Luhtala (5.6.1) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Corporeals in Stoic Physics”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Stoicism, entry directory]

[Anneli Luhtala, entry directory]

[Luhtala, Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.6

Stoic Physics

 

5.6.1

Corporeals in Stoic Physics

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

For the Stoics, a corporeal body is understood as the capacity to act and undergo action and thus is conceived in terms of causality. The Stoics were against the idea in Plato and Aristotle that incorporeals had causal efficacy. As we see from the sources, the Stoics understood incorporeals both linguistically and physically/metaphysically. And they understood statements as being incorporeals that express how some corporeal body has certain corporeal features, mentioned in the predicate. Statements do not refer to abstract generalities but rather only to concrete circumstances happening in the world. Thus when giving examples of statements, the Stoics used proper nouns instead of common ones. Also, for the Stoics, parts of speech are corporeal even though statements are incorporeal.

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.6.1.1

[Of the definitions the Stoics gave for corporeal body, the most prevalent one is: the capacity to act and undergo action.]

 

The Stoics defined corporeal body in a variety of ways, including: {1} “three-dimensionality and resistance (Diog. Laert. VII,135; Apollodorus 6; Galen De qual. incorp. 10 = SVF 2.381)”; {2} “contact and separation (Nemesius De nat. hom II,46,81,6-10 = SVF 2.790)” and {3} “the capacity to act and undergo action” (Luhtala 118). Luhtala says that the third definition of having the capacity to act and undergo action was the one that “figured most prominently in the Stoic conception of body”, and she will focus on that one (118, saying in footnote that her treatment follows Hahm 1977).

 

 

5.6.1.2

[The Stoic notion of corporeal bodies as acting and undergoing action comes from Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic (incorporeal) Ideas, which Aristotle thought did not exist separately from individual particulars but rather were inherent to them, in that universals are predicated of many things.]

 

Hahm attributes the Stoic view of corporeality as action and undergoing of action to Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Ideas. For Plato, Ideas have ontology primacy, and the Ideas are “incorporeal real entities” (118). Aristotle, however, did not think that Ideas exist separately from their individual particulars but were instead “inherent in the particulars” (118).

The Stoic view of corporeality, and the adoption of the notion of action and undergoing of action as the crucial characteristic of body, owe a number of features to contemporary philosophical discussion. Hahm claims that the Stoics adopted a peculiar usage of this feature, which was already familiar to Plato and Aristotle. He relates the Stoic theory of corporeality to Plato's theory of Ideas and its criticism by Aristotle which was adopted by the Stoics.²⁰⁵ Plato and his successors assigned ontological primacy to incorporeal real entities, the Ideas. Aristotle, who presented many arguments against the theory of Ideas in his works, was especially keen to refute the view that the Ideas exist separate from the individual particulars, insisting that the Ideas must be considered universals inherent in the particulars. Aristotle, who regarded universals as inseparable from objects, spoke of a universal as something predicated universally of more than one thing. Hahm relates this question to the introductory paragraph of the Peri hermeneias (Hahm 1977: 7-8).

(118)

205. Of course, even the dialecticians denied the existence of Ideas.

(118)

 

 

5.6.1.3

[Since the Stoics thought that only bodies exist, that probably means they did not derive their notion completely from Aristotle, who though there were different kinds of being for corporeal and incorporeal things.]

 

For the Stoics, “the Platonic Ideas are thoughts in our mind and as such are nonexistent (Strob. Ecl I,136,21 = SVF 1.65; Syrianus SVF 2.364; Aet. I,10,5 = SVF 2.360)” (118). But we cannot “derive the Stoic corporealism from Aristotelian ontology in any straightforward manner” (118). Aristotelianism recognized “different kinds of being for corporeal and incorporeal things,” which is not much different than the Stoic denial of the existence of anything except corporeals [see section 5.6.0.1]. Hahm notes that the crucial notion of acting and being acted upon is found in Plato’s Sophist, where it is used in application to a notion of a soul. Aristotle does not use this notion in his metaphysical writings, but he does employ it with his physics.

The Stoics maintained that the Platonic Ideas are thoughts in our mind and as such are nonexistent (Strob. Ecl I,136,21 = SVF 1.65; Syrianus SVF 2.364; Aet. I,10,5 = SVF 2.360). But Hahm emphasizes that it would be misleading to derive the Stoic corporealism from Aristotelian ontology in any straightforward manner; to deny existence to anything but bodies is a far cry from Aristotelianism which recognized different | kinds of being for corporeal and incorporeal things, and an eternal unmoved being, the prime mover. According to him, it would be more appropriate to try to explain Stoic ontological views by tracing the origins of the crucial notion of action and undergoing of action, in terms of which the Stoics defended their view of corporeality. This notion as a feature of being can be found in Plato’s Sophist (247DE), in which it is used to assert the existence of the soul and its virtues as against materialistic arguments based on visibility and tangibility as a characteristic of being. Aristotle shows in Top. 5,9,139a4-8 that he knows of this notion; but he never used it in his own metaphysical writings. Acting and being acted up on are nevertheless vital concepts in his physical theory in which he stressed, for instance, that there can be no action or suffering without contact; he further tended to equate acting and being acted upon to moving and being moved. While admitting that there can be no motion apart from the physical body, Aristotle came very close to asserting that there can be no acting or suffering without body (Cael. 1.9.279a15-16; Gen. corr. 1.6.323a17-20; Met. 5.21.1022b15). However, he never made quite this statement, as Hahm concludes, suggesting that this was because the most important mover or agent, the eternal prime mover, was incorporeal (Hahm 1977: 9-14).

(118-119)

 

 

5.6.1.4

[The Stoics as far as we know did not defend this notion of causality involving bodies acting and undergoing action. They were interested in countering the thesis of Plato and Aristotle that says incorporeals can have causal efficacy.]

 

So the Stoic notion of causality gives an important place for bodies [which are causally related through action and undergoing of it.] But, Hahm notes that “we do not quite know how the Stoics argued their case” for this (119). Long and Sedley note that the capacity to act and be acted upon is never given as a defining characteristic of bodies, although it is said to be peculiar to them.  They continue to write that “In confining this capacity to bodies, the Stoics were not redefining body but radically rejecting the thesis, accepted by Plato and Aristotle, that incorporeals can have any causal efficacy. (Long/Sedley 1987: 273)” (119).

 

 

 

5.6.1.6

[In the Stoic sources, incorporeals are said to be unable to act or be acted upon by corporeal bodies, although corporeal bodies do have this power. In an ethical context we see predicates being labeled incorporeal, thus pointing to the linguistic nature of their argumentation regarding corporeals and incorporeals.]

 

Luhtala will now examine passages that discuss this notion of body “to throw light on the linguistic nature of the argumentation used by the Stoics” (119). The first set of three will all make the point that incorporeals cannot causally interact with corporeal bodies.

1. “According to them the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to be acted upon.”

(Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII,263 = SVF 2.363, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 272)²⁰⁶

(120)

206. τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν.

(120. Note, in Luhtala’s text, the γὰρ is omitted, but it is found in the second volume of the Long/Sedley [p.269], the online text, and in the Opera text [p.475]:

)

2. Zeno also differed from the same philosophers in thinking that it was totally impossible that something incorporeal (to which genus Xenocrates and his predecessors too had said the mind belonged) should be the agent of anything, and that only a body was capable of acting or of being acted upon.” (Cic. Act. post. I,39 = SVF 1.90, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 272)

(120)

207. “Discrepabat etiam ab iisdem (scil. Zeno a Peripateticis et Academicis), quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea (natura), quae expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.”

(120)

3. He (Cleanthes) also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body and no body with an incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale respectively. Therefore the soul is a body. (Nemesius 78,7-79,2 = SVF 1.518, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 272)²⁰⁷

(120)

207.

[Luhtala’s footnoted quotation follows SVF (p.117).]

[In the 1987 Nemesius text (pp.20-21), it is given as:]

Luhtala then gives a quote from [I think] Stobaeus. The first part is too enigmatic she says to comment upon, “But towards the end of the passage nouns and verbs are contrasted in a way which represents more common themes in Stoic thought. The author argues that we should wish to have ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’ instead of ‘acting prudently’ and ‘acting moderately’ because the latter are incorporeal and predicates” (120). [See p.121 for the full quotation and its Greek original. Here I will select the more relevant part.]

For we choose what-should-be-chosen and wish what-should-be-wished and desire what-should-be-desired. For choices and desires and wishes, just like impulses, are of predicates. Yet we choose and wish and likewise desire to have goods, and so goods are choiceworthy and wishworthy and desirable. For we choose to have prudence and moderation, but not of course (to have) acting prudently and acting moderately, which are incorporeal and predicates.

(Stob. II,97 ,1 5-98,6 = SVF 3.91, tr . Long/Sedley 1987: 197)

(121, boldface mine)

Luhtala notes that “The Stoics seem to have argued that it is ethically more desirable to have prudence and moderation than to act prudently and moderately” (121). Here we are less interested in the ethical side of this argument, because we will focus on “the linguistic side of the argumentation” (121). [In the quotation, we distinguish for example ‘prudence’ and ‘acting prudently’. So] “What are contrasted here are common nouns and verbs (in the infinitive)” (121). [In the quote, ‘acting prudently’ and ‘acting moderately’ were said to be incorporeal and predicates. But there was no linguistic (or metaphysical) description of ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’. Thus] “It is then incorporeal items of linguistic theory which are said to be less desirable than that which is represented by σωφροσύνη (‘moderation’) and φρόνησις (‘prudence’)” (121). But, “These desirable items are not linguistically specified; they are labeled neither nouns (προσηγοριαί) nor cases (πτώσεις)” (121).

 

 

5.6.1.7

[In the Stobaeus extract, we see that the linguistically designated predicate is discussed not in a linguistic context but in a non-linguistic one. We see the same sort of non-linguistic application of incorporeal predicates in some passages by Sextus Empiricus discussing truth.]

 

Luhtala notes now the above Stobaeus extract demonstrates “that the Stoics made use of items of linguistic theory such as predicates in contexts other than statement-making” (121). She provides the following reasoning for how we can know that in this context the linguistic concepts were not meant simply to refer to statement-making. [I do not follow this part well, so please consult the quotation below. She might be saying the following, but it is a guess. In the ethical arguments, we had the incorporeal predicates ‘acting prudently’ and ‘acting moderately’. She says that if we are to think of them just  in terms of making statements using these predicates, then they would have been joined to an incorporeal case. Perhaps she means that somehow we would be making reference to the part of the sentence that would serve as the subject of the activity. But we did not turn the discussion in that direction. Rather, these incorporeal predicates were compared to such corporeals as ‘prudence’ and ‘moderation’, which are not thought of linguistically as case, subjects, nouns, etc.]

if statement-making were at issue, the incorporeal predicate would be joined to an incorporeal πτῶσις (‘case’). But in this ethical argument incorporeal predicates are contrasted with corporeal items which are not items of linguistic theory.

(122)

[Luhtala next gives a quotation from Sextus Empiricus to show a similar sort of structure in reasoning about incorporeals. I will not summarize this well. But I will guess Luhtala is saying the following. Sextus will make a distinction between truth (ἀλήθεια) and an incorporeal, true (ἀληθὲς). When distinguishing them with regard to substance, we say that ‘truth’ is a corporeal body while ‘true’ is an incorporeal, a judgment (ἀξίωμα), and a sayable (λεκτόν). These features are those of the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) (see section 5.5.4.0). Now, true (ἀληθὲς) is here formulated as an adjective. Luhtala says it also represents the predicate ‘to be true’. Like before, we have the non-linguistically specified corporeal body, truth (ἀλήθεια) being contrasted with the linguistically specified incorporeal, true (ἀληθὲς).]

“True is said (by the Stoics) to differ from truth in three ways, substance, structure, and function. In substance, since what is true is incorporeal, for it is a proposition and sayable; but truth is a body, for it is scientific knowledge capable of stating everything true; and scientific knowledge is the commanding-faculty disposed in a certain way, just as a fist is the hand disposed in a certain way; and the commanding-faculty is a body. In structure, since what is true is something simple, e.g. ‘I am conversing’, but truth consists of the knowledge of many true things. In function, since truth pertains to scientific knowledge but what is true does not do so at all. Hence they say that truth is only in a virtuous man, but what is true is also in an inferior man; for the inferior man can say something true.” (Sext.Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. II,81-83, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 198)²¹⁰

‘Truth’ (ἀλήθεια) is said to differ from ‘true’ (ἀληθὲς) in three ways: in substance, in composition and in potency. Where substance is concerned, ‘truth’ is a body whereas ‘true’ is incorporeal, a judgment ἀξίωμα) and a sayable (λεκτόν). The characteristics of ‘true’ are, again, those of the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) in Stoic linguistic theory. I take the adjective ‘true’ (ἀληθὲς) to represent the predicate ‘to be true’. ‘Truth’ (ἀλήθεια) is a noun; but it is not characterized in linguistic terms, only in terms of its corporeal nature. It is contrasted with something that is linguistically specified: a propositional item, an ἀξίωμα (‘proposition’), a λεκτόν (‘sayable’), an incorporeal. This passage lends further support for my claim that the Stoics contrasted items of linguistic theory such as predicates and propositions with corporeal entities, which are common | nouns, though they are not linguistically specified. They are specified only in terms of their corporeal nature. Where structure is concerned, ‘truth’ is composite, consisting of the knowledge of many things; it is a particular state of the leading part of the soul, the ἡγεμονικόν, which is corporeal. ‘True’ is something simple, a proposition such as ‘I converse’ (διαλέγομαι). ‘Truth’ and ‘true’ differ in function in that ‘truth’ is the scientific knowledge of many things, pertaining to a wise man, whereas ‘true’ (a true proposition) is something that even a less virtuous man can say.

(122-123)

210. λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ συστάσει δυνάμει. οὐσίᾳ μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντική, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πὼς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμή, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα. ἔστι γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα), συστάσει δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἁπλοῦν τί ἐστιν, οἷον, “ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι”, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ (τῆς) πολλῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως συνίσταται, δυνάμει δέ, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως. διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον ἀληθές τι εἰπεῖν.

(122, copied from socratics.daphnet.org and modified to make it more similar to Luhtala’s rendition)

 

 

5.6.1.8

[Seneca discusses a Stoic ethical claim that wisdom is a Good while being wise is not. For, something can only be a good if its usefulness can be put into actuality. That can only happen if it acts as a body. Since wisdom is useful, it must be a body. But being wise is an incorporeal predicate. It cannot be a Good, because it cannot act like a body.]

 

Luhtala says that Seneca “is our best witness to the linguistic nature of the argumentation used by Stoic philosophers in discussing non-linguistic issues,” and we will examine a lengthy passage by him to see this (123). There is an ethical controversy attributed to the Stoics that is the following: “wisdom (sapientia) is a Good (bonum) whereas being wise (sapere) is not” (123). Seneca disagrees with this Stoic view. In the quotation below, we see the Stoics reasoning. A Good is a body. Why? Whatever is useful must be able to act as a body (in order to put its usefulness into actuality). And whatever can act is a body. A Good is useful, therefore it is a body. And wisdom is a Good, therefore wisdom is a body.  However, being wise is an accident [and thus perhaps a predicate] and so it is incorporeal. It thus cannot act or be useful. [This and the following passages seem to be cited as: Seneca, Ep. 117,2-13.]

“According to our school”, Seneca declares, “whatever is a Good (bonum) is a body (corpus), because it can act (facit); whatever acts, is a body. Whatever is a Good is useful (prodest). In order to be useful, one has to do something (faciat aliquid oportet); that which acts is a body. The Stoics say that wisdom (sapientia) is a Good; consequently, it must be called a body. But being wise (sapere) is not regarded as partaking of the same condition. It is incorporeal (incorporalis) and an accident of something else (accidit alteri), that is wisdom; therefore it neither acts nor is useful (nec facit quidquam nec prodest).”

(123, quoting Seneca)

[I do not follow the next point so well. It might be that Seneca criticizes this view by saying that two things are possible. So, the incorporeal as an accident belongs to something else. {1} It belongs inside the object. But the object is corporeal, and if belongs to the object, it must be corporeal too. To belong to the object would mean being in contact with it, and only corporeal things can make contact with other corporeal things. {2} It belongs outside the object. But if it is outside the object while belonging to it, it must be receding from the object, and only bodies are capable of motion. His next criticism it seems is that the Stoics would seem to be saying that wisdom is of a fundamentally different nature than being wise, but surely what can be said of the one should be attributable to  the other. Let me quote as I may have this wrong.]

The corporeal nature of wisdom is defended in terms of the crucial feature of the body being able to act (and undergo action). But being wise is altogether different; it is incorporeal and belongs to something else. “Is that which belongs to something”, Seneca asks, “outside the object to which it belongs, or does it inhere in the object? If it is in the object to which it belongs, it is as corporeal as the object to which it belongs. Nothing can occur without contact; that which touches, is a body. If it is outside, it withdraws after having belonged to the object. That which recedes, has motion. That which has motion, is a body. You wish that I did not say that ‘race’ (cursus) is different from ‘running’ (currere), ‘heat’ (calor) from ‘to being hot’ (calere), and ‘light’ (lux) from ‘to give light’ (lucere); I admit that these are different things, but not of an altogether different nature. If health is a matter of indifference, so is even ‘being healthy’; if ‘beauty’ is indif-| ferent, so is ‘being beautiful’. If justice is a Good, so is ‘being just’. If ugliness is a bad thing, so is even ‘being ugly’, and for heaven’s sake, if bleary-eyedness is a bad thing, so is even ‘being bleary-eyed’.”

(123-124)

Luhtala finishes this paragraph with another quote where Seneca elaborates on this Stoic distinction. [The idea seems to be that the Stoics insist that wisdom and being wise must be distinguished, because wisdom is something possessed and being wise refers to one doing the possessing or having the wisdom. See p.124 for the quotation.]

 

 

5.6.1.9

[We see in Seneca’s account a linguistic understanding of this distinction.]

 

Seneca was discussing action and undergoing of action, and this “echoes the Stoic view of causation which takes place between bodies”. This distinction is given in terms of active and passive verbs (124). The Stoics distinguishes ‘field’ (ager) and ‘having a field’ (agrum habere). But we do not know too much more about how to conceptualize this distinction (125). Probably the distinction began as a linguistic one, and we see Seneca give a linguistic example.

Bodies have their particular natures, such as ‘man’ and ‘horse’. They are accompanied by motions of the soul which make statements about bodies. Their proper nature is derived from bodies. When I see Cato walk, the senses reveal this to me, and the soul believes it. What I see is a body on which I focus my eyes and my mind. Then I say: ‘Cato is walking’ . What I say is not a body, but a statement about a body, which is called by some effatum (‘utterance’) , by the others enuntiatum (‘declaration’) , and by yet others dictum (‘statement’) . Therefore when we say ‘wisdom’, we understand something corporeal; when we say ‘he is wise’, we talk about a body. It makes a big difference whether you name something or say something about it.

(125)

 

 

5.6.1.10

[For the Stoics, statements are incorporeals expressing that a body has certain features. Statements do not refer to abstract generalities but rather to concrete circumstances happening in the world; thus they used proper nouns instead of common ones.]

 

Luhtala notes that the passage illustrates certain “principles of Stoic logic”. [The first idea seems to be that bodies have features, which are corporeal but take the form of predicates and are expressed in incorporeal statements. When discussing bodies, they are understood generally, and thus we use common nouns. But for the Stoics, statements are made in reference not to abstract generalities but rather to express real situations in the world, and thus the Stoics when discussing statements used proper nouns.]

This passage is a good illustration of the principles of Stoic logic. Statements are made of bodies, which are specified in terms of their particular natures, i.e. in terms of common and particular qualities. They are thus men or horses or individuals such as Cato. By making a statement such as ‘Cato is walking’, we abstract a feature from a body, and what we say is an incorporeal statement. It is noteworthy that when discussing the nature or bodies, Seneca mentions men and horses which are precisely the two examples of common nouns in Diogenes Laertius’ report. But when he proceeds to discuss statement-making, a proper noun occurs in the example (Cato ambulat). This is fully in accordance with the fact that the Stoic made propositions essentially about individuals.

(126)

 

 

 

5.6.1.11

[For the Stoics, parts of speech are corporeal while statements are incorporeal.]

 

[I may not get the next points right, so see the quotation below. The idea seems to be the following. For the Stoics, the individual parts of speech we utter, like nouns for example, are corporeal. I am not sure however if the part of speech as a syntactical/grammatical structure is corporeal or if it is just simply that the thing named is corporeal. The second option is more conceivable but less interesting. However, the statement itself is incorporeal.]

Seneca finally draws a distinction between ‘saying something’ and ‘speaking about something’ in a way which is reminiscent of the ancient division between the levels of naming (ὀνομάζειν) and statement-making (λέγειν). When we utter an individual nominal part of speech, such as the noun ‘wisdom’, we understand, according to the Stoics, something corporeal. When we make a statement, we understand something incorporeal. This passage throws additional light on the corporeal nature of the parts of speech as such, which must have been a source of ambiguity.

(126)

 

 

 

 

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

[Note, for “Aet. I, I did not see something for it in the Bibliography.]

 

[Note, I could not find Apollodorus in the Bibliography.]

 

Cic. Act. post: Cicero. Academica posteriora.

Online text available at:

http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/acad.shtml

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

 

[Note, I did not see Galen’s De qual. incorp in the Bibliography list. Perhaps it is a part of the text that is listed:

Galen. Gelaeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Edition, translation and Commentary by Phillip de Lacy. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum. V.4.1.2. Berlin: Academie-Verlag 1978-80.]

 

Hahm, David E. 1977. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

[Note, I did not see Nemesius’s De nat. hom in the Bibliography list.  Perhaps it is De natura hominis.]

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

Another version available online:

https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext

Online text transcription at:

http://socratics.daphnet.org

[specifically here]

 

[Note, for Pyrrh. hyp. I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is:

Sextus Empiricus. Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis.

Online text at:

http://socratics.daphnet.org

(Specifically here)]

 

Seneca: Ad Lucilium epistulae morales. Ed. by Leighton D. Reynolds. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965.

 

[Note, for “Stobaeus ... Ecl.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Stobaeus’ Ἐκλογαί / Eclogae physicae et ethicae.]

 

SVF. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

 

Syrianus: In Metaphysica commentaria. CAG VI.1. Ed. Wilhelm Kroll. Berlin: Reimer 1902.

 

 

 

 

Texts I cite:

 

Nemesius. 1987. Nemesii Emeseni. De natvra hominis, ed. Moreno Morani. Leipzig: Teubner. Available online at:

https://archive.org/details/Nemesius_201604

 

Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner]. Available online:

https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext

 

Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, vol. I. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1964.

PDF available at:

https://archive.org/details/stoicorumveterum01arniuoft

 

 

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/06/stoic-logic-and-semantics-corporeals-in.html

 

 

.

Luhtala (5.5.4.8) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “Simple Propositions”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Stoicism, entry directory]

[Anneli Luhtala, entry directory]

[Luhtala, Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.4

The Component of Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

 

5.5.4.8

Simple Propositions

 

 

 

 

Brief summary:

The Stoics discussed simple propositions using intransitive sentence forms with neuter predicates. In other words, instead of using transitive forms that indicate how one subject acts upon another, they instead used intransitive forms that state the properties or accidents of some subject. (Some example predicates are “sitting” and “walking”.) What is crucial and interesting in this discussion is the way this analysis of syntax relates to their metaphysics and correspondence theory of truth. They use the same term ὑπάρχειν to mean that something exists (or that something is the case) and also to mean that a proposition is true. Situations in the world (that are relevant to these intransitive constructions) are the case (exist) when to some subject properly belongs certain attributes. And, a proposition is true when the predicate holds for the subject. This is determined when in reality the stated thing indeed does bear the attributes indicated in the proposition’s predicate.

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.4.8.1

[Propositions are either simple or non-simple. Simple propositions are classified as either negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definite and the indefinite. We concern ourselves with definite and indefinite, because they involve important issues regarding referentiality in Stoic logic.]

 

Luhtala notes that Chrysippus, “Like many other Stoic philosophers [...] divided propositions into simple and non-simple,” and he defines simple in the following way.

Simple are those that consist of one or more propositions which are not ambiguous, as ‘It is day’, (...) and are classified into negation, denial, privation, affirmation, the definite and the indefinite. (Diog. Laert. VII,68-69)¹⁸⁶

(111)

186. ἁπλᾶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ συνεστῶτα ἐξ ἀξιώματος μὴ διαφορουμένου (ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων), οἷον τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστίν” ... Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ἀξιώμασίν ἐστι τὸ ἀποφατικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρνητικὸν καὶ τὸ στερητικὸν καὶ τὸ κατηγορικὸν καὶ τὸ καταγορευτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον.

(111, text copied from Perseus)

Luhtala says we will only be concerned with definite and indefinite simple propositions, because they “reveal the crucial part that referentiality played in Stoic logic (see Kneale/Kneale 1962: 146; Pinborg 1975: 94; Goulet 1978: 171 ff.)” (111). [Luhtala then mentions higher and lower degrees of referentiality, but I do not know what they are. But it is on the basis of that distinction that simple affirmative propositions are divided into three types. She then quotes Diogenes Laertius, but it seems she unpacks it in the following paragraphs. The quotation will make the following distinctions. It will distinguish: assertoric, demonstrative, and indefinite. I am not sure, but I perhaps assertoric and demonstrative are both definite. Assertoric seem to simply state a situation, where the subject is a nominative like a name. In demonstrative propositions, the subject is a demonstrative phrase like ‘this one’. And in indefinite propositions, the subject is of course indefinite, like ‘someone’ or ‘that one.’ (I am not sure why ‘that one’ is not demonstrative, however. The Greek words are quite different looking, οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος, but I do not know Greek, so I cannot comment further.)]

According to the higher or lower degree of referentiality of the subject, the Stoics divided simple affirmative propositions into three types. I will follow closely the report given by Diogenes Laertius:

An assertoric proposition consists of a nominative case and a predicate, e.g. ‘Dion is walking’. A demonstrative proposition consists of a nominative demonstrative case and a predicate, e.g. ‘This one (οὗτος) is walking’. An indefinite proposition consists of one or more indefinite parts and a predicate, e.g. ‘Someone (τὶς) is walking’; ‘that one (ἐκεῖνος) is moving’. (Diog. Laert. VII,70, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 205)¹⁸⁷

(111)

187. κατηγορικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “Δίων περιπατει”: καταγορευτικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐκ πτώσεως ὀρθῆς δεικτικῆς καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “οὗτος περιπατεῖ”: ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου μορίου ἢ ἀορίστων μορίων καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον “τὶς περιπατεῖ,” “ἐκεῖνος κινεῖται.”

(111, text copied from Perseus)

 

 

5.5.4.8.2

[The definite pronoun makes the most specific reference. The Stoics’ examples for simple propositions do not have active or passive predicates and are thus not matters of transitive states of affairs.]

 

Luhtala says that the the definite pronoun, as in οὗτος or ‘that man’ most adequately represents the subject “because of its immediately obvious reference” (111). [Note, in the above quotation, οὗτος came beside ‘this one’. Here is seems a bit more specific, because it designates the type of thing being referred to.] What makes the definite pronouns so important for reference is that they pick out specific things: “The importance of the definite pronoun lies in its being the linguistic equivalent of a gesture point to an object which is present (Long/Sedley 1987: 206-207)” (111). The Stoics’ examples of simple propositions have neuter predicates like ‘sitting’ and ‘walking’, which means they were  not concerned in these cases with active and passive predicates and thus with “transitive states of affairs” (111-112).

 

 

5.5.4.8.3

[Sextus Empiricus’ account of the simple proposition is not a Stoic sort, like what is given by Diogenes’ Laertius.]

 

Sextus Empiricus’ account of these matters is probably not about the Stoics’ theory but instead about the Megarian Dialecticians, Philo and Diodorus. Luhtala notes some differences between Sextus’ account and Diogenes Laertius’ more properly Stoic account of propositions. In Sextus’ Megarian account, common nouns that refer to universals play a role in indeterminate propositions, but in Diogenes’ account, common nouns “are absent” (112). In fact, “In Stoic logic propositions were generally made about individuals rather than universals” (112). [This is perhaps important when considering the correspondence theory of truth, below.) Luhtala adds one more distinction. While in Stoic accounts the simple proposition receives a linguistic description, “analyzing it into predicate and case,” in Sextus’ account it is treated “in purely non-linguistic terms” (112). [This perhaps emphasizes the importance of linguistic matters in Stoic philosophy, with regard to issues of truth and reality.]

 

 

5.5.4.8.4

[There is an important Peripatetic notion that probably made its way into Stoic logic, namely, συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’ / ‘attributes’). The importance of this concept is that it is tied to the notion ὑπάρχειν, which can mean either that an object exists or that a proposition is true. And the statement is true when the predicate holds for the subject (is properly attributed to it) which is also the case when the thing referred to also has the attributes mentioned. (In other words, something exists or ‘is the case’ when in reality there exists such a thing with its proper attributes, and a statement expressing that situation is true if the stated predicate holds for the subject, as they are in reality.)]

 

Luhtala notes Sextus Empiricus using “the term συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’ / ‘attributes’)” when describing definite propositions (112).

the definite proposition such as ‘this one is sitting’ or ‘this one is walking’ is said by them (the dialecticians) to be true (ὑπάρχειν) whenever the predicate, such as ‘sitting’ or ‘walking’, belongs (συμβεβήκε) to the thing which falls under the demonstrative reference (δεῖξιν). (Adv. math. VIII,100 = SVF 2.205, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 204)¹⁹²

(112)

192. καὶ δὴ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ “οὗτος κάθηται” ἢ “οὗτος περιπατεῖ”, τότε φασὶν ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκῃ κατηγόρημα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν.

(112, text copied from Ancient Philosophy Source. Note a discrepancy. Above what Luhtala has as “συμβεβήκε” in the online source has as “συμβεβήκῃ”, and the Opera text might have as  “συμβεβήκοι”

 

)

Although Sextus is referring to the Dialecticians, Luhtala cites sources providing “evidence of genuinely Stoic usage of this terminology,” (namely, Duhot 1990: 94-96 and Long 1971: 88ff). So it is possible that “Peripatetic terminology” survived “in Stoic usage” (112). There is other evidence, like how Stobaeus attributes a usage of κατηγόρημα (‘predicate’) and συμβεβηκόσ (‘attribute’) to Chrysippus.

Only the present exists (ὑπάρχειν); the past and the future subsist (ὑφεστάναι); in the same way, as attributes (συμβεβηκότα), only the accidents are said to be the case (ὑπάρχειν); for example walking (τὸ περιπατεῖν) is true of me (ὑπάρχειν), when I walk; but when I sit or when I lie down, it is not true. (SVF 2.509)¹⁹⁴

(113)

194. [taken from  the SVF pdf, with Luhtala continuing after:]

It is noteworthy that the attributes are expressed by an infinitive rather than an abstract noun.

(133)

Also, “Seneca associates the notion of accident with the feature of the predicate of being incorporeal and being an attribute of something else, ‘accedens alteri’ ”(113). We also here see the survival of Aristotle’s notion of ὑπάρχειν (it was seen in the Stobaeus passage above). [This notion seems very important for understanding the way that statements correspond with reality. The same word ὑπάρχειν is applied both to mean that an object exists and also that a proposition is true, or in the wording of the above Stobaeus quote, it means the predicate holds for the subject.

In Aristotle’s theory ὑπάρχειν was a crucial feature of both the predicate and the proposition – a notion which is ambiguous between ‘exist’ of objects and ‘be true’ of propositions (Kneale/Kneale 1962: 151).¹⁹⁶

(113)

196. “In Stoic terms the whole theory may be summed up thus: a statement or lekton hyparchei (is the case) if what it describes hyparchei (exists) and what is described is true if the statement describing it is true” (Long 1971: 93) ; cf. Long/Sedley (1987: 206): “A true proposition corresponds to the actual state of the item(s) in the world, to which it refers. Unmistakably correct evidence about existing things is conveyed to us through ‘cognitive impressions’, and a proposition which describes that evidence will be true. The Stoics expressed this correspondence theory of truth by using the same verb, (huparchei/ouch huparchei) ... to differentiate true and false propositions and existing and non-existing things.”

(113)

 

 

5.5.4.8.5

[It is probably significant that the Stoics only spoke of accidents (and of this correspondence theory of truth and reality) using intransitive sentences. (For, the issue of truth and reality is a matter of the concord between a real subject and its accidents, and the intransitive structure is a matter of a nominative subject and its predicated attributes.)]

 

Given the textual evidence provided above,

There would thus seem to be no reason to doubt the persistence of the Peripatetic notions of ὑπάρχειν (‘subsist’) and συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’) in Stoicism. They are associated with the ability of the proposition to assert truth or falsity in terms of some state of affairs being the case, and the predicate belonging to the subject at the time the statement is made. 

(113)

Luhtala then notes that the Stoic sentences in these analyses are intransitive. As far as we can tell, the Stoics only discussed the notion of συμβεβηκότα (‘accidents’) when dealing with intransitive sentences (other types of sentences include transitive and impersonal). In intransitive sentences, “the two constituents pertain to the same referent and [...] show grammatical concord” (114). [This is an important point, but I do not grasp it. It will guess the following. Intransitive sentences seem to be ones of a simple subject predication structure where we are stating some attribute of some thing. (Were it transitive, we might instead be stating how one object is acting upon another, without mentioning the attributes of each.) Thus both the nominative/subject and the predicate pertain to the same referent, namely, the object in the world with those properties.) The grammatical concord might then be the grammatical agreement between subject and predicate, but I am just guessing. It must be something else.] Thus the fact that the Stoics only discussed accidents with intransitive sentences probably means that “these constructions [...] show concord of grammatical accidents” (114).

 

 

 

 

From:

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

[1-160]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

[1-160]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

 

Duhot, Jean-Joel. 1989. La conception stoicienne de la causalité. Librairie philosophique. Paris: Vrin.

 

Goulet, Richard. 1978. “La classification stoïcienne des propositions simples selon Diogene Laërce VII 69-70”. Brunschwig (1978: 171-198).

 

Kneale, William C. / Kneale, Martha. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

Long, Anthony A. 1971. “Language and Thought in Stoicism”. Long (1971a: 75-113).

 

Long, Anthony A. 1971a. (ed.) Problems in Stoicism. London: The Athlone Press.

 

Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Pinborg, Jan. 1975. “Classical Antiquity: Greece”. Sebeok (1975: 69-126).

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

Another version available online:

https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext

Online text transcription at:

http://socratics.daphnet.org

[specifically here]

Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner].

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/05/stoic-logic-and-semantics-simple.html

 

 

.

Luhtala (5.5.2) On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, “The Components of Expression (Σημαίνοντα) and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Stoicism, entry directory]

[Anneli Luhtala, entry directory]

[Luhtala, Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Anneli Luhtala

 

On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic

 

Ch.5 The Stoics

 

5.5 Stoic Logic

 

5.5.2

The Components of Expression (Σημαίνοντα) and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)

 

 

Brief summary:

Stoic dialectic has two parts. Generally speaking, there is a part that lies on the level of language itself and a part that deals more with the conceptual meanings the language expresses. Specifically, the two parts are: {1} “expression,” equivalent to σημαίνοντα (that which signifies), to φωναί (vocal sounds), and to λέξις (word), and {2} “meaning” or “sayables,” equivalent to σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning), and to λεκτά (sayables). The study of expression examines a heterogeneous set of related issues, including written utterances, parts of speech, poetry, definitions, and other various topics. The study of meaning, however, examines a more homogeneous set of logical sorts of issues, like propositions, sense (sayables), predicates, genera and species, arguments, and states of affairs. With regard to expression, ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’. With regard to meaning, these terms correspond with πτῶσις (case) and κατηγόρημα (predicate), respectively. Simple parts of speech, like nouns or verbs alone, are not able to take on truth values. This is only possible for sayables, which can be articulated in a propositional formulation, and thus truth and falsity are also matters of syntax, which is the meaningful combination of parts of speech. So “Dion” does not express a sayable, and it cannot be either true or false; however, “Dion walks” does and can, because its syntax allows it to represent a state of affairs in the world. Regarding the articulation of meaning, we arrange the relevant concepts in an order going from the most to the least conforming to the rational organization of the world. The world itself operates rationally, on account of its rational principle, λόγος. States of affairs (πράγματα) in the world thus have a rational sense to them, which is their sayable (λεκτόν). The verbal articulation that can adequately express the λόγος of the λεκτόν and thus of the πράγματα is also called a λόγος, but this time meaning an intelligible, articulate sentence. A step down from that is a λέξις, which is an articulate sound that might not even be intelligible, as with the famous example of “blituri”. Next down is  a φωνή, which is a sound that may not even be articulate (that is, might not even resemble a word with composite letters or phonetics).  There are two related sorts of speech acts: προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables). As we noted, while λέξις can represent a word for a real thing, it lacks the syntactical powers to represent a state of affairs. This is because real situations in the world have certain ontological properties that require more sophisticated syntactical mechanisms to be expressed. For example, the relation between a thing and its properties cannot be represented simply in a word but rather requires a syntax with a subject-predicate structure. Now, the sense of a state of affairs as the sayable (λεκτόν) is something incorporeal. However, as soon as it is vocally articulated into a propositional sentence, it has thereby taken on a corporeal form, because speech is corporeal, as it produces effects in the world. There is still another terminological distinction that divides meaning and expression into three units: 1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) and is thus incorporeal, and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification and is thus corporeal.

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

5.5.2.1

[There are two parts of Stoic dialectic: {1} “expression,” which is equivalent to σημαίνοντα (that which signifies) / φωναί (vocal sounds) / λέξις (word), and {2} “meaning” or “sayables,” which is equivalent to σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning) / λεκτά (sayables)]

 

There are two parts of Stoic dialectic:

{1} σημαίνοντα / that which signifies (Diog. Laert. VII,62), also understood as φωναί / vocal sounds (Diog. Laert. VII,43); and

{2} σημαινόμενα / that which is signified (Diog. Laert. VII,62), also understood with the same Greek term, σημαινόμενα, but with the sense, ‘meaning’, when related to φωναί / vocal sounds (Diog. Laert. VII,43) (70).

Note that σημαινόμενον (that which is signified) is equivalent to λεκτόν (sayable) (70). We also note that sometimes the term λέξις (word) is used as a synonym for φωνή (vocal sound). [Later we see a more precise way to differentiate them.] With this in mind, Luhtala makes the following terminological distinction:

{a} “expression” = σημαίνοντα (that which signifies) / φωναί (vocal sounds) / λέξις (word)

{b} “meaning” or “sayables” = σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning) / λεκτά (sayables) (70).

 

 

5.5.2.2

[The study of expression examines a heterogeneous set of related issues, including written utterances, parts of speach, poetry, definitions, and others. The study of meaning examines more logical sorts of matters, like propostions, sense (sayables), predicates, genera and species, arguments, states of affairs, and others.]

 

For Diogenes Laertius, expression is a matter of written utterances, parts of speech, and other elements of language, including poetry, euphony, definitions, and other matters (see p.70). [Meaning, however, is a matter of logical structures that can be expressed linguistically.]

According to Diogenes Laertius, the study of expression covered

written utterance and what the parts of language are, dealing also with solecisms and barbarisms, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, music, and, according to some Stoics, definitions, divisions and expressions.¹¹²

The component of meaning comprised

impressions and derivatively subsistent sayables – propositions, complete sayables, predicates and similar actives and passives, genera and species, along with also arguments, argument modes and syllogisms, and sophisms which depend on utterance and on states of affairs. (Diog. Laert. VII,43-44 , tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 183)¹¹³

112. Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. [See Perseus 44]

113. καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων. [See Perseus 43]

(70)

[Recall from above that the study of expression covers “written utterance and what the parts of language are, dealing also with solecisms and barbarisms, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, music, and, according to some Stoics, definitions, divisions and expressions”. Luhtala’s next point might be that this is a very odd heterogeneous combination of things to group under one study.]

The classification of topics under these two components of dialectic by the Stoics differs considerably from the modern understanding of the divisions of disciplines and it requires a special effort to appreciate the genuinely Stoic interpretation of these topics. It is particularly difficult to get to grips with the strikingly heterogeneous contents of the component of expression. It is probably best understood in terms of its composite nature, as has been suggested by Frede.

(71)

 

 

 

5.5.2.3

[The components of meaning are more homogeneous and are related to logical structures, like subject and predicate, but for the Stoics, the syntactical analysis is more sophisticated than with Aristotle.]

 

The expression can be analyzed structurally into its component parts of speech, which were likely studied for the sake of propositional analysis. [We noted before that the study of expression involves a heterogeneous set of topics.] “The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is much more homogeneous, including only philosophically relevant items, such as propositions and predicates” (71). [Luhtala in the previous chapters examined syntactical studies by Plato and Aristotle. The study of parts of speech in expression will derive from naming, while the components of meaning will come from the parts of statement making. Aristotle’s study of propositions was limited to simply subjects and verbs, but the Stoics had a much more sophistical analysis.]

The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is much more homogeneous, including only philosophically relevant items, such as propositions and predicates. I will view this division of topics as a development of the linguistic analysis initiated by Plato and Aristotle, so that the treatment of the parts of speech in the component of expression roughly derives from the non-syntactical level of naming (ὀνομάζειν) and the component of meaning from the syntactical level of statement-making (λέγειν). In such a comparison we must keep in mind the provisional nature of the Peri hermeneias as opposed to the elaborate system of the Stoics, to whom linguistic questions were of much more importance. Aristotle merely sketched the two constituents of the proposition, ὄνομα (‘noun’ / ‘subject’) and ῥῆμα (‘verb’ / ‘predicate’), and their combination into a statement without a careful analysis of the different levels involved in statement-making. The Stoics developed an elaborate system with a highly specialized vocabulary for each level of description.

(71)

 

 

5.5.2.4

[In their analysis of expression, ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’. In their analysis of meaning, these terms correspond with case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα), respectively.]

 

[The next point might be the following, but please check the quotation. In their analysis of expression, the Stoics considered ὄνομα to mean ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα to mean ‘verb’. In their analysis of meaning, ὄνομα corresponds to case (πτῶσις) and ῥῆμα corresponds with predicate (κατηγόρημα). This distinction is seen already in Aristotle, but the Stoics introduce additional terminology.]

While items of both levels were named ὄνομα and ῥῆμα by Aristotle, the Stoics posited a systematic terminological distinction to label the items of the two distinct levels. The Stoics maintained the well-established vocabulary of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα to refer to the noun and the verb as items of the component of expression (σημαίνοντα). I will view them as non-syntactical linguistic units in accordance with the level of naming (ὀνομάζειν) in the Peri hermeneias. Within the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα), the same items are known as case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα). Both of these terms can be derived from Peripatetic usage. But the Stoics introduced many other terms into their component of meaning (σημαινόμενα), such as σύμβαμα (‘congruity’) and λεκτόν (‘sayable’), which attest to the versatility of the Stoic approach.

(72)

 

 

5.5.2.5

[Truth and falsity are not matters of grammatical parts of speech but rather of sayables and thus of syntax, which is the meaningful combination of parts of speech.]

 

The truth and falsity of statements lies in the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα). But the parts of statements, namely, cases and predicates, are not sufficient on their own to carry truth or falsity. [I am not sure about the next point. It might be the following. To combine a noun and a verb is not enough to make a statement. Perhaps it is enough to make a sentence. But what is needed are units of meaning, namely, case and predicate. She says that parts of speech do not have “syntactic force”, but I do not know what that means. Yet, given that it is needed for statements and thus for truth and falsity, syntax pertains to sayables or meaning. I do not understand how syntax is distinguishable from a study of parts of speech. Perhaps the difference is that an analysis of parts of speech is a matter of finding different grammatically categorizable parts, but syntax is more a matter of determining rules or patterns for how these parts can be arranged and interrelated so to form meaningful sentences. From page 26:

Syntactical analysis, when included in ancient grammars, amounts to the combination of the parts of speech, as based on their morphological characteristics, which were known as ‘accidents’. Ancient grammar adheres to a hierarchical principle according to which elements (στοιχεῖα) of each level are combined in order to form units of a higher level: combinations of letters form syllables, those of syllables words, words are combined to form sentences (e.g. Holtz 1981: 60-61 and Baratin 1989: 9, and note 16).

This hierarchical viewpoint is present in the earliest linguistic speculation when pursued within dialectic. ‘Syntax’ represents the highest level in this hierarchy, that is the level of speaking (λέγειν) defined by Plato and Aristotle as that in which it is possible to assert something. Two items were recognized by them on the previous level, that of naming (ὀνομάζειν), namely noun/subject (ὄνομα) and verb/predicate (ῥῆμα)

(26)

]

The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is where true and false statements are made. The constituents of statements, cases and predicates, are deficient sayables. As far as I can see, in the Stoic system one cannot combine the noun and the verb, i.e. items of the component of expression (φωvαί), to effect statement-making because the parts of speech as such do not have syntactic force. Units of meaning (σημαινόμενα) are combined, that is cases and predicates. That truth and falsehood do not pertain to individual words (φωναί) but to their combination is a conclusion which the Stoics would seem to share with Plato and Aristotle. I am thus inclined to think that syntax, just like the question of truth and falsehood, pertained solely to the component of sayables (λεχτά) or meaning for the Stoics.

(72)

 

 

5.5.2.6

[A λόγος (speech, sentence) is an intelligible, articulate utterance. A λέξις is an articulate sound that may not be intelligible. And a φωνή is a sound that may not even be articulate. There are two related sorts of speech acts: {1} προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables).]

 

Luhtala next examines the relation between the notions of λεκτόν (sayable) and λόγος (speech or sentence) (72). [The concepts here seem to be organized in the following way. We begin with the least rational or logically structured thing and move toward the most. The first is φωνή (voice). It can be simply noise or it can be a sound with linguistic significance. Next is λέξις (articulate sound), which, like φωνή (voice) is composed of sounds, but it is unlike φωνή in that λέξις is articulate (which I think means it forms sounds which are language-like or which at least are candidates for carriers of significance.) The next is λόγος (speech, sentence), which is like λέξις in that both are articulate sounds, but the difference is that a λόγος has a certain meaning, while  a λέξις might be unintelligible, as in the example of blituri. (See this entry on Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII,57). We now stop with this hierarchy, and we consider two sorts of speech acts, which are involved in the prior classifications: {1} προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables).]

The concept of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’) occurs in the following hierarchy of linguistic expressions reported by Diogenes Laertius (VII,56-57):

Φωνή (‘voice’) differs from λέξις (‘articulated sound’). Because, while the former may include mere noise, the latter is always articulate. Λέξις (‘articulate sound’) again differs from λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’) because the latter always signifies something, whereas a λέξις (‘articulated sound’), as for example blituri, may be unintelligible, which a λόγος never is. And speaking/saying (λέγειν) is different from uttering (προφέρεσθαι); for while | vocal sounds (φωναί) are uttered, states of affairs (πράγματα) are said, and sayables pertain to states of affairs.¹¹⁶

A distinction is drawn here between two kinds of speech acts, that of uttering (προφέρεσθαι) and that of speaking (λέγειν), which are associated with two kinds of linguistic items, vocal sounds (φωναί) and states of affairs (πράγματα), respectively. Furthermore, sayables (λεκτά) are said to pertain to states of affairs (πράγματα). This idea of two kinds of speech acts would seem to correspond closely to the distinction between the two components of dialectic. We know that vocal/articulate sounds belong to the component of expression and states of affairs/sayables to the component of meaning.

116. διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἦχός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἔναρθρον μόνον. λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἄσημος, ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν τοῦ προφέρεσθαι: προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει.. [See Perseus 57] See Long/Sedley:  Most editors accept Casaubon’s supplement, οἶον ἡμέρα ἐστί, after ἐκπεμπομένη. This may be right, but there is no reason to think that a λόγος has to be a complete sayable  (1987 II:197 n. 2). I am inclined to accept Casaubon’s supplement.

(72-73)

 

 

 

5.5.2.7

[λόγος can take the form of speech. Since meaningful speech comes from the throat, which is near the heart, Diogenes of Babylon thought that the mind is in the heart and not the head.]

 

[The “syntactical nature of the notion of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’)” seems to be the fact that conceptualizable things about the world have a rational structure that is paralleled by the relation between parts of propositions, as for example the way that a thing and its properties is represented in the subject-predicate structure.] In the next paragraph we will see a quote by Diogenes of Babylon. His point will correspond with our understanding of the “syntactical nature of the notion of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’)” (73). For, while λέξις is a vocal sound that can be written as a word, λόγος  instead is a “meaningful vocal sound that issues from the mind” and which takes the form of a proposition, like, “It is day” (73, citing Diog. Laert. VII,55-56). [The next point seems to be the following. We have made a linguistic point by distinguishing mere vocalized signification, which will take the form of simple terms, and conceptualized signification, which can also be vocalized in the form of propositions. The realm of mere vocalization lacks the rational component of logical syntax. But the Stoics make this distinction between vocal speech (φωνή) and meaningful speech (λόγος) for another purpose, “namely to show that the source of thinking and speaking is the same” (74). The idea in this latter half of this paragraph and in the next might be the following, but please see pages 73-74 to be sure. We begin by assuming that we do not know where in our anatomy our mind is located. For example, it could be in the head or it could be in the heart. The next assumption we make is that wherever is the source from which rational articulations arise is the place where the mind is. We then observe that both mere speech and meaningful articulate speech are sent out from the throat region. Next we note that this region is physiologically near to the heart, and more distant from the head. Thus, the mind is located in the heart.]

 

 

5.5.2.8

[This notion of the rational thought being expressible through vocalization reflects the dichotomy between {a} λόγος  as rational thought or meaningful speech and {b} λέξις or φωναί as mere speech that does not necessarily express a propositionally structurable thought.]

 

Luhtala then quotes Diogenes of Babylon, making this point we noted above, that since meaningful speech comes from the throat, which is near the heart, the mind is in the heart and not the head. Following this is a quote from Chrysippus that makes the same point (74, quoting: [Chrysippus maybe or perhaps Galen] De Plac. II 5, 18-20, tr. De Lacy 1978: 131). Luhtala then relates Chrysippus’ notion with Plato’s “twofold description of speech, thought and spoken, in the Sophist.” [Here the idea seems to be that speech in thought, which is silent, has another side to it when it is articulated into vocalized speech. See p.75.]

 

 

5.5.2.9

[The Stoic notion of sayables is like Plato’s notion of internal speech, however, for the Stoics, when the sayable is given vocal utterance, it becomes corporeal speech (λόγῳ).]

 

Luhtala then compares the Stoic notion of sayables with Plato’s notion of internal speech, “which precedes the actual enunciation of spoken words;” for, “Sayables would thus literally be something that could be uttered but actually need not be uttered” (75). [However, one difference is that for the Stoics, as soon as the sayable is uttered, it becomes corporeal speech (λόγῳ).

This is in accordance with what we know of the relationship between speech and thought in the Stoic theory: the rational impression (φαντασία) comes first, then thought which is able to speak (διάνοια εχλαλητιχή) expresses its experience by means of speech (λόγῳ) (Diog. Laert. VII,49).

(75)

 

 

 

5.5.2.10

[The λόγος  of meaningful articulate speech is incorporeal, but the speech as mere vocal sounds φωναί is corporeal, because it has an effect.]

 

For the Stoics, meaningful articulate speech as λόγος  [or as sayable] occupies the incorporeal ontological sphere. However, the parts of speech as vocal sounds (φωναί) lie in the corporeal ontological sphere, because they have an effect:

For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect for whatever produces an effect is corporeal. Voice, as it proceeds from those | who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. (Diog. Laert. VII,55 = SVF 2.140, tr. R.H. Hicks; cf. Aet. Plac. IV,20,2 = SVF 2.387 and Suda s.v. σῶμα.)¹²⁰

120. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι: ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων. [Following Perseus]

(75-76)

[Note, in my version of the Hick’s translation, the quote does not have this redundancy in its formulation. It reads simply as one sentence: “For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect.” See 56 at Perseus.]

 

 

 

5.5.2.11

[The Stoic theory of meaning and expression distinguishes three units: {1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) and is thus incorporeal, and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification, and is thus corporeal.]

 

The Stoic theory [of meaning] has three units: {1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) [when it is formulated propositionally such that it could be either true or false], [also, it might be a matter of the motion of thought (κινήσει τῆς διανοίας)] and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification (76). The corporeal sound and its signfication lie in the realm of dialectic. The referent, however, is a matter of physics. Luhtala notes that Sextus may have misrepresented the theory by portraying the signification as a term, which cannot be true or false. Instead of it being the notion of “Dion”, it should rather be a proposition like “Dion walks” [See these entries on that topic.]

It is customary to view the Stoic theory as involving three units, a corporeal sound, its ‘signification’ and the referent. Two of them belong to the domain of dialectic whereas the third component, the object in the external world, which activates the impression, belongs to the physical theory. The Stoic theory is generally illustrated with a passage from Sextus Empiricus, who records the Stoic position in the course of his exposition of a controversy concerning the sphere of truth in the doctrines of the various philosophical schools (see e.g. Müller 1978: 7; Graeser 1978: 78):

The Stoics defended the first opinion (according to which true and false is a question of the signification), saying that three things are linked together, ‘the signification’, ‘the signifier’, and ‘the name-bearer’. The signifier is an utterance, for instance ‘Dion’; the signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal – the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false. (Adv. math. VIII, 11-13, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 195)¹²¹

121. Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πρώτη περὶ τἀληθοῦς διαφωνία τοιαύτη τις ὑπῆρχεν. ἦν  δὲ καί ἄλλη τις παpὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ᾽ ἣν οἱ μὲν πεpὶ τῷ σημαινομὲνῳ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς,  τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίων, σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαΐουσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίων. τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν ὅπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ τοῦτο οὐ κοινῶς πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐλλιπές τὸ δὲ αὐτοτελές. The ‘name-bearer’ appears to be an infelicitous translation for τυγχάνον because this text has to do with statement-making rather than name-giving. Ι have replaced it by ‘case-bearer’ which Long and Sedley use elsewhere (1987: 201).

(76)

[For an online transcription: 8.11; 8.12. Below is an image of a text for reference.

Here is another translation:

11. ... And there was yet another quarrel among the dogmatists; for some located the true and false in the thing signified, some located it in the utterance, and some in the motion of the intellect. And the Stoics championed the first view, saying that three things are linked with one another: the thing signified, the signifier, and the object. 12. Of these, the signifier is the utterance, for example, ‘Dion’. The thing signified is the thing indicated by the utterance and which we grasp when it subsists in our intellect and which foreigners do not understand although they hear the utterance. The object is the external existent, for example, Dion himself. Two of these are bodies, the utterance and the object, and one incorporeal, the signified thing, i.e., the thing said [lekton] which is true or false. This last point is not of unrestricted application, but some lekta are incomplete and some complete. One kind of complete lekton is the so-called proposition, which they describe thus: a proposition is that which is true or false.

(Stoic Reader 89)

]

 

 

5.5.2.12

[We are concerned with the propositions resulting from rational impressions, which correspond to sayables. We are not concerned with other sorts of sentences.]

 

[In addition to issues of syntax,] Luhtala will also be examining “the propositions resulting from rational impressions which are the essential subject matter of the theory of sayables (λεχτά)” (77), and she will exclude any non-propositional sorts of formulations (77-78). Matters of expression will only interest us insofar as they are “relevant to the syntax of deficient and complete sayables” (77).

 

 

5.5.2.13

[Our concern is not with name-giving or etymology.]

 

Luhtala is also not concerned with “name-giving and the etymological procedures” (78).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From:

 

Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.

 

 

Other texts, cited by Luhtala:

 

[Note, for “Aet. Plac.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Aetius’s Placita Philosophorum.]

 

[Note, for Chrysippus or Galen De Plac. II 5, 18-20, tr. De Lacy 1978, I could not find either in the Bibliography. Perhaps it is Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. And perhaps for the translation: Galenus / Phillip Howard De Lacy. Galeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis = Galen on the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato.      Berlin [-Ost] : Akademie-Verlag, 1978-1984. Worldcat link.]

 

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.

The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

 

Graeser, Andrea. 1978. “The Stoic Theory of Meaning”. Rist (1978: 77-100).

 

Müller, Ian. 1978 “An Introduction to Stoic Logic”. Rist (1978: 1-26).

 

Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.

 

Suda ( = Suida). Suidae Lexicon. Ed. by Ada Adler. Leipzig: Teubner 1931.

 

SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.

 

 

Texts I cite:

 

Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner]. Available online:

https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext

Online text transcription at:

http://socratics.daphnet.org

[specifically here]

 

2008. The Stoic Reader. Selected Writings and Testimonia. Translated by Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson. Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett.

 

 

This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:

http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-components-of.html

 

 

.