Showing posts with label ecology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ecology. Show all posts

8 Dec 2016

Uexküll’s Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men, entry directory

 

by Corry Shores

 

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Jakob von Uexküll

 

A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds

[A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans]

[Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welt]

 

 

Foreword

 

Introduction

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1934. Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Berlin: Springer.

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1956. Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. In Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Bedeutungslehre, pp.19–101. Hamburg: Rowohlt.

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 1957. A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds. In Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept, pp. 5–80. Edited and translated by Claire H. Schiller. New York: International Universities.

 

Uexküll, Jakob von. 2010. A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans. In A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, with A Theory of Meaning, pp.41–135. Translated by Joseph D. O’Neil. London/Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

 

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19 Jan 2010

Adrian Ivakhiv on Deleuze, Cinema, Time, and Ecophilosophy


posting by Corry Shores
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Adrian Ivakhiv on Deleuze, Cinema, Time, and Ecophilosophy

In his entry ecology, Deleuze/Tarkovsky, & the time-image at immanence, Adrian Ivakhiv has an original and exciting idea for applying Deleuze's cinema theories to ecophilosophy. [Adrian Ivakhiv is an Associate Professor of Environmental Thought and Culture at the University of Vermont, with a joint appointment in the Environmental Program and the Rubenstein School of Environment & Natural Resources. He is the author of Claiming Sacred Ground: Pilgrims and Politics at Glastonbury and Sedona, and his other publications are listed here.]

He gives three reasons for why Deleuze's cinema ideas should be interesting to ecophilosophy. His third reason regards time, and if I may, I would like to quote some passages. Ivakhiv writes:

The third reason has to do with time and our perception and understanding of it. One of the key insights of ecology is that everything comes from somewhere and goes somewhere -- everything is in motion between one state of matter/energy and another -- and when we treat something as a mere resource bank or waste disposal site, as a source or a sink, a "from" or an "away to," we relegate a subset of the circular or systemically interrelated processes that make up the self/world system to a shadowy "outside," hoping to forestall its return by a kind of freezing of time. We make a cut in time, but this cut is artificial, conceptual, and ultimately unsustainable; the "real" will return in one form or another.
[...]
Time, then, does not stand still, and as our society induces progressively quicker rates of change on and in the world, it also intensifies its efforts to stave off the changes that it sets into motion. We want to freeze property lines, national boundaries, and personal and group identities, to stop the aging of our bodies, to squeeze out as much productivity as we can from a dwindling resource base, and we want to do all that without facing the inevitable repercussions -- collapsing ecosystems, population movements, and the like -- that these all set into motion.
As an art form of time, cinema can help us arrive at a more adequate understanding of the nature of time. If Deleuze is correct and the production and dissemination of a "direct" image of time within cinema expands our capacity to conceive of our own and the world's temporality -- or, rather, expands our capacities for ethically inhabiting time, for thinking, feeling, and affectively being with others, for generating productive syntheses in the differential fabric of the world, for becoming -- then moving-image media hold great potential for our ability to understand and visualize the relationship between the world and ourselves in our common nature as time, duration, becoming, and change.
[...]
Understanding identity/subjectivity and its vicissitudes -- how subjectivity congeals under pressure, how it opens and escapes its own frames -- is part of the project whereby seven billion humans can come to a more workable accommodation with each other and with the other life forms we share the Earth with. To the extent that moving image media can generate viscerally felt images of the times of things -- things in production and in decay, in differentiation and in synthesis, things making up the unfolding materiality of the world, of identity and of relationality (in all their narratively spun forms), and the swift, dark flow of their vanishing -- to that extent cinema is a powerful tool for eco/geophilosophy. [Ivakhiv]

I have been wondering about how to apply Deleuze's ideas to environmental philosophy, and I never would have thought to start here. Ivakhiv has much more to say on this topic, and his entry is rich with links and video illustrations.






8 Apr 2009

Wilder than Chaos: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.8, subsection 7



Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter VIII: Wildness and Wilderness

Subsection 7

Wilder than Chaos



We are wild. Our DNA makes us that way. This has made us hunters as well as gatherers. We are omnivores. But how should we deal with our carnivoracity? It developed genetically over the course of two million years. So too did cultural adaptations to it.
In our DNA is the wildness that proscribes the limits of a workable physiology as well as a competent culture. Having been generated for over two million years, our wildness requires the taking of life and the eating of flesh of animals as well as fruits and seeds. Life feeds by death-dealing (and death-receiving). The way "out" of the dilemma is into it, a way pioneered for us in the play of sacred trophism, the gamble of sacramental gastronomy, central myths of gifts and chance, the religious context of eating in which the rules are knowing the wild forms who are the game -- and being part of the game. You cannot sit out the game except at the cost of health. (146a, emphasis mine)
Wild things have their unique niche. They evolved adaptations to it.

World religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, have spread. As they move into new cultural territory, they replace indigenous nature-religions. Wherever they go
earth shrines, sacred forests, springs, and other places with their wild inhabitants have vanished, replaced often with temples or churches. These "new" architectural structures, often built over an earth shrine and incorporating some of the "old" building materials within them, are often recognizably specific to a certain religion, demonstrating the portability and cosmopolitan nature of that particular religion. (146bc)
But could there be a world religion with a different sort of philosophical basis? Can we create a spiritual sensibility that is universal, because no matter where it is, it worships the earth, but which also is uniquely fitting to the given bioregion?

Religion scorned nature for reminding us of our fall. Physical science has picked up such an attitude, although in a secular form. Physics tries to find logical order in the world. But fluxions have a wild logic all their own.
nature is so complex that when a correlative of wildness was seen in fluid dynamics, the dismayed physicists cried "Chaos!" The fashionable topic of Chaos represents modern science's consternation with its attempt to "tame" the world: its one-factor approach cannot predict in a world of irreducible variables. Where today's molecules of vapor may be tomorrow at noon no one can say, but not because of the disorder associated with the word "chaos." The attempt to analyze by reduction merely opens an endless series of scales, or "fractal" horizons. It turns out that the closer you look at the edges of things the more they mimic the incredible diversity apparent without magnification. (146-147, emphasis mine)
[Nature is not chaotic in the sense of disorder. Nor is it even theoretically possible to sort through all the complexity to make absolutely precise determinations. This is not because nature's complexity is so great that we will never have the mathematical and technological means to understand it all. The problem is that nature has an infinity of scales of complexity. There is not a fundamental determinism that is covered-over by so many variables that we will never arrive upon it. No, the "problem" (or rather the magic) of nature is that there are infinite layers of determination. Nature is "over-determined". There are an infinity of interrelated and hierarchically scaled-variables, so we can never get to its bottom or see it from above. Nature obeys an ordered determinism. But there is so much of it, infinitely much determinism, that the sum total of its workings is chance. Chaos theory also assumes a deterministic framework. But for such theorists, the sheer complexity makes things seemingly random. However from Shepard's perspective, there is no a fundamental layer of order, and the random is not "seeming." The determinism is real, and chance is real. But chance is real in the sense of virtual. Infinitely-scaled determinism is virtually chance. It is wild chance. Not mathematically or statistically random, but wild.]
The error is comparable to thinking that a circle is really made up of a very large number of tiny straight lines that would be obvious if only we could magnify it enough. Naturalists knew all along that the world was not chaotic. As genetic mapping inches forward, sometime in the next century the resonance of the two ecologies -- the biome and the genome -- will be perceived as the key isthmus in the pursuit of human health. The physical sciences will have finally discovered what people already knew, probably for fifty thousand years, that nature cannot be simplified by looking closer and that isolated components have very little value in understanding or prediction. By showing that complexity has limitless dimensions, "the new mathematics of fractal geometry has brought hard science in tune with the peculiarly modern feeling for untamed, uncivilized, undomesticated nature," says James Gleick. (147b)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.



The Wild Within: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.8, subsection 6



Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter VIII: Wildness and Wilderness

Subsection 6

The Wild Within


Humans have domesticated many plant and animal species. But in many cases, their wild ancestors have become extinct. So we no longer can compare domestics to wilds in order to see which is which.

Yet many other species have been spared.
Wildness occurs in many places. It is composed of the denizens of wilderness -- eagles, moose, and their botanical coinhabitants and all of the species whose sexual assortment and genealogy have not been controlled or set adrift by human design or captivity. But it also includes those species who have been cohabitants with domestication -- house sparrows, cockroaches, and ourselves. (142c-d)
But domesticated species have undergone "bodily and behavioral degradation." They have been "bred to be passive and to have physical conformities that are 'babylike' and thus appeal to our protective instincts" and show "the destruction of wildness." (142d)

So we ask, what is the wild human? Shepard quotes Lévi-Strauss as saying that wild humans are not savages, rather, they are we ourselves: "mind in its untamed state as distinct from mind cultivated or domesticated for the purpose of yielding a return." (Savage Mind qt 143a) Wildness remains our "generating matrix."
The savage mind is ours! We may be deformed by our circumstances, like obese raccoons or crowded, demented rats, but as a species we have in us the call of the wild. (143b, emphasis mine)
The loss of wildness is the destruction of the other. We have made the wild our prey, but now we are prey to the deep destruction this has brought upon us.
The loss is usually spoken of in terms of ecosystems or the beauty of the world, but for humans, spiritually and psychologically, the true loss is internal. It is our otherness within. (143c)
According to Julia Kristeva, modern civilization's problem of otherness and the self finds its source in self-consciousness. There are two failed solutions:
1. We try transcending the problem by merging with the One or God through meditation, ascetic solitude, and renouncing the physical world: "nature is merely the illusion of a mistaken reality." (143d)
2. We see the world as a reflection of the self. This is the "new insanity" of Narcissus.
Our selfhoods were once intertwined with the landscapes around us. But then the ancient world discovered the psychic self, an internal life versus an outside. This isolated the self and "drove the mechanistic empiricism of the seventeenth century toward 'the conquest of the outside . . . the outside of nature, to be subjugated by science." (qt 144b)

We domesticate and strip nature of her otherness to us. Then we reintegrate this neutered world back into us.
We discovered that our own inner otherness -- fundamentally perceived as a reflection of the outer forms of life -- when bereft of wildness was no longer infinitely mysterious and beautiful and diverse. (144bc)
But consider the hunter. He must imitate the animal in order to hunt it. He turns within himself to find otherness. Within us is an alien aspect, which as well is the otherness of the wild. We are a part of nature's wildness, but we are not the whole. So nature is other to us in the sense that we are not her in her entirety. But she is within us, because we are a part of her.

Hence,
Domestication is a kind of alchemy whose animals reshape the character of people who have tamed them. Remembering that the opposite of wild is not civilized but domesticated, the best in ourselves is our wildness, nourished by the wild world. To be in a community with crops is to feel like a crop, to have the edges all dulled, our diversity muted. (145b)
Domestication has corrupted us. So too has nature-aesthetics. The corporate world cordoned off
parcels of wilderness that restrict the random play of genes, establish a dichotomy of places, and banish wild forms to enclaves where they may be encountered by audiences while the business of domesticating and denuding the planet proceeds. The savage DNA is being isolated and protected as esthetic relics, like the vestiges of tribal peoples.
My wildness, according to this agenda, can be experienced only on reservations called wilderness, but cannot be lived daily in ordinary life. (145c, emphasis mine)
But we should experience our wildness. Our selves grow by incorporating our natural surroundings into our personal identity.
To the indigenous people of the Australian outback the terrain is not a great three-dimensional space, not a landscape, but a pattern of connections lived out by walking between places and performing rites that link the individual in critical life stages to sacred places -- places that become part of an old story told, sung, and walked through over generations. To be so deeply engaged in place and myth is for most of us today a great hunger. (145d)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.



7 Apr 2009

Art Against Wild: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.8, subsection 5



Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter VIII: Wildness and Wilderness

Subsection 5

Art Against Wild



Is wilderness landscape?
In this sense wilderness becomes a series of scenes before which spectators pass as they would the galleries of a museum or a kind of scenery for souvenir photographs that we describe to ourselves in a language invented by art critics. (138c)
Western landscape painting began with 15th century perspective painters. But we see it in Neolithic art at the end of the Pleistocene era. Their small size gives the impression of things happening at a distance. The viewer seems detached from an objectified scene. People of this era must have begun to feel outside of nature. We see this much later in history too, in Roman mosaics and in Renaissance paintings that strive for "distancing."
It was the same classical rationality that made possible the lines of latitude and longitude and straight roads across North America, routes based on survey rather than old trails. (139b)
Our present attitudes about nature span back "into European and Mediterranean cultures and the ideology of their organized religions." There emerged a "linear/mathematical perspective and the representation of places framed as pictured objects." These factors "removed the observer rather than connecting him to his surroundings." In landscape art, we step back from nature. (139c)

Technical advances converted "the old two-dimensional, asynchronic world (in which different events in time can appear in the same picture) into the Renaissance eye-world composed of repeating units of space and time. (139d) Caravaggio isolated the moment, "the instant exposure in a temporal world of constant flux." (140a)

Landscape came most to be objectified and distanced in photography. (140c) Its makes the land surreal and isolates us from it temporally and spatially. They turn nature into nothing more than images.

The surrealism of photography confuses reality with fantasy. It is a schizophrenia resulting from "centuries of splitting art from its origins in religion." But
Wildness cannot be captured on film; wildness is what I kill and eat because I, too, am wild. (141b)
Around fifteen thousand years ago, art began simulating and representing nature for the sake of "narrative and mythic referral." It presented us with reality. But art developed away from this purpose. The "abstract characteristics of color, form, movement, symmetry, and line became reality."
In the end painting represents painting, and any object in nature, any scene or landscape (that is, any place), may be taken as an abstraction representing only brushstrokes, signs in which nothing is signified." (141d)
Art has abstracted nature. But this causes the masses of people not interested in art-critique to regard environmentalism to be an elitist endeavor.
Nature has been oversold for four centuries as an esthetic as opposed to religious experience. (142a)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

The Price We Pay to Hide the Wild: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.8, subsection 4



Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter VIII: Wildness and Wilderness

Subsection 4

The Price We Pay
to Hide the Wild


Our natural systems are coming undone. It's time we do away with the conception of the wilderness "as the last zoo, as an exalted, beautiful picture, as a precious, exotic landscape, or as a storehouse of tomorrow's resources." We measure our weakness against wildness. The strength of our technologies indicates our failures to survive in the wilderness. The wild is more than our therapeutic retreat. And our concern for nature is not altruism. It is survival.
Wild species, not an illuminated Nature, are the components of wilderness. Animals and plants are correlates of our inmost selves in a literal as well as metaphoric sense -- literal in the identity of their DNA and our capacity to analogize them as a society. (138a, emphasis mine)
But to become Pleistocene, we must hunt. How can that be meaningful now? If we set aside wilderness sanctuaries, we affirm the privatization of everything else.
The corporate enterprise in the use of the earth is not interested in either human or natural well-being. Its claims of altruism are made by hired publicists and its sole purpose is to convert the "resources" of the earth into money for its investors. The "trickle-down" benefit for the mass of humanity and for the order of nature is one of the great lies of our time. (138b)
Corporations have taken-over the moral worth of our land.


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.



We're Wild Inside: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.8, subsection 1





Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter VIII: Wildness and Wilderness

Subsection 1

We're Wild Inside


There is a difference between wildness and wilderness.
Wildness is a genetic state. Wilderness is a place we have dedicated to that wildness, both in ourselves and in other species. The home of our wildness is both etymologically and biologically wilderness. Although we define ourselves in terms of nationality, race, profession, and so on, it is evident that the context of our being in the past is wilderness -- to which, one might say, our genes look expectantly for those circumstances that are their optimal ambiance, a genetic expectation of our genome that is unfulfilled in the world we have created. (131b-c, emphasis mine)
We are currently developing technologies that will allow us some day to identify and perhaps eliminate deleterious genes from the human genome. We pursue this genetic research out of a drive for total health and perfect crops. However, "at a less conspicuous level this research is also defining the genetic basis and reality of the 'normal' or optimal human individual" (131d) [see Siep's article for further discussion.] Studies are showing that human traits we for long thought to be learned through culture and education are really inherited genetically.
At last we approach the hard truth: being human is heritable. (131d)
Even if we are born and raised in the wilderness, we still have all our human traits. So to what extent are we wild creatures?

Contemporary Western culture regards the wilderness as a beneficial realm of purification. It provides us "solace, naturalness, nearness to a kind of literary, spiritual esthetic, or to unspecified metaphysical forces, escape from urban stench, access to ruminative solitude, and locus of test, trial, and special visions." But all these valuations derive from prior traditions. Really we never left the wilderness.
True, wilderness is something we escape to, a departure into a kind of therapeutic land or sea, a release from our crowded and overbuilt environment, healing to those who sense the presence of the disease of tameness. We think of wilderness as a place, a vast uninhabited home of wild things. It is also another kind of place. It is that genetic aspect of ourselves that spatially occupies every body and every cell. To "go into" that wilderness is something we do constantly. We are immersed in it. Our consciousness and our culture buzz around it like tiny lights, not illuminating a great darkness but drawing energy that makes a self possible. (132c, emphasis mine)
To better grasp the nature of our wildness, we should contrast it with the concept of "domestication."
"Domestic" means a "breed" or "variety" created by the deliberate manipulation of a plant or animal population's reproduction by humans with a conscious objective. We ourselves are genetically wild rather than domesticated. (132c, emphasis mine)
We further distinguish "tame" from "domestic."
We are also tame, for almost any animal can be conditioned to accept the human environment, domestic or not. The tameness of captive wild animals is like our own tameness: it is conditioned to appropriate behavior in the household. Our tameness not our domestication, makes us at home in domesticated landscapes, in the sedentary life surrounded by household artifacts and the romance of the hearth and homestead, restraints in the interest of civic order that cloud the definition of "domestic." None of these affects the human genome and therefore it is wildness. (132-133, emphasis mine)
We are tamed. But that does not change our genes. They have retained their wild tendencies.

When we domesticate plants and animals through selective breeding, we also produce rapid genetic changes that exaggerates both selected traits and unintended ones as well. One gene might cause deleterious characteristics. Yet it might also be a part of a more complex web of interacting genes that function "like a safety net." For example, someone might have a gene bearing a recessive trait that makes him more prone to a certain disease. And yet he will be immune. For, other dominant genes protect him.

We have also selectively bred plants to bring out desired traits. Often this is done by pairing recessive genes. In doing so, the plant becomes less adaptable to its living conditions. We then need to compensate by taking extra care of the plant using artificial means. In other words, domesticating plants and animals weakens their genes and makes them more dependent on artificial human interventions.

We live in artificial structures that we designed and built for ourselves. But we also have selected certain plants to occupy our surroundings. We have chosen certain breeds of grasses and, grains. Even such 'weeds' as dandelions are "successional forms" of these chosen breeds. The human landscape seems durable. But this is an illusion. It is not in ecological equilibrium. Rather, it is an "ecological suppression caused by human and domestic animal pressures." (133bc) And yet, at the margins of the domesticated ecosystems are vegetation, microorganisms, insects, and animals that maintain their wildness. They do not need artificial support.
None is bound strictly to the mosaic of domestic plants and animals in order to survive in the way that domestic life forms are. (133c)
These domesticated landscapes cause us unease. We worry that such homogenization and artificiality threaten our well-being.
The radical implication is that we, like the other wild inhabitants, may actually be less healthy in the domesticated environments than in those wild landscapes to which our DNA remains tuned. (133d, emphasis mine)
We often find rural landscapes beautiful. This is probably because they "superficially resemble the savannas of our evolution." (133d)

But even these agrarian regions are not truly wild.
Our domesticated surroundings are human inventions -- the results of empirical technology over the past ten millennia and scientific technology during the past three hundred years. (134a)
But even though we have become accustomed to our domesticated surroundings, our human potential is better actualized in the wilderness where our wild genes belong, "where we are realized as mature individuals and communities of generous and peaceful character." (134b)

In fact, we cannot live without the wilderness.
Modern life conceals our inherent need for diverse, wild, natural communities, but it does not alter that need. (134b, emphasis mine)
So we become deprived of our essential need for wilderness. We see symptoms of that deprivation as the prevalence of psychic stress and social disorder. And we pretend that we do not need the wild. This is our "universal act of modern denial."

One mistaken belief about the human species is that we can survive even if our environment changes drastically. The dinosaurs could not. So they became extinct. But we are a "generalized" species that will outlast all the other ones that are too "specialized." (134c)

We delude ourselves in these ways. At the height of our self-deception is our belief that the human brain, "the magic means of our intelligence and mastery, is the instrument of our exception from the biology that has burdened and exterminated so many other species." (135cd)

But this very same human brain has "scarified" whatever new ecosystem it migrated into.
What was a good (and very highly specialized) brain for positioning a terrestrial primate in a Pleistocene niche is evidently maladapted for life in the throes of its own glut of people and barrenness of nature. (134d)
Thus we are not a generalized species: "human ontogeny -- the intricately structured, human life cycle -- is, like our central nervous systems, a delicately equilibrated biological complex." (134-135) We have for long thought ourselves to be universally adaptable to all environments. Really, we have adapted the environment to us, so to create ecological prosthetics that compensate for our genetic deficiencies. And doing so is not merely making the world more hospitable. Our alterations to the ecosystem now threaten to completely alter the ecological balance of the whole globe. The 21st century will probably bring us to the brinks of our adaptability. We will find that our bodies and minds can only adapt so much to a changing environment. But we will also learn that our culture is perfectly flexible to be able to adapt any which way it needs. What will guide these cultural changes will be the ways our cultural choices reward and punish us according to our "given natures." Our genome evolved as part of a very specific ecosystem, the African savanna. This genome kept us in its proper subsystem for three million years. It was only ten thousand years ago that culture really started to "evolve" away from our genome. During this agricultural revolution, we stopped being hunter-gathers and instead began the systematic husbandry of animals and plants. But although we domesticated many natural species, we spared ourselves from this genetic pruning. Homo sapiens has not evolved an "agrarian" genome. We are still hunters. We are still wild. So we can expect that if the modern form of our cultural heritage begins to threaten the species, we will return to a life more suitable to our genes.



Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

6 Apr 2009

A Wilderness of Chance: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.4, subsection 3




Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter IV: How the Mind Once Lived

Subsection 3

A Wilderness of Chance


Shepard now examines the complex mental processes involved in primitive foraging. The result of their interpenetration with the nonhuman world are such human accomplishments as toolmaking, intellectual sophistication, philosophy, and tradition. As Lévi Strauss writes: "in a world where diversity exceeds our mental capacity nothing is impossible in our capacity to become human." (57b)

On the one hand, civilized thought aims to simplify complexity rather than to clarify it. We unify, seek continuities, variabilities, and relativities rather than conceptualize new schemas. But this is precisely what primitive cultures attain.
the "civilized mind" attempts to simplify and level the world whereas the "savage mind" is not afraid to become enmeshed in its complexity. (57bc)
Rituals transcend the difference between real and imaginary. And yet, the way that primitive people conceptualize their world is nonetheless coherent and sophisticated. It is a "science of the concrete." And the world is seen as made-up of discontinuities. Lévi Strauss writes:
The manner in which primitive peoples conceptualize their world is not merely coherent but the very one demanded where objects are discontinuous and complex. (qt 59c, emphasis mine)
They treated plants and animals as "elements of a message."

For many prehistoric foragers, animals were the "principle actors in cosmology."
The human task was to discover social themes coded in nature and cataloged as taxonomy, told as stories and danced to the rhythms of animal-skin drums. (58a)
To hunt and gather, we need memory, which is directly related to brain size.
Memory becomes more important the bigger and more dangerous the game, the more helpless and far-traveled the gatherers. (58a)
Humans are naturally the prey to large animals, or at least we are their inferiors in the natural order of the wild. But we developed hunting abilities. Giant animals became our prey, and not the other way around. To hunt the great beasts, we needed to cooperate in a well-timed way. And this required planning. Primitive cultures must initiate and carry-on lengthy dialogues about how they will conduct the hunt. They continue the discussion throughout. And afterward their conversation reviews and assesses the events.
When tracking, the !Kung San note birdcalls and signs and discuss the spoor. Tracks tell the species, age, sex, speed, and physical condition of the animal and whether it was accompanied by other animals, what it was feeding on, and when it passed. Since tracks change over time, the !Kung San develop "their discriminating power to the highest degree," estimating how far ahead the animals are. The hunters read the dung and watch for bits of the foliage dropped from the animals' lips while eating. They appraise the size of a herd, whether it has been seeking shade, resting, or halting to feed. The stalking of a wounded animal opens new and repeated discussions and decisions. (58c-d)
At night, the hunters enter the wilderness of spirit.
During overnight stops the hunters observe specific taboos in a ritually heightened state. Access to the spirits by hunters -- ancestral, demonic, plant or animal -- is not unusual and can be undertaken in prayer, supplication, dream, trance, visionary disembodiment, and ecstatic flight to the other world. This spiritual state leads to a deeper insight into the meaning of the hunt, the chancy character of the game that may lead to a loss of the hunter's life, and the ethical implications of taking other lives. (58-59, emphasis mine)
Hunters are humble. They learn the fragility and spiritual value of all creature's lives.

Before and after the hunt, primitive people tell stories and conduct ritual ceremonies. This enhances the hunt's spiritual dimension. The hunters will hunt animals. To do so, they spiritually become animals.
Animal masks in rites give palpable expression to transitional states. On the body of a person the animal mask joins that which is otherwise separate -- not only representing human change but conceptualizing shared qualities -- so that unity in difference and difference in unity can be conceived as a pervasive truth. And some animals, by their shape or habit, such as foxes and frogs, are also boundary creatures who already signify the threshold world of human passages. In dance and song, bodies, painted and adorned, move to deep rhythms that bind the world and bring the human into mimetic participation with other beings and the truth of the multiplicity of all domains. (59bc)
José Ortega y Gasset describes human hunting. We enter inside the natural system.
Wind, light, temperature, ground-contour, minerals, vegetation, all play a part; they are not simply there, as they are for the tourist or the botanist, but rather they function, they act. (qt 59d)
And we learn about death from the animal we kill. So "we must seek his company" in the "subtle rite of the hunt." Gasset argues that hunters are our true fathers: "we realize our true heredity in the hunt." (60a)

Power is structured much differently in primitive cultures. It is less hierarchical and more fluid. What binds them socially are
the array of natural species about them. Animals and plants are regarded as centers, metaphors, and mentors of the different traits, skills, and roles of people. Insofar as they model diversity and the polythetic cosmos, the animals provide analogs to the multiplicity of stages and forms: the are interlocutors of change that is brought ceremonially into human consciousness. (60bc)
The forager's world is just as rich. It is full of "signs of a gifting cosmos, a realm of numerous alternatives and generous subsistence, not so much to be controlled by humans as to be understood and affirmed and joined." (60c) Hence forager's and hunters affirm chance.
The original chancy game of prey and predator, of eating or being eaten, takes on a more significant meaning in a gifting world where chance is still an element: the only question is when the gift will pass on. (60c, emphasis mine)
Recall Bateson's notion of metarandom variables. We are only limited parts of cybernetic ecosystems. So we can never understand the whole of its workings. There are always variables that vary other variables. We can never predict everything. So we must affirm chance. Or as Shepard writes:
Hunter/gatherers know nature well enough to appreciate how little they know of its complexity. They are engaged in a humble play of adventitious risk, which is hypostasized in gambling, a major leisure-time activity. Gambling is, after all, miniaturizing the game, depicting in the bodies of beasts, lounging or in repose, the ravishing mystery and fun of being a counterplayer, of moving and being moved in the excitement of the chase, the stillness of its sacred aftermath, and the joy of retelling. The great game of chance is elaborated in foragers' myths rich in the strangeness of life with its unexpected boons and encounters, its unanticipated penalties and rewards, not as arbitrary features of supernatural visits but as infinitely complex affiliations. (60-61, emphasis mine)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

We Creatures of Trees: Shepard, Coming Home to the Pleistocene, Ch.3, subsection 4





Paul Shepard

Coming Home to the Pleistocene

Chapter III: How We Once Lived

Subsection 4

We Creatures of Trees


Primitive cultures often use certain biological markers to indicate when the child is ready to take on adult roles and responsibilities. For example, when a child loses his milk teeth, that means he is ready to accompany adults to help forage for food.
The boy learns the rudiments of the hunter/tracker skills and the girl the intricacies of the digging stick and the subtleties of plant distribution. (42c)
Yet they are just at play. And they learn "a vast store of cultural information" by listing to hunting stories. And their playful explorations teach them how to identify countless plants and animals.

Children also are naturally in touch with the ecosystem.
Children at age six are typically anthropomorphic: they perceive other forms of animal life as motivated and feeling like themselves, which is the basis of kinship with the natural world. This feeling extends to plants as well. (42c)
Like other primates, we love trees. Hence they are perhaps the most important plants for our childhood.
They are on the one hand like great, protective, benign adults whose whispering and lightly percussive tremolo is like the humming of a kindly aunt or uncle. On the other hand trees structure space as though it were a labyrinthine underworld, where hiding is like survival itself. (42-43)
As well, dense forests have their "gothic side and smell of danger."

Before our species migrated to the savannas, we were creatures of the trees. "Its roots go much deeper into our past, as though the forest were part of our brain." (43c)


Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.