the eight of spades and can even recognize the characteristic patterning of pips up to ‘ten’.

In other words, number is of the world of pattern, gestalt, and digital computation; quantity is of the world of analogic and probabilistic computation. (Bateson 59a.d, some emphasis mine)

Bateson illustrates with a bird experiment. There are birds that can distinguish number up to seven. The bird first flies to a cup. There is a limited number of pieces of meat in it. After it finishes, it may then fly to a plate with many more meat pieces than in the cup. But it is punished if it eats more plate pieces than were in the cup. Soon the bird learns to eat only as many plate pieces as were in the cup, and no more.

The question is if the bird computationally counted the plate meat-pieces, or used pattern recognition. The experimenter tried many tactics “to make it impossible for the jackdaw to create some sort of pattern or rhythm by which to recognize the number of the pieces of meat.” (60c) But despite these measures, we still might insist that “the taking of the meat from the cups becomes some sort of rhythmic dance and that this rhythm is in some way repeated when each bird takes the meat from the plate.” Nonetheless, the experiment does strongly suggest that the bird counts the meat. (60c)

Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. London: Wildwood House, 1979.

More information at:

http://books.google.be/books?id=aQtHAAAAMAAJ&q=Mind+and+Nature:+A+Necessary+Unity&dq=Mind+and+Nature:+A+Necessary+Unity&ei=CWcpSpDIF5TyzQSqiZj7Cg&hl=en&pgis=1



16 Mar 2009

Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 2, §77 "Eliminate the Superficial Psychic States and We no longer Perceive a Homogeneous Time ..."


Henri Bergson

Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness

Chapter II, "The Multiplicity of Conscious States," "The Idea of Duration"

Part XXVII: Real Duration

§77 "Eliminate the Superficial Psychic States and We no longer Perceive a Homogeneous Time or Measure Duration, but Feel It as a Quality"




Recall Bergson's experiment: we close our eyes and block-out the external world. We no longer experience linear homogeneous time. Rather, we experience just pure duration. [see §59 ]

We noted previously that we have an inner and outer psychic life. The inner life is made-up of a manifold of qualitatively different mental states. Nothing spans between them. So they all contract or interpermeate into one another. Hence these states do not fall along a linear continuum. So we cannot say that one comes before or after another. The outer psychic layer can place its segments along a temporal continuum that has been homogenized from our spatializing our durations. So on this higher level we can have sequential orders of distinguishable mental states. Thus the inner domain of pure consciousness uses this outer circle of psychic states as a "balance-wheel" to keep itself related to an ordered medium. Recall again the experiment when we block-out the higher level. Doing so eliminated our experience of homogeneous time and caused us to sense pure duration. But ordinarily when we speak of time, we mean this homogenized temporality. Yet, we only obtained this homogenized temporality by connecting real inner psychic states to symbolized and spatialized outer sensations. So it is only by means of the "gradual incursion of space into the domain of pure consciousness" that we obtain our ordinary sense of duration as spatialized homogeneous time. (126c.d)

[Consider a possible dream. We and our brother are flying somehow in the air. Our brother is talking about earlier times when we visited our grandparents. He tells us about the toy room. Now we find ourselves there as children in that toy room. But we also notice that we are no longer flying. Just then we observe that our brother is wearing a superhero cape from a costume we used to wear when playing. Yes, we have such a cape on too. Then we realize that we were not flying before, but just pretending. Here we see how we do not experience time as a temporal continuum in our dreams. Something new that happens changes the past, as though the present were more "prior" to the past. We were flying. Then we were playing. Therefore, we were not flying, but instead really playing. The posterior is prior to the anterior. The effect brings about the cause. We see that we do not experience linear temporality in dreams. Rather, each new event contracts with the rest. In this way, they all passively synthesize.]

When we dream, our ego no longer communicates in the same way with the outer world. This is also like the meditation demonstration when we block out the external world around us. And in both cases, we feel pure duration rather than measure it as a linear continuous extension. When awake, time is quantitative. But when asleep, it is qualitative. Our waken consciousness mathematically estimates past time. But when we are asleep, we lose this ability to apply mathematics to duration. Instead, our confused instincts take over. As instincts, they are capable of acting at times quite erroneously and at other times very skillfully.

So when we dream we experience this qualitative duration. And probably this is the duration that animals experience too. But even when awake we sometimes distinguish qualitative duration from the materialized quantitative time that has been extended into a spatial medium.

Bergson evokes an example. He is writing this book. Just now he hears a bell toll the hour. But he was so engrossed in his writing that he did not start paying close attention until after several tolls had transpired. Now he wants to learn the time. To do so, he goes back into his memory and recalls the different tolls that have already transpired. Then he adds them to those now occurring. But, he did not originally count the first tolls. Rather, each one "melted" into each other. Together they made a musical phrase that as a whole has a peculiar quality. Then afterward, he is able to distinguish each toll according to its qualitative differences. Thereby he counts four tolls and adds them to the remaining sounds.

And he obtained the number four by means of a qualitative criteria:
1) First he went back into his memory. He imagines one stroke. But this one stroke does not have the same qualitative feel as four.
2) Then he imagines two strokes. Again, the two strokes do not have the same qualitative feel as four strokes do. So once more, he imagines a stroke. But three still feel different than the qualitative feeling of the whole melodic phrase.
3) Finally he imagines four strokes. Together these four imagined strokes have the same qualitative feel as his impression of the whole phrase. Now he knows to stop counting the multiplicity.

So we see that we perceived the number of strokes firstly as a quality and not as a quantity. Likewise, duration is presented to our immediate consciousness in this qualitative form that has not yet obtain any quantitative characteristics. And, the duration remains in this qualitative form until we render it as a "symbolic representation derived from extensity." (128a)

[Directory of other entries in this series.]


