Showing posts with label Hatfield. Charles Hatfield. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hatfield. Charles Hatfield. Show all posts

17 Aug 2016

Hatfield (3) “The Art of Tensions”, ‘3. Single Image vs. Image-in-Sequence', summary


by Corry Shores

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[Central Entry Director]
[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]
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[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so I apologize for any distracting typos.]




Summary of

Charles Hatfield

“The Art of Tensions”

3. Single Image vs. Image-in-Sequence


Brief summary:
Comics begin as more or less continuous and coherent imagined sequences in the creators’ minds. This imagined sequence is then crafted by means of division and selection (and thus by omission) into a discrete series of less continuous fragments, constituted by the visual series of panels and called the ‘breakdown’. The reader, by means of closure, then reconstructs the story’s imagined sequence. This element of closure brings cohesion between panels and constructs an overall coherent imagined sequence. This process of construction can be relatively straightforward, especially when the creators make obvious and continuous transitions between panels within an overall coherent and consistent narrative. But the creators can also place challenges upon the reader’s ability to find closure by introducing discontinuities in the fabric of the presentation. For example, the images can insist on their own independence from one another on account of their individual traits that resist synthesis with the other panels, or this challenge to closure can come from an overall lack of obvious coherence in the overarching narrative sequence. This is the tension between single image vs. image-in-sequence. In cases where there is visual discontinuity, the dialogue can serve as a closure device, even when the dialogue itself is meandering or iconic.


Summary

Hatfield notes the importance of time in understanding comics and also in how comics narratives are structured. He defines breakdown as the process of producing and selecting images for a narrative sequence (which involves omitting certain ones).
Most definitions of comics stress the representation of time, that is, of temporal sequence, through multiple images in series. The process of dividing a narrative into such images — a process that necessarily entails omitting as well as including — can be called breakdown, a word derived from “breakdowns,” a term of art that refers to the rough drawings made in the process of planning out a comics story (Harvey, 14–15).
[Hatfield 135. Citing Harvey, R. C., The Art of the Funnies: An Aesthetic History (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1994).]
[We will need to think of the reverse process of the breakdown. So maybe the ideas is the following, but I am not sure. The breakdown would be the comics creator’s activity of taking the story as a whole (existing in her mind) and breaking it down into the fragments that make up the comics work. The reverse process is the reader starting with those fragments and building back up the story that started as whole in the creator’s mind. We discussed this when we examined chapter 3, on closure, in Scott McCloud’s Understanding Comics, in light of Wolfgang’s Iser’s text, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach.” Hatfield then makes a terminological distinction between sequence and series. But I am not sure that I grasp it well. Perhaps these are conventional terms in this field, but they seem conceptually almost identical to me. As far as I can tell, the “imagined sequence” is something that occurs in the imagination of either the creator or the reader, but the “visual series” is the breakdown (the set of more or less ordered panels). I am really not sure, but perhaps we use the word ‘sequence’ in this way because it might suggest more of the relatively continuous unfolding of the story, while ‘series’ somehow implies a linear arrangement of discrete parts. But I am not certain.]
The reverse process [of a breakdown], that of reading through such images and inferring connections between them, has been dubbed (borrowing from gestalt psychology) “closure” by McCloud, in keeping with the reader-response emphasis of his Understanding Comics. In fact “breakdown” and “closure” are complementary terms, both describing the relationship between sequence and series: the author’s task is to evoke an imagined sequence by creating a visual series (a breakdown), whereas the reader’s task is to translate the given series into a narrative sequence by achieving closure. Again, the reader’s role is crucial, and requires the invocation of learned competencies; the relationships between pictures are a matter of convention, not inherent connectedness.
(Hatfield 135, bracketed insertion is mine)
Hatfield first says that this process of closure can happen in an unproblematic way. He cites a scene from Julie Doucet’s “The Artist” where after stripping off her close, she begins cutting apart her body. [This story can be seen here, at what might be a webpage for one of Hatfield’s classes.] [Hatfield’s point with this demonstration might be that we use our normal pattern of closure at the beginning, where we imagine the motions that transpire between panels, but then we are committed to that pattern when we arrive at the end when she begins doing things we might not want to imagine. Or perhaps he is not talking about the gutter closures individually but rather about the ongoing construction of a whole story that we commit to at the beginning and must finish at the end, even if we do not like the way the story turns.]

[So this case of Doucet’s “The Artist” seems to be one where the closure operation is automatic and fluent.] But there are cases where closure can “require more active effort on the part of the reader” (135). Hatfield illustrates with a couple pages in Jason Lutes Jar of Fools, and he notes a few ways that the reader needs to expend more effort to achieve closure in this panel series. The first thing he notes is that it does not begin with an establishing shot. So spatially speaking, there is no initial sort of holistic view of the location. That comes only after four panels.
 photo Lutes. Jar of Fools.36_zpsmcvy5pkz.jpg
Hatfield describes this scene in the following way: “Lutes frames the entire day from Esther’s point of view, sticking close to the minutiae of her clockwork routine. The repeated use of close-ups throughout the sequence reinforces the repetitive yet discontinuous nature of her work” (135). [One point here Hatfield might be making is that closure may be more difficult to accomplish since the nature of her work is discontinuous, but I am not sure.] We see the repetitiveness in Ester’s mechanical repetition of the question, “Can I help you?” (135). Hatfield then notes a moment that presents a challenge for the reader to attain closure. When a customer offends Ester, we see her punching the customer in the face. At first, our process of closure might regard this as reality. But in the next panels we see that nothing has happened in reality, so we know retroactively that this was a dream. We might also notice that the panel border became rounded, which also suggests a switch to a different mode of reality. [Hatfield writes, “That she imagines this, but does not do it, is something the reader must figure out for herself: Lutes suggests this both by the unvarying rhythm of the sequence and by the subtle variation in panel bordering around the imagined punch (the latter a technique used previously by Lutes to set off dreams and memories — by this point the reader presumably knows the code).” But I was confused how the unvarying rhythm of the sequence would suggest there was a shift in modes of reality. Would not an invariance in the rhythm suggest a maintenance in the mode of reality? His point might be that the invariance tells us real time has been pacing as normal, while the punch action was a daydream superimposed on that steady flow of real time.]  So here is another case where achieving closure is not absolutely automatic, as it required the reader to do some revision: “Yet the moment comes as a shock nonetheless, due in part to the repeated use of a single, unvarying image — Esther’s taciturn face — to pace the sequence. We see her land a blow, yet nothing about her or around her changes to match this unexpected outburst. The reader must negotiate the larger context of Lutes’s narrative to make this key distinction” (136).

Hatfield then notes that this pattern continues to the next page, and he writes, “To follow this sequence, the reader must be mindful of Lutes’s previously established habits as a storyteller — his approach to panel bordering, his interpolations of dream and fantasy into mundane reality, and so on — and take an active part in constructing a flow of events from discontinuous images” (137).
 photo Lutes. Jar of Fools.37_zpsq2tqexbh.jpg
Hatfield then gives examples where “achieving closure can be quite difficult, as when images seem radically disjointed and verbal cues are scant.” The first example is from Spiegelman’s “drawn over two weeks while on the phone” [which can be seen again at Hatfield’s class site here.] [Hatfield’s point here seems to be that were it not for certain genre conventions or design elements that carry over from panel to panel, we would perhaps be unable to see this as a single comic. And in fact, the real continuity is simply the author’s playful irregularity.]
At times achieving closure can be quite difficult, as when images seem radically disjointed and verbal cues are scant. For example, Art Spiegelman’s wordless “drawn over two weeks while on the phone” (Raw 1) presents a series of disconnected panels with recurrent character types and situations but no narrative per se. Generic conventions — nods to film noir, for instance — are repeatedly invoked but without a linear rationale; motific repetition suggests at best a vague connection between otherwise disjunct panels. Certain characters and symbols are repeated: geometric symbols, for instance, which serve as pictographic dialogue, as decorative effects, and, in a droll reversal, even as characters. But the sought-for unity of the piece, finally, rests on the reader’s recognition of the author’s formal playfulness rather than on any coherent narrative. It takes much knowledge and careful attention to read Spiegelman’s series as a sequence.
(137)
Hatfield’s next point is that McCloud’s Understanding Comics may be missing one important closure device, namely the interaction between word and image. [Perhaps here he is referring to the shapes in the speech bubbles of Spiegelman’s “drawn over two weeks while on the phone” (again, viewable here). Even though we cannot discern any textual meaning to them, their common visual appearance lends some sense of continuity to the sequence.]
The tension between single image and image-in-series is bound up with other formal issues, and therefore hard to codify. McCloud’s Understanding Comics remains the strongest theoretical treatment (in English, that is) of comics sequencing; yet McCloud, perhaps because he does not consider visual/verbal interplay crucial to the form, neglects just | how much the interaction of image and word can inform, indeed enable, the reading of sequences. Verbal cues do help to bridge the gaps within a sequence, as seen in common transitional captions such as “Later” or “Meanwhile” (devices that have fallen from favor as readers become more versed in reading comics, just as title cards, fades, irises, and other such transitional devices fell from favor in cinema). In fact verbal continuity can impose structure on even the most radically disjointed series. Witness, for instance, Spiegelman’s oft-reprinted “Ace Hole, Midget Detective,” in which the hero’s nonstop narration (a spoof of hard-boiled fiction) serves to structure an otherwise nonlinear barrage of non sequiturs, visual gags, and stylistic swipes.
(137-138)
 
 photo Ace detective p.5_zpsm7owbt3f.jpg

 
 
Hatfield notes that one way closure is achieved is through the interplay of successive images [as with Doucet’s “The Artist” and perhaps the Jar of Fools sequence. Here, the continuity or rhythm of the panels facilitates the closure process.] Also, closure can be attained through the “interplay of different codes of signification: the verbal as well as the visual” (138) [as we saw with the Spiegelman examples. Here we had verbal codes of signification, in the balloons, which had either a visual or a genre sort of consistency, and the visual codes of signification, which may not have been obviously related to the dialogue but which had their own sort of associative logic.] [Now, recall McCloud’s categories of transition from chapter 3 of Understanding Comics, like moment-to-moment, action-to-action, and so on. Here McCloud does not include something like what Hatfield has in mind. I am not sure how to name it, but maybe something like, “dialogue-to-dialogue”.] But there is a certain sort of transition that does not fit within McCloud’s six types.
Verbal/visual interplay often muddies the pristine categories of transition that McCloud tries to establish in Understanding Comics (moment to moment, action to action, scene to scene, and so on). Words can smooth over transitions and unobtrusively establish a dramatic continuity that belies the discontinuity of the images.
(138)
[I think Hatfield’s point here with regard to McCloud’s transition types is that dialogue can serve as the coherence device in any of the six types. And thus we cannot clearly distinguish them. But I am not sure that this criticism lands so well, or perhaps I misunderstand it. I do not think that McCloud’s distinctions disallow for dialogue to assist the closure. Granted, the emphasis in each type is on the visual contents of the panel, almost as if dialogue is irrelevant to the classification. But perhaps the dialogue really is irrelevant to the classifications. The types are not classified on the basis of the closure mechanism, but rather on the type of change in each case. In other words, whether or not there is dialogue that bridges the panels should not matter in his classification system. Hatfield’s point might still be that for example the non-sequitur type, where there is no visual coherence, is not really a non-sequitur, when for example the dialogue bridges the visual incongruities. However, there is no category in McCloud’s system for when panel transitions are visually discontinuous but textually continuous. And thus, as Hatfield observes, McCloud misses the importance of the interplay between text and image in this classification system.]
 
To show how “Words can smooth over transitions and unobtrusively establish a dramatic continuity that belies the discontinuity of the images,” Hatfield will contrast Harvey Pekar’s (and Robert Crumb’s) “The Harvey Pekar Name Story” and “Hypothetical Quandary”. [I might be mistaken, but Hatfield’s procedure seems to be the following. First he shows a case where visually the closure is achieved quite easily, because the panels are all quite similar. This also has the effect of allowing us to focus on the text. Then Hatfield shows an example where the monologue is similarly continuous, but the image sequence lacks an overall sense of a unifying element to give it closure (although I would note that there seems to be a temporal continuity implied in the visual sequence that gives it its own coherence). So now we recall the first two kinds of tension. In section 2 we discussed code vs. code tension. Here we noted that pictorial codes and textual codes can have a tense interplay of some sort. This is especially obvious when pictures or icons are used in dialogue bubbles. Then in this section we have discussed single image vs. image-in-series tension. I am not sure I follow what that tension is, but I think it might be the tension between the individuality and conceptual independence of each panel with the fact that it inevitably becomes a participating unit in a larger sequential structure. Now Hatfield says that there is another tension between these two layers of tension. I suppose the idea is that there is a tension between image and image-in-series resulting from the discontinuity of the panels, and there is also somehow a tension between codes, but I do not know what that is. It might be the relative discontinuity of Pekar’s discourse, which explores “all the twists and turns of Harvey’s thinking”. So now there is a tension between these tensions. (I am not sure at this point why we need the concept of tension. I guess we use it because it both implies a bond while also suggesting a non-reducibility of the bonded things, as they act in resistance to one another. But I am not sure why we are not simply using the term “relation”. The “tense” element only seems to come to light in the exceptional cases that Hatfield gives rather than being obvious in most cases. I think the idea is that we see it in these exception cases where it is obvious, and then we can better detect it in the normal cases, where it is less apparent but still an important factor.)]
Propelled as much by Pekar’s text as by the subtle authority of Crumb’s pictures, “Hypothetical Quandary” moves Harvey (and the reader) over a great distance, telescoping his Sunday morning expedition into three pages. Like the above example from Lutes’s Jar of Fools, this story relies on words as well as common visual cues for its pacing. Driving, walking, buying bread, walking again — all of these happen while Harvey’s internal dialogue carries on without interruption, until the last two panels find him savoring the bread’s fresh smell, his quandary forgotten. The continuity of the verbal text disguises the discontinuity of the visual: Pekar’s ongoing words, exploring all the twists and turns of Harvey’s thinking, elide the gaps in the visual sequence, making this stylized evocation of his world seem naturalistic and unforced. Whereas “The Harvey Pekar Name Story” weds the author’s text to deliberately repetitive breakdowns and a single, static composition, “Hypothetical Quandary” uses text to carry the reader from one locale to the next without ever losing continuity of thought. These contrasting examples point up the possibility that breakdown may depend on mixing the verbal and the visual. Thus the two tensions named so far, code vs. code and single image vs. image-in-series, interact to create a yet more complex tension, soliciting the reader’s active efforts at resolution.
(139)

 photo Pekar. American Splendor 2. Name Story.p1_zpsmtm7ncxm.jpg

 photo Pekar. American Splendor 9. Hypothetical.p3_zpsqdtg8ije.jpg




From:

Hatfield, Charles. “The Art of Tensions.” In A Comics Studies Reader, pp.132–148. Edited by Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi,  2009.


Image sources:

Lutes, Jason. Jar of Fools.  ©1997 Jason Lutes. Montreal: Black Eye Books [Originally published 1994 Penny Dreadful Press.]

Pekar, Harvey. “The Harvey Pekar Name Story.” In American Splendor #2. ©1977 Harvey Pekar.

Pekar, Harvey. “Hypothetical Quandary” In American Splendor #9. ©1984 Harvey Pekar.
 
Spiegelman, Art. “Ace Hole: Midget Detective.” ©1974 Art Spiegelman. In Breakdowns: Portrait of the Artist as a Young %@$*! ©2008 Art Spiegelman. Penguin.



Hatfield (2) “The Art of Tensions”, ‘2. Pictographic Language’, summary

 

by Corry Shores

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Director]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

[Graphic Literature, Entry Directory]

[Charles Hatfield, entry directory]

[Hatfield’s “The Art of Tensions” entry directory]

 

 

[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so I apologize for any distracting typos.]

 

 

Summary of

 

Charles Hatfield

 

“The Art of Tensions”

 

2. Pictographic Language

 

 

 

Brief summary:

The tension between words and text can appear even when there is no text. First, we suppose that we regard as symbols all elements of the comics work that serve a referential function, including images that refer or represent by means of resemblance. Symbols that show are ones that represent by means of resemblance, and symbols that tell are ones that represent by means of convention. Next, consider comics where the dialogue balloons contain pictures or icons rather than text. Here there is a tension between the contents of the balloons being both symbols that show and symbols that tell, despite the fact that these two functions cannot be reduced to one another.

 

 

 

Summary

 

[Previously we saw that there is a tension in comics between word and image, because in some sense they can be distinguished but in another sense the basis of the distinction is called into question through the interplay of these distinguished things.] [We might think that the tension between image and text can only occur when there is text. However,] “Comics can exploit the tension between picturing and writing without incorporating words per se, as the growing body of ‘mute’ or ‘pantomime’ (that is, wordless) comics attests” (133). Instead of text, these wordless comics can have “diagrammatic symbols, such as panels, speed or vector lines, and ideograms, to gloss or reinforce what’s going on in the pictures” (133). Also, the material inside word balloons can have icons instead of words (134).

Hatfield gives the example of Eric Cartier’s Flip in Paradise. Here Flip is negotiating a drug deal. Hatfield notes how balloons, by showing a decreasing amount of money, suggests haggling. Then, as the drugs take effect, the balloons crowd together and their icons’ relevance becomes hard to discern, suggesting he is losing his ability to think and communicate coherently.

 photo deal scene_zpsloutjgyv.jpg

Later Flip is teaching a parrot some words, but as we see, he is actually teaching the bird about killing and cooking it.

 photo parrot scene_zpsrvi7ygbe.jpg

In this way, “Cartier makes ingenious use of such visual symbols to dramatize Flip’s struggles to communicate in strange lands” (Hatfield 134).

 

Hatfield notes that the pictures in the balloons can be more generic than the drawing style outside the bubbles, or they can be the same style. He cites some examples in François Avril’s and Phillipe Petit-Roulet’s Soirs de Paris, in the story “63 Rue de a Grange aux Belles,” where “elaborate pictograms [...] capture the conversations taking place at a cocktail party” (134). Hatfield then notes the range of types of pictures that appear in the balloons. There is a man who asks a number of women to dance, and in each case there are the same simple icons to show the man’s request and the woman’s subsequent rejection (134).

 photo Pairis Soirees.3.1-3_zpsadqopv1u.jpg

Or the balloon contents can appear almost exactly like they do visually in the scenes, “as when a would-be Romeo uses a series of balloons to itemize a woman’s attractive features: her eyes, breasts, legs, and so on” (134).

 photo Pairis Soirees.2_zpsreyh00fw.jpg

And also in another case, when people are discussing paintings, we see images of the works they are discussing.

 photo Pairis Soirees.8.3-4_zps2lxgflfb.jpg

Hatfield explains, “Such examples suggest that visual/verbal tension is not necessarily even a matter of playing words against pictures; it may be a matter of playing symbols against other symbols” (134). [I do not find this part absolutely clear. Some of the examples in “63 Rue de a Grange aux Belles” do not seem to me to be so obviously symbols, especially for example the paintings, because their referential function seems to be one of resemblance. Hatfield will clarify this terminology in the next section, so let us move to it.]

 

[In this next paragraph, I have the impression that Hatfield is considering all visual givens in the comics work that have a referential function as being a symbol. Then, there are symbols that are supposed to show us what is really supposed to be there in the story’s world (available for the characters to experience), and there are symbols that tell us things about what is going on in the situations. (But I am not sure that I fully grasp the correspondence between diegetic and non-diegetic with image and text. I suppose thought bubbles are non-diegetic, because the characters do not actually see those symbols floating in the air, even though the dialogue is apparent to the characters and not just to the reader.) Hatfield then says that normally symbols that show are more or less representational drawings, while symbols that tell are “words, balloons, and a few familiar icons” (134). It also seems that he is locating the tension between image and text between these two types of symbols, with images being symbols that show and text being images that tell. He then says that the difference between these two types of symbols can be blurred when we use symbols that show to function as symbols that tell, as in the examples above. Now, symbols that show use one sort of code of signification (which I suppose is reference by means of resemblance) and symbols that tell use another code of signification (which I suppose is reference by means of convention). This means that this tension that can arise between the two “may be characterized as the clash and collaboration of different codes of signification.]

Such visual/verbal tension results from the juxtaposition of symbols that function diegetically and symbols that function non-diegetically — that is, the mingling of symbols that “show” and symbols that “tell.” More precisely, we may say that symbols that show are symbols that purport to depict, in a literal way, figures and objects in the imagined world of the comic, while symbols that tell are those that offer a kind of diacritical commentary on the images, or (to use another rough metaphor) a “soundtrack” for the images. In most comics, the symbols that show are representational drawings while the symbols that tell are words, balloons, and a few familiar icons. (These icons are nonalphabetic symbols of a sort that many word processors now make available to writers: arrows, dotted lines, lightbulbs, stars, and so forth.) But the potential exists for comics creators to push this tension much further, even to incorporate representational drawings as “dialogue” and to blur the difference between alphabetic symbols and pictures. At its broadest level, then, what we call visual/verbal tension may be characterized as the clash and collaboration of different codes of signification, whether or not written words are used. Again, the deployment of such devices assumes a knowing reader.

(Hatfield 134)

 

 

 

From:

Hatfield, Charles. “The Art of Tensions.” In A Comics Studies Reader, pp.132–148. Edited by Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi,  2009.

 

 

Image sources:

Cartier, Eric. Flip in Paradise. Paris: Rackham, 1990.

Avril, François and Phillipe Petit-Roulet. “63 Rue de a Grange aux Belles”. In Paris Soirees [English translation of: Soirs de Paris]. ©2012 Humanoides. Los Angeles.

 

 

.

Hatfield (1) “The Art of Tensions”, ‘1. Code vs. Code’, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Director]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

[Graphic Literature, Entry Directory]

[Charles Hatfield, entry directory]

[Hatfield’s “The Art of Tensions” entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so I apologize for any distracting typos.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Charles Hatfield

 

“The Art of Tensions”

 

1. Code vs. Code

 

 

 

Brief summary:

Comics contain both image and text. It is hard to distinguish the one from the other. For, whenever we think we may have designated some element of a comics work as a word, we find it can also function as an image, especially to the degree that is written pictorially or at least serves some pictorial function or has some sensory effect. And likewise, any instance of an image will involve some system or operation of reference whenever that image is perceived in a thoughtful way. For this reason, we cannot follow other comics scholars who deem there to be an absolute distinction between word and image, and we thus cannot go the extra step and characterize pictures by the immediacy by which they communicate information and text by the need for that information to be mediated through learned, culturally-conditioned conventions. But instead of this circumstance leading us either to try to dissolve the distinction or to define image and text on the basis of how elements function (and thus to say for example that one same element is text insofar as it functions referentially and an image insofar as it functions sensory-affectively) we will instead in a deconstructive sort of way make use of the tension between the distinguished terms in a manner that both maintains the distinction while as well seeing how the distinguished concepts play off of one another in ways that call into question the basis for that very same distinction that enables the interplay.

 

 

 

Summary

 

When comics are defined, often there is some appeal to the “co-presence and interplay of image and written text” (133). Hatfield says that for some critics the elements of word and image are opposites and their interaction is a clash of sorts, with “the image’s transparency versus the written text’s complexity” (133). Hatfield cites Scott McCloud as someone who insists not only on the difference of these two elements, but also on the greater importance of images – which he understands as “received information” that is obtained passively by the reader – over words, whose meanings “must be perceived” in a more active way through “committed reading” (Hatfield 133, citing McCloud, Understanding Comics, 49) [McCloud writes: “Pictures are received information. We need no formal education to ‘get the message.’ The message is instantaneous. [...] Writing is perceived information. It takes time and specialized knowledge to decode the abstract symbols of language.” It seems Hatfield will take issue with how this distinction is made here. The basis of Hatfield’s argumentation seems to be that in most cases when we see an image, we obtain the information by means of some mediation through cultural values and through habits of interpretation and so on. Perhaps even it can be said that the ways our minds organize our raw sense perceptions is in certain ways culturally conditioned. His argument against McCloud’s view of text seems to be based on text always taking some stylized visual form or another, often times with that stylization having pictorial qualities and functions. If I might suggest an example, simply italicizing a word gives it a different sound in one’s mind while being read, and certainly much more drastic pictorial variations can be found in comics to even greater sensory effect.]  Hatfield then assesses, “By this argument, comics depend on a dialectic between what is easily understood and what is less easily understood; pictures are open, easy, and solicitous, while words are coded, abstract, and remote” (133).

 

Hatfield view is not the same as this. He notes that “in comics word and image approach each other;” for, “words can be visually inflected, reading as pictures, while pictures can become as abstract and symbolic as words. In brief, the written text can function like images, and images like written text” (133). [At this point I wonder what the basis of the distinction between text and image is. One way to make the distinction is by function. Under this view, insofar as something is functioning as text, it is text, and insofar as it is functioning as image, it is image. With this in mind, one same thing performing both functions could be called by both names. Hatfield’s distinction does not seem to be based on function, since one thing can perform the other’s function. In other words, my confusion comes from the fact that Hatfield first designates something as a word, then says it can function as an image. What I would like to now is on what basis was it originally classified as a word, if we are saying that it is functioning like an image? Perhaps he is saying that certain things in comics can have a primary function but a secondary one as well, and in that way for example text can function as pictures. So for instance, if a sound word like “zap” is drawn to make it appear like electricity, then it primarily functions as a word for the sound that is being made, and secondarily it functions as a picture to evoke in our imagination physical sorts of features of the sound (like harsh, rough buzzing ‘edges’ to the noise) or visual correlates to the sound, like sparks of light flashing erratically in concord with pops or snaps in the sound. Phenomenologically speaking, for me text and image experiences never really blend, although they can coincide or interchange. So were I to see for example the image-like “zap” word, the part of my consciousness that would decode it as being a linguistic signifier is different than the part of my consciousness that would picture the scene and its sounds as having certain tangible features to it. I notice this experiential division sometimes when I see contemporary paintings with a poetic sort of text painted into them. Were it just imagery, I would experience it in a singular sort of way. But with the text in it, I switch between modes of reception, and I often find the experience a bit confusing.] Hatfield says that comics “collapse the word/image dichotomy,” because written text can be made visually “quite elaborate in appearance, forcing recognition of pictorial and material qualities that can be freighted with meaning,” while images on the other hand “can be simplified and codified to function as a language” (133). Hatfield says that this “renders McCloud’s larger argument incoherent, as it belies his earlier distinction between perceived and received information” (133). [I am not sure if I follow, but I think Hatfield is saying that if we take it to be true that there is no substantial distinction between word and image, as one can take the other’s function, then McCloud’s point about the experience of one involving receiving information and the other involving perceiving information no longer holds. For, each case could involve both receiving or perceiving information. But I am assuming Hatfield is not saying that McCloud’s argument itself is incoherent. I do not think McCloud contradicts himself. As far as I can tell so far, McCloud’s view is only incoherent with other views that oppose his. It would be incoherent in itself if McCloud on the one hand said there was a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between word and text and on the other hand said that this difference dissolves in many cases. I think perhaps the criticism here is that McCloud is offering a theory to explain the way certain elements in comics work, but further examination shows his theoretical assumptions to contradict many other obvious findings. The problem we might raise with this criticism is that we have not considered how McCloud might defend his position in the face of this evidence that he did not consider in his book. Would he concede the point? Would he maintain the distinction but with reservations? Would he find fault with these other findings?  Here is McCloud’s graphic for the distinction:

 photo McCloud. Understanding. p49.3_zpsukhxxyes.jpg

On the one hand, he does have a dotted line clearly separating image from text. However, the instances are placed along a continuum of variation. And he writes “received” and “perceived” not at the centers of each division, but rather at the poles. That fact combined with the way the instances seem to vary more or less continuously from one pole to the other suggests that as we get to the middle, either there is a mix of receptivity and perceptivity, with both in full operation but simultaneous, or there is an equal diminishment of both factors. In other words, it is not so obvious to me that McCloud is making an absolute distinction. But I personally would not construct the spectrum the way McCloud does, because I would be more inclined to place sensory-affectivity at the left pole and conceptualization at the right.] Hatfield’s next point seems to be that there is compelling reason to think that there is not this division between word and text. One thing he cites is Perry Nodelman’s point that [if I understand correctly] the only way we could “read” the pictures in picture books is if we have some linguistic sort of cultural knowledge that is requisite to decipher the images. [Let me quote this, as I probably misinterpreted: “The distinction does not hold in any case, for, as Perry Nodelman points out with regard to picture books, “All visual images, even the most apparently representational ones, . . . require a knowledge of learned competencies and cultural assumptions before they can be rightly understood” (Hatfield 133, citing p.17 of Nodelman, Perry, Words About Pictures: The Narrative Art of Children’s Picture Books (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988). Hatfield’s next point seems to be giving reason to think that images are really signs. So perhaps this sentence we just quoted was making the point that signs are really images. But I am not sure really, because I have not had a chance to read this source yet.] And images, according to W.J.T Mitchell, are signs that pretend not to be signs, even though they can never stop being such, because they are bound up with habit and convention just as text are (133). [So the idea here seems to be that whatever is bound up with habit and convention would have to be a sign, which makes sense, as it would be a mediated significance rather than an immediate sort that McCloud seems to think images have. Now, since there are no experiences of images that give their sense immediately in this way, but rather they require the mediation of habit and convention, images must also be understood as signs. Again, I am still a little confused about the criteria for the terminology. If we say that an image is also a sign, because the image has the function of a sign, that on what basis do we say it was an image in the first place? I wonder if Hatfield is saying that there is no need for the terminological distinction between word and sign. Whatever we call a word we can also call as sign, and vice versa, or we could find a word to mean both. So one possibility I think is to say we have visual data that no matter what will serve to a lesser or greater degree both a significatory and a sensory-affective function. But, we can arbitrarily think of it as a word when we are concerned with its signification or we can just as arbitrarily think of it as an image when we are concerned with sensory-affectivity. Another possibility could be to say that there is no difference between these functions. Whenever our senses are affected in a purely sensory way, they are in one way or another serving as signifiers, and likewise, whenever we take something to stand referentially for something else, we are performing a sensory sort of operation, perhaps like how David Hume understood concepts as habits of associating retained sensory impressions.] In other words, as Hatfield summarizes, “Pictures are not simply to be received; they must be decoded” (133).

 

[In the next paragraph I think it begins to become more evident what mode of reasoning Hatfield is using for this distinction. I think it might be a sort of deconstructive approach in some sense. On the one hand, he needs the distinction (between word and text in comics) in order for there to be a play of opposition between them (but I am not yet sure why that play is needed). On the other hand, the nature of that play, which challenges boundaries, affirms ambiguities and ambivalences, inverts hierarchies, and so on, calls into question the rigidity and integrity of the distinction. In other words, he needs there to be “tension” for the play to operate, so the distinction must hold in some sense. However, the result of this play presents a challenge to the very basis of the distinction that is supposedly responsible for that tension in the first place. Logically speaking this seems to be some sort of a notion of undecidability. Whether some given in a comics work is an image or a text is something undecidable. It is not strictly both or neither, nor is it strictly one or the other. Whatever it is cannot for some reason be decided. I am not sure why, but perhaps it is because sometimes it functions exclusively one way, other times exclusively another, and any effort to pin it down at one pole of functioning will only make it squirm off to the opposite pole, in a sense. Or perhaps it functions exclusively one way but thereby somehow as well must function exclusively the other way, in some paradoxical operation that I am unable to conceive. My own personal view, which I mentioned before, is that the same given can have either function depending phenomenologically on how they operate in our consciousness, and when both operations are somehow at work at the same time, there would have to be a divided but simultaneous consciousness of both operations, or perhaps a rapid interchange between them. The idea of our consciousness having one operation that accomplishes two very different tasks, namely, on the one hand taking something to stand for another thing while on the other hand doing nothing more than simply registering the sensory features of something, is hard for me to conceive or to find in my own experiences. How can one operation of consciousness accomplish both tasks? I can only think for example of Deleuze’s notion of pre-linguistic signalytic material, which is somehow both purely sensory and yet the basis on which significance is built. In other words, we can have sensory-affective experiences that are not linguistic in any way, but we sense differences that make a difference and thus we have a prelinguistic sort of sign or bare significance. But my phenomenological approach is not relevant here. So let us stick with Hatfield’s text:]

Still, responding to comics often depends on recognizing word and image as two “different” types of sign, whose implications can be played against each other — to gloss, to illustrate, to contradict or complicate or ironize the other. While the word/image dichotomy may be false or oversimple, learned assumptions about these different codes — written and pictorial — still exert a strong centripetal pull on the reading experience. We continue to distinguish between the function of words and the function of images, despite the fact that comics continually work to destabilize this very distinction. This tension between codes is fundamental to the art form.

(Hatfield 133)

 

 

 

From:

Hatfield, Charles. “The Art of Tensions.” In A Comics Studies Reader, pp.132–148. Edited by Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi,  2009.

 

Or if otherwise noted:

McCloud, Scott. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. Northampton, Mass.: Kitchen Sink Press, 1993.

 

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15 Aug 2016

Hatfield (0) “The Art of Tensions”, ‘[introductory material]’, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

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[The following is summary. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so I apologize for any distracting typos.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Charles Hatfield

 

“The Art of Tensions”

 

[introductory material]

 

 

Brief summary:

Comics are a complex medium or art form, because they have a heterogeneous form capable of communicating a plurality of interacting messages or codes. Hatfield will take a reader-response approach and discuss four fundamental tensions that are important to consider when examining comics in this way, namely, the tensions between {1} codes of signification, {2} single image and the image-in-series, {3} narrative sequence and page surface, and {4} reading-as-experience and the text as material object.

 

 

 

Summary

 

Hatfield opens his article by saying that if we regard comics to be simple and transparent, that is, “rhetorically constructed as ‘easy’,” then comics criticism will “remain at an impasse." Rather, comics are hardly simple, since they are a complex communicative medium capable of conveying “a plurality of messages,” and also, they “are heterogeneous in form, involving the co-presence and interaction of various codes” (132). [What is interesting then is that Hatfield’s concern will be phenomenological in a sense, as he writes:] “To the already daunting (and controversial) issue of reading, then, we must add several new complexities, if we are to understand what happens when we read comics” (132).

 

Hatfield claims that comics’ great strength is that “comic art is composed of several kinds of tension, in which various ways of reading – various interpretive options and potentialities – must be played against each other” (132). Given this complexity, when reading comics, we should “call upon different reading strategies, or interpretative schema” than what we would use when simply reading conventional textual media (132).

 

Hatfield then outlines the reader-response approach he well take:

The balance of this chapter will engage the fundamental tensions within comics, with emphasis on the kinds of judgment (or suspension of judgment) they demand of readers. I shall concentrate on questions of reader response, in the sense of participation and interpretation, rather than those underlying questions of reading process that properly belong to empirical study (for example, eye movement, working memory, or graphophonic competence). My aim is not to set forth an empirical model of comics reading but rather to establish the complexity of the form by broadly discussing the kinds of mixed messages it sends even to the most experienced of readers. This discussion will serve as a prospectus for the collective task of theorizing reader response in comics in a more general way.

(132)

 

There are four tensions that are of particular importance in such a reader-response theorizing on comics:

{1} the tension between codes of signification,

{2} the tension between single image and the image-in-series,

{3} the tension between narrative sequence and page surface, and

{4} the tension between reading-as-experience and the text as material object.

(Hatfield 132, partly quotational)

To illustrate and discuss these tensions, Hatfield will draw from a wide range of examples (132).

 

 

From:

Hatfield, Charles. “The Art of Tensions.” In A Comics Studies Reader, pp.132–148. Edited by Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi,  2009.

 

.

Hatfield, ‘The Art of Tensions’, entry directory

 

by Corry Shores

 

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Entry Directory for

 

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“The Art of Tensions”

 

0. [introductory material]

 

1. Code vs. Code

 

2. Pictographic Language

 

3. Single Image vs. Image-in-Sequence

 

 

 

 

Hatfield, Charles. “The Art of Tensions.” In A Comics Studies Reader, pp.132–148. Edited by Jeet Heer and Kent Worcester. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi,  2009.

 

Charles Hatfield, entry directory

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[[Central Entry Director]

[Literature, Drama, and Poetry, Entry Directory]

[Graphic Literature, Entry Directory]

 

 

 

Entry Directory for

 

Charles Hatfield

 

hatfield. graphicnarratvives.org .. charles-hatfield

(Image source: Comics and Graphic Narratives)

 

 

 

“The Art of Tensions”

 

Hatfield, ‘The Art of Tensions’, entry directory

 

 

 

 

 

Image credits:

https://graphicnarratives.org/charles-hatfield/