Images from the pages summarized above, in the English Translation [click on the image for an enlargement]:






Images from the pages summarized above, in the original French [click on the image for an enlargement]:


Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. F. L. Pogson, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001).

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog


French text from:

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888.

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft






15 Mar 2009

Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 2, §75 "Two Kinds of Multiplicity: Two Senses of the Word 'Distinguish.'..."

by Corry Shores
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Henri Bergson

Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness

Chapter II, "The Multiplicity of Conscious States," "The Idea of Duration"

Part XXVI: Two Kinds of Multiplicity

§75 "Two Kinds of Multiplicity: Two Senses of the Word 'Distinguish.' The One Qualitative and the Other Quantitative."



Previously we discussed the way that bodies move through a continuum of space. Each place in space is distinct from the other. This makes them like numbers, which as well are distinct from each other and fall along a continuum. But to each place in an object's motion corresponds a moment of duration in our minds. And these instants of consciousness are not a part of an extensive continuum like space is. So there are not spaces between each mental state. And each mental state does not take up temporal "space." But because there is no space between these discrete consciousness states, they interpermeate [or "contract"] into each other.

Our conscious states are made-up of a discrete multiplicity. But they interpermeate, unlike numbers. Hence when we regard conscious states in their "original purity" [that is, in terms of their duration], we see that they are not multiple in the same way that numbers are multiple. So we must distinguish two types of multiplicity. But to do so, we need to look at other fundamental differences, namely, between qualitative and quantitative distinctions, and between same and other.

[Imagine that we are reading a book and there are illustrations on each page. Our friend later asks us about what we have read. We then recall one-by-one each page, based on the illustrations we saw. And we are able to describe what we learned from each page. Then our friend asks how many pages we have read. To give the answer, we must go back through and imagine each page, and count them one-by-one. So we see that we very easily made qualitative distinctions between each page. But we did not thereby count them or consider them quantitatively.]

Sometimes we first distinguish the parts of multiplicities qualitatively, but not yet quantitatively. Then afterward we might quantify them. In this way, the heterogeneous multiplicities potentially contain number, as Aristotle might say. [Here Bergson might be referring to Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential infinities. If we obtain an infinity by a continuous process of division or addition, then it is potentially infinite, but not actually infinite. For, it is obtained by means of an endless process.] So in this way we may have a multiplicity without quantity. (121-122)

We learned previously what we do when we count the parts of multiplicities. We distribute them into distinct places in real or idea space, even if they are durational, like successive tolls of a bell [see §57.] So it is by means of spatialization that we may have a multiplicity with a quantity.

The problem is that we normally confuse these two types of multiplicities, quantitative and qualitative. For, we often
a) use the same word for both,
b) use one of the two meanings to illustrate the other,
c) perceive one as being a part of the other, and thus we often
d) find it difficult to distinguish them or express their distinction in words.

Even Bergson has walked into this confusion when previously speaking of the multiplicity of conscious states. He has written of there being "several" conscious states that
1) are organized into a whole,
2) permeate one another, and
3) gradually gain a richer content.

The very fact that Bergson uses the term "several" shows that he has
a) isolated these states,
b) externalized them in relation to one another, and thereby
c) set them side-by-side.

So the language Bergson felt compelled to use reveals his deeply ingrained habit of extending-out time into a linear spatiality. So we are accustomed to think about multiplicity and time in this way. But then we might also want to describe our mental state before its sense of duration is extended into space. To do so, we often fall-upon our usual terminology that is based on the spatialization of multiplicity and temporality. Thereby we misrepresent the pre-spatiality of these things.

So in our pure reflective thought, we may conceive the idea of a multiplicity that does not relate to number or space. However, when we translate this idea into the language of common sense, we end-up using misleading terms. So when we speak of non-numerical multiplicities we are inclined to use the language of space and number. Likewise, we have difficulty thinking of a discrete numerical multiplicity without also conceiving it as a qualitative multiplicity. Imagine an anvil. Heavy hammers fall mercilessly upon it. If it could feel, it would sense each blow as being qualitatively different. But as well these qualitatively unique experiences become organized in the depths of our souls in a "wholly dynamic process." This primordial ordering founds the basis for our subsequent homogenization of each instance so that we may regard them as identically the same things being repeated. Thereby we may place them in homogeneous space so that we may "explicitly count units by stringing them along a spatial line." (123a.b)

The anvil dreads each succeeding blow. Numbers have a qualitative, emotional basis. We would feel different if something were to cost one monetary unit more. This is why tradesmen often price things just a couple cents below a round unit. This way we feel better about spending our money.

Thus there are two sides to our process of counting multiplicities.
1) we assume that the units are identical. This we may only do if we range the unites alongside each other in a homogeneous medium (space). Yet,
2) every unit is primordially a qualitatively unique emotional state. The number 1 has a certain "feel" to it. We might think of beginnings, wholes, unity, and so forth. Then when we add another one, we obtain 2, which also has its own "feel." It might cause us to think about linearity, divisibility, evenness, and so forth. It might also give us a "rhythmic" feeling of steadiness. Now we add another to obtain three. We imagine a triangle. We might also think-of oddness or unequal divisibility. And we might feel an uneven "rhythm." So when we add a third unit upon two others, we change the nature, appearance, and rhythm of the whole. Thus we form the idea of a quantity without quality only by means of qualities of quantities. (123d)



[Directory of other entries in this series.]


Images from the pages summarized above, in the English Translation [click on the image for an enlargement]:





Images from the pages summarized above, in the original French [click on the image for an enlargement]:





Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. F. L. Pogson, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001).

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog


French text from:

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888.

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft